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ABSTRACT 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 had a significant impact upon how governments 
counter terrorism. The UK introduced and implemented an array of measures, each taking a 
pre-emptive and preventative approach, to tackle terrorism. The change in counter-terrorism 
law and policy post-9/11 has, as this thesis will show, increasingly become reliant upon fear-
based risk and uncertainty rather than evidence-based guilt.  
This thesis will examine some of those UK measures used post-9/11, which were seen as 
some of the more controversial measures. When analysing each measure there will be an 
assessment of the human rights issues associated with those measures, specifically under 
Article’s 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The assessment of these 
rights with each measure will provide a legal understanding of the wider academic and legal 
implication of those measures, these include the right to a fair trial. 
Having assessed the human rights implications of each measure, a risk assessment is 
undertaken. This enables further analysis of each measure and holistically identifies the wider 
risk implications of such counter terrorism measures. Such risks may include negative 
perceptions of the police, the UK or provide indirect support for the radicalisation of new 
terrorists.  
This process is developed within the thesis and becomes known as the ‘tri-relationship'.  
Throughout, the measures examined will be seen to erode those human rights principles 
ordinarily guaranteed by the criminal justice system, for example liberty. Instead, the 
measures give way to a new counter-terrorism justice system which has become increasingly 
normalised by the measures introduced and accepted by the courts. This is despite the 
implications on human rights and risks involved. This thesis will show that the measures 
introduced by the UK to achieve securitization, fail to achieve the long-term protective aims 
of the UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve 
neither Liberty nor Safety".  
– Benjamin Franklin1 
 
The September 11 terrorist attacks (henceforth '9/11') have significantly changed the attitude 
of many on how to deal with counter-terrorism, none more so than the United States of 
America for whom it became a 'sudden realization of the threat' (Weisburd et al, 2010:725).2 
9/11 subsequently resulted in prolonged debate on how best to tackle terrorism; the then 
United States President George W. Bush argued that "if we wait for threats to fully 
materialize, we will have waited too long...we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupts his 
plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge".3 Similarly, the former British 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair MP, maintained that the Government was desperate to avoid 
situations where people could say "if you’d only been vigilant as you should have been, we 
could have averted a terrorist attack".4 This discourse paved the way to adopting a stronger 
strategy of pre-emption and prevention in both countries. This thesis will concentrate 
primarily on the manifestations of that strategy in the UK through its measures to tackle 
terrorism. 
 
Pre-9/11 the then Labour UK Government (henceforth ‘the former Labour UK Government’) 
had completed its assessment of UK terrorism laws and policies shortly after it came to 
power in 1997. As a result, it introduced the Terrorism Act ('TA') 2000 which was intended 
to be the consolidation of all UK terrorism laws; it was to provide an established regime 
which would stop the government and parliamentary cycle of introducing emergency laws 
following a recent terrorist atrocity (Walker, 2006: 1142). The introduction of the TA 2000, 
one may argue, signified a turning point for the UK generally when the former Labour UK 
Governments’ decision to: become more intrusive into the lives of citizens and affect their 
                                                          
1 Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin 'The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda' (University of 
California Press 2007) 419. 
2 David Weisburd, Badi Hasisi, Tal Jonathan and Gali Aviv (2010) 'Terrorist threats and police performance: a 
study of Israeli communities' 50(4) British Journal of Criminology, 725-747. 
3 Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering (2009) 'Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in 
the ‘War on Terror’' 49 British Journal of Criminology, 628-645, 630. 
4 McCulloch and Pickering (fn 3) 632. Also see Frederick John Desroches 'Policing in the Post 9/11 Era' 2005 
Research and Evaluation Branch (Royal Canadian Mounted Police). 
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day-to-day activities more profoundly; and empowerment of the state at times of national 
emergency. However, the TA 2000 faced its first challenge when the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
occurred and was considered, by the former Labour UK Government, to be insufficient to 
deal with the new terrorist threat. Thus the perception arose that the UK was required to re-
shape its counter-terrorism strategies, moving towards a trend of pre-emptive security that 
was already spreading in Western countries5 (Agamben, 2005; Dershowitz, 2006; Ericson, 
2007). The former Labour UK Government enacted more counter-terrorism legislation and 
provisions to support the TA 2000, starting with the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
('ATCSA') 2001, then the Prevention of Terrorism Act ('PTA') 2005 and the Terrorism Act 
('TA') 2006. This thesis will focus on some of the more controversial aspects of UK counter-
terrorism measures used post-9/11. Specifically these are: 
(i) Section 44 stop and search under the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 (henceforth 's44'); 
(ii) The Control Order regime as enacted by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 
2005; 
(iii) The Deportation with Assurances (henceforth 'DWA') which is an immigration 
counterterrorism measure; and 
(iv) The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure scheme and the Enhanced 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure scheme (henceforth 'TPIMs' and 
'ETPIMs' respectively), which replaced the control order regime. 
 
It is argued by Fenwick (2010) that a significant aspect of the ‘war on terror’ following 9/11 
in the UK was the shift from 'a wholly criminal justice response under the Terrorism Act 
2000 to the creation of a parallel preventative system running in tandem with the continuing 
criminal justice one, a system that does not rely on the commission of criminal offences or on 
adherence to ordinary criminal justice safeguards'.6 This parallel preventative system may be 
best labelled as a ‘counter-terrorism justice system’. Fenwick (2007) suggests that this action 
is a typical UK counter-terrorist response by being using ‘…over-broad and arguably 
counter-productively draconian proactive measures...’.7 In contrast, Lord Carlile QC (2011b)8 
openly remarked that terrorism should not be dealt with in the same way as ordinary crime 
                                                          
5 Louise Amoore and Marke de Goede 'Risk and the War on Terror' (Routledge 2008), 57. 
6 Helen Fenwick (2010) 'Recalibrating ECHR Rights, and the Role of the Human Rights Act Post 9/11: 
Reasserting International Human Rights Norms in the ‘War on Terror’?' Current Legal Problems, 63(1): 153-
234, 153. 
7 Helen Fenwick 'Civil Liberties and Human Rights' Fourth Eds. (Routledge-Cavendish 2007), 1332. 
8 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew, (2011b) speaking at the English Law Student Association Seminar, University of 
Durham (8th February). 
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due to the nature of terrorism, therefore supporting pre-emptive and preventative action. Pre-
emptive and preventative measures began to form a greater part of the former Labour UK 
Governments’ strategy, as reflected in the former Home Secretary’s opinion following the 
Madrid train bombing: ‘the norms of prosecution and punishment no longer apply’.9 
Arguably, this became the former Labour UK Governments’ admission that new counter-
terrorism measures would not fully comply with the ordinary application of due process, 
including the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and to be heard by an 
independent and impartial member of the judiciary. In fact the new measures tended, this 
thesis will argue, to breach human rights’ standards at national and European level. Fenwick 
(2007: 1329) suggests that 'proactive measures are clearly more risky and pernicious in 
human rights terms...'10  
 
The former Labour UK Government increased state control over suspects; they also provided 
extended powers for the police, including greater stop and search powers and powers to 
detain suspects for longer periods without charge. This formed part of the state’s intelligence 
and evidence gathering exercises. Further to this, some of those against whom the state could 
not gather sufficient evidence would become subject first to Part IV ACTSA ('Part 4'), and 
then to controversial 'Control Orders', which could also form part of intelligence and 
evidence gathering, due to the use of increased surveillance. This has subsequently been 
replaced by TPIMs and ETPIMs. In recent years such powers have been labelled as failing 
strategies and are deemed by human rights campaign groups such as Liberty, as ‘unsafe and 
unfair’,11 whilst others, such as Warbrick (2012), view a number of these newer powers 
enacted post-9/11 as conflicting with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(henceforth 'ECHR') in a ‘potentially unjustifiable fashion’.12 
 
THEMES OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis will examine the main features of current pre-emptive and preventative counter-
terrorism strategies, in particular stop and search, detention, deportation, control orders and 
TPIMs and ETPIMs; their use in gathering intelligence and evidence. The reason for this is 
                                                          
9 Jessica Wolfendale (2007) 'Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism', Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 30: 75-92, 75. 
10 Fenwick (fn 7) 1329. 
11 Liberty, 'Unfair Unsafe Campaign' <http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-
rights/terrorism/control-orders/index.php> accessed 5th January 2011. 
12 Colin Warbrick 'The principles of the European Convention on Human Rights and the responses of states to 
terrorism' 2012 European Human Rights Law Review, 287. Also see: Fenwick (fn 7) 1335. 
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that, as noted by McCulloch and Pickering (2009), intelligence gathering which can be 
gathered coercively 'involves a process of bringing a vast body of information, often 
meaningless in isolation, together in the hope of discerning links and underlying patterns 
that...create a meaningful picture'.13 Also this thesis will identify the contradiction between 
use of those mechanisms of counter-terrorism rather than the use of the criminal justice 
systems to prosecute. Collectively this will facilitate in the primary assessment of whether 
such counter-terrorism measures achieve the UK governments policy aims of 'Pursue, 
Prevent, Protect and Prepare' as outlined under the current UK Strategy 2011.14 Throughout 
this process of assessment consideration of the risks of pre-emptive and preventative 
measures in counter-terrorism, such as: the loss of human rights credibility; alienation of 
communities; provision of perceived evidence supporting radical propaganda which assist 
terrorism and contribute to a breakdown of trust between communities and the state 
(Fenwick, 2011: 3). Each of these processes of analysis will enable the assessment of the 
relationship between risk, the counter-terrorism pre-emptive and preventative measures and 
human rights as guaranteed by the criminal justice system. These three components create 
what this thesis labels the ‘tri-relationship’, each being interlinked to one another (see 
diagram 1 below) which this thesis will use to establish the main arguments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1: Tri-relationship 
                                                          
13 McCulloch and Pickering (fn 3) 634. 
14 HM Government (2011) 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism', (July) Cm 8123. 
Whilst the policy has been updated since 2011, the key aims of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare have 
remained consistently the same throughout subsequent strategies. 
Counter-
Terrorism 
Measures 
 
Risk 
Criminal 
Justice System 
and Human 
Rights 
15 
 
 
It is anticipated that this thesis will show that as preventative measures are implemented and 
used, there will be evidence, or risk, of abuse and manipulation by the state and/or 
emanations of the state (eg the Police). This consequently increases the risk of dividing 
society, fostering segregation and contributing to a climate of fear. It is suspected that current 
preventative measures create a divide which enhances negative perceptions of cultural and 
ethnic groups, thus creating ‘suspect communities’ (Greer, 2010: 1171; Fenwick and 
Choudhury, 2011). These communities and their supporters will in turn tend to become 
segregated from mainstream British society. It is suggested that the limited judicial 
involvement in the use of proactive counter-terrorism measures is due to the state’s concerns 
relating to assessment of risk, and the preferred option of managing and controlling ‘suspects’ 
based on associative and situational suspicion; these being questionable intelligence-led 
assessments rather than being evidence-based that could be presented in a criminal trial, 
thereby avoiding the need to present security service material for scrutiny. This thesis will 
argue that further safeguards should be implemented within counter-terrorism statutory and 
policy frameworks in order to protect human rights and reduce the risks caused by those 
measures, including: greater independent involvement of the Judiciary; transparency within 
the measures used; improved accountability; and realignment with the criminal justice 
system. Consequently, if there is a failed rebalance between national security, human rights 
and risk British citizens face a harsh choice between national security or human rights. 
Preference for national security is likely to result in further erosion of human rights and the 
high regard that is given to the UK due process under the criminal justice system, allowing 
only basic human rights standards and giving rise to a new ‘counter-terrorism justice system’.  
 
To assess this, this thesis will first consider the circumstances surrounding an individual 
subjected to stop and search under s44 of the TA 2000. Then consideration will be given to 
those who are placed on control orders, followed by other measures to detain and manage 
terrorist suspects such as deportation. Individually and collectively the measures examined 
will show, it is believed, a trend which moves away from the use of the ‘traditional criminal 
justice system’, creating a new ‘counter-terrorism justice system’; giving support to Gearty 
(2006) who identified a ‘criminal justice model’ and a ‘counterterrorism model’ (2006: 125). 
This alternative creates a number of human rights concerns and risks, both for the state and 
individual suspects. It will be argued that the alternative system or the counter-terrorism 
system provides: a lack of or limited judicial involvement; a reduction in safeguards to 
16 
 
support human rights, particularly Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR; is politically driven with the 
Home Secretary at the helm; and operates on the grounds of suspicion that may be 
circumstantial supported by ambiguous information not evidence based. This thesis does not 
assess the HRA 1998 relationship as the courts are required to interpret the ECHR into 
national law, although the application and importance of human rights to the counter-
terrorism debate is relevant. Chapter One will assist in the understanding of the general 
themes that will re-occur within this thesis, specifically the characteristics of pre-emptive and 
preventative measures and its relationship with UK counter-terrorism generally. This is 
achieved by looking at the developments and trends identifiable from laws and policies 
introduced to counter-terrorism post-9/11 and in particular following the 2005 July 7 London 
Bombings (henceforth '7/7').  
 
Chapter One will consider the various models used in relation to counter-terrorism and their 
application to current counter-terrorism strategies. This will provide greater understanding 
and identification to some of the trends and concerns regarding human rights and risk whilst 
discussing counter-terrorism measures in subsequent chapters. The findings of this chapter 
will support this thesis in considering the role of risk assessment when examining counter-
terrorism measures in subsequent chapters, determining whether they support intelligence and 
evidence gathering which may assist the UK in detecting, investigating, disrupting and 
prosecuting terrorism (UK Strategy, 2011: 10). It will also aid in scrutinising the relationship 
between risk and human rights when applied to the measures being considered. The 
conclusion will consider the model adopted by the UK, which underpins many of the counter-
terrorism measures which this thesis will be considering. The underlying reasons for adopting 
such strategies will be considered and related back to the general trend of adopting pre-
emptive and preventive measures post 9/11. 
 
 
Chapter Two will specifically examine emergency stop and search powers under s44 TA 
2000 and the main themes which are identified from Chapter One. Chapter Two will show 
that emergency stop and search powers, such as those under s44, have a number of 
consequences, including: ordinary policing becomes complex and intertwined into countering 
terrorism; negative perceptions of the police develop; and these measures are open to abuse. 
The powers under s44 may arguably form part of intelligence and evidence gathering 
operations of the state to either secure conviction against or detain terrorist suspects, however 
17 
 
it will be argued that this measure of countering terrorism limits the states opportunity to 
obtain such information. The s44 powers have been held as a breach of Article 8 ECHR by 
the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth 'ECtHR') in Gillan and Quinton v United 
Kingdom.15 In order to assess these issues, this chapter will need to consider whether s44 
develops or creates and exacerbates a difficult relationship between the police and the 
community? Whether such powers are an effective pre-emptive and preventative measure of 
countering terrorism? Were these powers enforced effectively? Are such powers open to 
abuse and, if so, to what extent? Ordinary powers of stop and search form part of the criminal 
justice system process; can the same be said for those powers under s44? Do such emergency 
powers cause greater harm than those they are supposed to avert and do they appear to 
contribute to increasing the risk of terrorist incidents? 
 
In order to answer these relevant questions, which assist in identifying issues of risk, there 
will be an assessment of the measures related to risk and consideration of statistical data 
provided by the Home Office. There will also be an examination of the Gillan and Quinton 
case16 and the ECtHR decision that there was a breach of Article 8 ECHR. Whilst it was 
decided that Article 8 ECHR had been breached, it is important to consider the human rights 
and risks identified by the ECtHR and consider whether such conclusions are applicable 
when considering Article 5. Consideration will be given to the ‘suspect profile’ of who a 
terrorist is and whether and to what extent the police may use this to enforce emergency 
powers provided by counter-terrorism legislation. It is noteworthy that as a consequence of 
the Gillan and Quinton case and following the 2011 Report by Lord MacDonald (henceforth 
'the MacDonald Report, 2011'), the former coalition UK government repealed the s44 
measure under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011.  
 
Based on the recommendations made under the MacDonald Report (2011) the former 
coalition UK government changed the police powers to stop and search suspected terrorist 
under the Protection of Freedoms (PoF) Act 2012;17 the extent of the recommendations and 
the use of the Act to reform counter-terrorism stop and search powers will be considered in 
more detail in Chapter Two. It is envisaged that there will be little change in the way police 
form their suspicions or in relation to the use of powers to stop and search suspected 
                                                          
15 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom [2010] Crim LR 415; 28 BHRC 420; [2010] ECHR 28; (2010) 50 EHRR 45 
(Application No. 4158/05). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Part 4, Section 59. 
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terrorists. It will be argued that the police will continue to assess the risk posed by suspected 
terrorists on circumstantial or minimal intelligence rather than on evidence, resulting in a 
distorted balance between the prevention of terrorism and due process. As a consequence it 
will be shown that this type of pre-emptive measure is best utilised when the threat of 
terrorism is believed to be imminent. It will be suggested that the reason for this is because 
preventing terrorist activity through measures like s44, will create a lost opportunity to gather 
intelligence and evidence to subsequently identify and convict terrorists; this will be an issue 
that will be seen throughout this thesis. 
 
Chapter Three will discuss the Control Orders regime which operated between 2005 and 
2011. The regime replaced an earlier indefinite detention without trial power, as enacted 
under Part 4 ATCSA 2001. Part 4 ATCSA will not be considered due to the extensive 
literature already available on the subject (eg Fenwick, 2007). The chapter will consider the 
regimes relationship with the ECHR, focusing on Articles 5 and 6 ECHR (the Right to 
Liberty and Security and the Right to a Fair Trial respectively). It will consider the two forms 
of control orders, derogating and non-derogating, although it will focus on the latter as the 
former had never been activated during the course of the regimes lifetime. Under the regime 
obligations could be imposed by the regime against the terrorist suspect, also known as the 
‘controlee’, which will be shown as being excessive. The relationship between the regime as 
a preventative counter-terrorism measure with Articles 5 and 6 ECHR can be considered, 
with risk assessment being used to conduct an extensive examination of the measure. The key 
questions for Chapter Two, particularly when considering the obligations that can be 
imposed, is whether the regime was proportionate to the risk allegedly posed by the suspect. 
 
Non-derogating control orders are controversial and have been challenged in the courts in the 
UK; they have been described by Lord Carlile QC as 'inhibit[ing] normal life considerably'18 
which would be considered to be a serious understatement by Ewing and Tham (2008: 674). 
Control orders were believed to create a number of risks, including: isolation with resultant 
mental health issues for the controlee; victimisation or segregation for the family of the 
controlee; provide propaganda and support to terrorist campaigns by providing negative 
perceptions of the UK. Furthermore, it will be argued that the lack of safeguards under the 
                                                          
18 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew 'Second Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005' (19th February, 2007a) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/feb/uk-pta-
carlile-ann-report.pdf> accessed 29th May 2011. 
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regime, such as the lack of or minimal independent judicial involvement throughout the 
process, strengthened the argument that the use of this counter-terrorism measure was abused 
by the state, consequently jeopardising the UK’s moral standing in terms of human rights’ 
principles. 
 
Chapter Three will consider whether control orders were an effective way of preventing 
terrorism by considering the risks the measure posed; giving consideration to what extent 
could the control order regime have caused harm to national security? There will be an 
examination of the suggestions made by others, such as professionals and academics, on 
ways the control order regime could have been improved; more specifically, there will be an 
assessment of whether the use of bail as an alternative could be used to achieve the same 
aims of the regime and the Strategy 2011. Consideration to the recommendations provided by 
Lord Carlile QC, the former Independent Reviewer of Anti-Terrorism Laws, and Lord 
MacDonald following the MacDonald Report (2011) will assist in determining whether the 
regime was proportionate in balancing between national security and human rights. This will 
also be achieved by analysing some case studies and relevant case law, including AP v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department19 and AF v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,20 allowing an extensive discussion of what constitutes deprivation of liberty and 
failures of due process. The chapter will seek to evaluate the risks created and addressed by 
measures such as control orders.  
 
Chapter Three will formulate strong arguments for the removal of the control orders regime. 
Within the thesis it will be recognised that the UK is unable to convict all terrorists due to 
concerns of having to divulge security sensitive material, an alternative process will be 
considered that operates in a similar way to the regime but is in line with criminal justice 
standards, namely the process of bail. This assessment will be supported by the examination 
of the risks involved, including the risks to the controlee, the state, and the courts. It is 
noteworthy that the regime under the PTA 2005 was repealed as a response to AF, as 
indicated under recommendations of the MacDonald Report (2011). As a consequence of 
this, the arguments supporting the removal of the regime will be used to examine some of the 
features of the replacement scheme known as TPIMs and ETPIMs, which replaced the 
                                                          
19 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2011] 2 AC 1; [2010] UKHRR 748; [2010] 3 WLR 51; [2010] 
UKSC 24. 
20 AF v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 28; [2008] EWCA 1148. 
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control order regime from January 2012. This will support the detailed analysis and 
assessment of TPIMs and ETPIMs in Chapter Five, as well as support this thesis assessment 
of whether current UK counter-terrorism measures support the UK governments aims 
outlined under the Strategy 2011. 
 
Chapter Four will look at other forms of pre-emptive and preventative measures used in 
counter-terrorism post-9/11 in the UK. Having examined the main features - s44 and control 
orders - it will be possible to look at other measures and identify their effectiveness in 
balancing national security with individual human rights. Specifically, Chapter Four will look 
at the use of the executive decision to deport terrorist suspects. The assessment of DWA will 
help test the tri-relationship model of discussion when considering the link between counter-
terrorism measures, risk assessment and the criminal justice system. Unlike the other counter-
terrorism measures which deal with aspects or adaptations of criminal justice process (eg 
police stop and search), this measure adopts the immigration system as a way of achieving 
the aims of the Strategy 2011. 
 
The counter-terrorism measure DWA has been developed post 9/11, compared to the control 
order regime which was introduced following a previously failed measure as mentioned 
earlier. The DWA measure is pre-emptive and preventative, thus similar to s44 and the 
control order regime in terms of its natural characteristics. DWA has been under public 
scrutiny and regularly reported upon due to the legal challenges by suspects, specifically 
Omar Othman (aka Abu Qatada) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (henceforth 
'Abu Qatada').21 In this chapter there will be discussion of the legal challenges brought by 
Abu Qatada and the House of Lords unanimously ruling in favour of the UK’s practice of 
deporting terrorist suspects to countries, including those with poor human rights records, so 
long as they had signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (henceforth MoU). The British 
Ambassador, James Watt, believes that the practice of deporting with assurances guarantees 
security "whilst maintain[ing] and upholding the human rights principles".22 Although the 
assessment of this measure when using the tri-relationship model will show that UK 
credibility in relation to protecting a person’s Article 3 ECHR rights (Prohibition on torture 
                                                          
21 RB (Algeria) and OO (Jordan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10, [2010] 2 AC 
110. 
22 James Watt, Former British Ambassador <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=News&id=13821064> accessed 11th May 2011. 
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and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) is damaged; a risk in itself one would 
argue. 
 
Although this counter-terrorism measure has been vilified, it is a measure which it is believed 
will prove to be worthwhile dependent upon clearer reforms of the mechanism (Walker, 
2009a: 306). The MacDonald Report (2011) indicates that the system of DWA is an 
acceptable practice, particularly if there is no evidence suggesting that those deported are in 
danger of being tortured or suffering inhumane treatment. However, whilst the Report 
condones the use of DWA it concedes that it is a difficult, long and costly process to obtain 
assurances with other jurisdictions that are known or believed to engage in the abuse and 
mistreatment of people. Although, the Report suggests that that access to the courts provides 
suspects with 'clear reassurances that their rights are appropriately respected during the 
deportation process';23 recommending the extension of the process due to its success. 
However, by exploring the legal challenges by Abu Qatada it will be possible to demonstrate 
the risks of the DWA measure and the importance of independent judicial involvement when 
a person faces a ‘real risk’ of harm of their Article 3 ECHR rights being breached. 
 
By examining the development of the DWA measure through the assessment of case law, it 
becomes possible to identify any other dominant trends within UK pre-emptive and 
preventative counter-terrorism measures that may not have been identified in the previous 
chapters. Similarly, the assessment of risk will assist in the identification of any dominant 
trends of risk. One of the risks that will be identified is the negative impact upon the UK’s 
reputation and credibility. Just as the control order regime was introduced, it will be 
concluded that the DWA measure was developed to correct the House of Lords findings in A 
and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department24 (also known as the ‘Belmarsh 
case’) providing the UK government a solution to deal with foreign terrorist suspects that 
cannot be prosecuted without exposing national security intelligence. It is likely that such UK 
counter-terrorism measures will continue to show a trend towards avoiding utilisation of the 
criminal justice system, or at the very least, limiting its involvement. As seen within the UK 
Strategy 2011 and the MacDonald Report (2011), counter-terrorism measures are intended to 
be realigned with the criminal justice system, and intended to increase the ability to increase 
                                                          
23 MacDonald Report 'Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: A Report by Lord MacDonald of River 
Glaven QC' 2011 Cm 8003, 9: 7. 
24 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department; X and Another v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68. 
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the prosecution of terrorist suspects. A further risk that will be explored is the risk that DWA 
removes or reduces the UK’s ability to manage and control the threat posed by terrorists, 
caused by sending the suspect to another jurisdiction within which the UK has no power. This 
will also significantly reduce the UK’s ability to gather evidence and intelligence to tackle 
terrorism, both of these consequences fall outside of the UK Strategy (2011). 
 
Following on from discussions in Chapter Three, Chapter Five will discuss the TPIMs and 
ETPIMs scheme’s which replaced the control order regime in January 2012. The discussions 
from Chapter Three and the recommendations of counter-terrorism reviews will assist in an 
accurate and detailed assessment of the new schemes. This will enable the identification of 
what effect these measures will have on human rights, the relationship with the criminal 
justice system in the governments endeavour to secure conviction and the role of risk 
assessment. There are various suggestions proposed by the government, academics and 
Parliamentarians, including the Joint Committee on Human Rights, explaining how best to 
improve the measures like control orders and TPIMs/ETPIMs. However, various sources 
such as Hansard provide evidence that TPIMs and ETPIMs is not dissimilar to the former 
control order regime, in fact some may deem them to be one in the same save for the name 
(Walker, 2013). It is likely to be found that the new schemes will restrict human rights and 
raise similar risks as those identified in previous chapters, for example Chapter Five will 
examine the risks of the state losing the opportunity to gather evidence and intelligence. It is 
important however to identify what significant differences there are and whether and how far 
they deal with the risks raised previously from Chapter Three. It is expected that whilst the 
new schemes are more closely aligned to the criminal justice system compared to the former 
control order regime, it remains separate to the criminal justice system and the protections 
offered therein and consequently strengthening the development of a new counter-terrorism 
system. Ultimately Chapter Five will recognise the risk of adopting a counter-terrorism 
system and practices, which are separate to those provided by the criminal justice system, and 
the risk of such becoming normalised; this will assist in wider discussion of this risk in 
Chapter Six. 
 
In Chapter Six, the conclusion of the thesis, the wide range of sources will be re-focused in 
order to re-consider the concerns raised by the implementation of pre-emptive and 
preventative counter-terrorism measures in each chapter. It will answer the main question of 
23 
 
this thesis: does pre-emptive and preventative measures support the government in its aims as 
set out under the Strategy 2011, including:  
(i) the detection of terrorist-related activity;  
(ii) the collection of intelligence and evidence; and  
(iii) the prosecution of terrorists.  
Drawing upon the findings of each previous chapter, Chapter Six will consider whether a 
balance can be achieved between national security and human rights, in doing so identify 
which model is more successful: a unique model within an emergency process or the criminal 
justice and human rights approach model. Through the use of the tri-relationship discussions 
a balance is required; however, greater preference for the safeguards provided by the criminal 
justice system should be favoured, otherwise a newly developed counter-terrorism justice 
system would be open to political influence, reduction in the respect for human rights and 
increased risk to UK national security. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM IN 
THE UK POST-9/11: THE KEY ISSUES AND THEMES OF THIS 
THESIS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; its existence has been seen throughout history and 
during periods of conflict. Terrorism is considered a technique as old as warfare (Chaliand 
and Blin, 2007: 5) and as such requires strategic methods to prevent, if not reduce, the 
devastating consequences terrorist attacks may inflict, including risks to life and serious 
injury. Since 9/11 the UK has taken a clear strategy of 'Pursue, Prevent, Protect and 
Prepare'.25 In partial pursuit of that strategy, the UK government has placed greater emphasis 
on the use of detention, where evidence is presented by the security services of 'suspected' 
terrorists or those 'suspected' of being linked to terrorist-related activity. Under Part 4 of the 
now repealed ATSCA 2001, suspect terrorists were detained indefinitely without being 
informed of the grounds on which their detention was based and with little or no prospect of a 
trial. This was an extreme measure of which Britain has used on two occasions in the 20th 
century, the First and Second World Wars (Ewing and Tham, 2008: 668). On both occasions 
legal challenges arose (R v Halliday26 and Liversidge v Anderson);27 both of which were 
unsuccessful as the House of Lords favoured security over civil liberties. 
 
This thesis will show that the courts have attempted to maintain a balance between security 
and human rights’ standards. This has resulted in the government introducing further 
restrictive measures, which Zedner (2007b) describes as causing the criminal justice system 
to become a victim caused by the success of the courts; in other words, due to the decision of 
the court in the Belmarsh case the government enacted new measures to counteract the 
decision. Under the previous strategy introduced post-9/11 by the former Labour UK 
                                                          
25 Home Office, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Cabinet Office and Ministry of Justice 'Protecting the UK 
against terrorism' (26th March 2013) <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-
terrorism-strat/> accessed 11th May 2011. 
26 R v Halliday [1917] AC 260. 
27 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206. 
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government,28 terrorism was tackled by means of strengthening its pre-emptive and 
preventative measures. Unlike previous acts of terrorism, such as during World Wars I and II 
and the IRA attacks, terrorism has, it has been argued, become increasingly about 
uncertainty; playing on randomness, anticipation and disestablishment (Ericson, 2008: 58-
60). Current acts of terrorism tend to be secretive, well planned and developed to have great 
impact, as demonstrated by the 7 July London Bombings ('7/7').  
 
The earlier preventive strategy appeared to be a response to a perception that Islamic 
extremist terrorism is of a different nature from previous forms of terrorism (Fenwick, 2011). 
It is argued that the pre-emptive and preventative measures employed are in conflict with the 
ECHR (Warbrick, 2008). This may be as a result of the measures being either inadequate or 
abusive in their aim of dealing with terrorism which, as explained above is viewed as 
especially random and unpredictable. For example, the TA 2000 did not generally adopt a 
preventative strategy but instead a punitive one (which nevertheless had pre-emptive 
elements) and was viewed as an inadequate response to deal with terrorism post-9/11. Part 4 
ATSCA 2001 was predominately preventative and repealed because it breached human 
rights. This suggests that the more sophisticated and unpredictable terrorism becomes, the 
more repressive the measures that the UK government is likely to introduce which 
consequently conflict with human rights. This again supports the opinion of Zedner (2007b) 
and enables one to argue that through the conflict of human rights and counter-terrorism 
measures, the human rights standards expected under the criminal justice system has resulted 
in the development and introduction of a new counter-terrorism justice system. Within the 
creation of the counter-terrorism justice system the use of a pre-emptive and preventative 
approach has increased, lacking in the analysis of the risks results in over-broad pre-emptive 
and preventative measures being adopted.  
 
 
PRE-EMPTION AND PREVENTION: THE KEY APPROACH TO COUNTER-
TERRORISM POST-9/11 
Police involvement throughout the process of investigating terror suspects and gathering 
intelligence and evidence had increased post-9/11 under the UK strategy (Deputy Assistant 
                                                          
28 The ‘former Labour UK government’ was the Labour Party between 1997 and 2010, the ‘former coalition UK 
government’ is reference to the Coalition government made up of the Conservative Party and Liberal 
Democrats elected after the 2010 general election. 
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Commissioner Peter Clarke, 2007). This was considered important due to the perceived 
increased risk terrorism posed to public safety. It is suggested by Chaliand and Blin (2007) 
that the age of deterrence gave way to the age of pre-emption and as a consequence of 9/11 
pre-emptive and preventative measures became intertwined as a basis for tackling terrorism 
(Chaliand and Blin, 2007: 417). Ericson and Haggerty (1997) and Walker (2004: 314) 
describe UK anti-terrorism policy as switching from reactive to proactive in policing and 
management of the risks posed. At The Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture (24th April 
2007), the then Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke29 stated that the police have 
moved towards a 'Risk Management' model of counter-terrorism. Under this model the police 
are expected to intervene when the level of risk becomes undesirable, rather than intervening 
when evidence to support prosecution becomes available. This thesis will argue that early 
interventionist approach can prevent evidence and intelligence from being gathered to 
support subsequent prosecution and conviction, which is contradictory to the UK Strategy 
(2011). However, McCulloch and Pickering (2009: 629-30), support pre-emptive actions and 
accept that it such actions can take the form of coercive policing or state intervention despite 
no evidence or conviction existing. As this thesis will show, this lack of focus in providing 
the police a test to determine that a threat is imminent before enforcing emergency counter-
terrorism powers, consequently undermines pre-emptive actions to prevent terrorism; done by 
restricting the available collection of intelligence and evidence to secure a conviction against 
a suspect. 
 
Pre-emptive measures, which are also referred to as 'pre-crime',30 are the processes used to 
forestall possible risks, and as a result over-shadow post-crime and use of the criminal justice 
system (Zedner, 2007a: 261-262). It is asserted by Amoore and de Goede (2008: 8) that 'pre-
emption draws on but goes beyond the established language and techniques of risk', which, as 
explained by McCulloch and Pickering (2009: 629-30), focus on identifying future terrorists, 
by means of suspicion, rather than identifying the specific root causes of terrorism. This is 
arguably because effective profiling of terrorists has been found to be difficult, if not 
impossible. Hoffman (2006: 7), Harris (2002: 1) and Hayes (2005: 37) found there was no 
statistical evidential link between "psycho-sociological features, nationality or birthplace"31 
                                                          
29 Peter Clarke, Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'Learning From Experience – Counter Terrorism in the UK since 
9/11' The Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture (24th April 2007) <http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-
02228.pdf> accessed 29th August 2013. 
30 The term 'pre-crime' is taken from 1950s The Minority Report by Phillip K. Dick. 
31 McCulloch and Pickering (fn 3) 635. 
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and the risk of terrorism. Likewise, Goldson (2006) found no positive links post-9/11 to 
identifying terrorists through racial, ethnic and religious profiling, although these factors 
continue to be used as proxies for risk calculation (Cole, 2006; Ansari, 2005; Hagopian, 
2004; Harris, 2002). Zedner (2007a) identified a framework for the best means of 
characterising pre-emption as: "calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution, 
prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all of these, there is the pursuit of 
security".32 Pre-crime requires the accurate prediction of threat which is obtained through 
intelligence. The prevention of terrorism and pursuit of security has led to a 'growing and 
profitable field of ‘crime science’ that sees prediction and risk management as entirely 
feasible and objective' (Zedner, 2007a: 267-8; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009: 635).  
 
Preventative measures, on the other hand, are accepted as being non-punitive, reducing the 
likelihood of the would-be or suspected terrorist committing acts of terror, or, as suggested by 
Sutton et al (2008), they ‘address the broader context in which people commit crime through 
a range of social and environmental strategies’.33 As asserted by McCulloch and Pickering 
(2009: 631), preventative measures are part of a framework that are less concerned with 
gathering evidence, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists, instead place greater emphasis 
on targeting and managing threats and risks through disruption, restriction and incapacitation; 
this will be shown to happen when discussing various counter-terrorism measure such as 
TPIMs/ETPIMs. On this basis preventative measures do not support the current UK Strategy 
2011 to secure prosecution, conviction and punishment of terrorists. It is important to note 
that theorists of risk society believe control is ideological and will fall short of measuring 
reality (Aradau and van Munster, 2008; Amoore and de Goede, 2008: 23), this means that 
whilst counter-terrorism measures try to control terrorist suspects it will fail to achieve this as 
will be shown in Chapter Four when discussion Deportation with Assurances. Each of the 
counter-terrorism measures that this thesis will examine are, arguably, by their nature, both 
pre-emptive and preventative. They prevent or delay the criminal justice system from playing 
its role to punish and enable 'intervention at such an early stage in any engagement or 
                                                          
32 McCulloch and Pickering (fn 3) 631. Also see: Lucia Zedner 'Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?' 2007a 
Theoretical Criminology, 11(2): 261-281, 626. 
33 McCulloch and Pickering (fn 3) 629. 
28 
 
potential engagement with terrorist-related activity or support...';34 and therefore either deter 
any terrorist or manage the risk they are suspected of posing. 
 
UK STRATEGY POST-9/11 AND FOLLOWING THE SECURITY REVIEW 2010 
The former Labour UK government developed its counter-terrorism strategy in 2001 
(ATCSA Part 4) and then more specifically in 2003, which was subsequently rebranded 
‘CONTEST’ in 2009. This was later updated by the coalition UK government creating the 
current UK Strategy 2011 which was in line with the MacDonald Report (2011). The UK 
strategy became the driving force to provide the state and law enforcers with powers to 
prevent terrorism as part of a security response (Walker, 2010a: 4). As explained earlier, the 
counter-terrorism laws introduced followed on from the TA 2000; each of them, and 
including s44 of TA 2000, aided in establishing an era countering terrorism predominantly 
based on pre-emptive and preventative measures. Previous approaches, such as those used 
during the IRA struggles between the 1970s and 1990s, were more reactive instead of 
proactive. This change in approach was recognised and welcomed by the then Deputy 
Assistant Commission Peter Clarke because 'no longer can the police service feed off the 
crumbs falling from the end of the intelligence table'.35 In other words, the role of the police 
is now proactive and supports the UK strategy to pre-empt and prevent terrorist attacks; the 
perception being, that otherwise if the police continued with a reactive approach they would 
be dealing with the aftermath of the attack and would be reliant on the Security Services to do 
their job. 
 
During the Terrorism Review 2009,36 Lord Carlile QC, the then role as Independent Review 
of Terrorism Legislation, believed that terrorist threats emanated from Islamist extremism. 
But the idea that terrorism in the modern era only stems from Islamist extremism is arguably 
unreasonable and may result in ‘ethnically imbalanced’ measures being taken which would 
arguably be risky for various reasons, including the creation of ‘suspect communities’ 
(Choudury and Fenwick 2010). Hazel Blears, the former Minister of State for Community 
Safety, Crime Reduction, Policing and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, submitted to 
                                                          
34 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson 'UK Counter-terror law post 9/11: initial acceptance of extraordinary 
measures and the partial return to human rights norms', in 'Global Anti-Terrorism Law & Policy' (Second Ed.), 
Ramraj, V., Hor, M., Roach, K., & Williams, G. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), 481-513, 481. 
35 Clarke (fn 29). 
36 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew 'Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2006' 2009a (June) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/jun/uk-carlile-report-2008.pdf> 
accessed 12th May 2012. 
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the Home Affairs Select Committee (2004-2005) in order to deal with terrorism, which most 
likely emanates from an extreme form of Islam ‘some of our counter-terrorism powers will be 
disproportionately experienced by people in the Muslim community. That is the reality of the 
situation…’37 However, when there is no evidence that link race, ethnicity or religious beliefs 
to terrorism, as discussed earlier, this remark can only be based on terrorist stereotypes rather 
than evidence.  
 
 
During the 2010 general election the Conservative Party promised to review the use of 
control orders whilst the Liberal Democrats claimed they would abolish them. The UK 
coalition government (henceforth ‘the former coalition UK Government’), formed by both of 
these parties led with a Conservative Party majority, raised one question: what does the future 
hold for pre-emptive and preventative measures of countering terrorism? On the 18th and 19th 
October 2010 the UK government announced its National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review, both entitled 'A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty' 
(henceforth 'the Strategy Review 2010').38 This provided details of how the Government 
believed it can counter-terrorism and the threat of it: 
 
"[There is need] for a radical transformation in the way we think about national security and 
organise ourselves to protect it. We are entering an age of uncertainty. This Strategy is about 
gearing Britain up for this new age of uncertainty – weighing up the threats we face, and 
preparing to deal with them. But a strategy is of little value without the tools to implement 
it..."39 
 
On the 6th January 2011 the then British Prime Minister, David Cameron MP, told the British 
media that "I think we need a system that keeps the country safe but that respects our 
freedoms..."40 Earlier in 2010 the then Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, appointed Lord 
MacDonald QC of River Glaven to review the UK counter-terrorism laws, which will be 
                                                          
37 Home Affairs Select Committee 'Developments since 9/11' Sixth Report (2004-2005, 22nd March 2005), 
House of Commons, 167 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmhaff/165/16509.htm> accessed 22nd 
January 2011. 
38 HM Government 'A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy', (Cm 7953, 
October 2010). 
39 Ibid 3. 
40 BBC News: Politics 'Control orders need replacing, David Cameron says' (5th January 2011a) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12120911> accessed 6th January 2011. 
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considered and commented on throughout this thesis. Whilst the coalition UK Government 
continued to endorse the former Labour UK governments strategy of ‘Pursue, Prevent, 
Protect and Prepare’, greater emphasis had been placed on the preventative pillar of the UK 
strategy as supported by Baroness Neville-Jones, the then Minister of State for Security and 
Counter Terrorism (Home Office, 2011e). With two political parties formulating the coalition 
UK government, one party [Liberal Democrats] has advocated the abolition of control orders 
and the other [Conservative Party] wished to simply review them; how does the Government 
intend on strengthening preventative measures when the existing preventative regimes are not 
fully supported? Would the approach of preventing terrorism truly differ under the new 
strategy? The coalition UK government wanted to rebalance the measures to tackle terrorism 
to provide safety and security whilst respecting the rights valued by UK customs and 
principles; it will be argued throughout this thesis that attempts were made in light of the 
introduction of TPIMs and ETPIMs but more needs to be done.  
 
Both the Strategy Review (2010) and the MacDonald Report (2011) provided 
recommendations to improve the intended operational aim of s44 stop and search, as well as 
general counter-terrorism police stop and search powers. S44 was a key 
preventive/information gathering counter-terrorist measure used in the UK pre-dating 9/11. 
As mentioned, the TA 2000 generally does not take a preventative approach, however s44 
was believed to have played a key role in counter-terrorism: by maintaining a pre-emptive 
police presence it was believed that terrorists were unlikely to carry out acts of terrorism 
(Home Office, 2009-2010); and through preventative engagement by stopping, questioning 
and searching those who the police suspected posed a terrorist threat (Lord Carlile QC, 2009). 
Powers such as s44 were intended, so far as the Metropolitan Police were concerned, to 
create a hostile environment for terrorists to operate and therefore disrupt, deter and prevent 
terrorist-related activity. 41 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Metropolitan Police 'Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 Standard Operating Procedures' (1st August 2007) 
<http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/policies/stop_and_search_s44_tact_2000_sop.pdf> accessed 18th March 
2011. 
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SECTION 44 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000: A KEY ASPECT OF A PREVENTATIVE 
COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY 
As explained earlier, the Home Office (2009-2010) viewed s44 as an important part of the 
counter-terrorism strategy because of the hostile environment such powers would provide. 
Prima facie the government implemented s44 with the clear intention of ensuring the police 
could act when they suspected an individual of being involved in terrorist-related activity 
without the constraints of establishing reasonable cause, as per ordinary stop and search 
powers. These widened powers, as explained by Lord Lloyd of Berwick, were designed to 
facilitate the authorities in their duties of interception and thwarting terrorism (Walker, 2004: 
168).42 Stop and search is ordinarily a primary tactic of policing, and during threats of 
terrorism can form part of ‘high policing’ strategies which are adopted by the police during 
covert surveillance, intelligence gathering and clandestine interference of terrorist plots 
(Weisburd et al, 2010: 726). High policing is significantly different from ordinary policing 
tactics due to the lack of transparency and accountability, and the carefree disrespect of 
human rights (Weisburd et al, 2010: 726; Bayley and Weisburd, 2009); risks which will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter Two. One may well find that s44 provided police with 
the opportunity to abuse their position of authority; a concern raised by Lord Carlile QC the 
Independent Terrorism Review (2009). The relationship between the state or police and 
society or local communities can be delicate and often fragile (Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner Peter Clarke, 2007), therefore wide powers such as s44 risk causing further 
frictions, which will be considered in Chapter Two. During the ELSA seminar Lord Carlile 
QC stated 'I am offended by its use [s44]'43 and it is a 'very major problem' in countering 
terrorism.44 
 
In what may be considered an attempt to further support the police and broaden their stop and 
search powers, the former Labour UK government enacted s58A amending the TA 2000 
making it an offence to take pictures of police officers. The decision to do this was validated 
on the basis that 'there may be situations in which the taking of photographs may cause or 
                                                          
42 Clive Walker 'Terrorism and Criminal Justice: Past, Present and Future' (2004) Criminal Law Review (May), 
311, 168 citing Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (Cm 3420, London, 1996), 
10.14 and 10.21. 
43 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew (fn 8). 
44 Ibid. 
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lead to public order situations or raise security considerations’.45 Whilst the anonymity of 
officers may be considered important to fulfil their duties, as some examples will show in 
Chapter Two, this police protection reduced the transparency and accountability of police 
when executing emergency powers and an increased opportunity to abuse and take advantage 
of those emergency powers under the TA 2000. 
 
It was noted by Hasisi et al (2009) that police dedicate more time to improving their 
strategies and tactics of counter-terrorism, spending less time on problem solving and 
improving their relationship with the community. When stop and search under s44 was 
enforced by the police the process of gathering evidence and intelligence to support any 
possible criminal process began. With broad powers the police had wider discretion and able 
to interpret information given to them by suspects, which could have been used to either 
detain or release a suspect. Information gathered could also be used to support other measures 
including deportation, a control order or TPIM. As this thesis will argue, these measures were 
used as an alternative to divert suspects away from the criminal justice system. 
 
During the Independent Terrorism Reviews by Lord Carlile the use of s44 was criticised, 
which David Anderson QC repeated46 in his Independent Terrorism Review (2013), 
welcoming the repeal of s44.47 Since its introduction s44 had caused considerable public 
outrage and protest, and with the support of Liberty it was challenged in the ECtHR in Gillan 
and Quinton v United Kingdom,48 where it was ruled that s44 violated Article 8 ECHR. 
Although the decision of the ECtHR will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Two, the 
decision of the court subsequently led to the then Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, 
informing the House of Commons on the 8th July 2010: 
"...This judgment found...section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 amount to the violation of the 
right to a private life. The Court found that the powers are drawn too broadly...It also found 
                                                          
45 Fred Miranda 'Jail for photographing police?' British Journal of Photography (28th January 2009), 248 
<http://www.bjp-online.com/> accessed 20th May 2012. 
46 In 2012 David Anderson QC was appointed as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, replacing 
Lord Carlile QC of Berriew. 
47 David Anderson QC 'The Terrorism Acts in 2012: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006' (July 2013) 
<https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Report-on-the-
Terrorism-Acts-in-2012-FINAL_WEB1.pdf> accessed 3rd September 2013. 
48 Gillan and Quinton (fn 15). 
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that the powers contain insufficient safeguards to protect civil liberties...I can therefore tell 
the House that I will not allow the continued use of section 44..." 49 
 
In Chapter Two, when examining whether s44 did facilitate in the intelligence and evidence 
gathering processes to prosecute a terrorist suspect it will be compared to the phenomenon of 
control orders. It will become clear that they form a separate part of the UK’s preventative 
strategy rather than a punitive one. Despite this they operate differently: s44 was applied to 
the wider public, whilst control orders were used against a small number of suspects; the s44 
measure is an adaptation of pre-existing criminal justice system powers (eg s1 Police and 
Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984), whilst control orders operated outside of and parallel 
to the criminal justice system; s44 was generic in its suspicion of suspects, whilst control 
orders was based on suspicion formulated by an intelligence-led process undertaken by the 
Security Services. 
 
 
CONTROL ORDERS: A KEY ASPECT OF A PREVENTATIVE COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGY 
During the IRA struggles the British government used powers of internment50 as part of its 
approach to counter the terrorist threat presented by the IRA, a measure described as being 
similar to the control order regime (Patrick Mercer MP, House of Commons (Hansard), 2006-
2007, 22nd February 2007). The use of internment as a measure to prevent terrorism was 
challenged in Ireland v United Kingdom51 and was held to be in breach of the ECHR. As a 
consequence of 9/11 it was perceived by the former Labour UK government that the TA 2000 
would prove to be insufficient alone in its response to the terrorist threat; therefore the 
ATCSA 2001 was introduced, implementing the Part 4 measure as discussed earlier. The then 
Home Secretary, David Blunkett MP, said that the provisions under ATCSA 2001 would 
result in the 'strengthening [of] our democracy and reinforcing our values is as important as 
the passage of new laws...the legislative measures…outlined today will protect and enhance 
                                                          
49 House of Commons 'Terrorism Act 2000' 2010-2011 (Hansard, 8th July 2010) 513(29): 540-549. 
50 Internment is best understood as an act of confinement and is generally described as imprisonment without 
trial. It was used as a strategy known as ‘Operation Demetrius’ by the British Government when attempting to 
tackle the terrorist threat posed by the IRA. Operation Demetrius was implemented on the 9th and 10th August 
1971, during which time mass arrests and internment had taken place. 
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our rights, not diminish them...'.52 It is noteworthy that as a result of this counter-terrorism 
legislative framework, if a British citizen were suspected of terrorism they would continue to 
receive the full panoply of protections under the ECHR, whilst the same could not be said for 
non-British citizens (Hoffman, 2004: 947). 
 
The provisions under Part 4 were challenged in the House of Lords with a committee of nine 
Law Lords rather than five in the Belmarsh case. The court upheld the former Labour UK 
government’s argument that there was a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, 
largely due to the court not being in a position to challenge this assertion. Although the 
House of Lords declared the provisions unlawful under s4 Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, 
the only time they have declared the incompatibility of UK legislation enacted since the HRA 
1998 in the terrorism context. Despite the ruling and there being no obligation under the 
declaration on the government to change the law, they did so. This was done in an attempt to 
realign these measures, or similar measures, with human rights, which would reduce potential 
challenges against such measures from being used, although when exploring the control order 
regime and Deportation with Assurances, in Chapters Three and Four respectively, it will be 
shown that this did not happen. It will be argued that in changing the law the government 
could also try and ensure the new measures would enable the UK to deal with terrorist 
suspects without fear of due process compliance or human rights protections, in the name of 
national security – demonstrating that human rights would become a victim of its own 
success. On the 26th January 2005 the Home Secretary stated a twin-track approach would be 
introduced: one to deport foreign nationals with assurances which became known as 
Deportation with Assurances; and the other to employ control orders which could be imposed 
upon national or foreign suspects. This led to the government withdrawing its derogation 
from Article 5 ECHR and enacting the PTA 2005 to support the latter twin-track approach. 
 
The control order regime was applicable to both British and foreign suspects alike. 
Paralleling the previous scheme, it does not require proof of criminal activity and therefore 
operated outside the traditional operations of the criminal justice system. Control orders were 
described under s1(1) PTA 2005 as an order 'against an individual that imposes obligations 
on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of 
terrorism'. The concept of risk is spread across a wide spectrum from serious to insignificant, 
                                                          
52 House of Commons 'Anti-terrorism Measures Debate' 2001-2002b (Hansard, 15th October 2001) 372(30): 
923-940, 925. 
35 
 
and risk is poorly defined here, although the notion that the risk is connected with terrorism 
may give the impression that the risk was serious. It becomes relevant when ensuring that the 
appropriate measures are imposed against a suspect to curtail their ‘terrorist activity’, 
although it must be remembered that without any conviction the terrorist activities were 
allegations for which the suspect is innocent until proven guilty (Article 6(2) ECHR). 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the PTA 2005 had ‘non-derogating’ and ‘derogating from 
Article 5 ECHR’ control orders, the latter never being. When non-derogating control orders 
were made against a suspect “obligations” would be placed against the controlee; intended to 
curtail the suspect’s terrorist activity. S1(4) PTA 2005 provided an illustrative list of such 
obligations, ranging from restrictions on possessing certain items, entering certain public 
areas, electronic tagging curfew and many other obligations. The use of certain obligations, 
namely prohibitions on association and curfews, became the subject of criticism and were 
identified for improvement through the replaced TPIMs and ETPIMs, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Due to the restriction on a suspect’s freedom caused by the imposed obligations, the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights described the control order regime as 
amounting to 'virtual house arrest' with the homes of suspects being used as 'domestic 
prisons'.53 There was concern that it could cause a ‘controlee’ to become segregated and 
isolated from the wider community, a risk identified by Lord Bingham in Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v MB and AF.54 However, Lord Hoffman in Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v JJ55 stated that suggestions [such as those by the Joint Committee], 
that a control order placed the controlee in prison would be 'an extravagant metaphor'.56 In 
their 2010 Report on the renewal of the PTA 2005, the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
argued that control orders had a much wider effect than the conditions placed upon the 
controlee. Their acknowledgment and similar recognition from the case of CA v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department57 identified that the impact of such counter-terrorism 
measures indirectly impacted upon the family of the suspect: 
                                                          
53 Fenwick and Phillipson (fn34) 481-513: 4. 
54 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46; [2008] 1 AC 499; [2007] 3 WLR 
681, paragraph 8 Lord Bingham noted the applicant (AF) ‘was cut off from the outside world’. 
55 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45; [2007] 3 WLR 642. 
56 SSHD v MB and AF (fn 54) [45]. 
57 CA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 2278 (QB). 
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'We heard with alarm about the ‘growing use’ of conditions in control orders which require 
the controlled person to move out of the community in which they live and stay away from it 
– ‘a form of internal exile’ as it was described. We learned that these ‘relocation conditions’ 
are being used to require British citizens who have grown up in a particular community to 
uproot themselves from that community and move to a new and unfamiliar location. The 
impact of such relocations on the controlled person’s families was described as 
‘extraordinary’'.58  
 
In their earlier report of 2005-2006b, the Joint Committee on Human Rights heard evidence 
that the controlees’ children would live in trepidation and had witnessed their fathers’ being 
arrested numerous times. This experience would leave the children 'severely traumatised'.59 
Within the neighbourhood, or community of the family, the view of the controlee living 
under strict conditions caused neighbours to alter their views of the family and the children to 
be stigmatised at school (Ewing and Tham, 2008). This means that control orders had a much 
wider effect and raised issues relating to human rights and consequential social risks, which 
this thesis will argue is a consequence of the counter-terrorism measures adopted by the UK. 
The allegation that an individual is suspected of being involved with terrorist-related activity 
is an allegation of the utmost gravity. The control order regime removed traditional rights 
guaranteed by the criminal justice system and, as will be established in this thesis, created 
divides and fostered animosity within society towards the UK. 
 
Control orders were viewed by politicians as dangerous and draconian. Having described 
control orders as being similar to internment used during the IRA conflict, Patrick Mercer 
MP compared the two measures: 
 
"I saw the effects of internment. I saw the effects of men and women who were released after 
months in detention without charge and the damaging influence that they had on the counter-
terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland. One of my objections to control orders, among many 
                                                          
58 Joint Committee on Human Rights 'Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (Sixteenth Report): Annual 
Renewal of Control Orders Legislation 2010' 2009-2010a Ninth Report (26th February 2010), HC 395/HL 64: 41.  
59 Keith D. Ewing and Joo-Cheong Tham ‘The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Acts’ 2008 Public Law 
(Winter), 668-963: 676. Also see: Joint Committee on Human Rights 'Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human 
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others, is that they impose a sort of terrorist ASBO status on the individual. Those individuals 
cannot help but become iconic in the communities to which they return."60 
 
The experience of police interference and control orders were discussed by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2005-2006b) and evidence was given by one witness, who 
stated: 
 
"They [the controlee] live in total seclusion under very strict conditions. They exist with the 
certainty that they will eventually be arrested again and they suffer severe depression and 
post-traumatic stress disorders due to their previous harrowing experiences and arrests at 
dawn..."61 
 
Although control orders will be discussed fully in Chapter Three, the dominant trends 
identified will feed directly into the discussion surrounding the newer TPIMs and ETPIMs in 
Chapter Five. It will be shown in Chapter Three that the control order regime served a 
preventative approach to countering terrorism. Whilst control orders were intended to prevent 
a suspect from participating in acts of terrorism, the effects were much wider and of a 
magnitude that would prima facie contradicted the UK Strategy 2011; in turn, this raises 
questions about the use of pre-emptive and preventative measures to counter-terrorism. 
Chapter Three will consider this issue in relation to the potential that techniques of risk 
assessment have to legitimise or de-legitimise the use of such measures. 
 
CONTROL ORDERS BEING REPLACED BY TPIMS: A NEW PREVENTATIVE 
MEASURE? 
The development of pre-emptive and preventative measures to counter-terrorism has 
significantly increased since 9/11. There is a degree of Parliamentary acceptance with the 
lack of use, if any, of the criminal justice system and due process. This may be because 
modern terrorists place themselves outside the sphere of rationality and deterrence (Fenwick, 
2010: 154) and the sanctions of the criminal justice system therefore would not deal with the 
threat. Many of the measures introduced are reactive from a terrorist threat or court decision, 
and the introduction and enforcement of those measures by third parties, such as politicians 
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2007 (Hansard, 22nd February 2007), 434-461: 440. 
61 Ewing and Tham (fn 59) 676. Also see: Joint Committee on Human Rights (fn 59). 
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and the police respectively, play a quasi-judicial role (Walker, 2010a: 15). Whilst this is a 
matter to explore in further detail in Chapter Two or Three when addressing matters of 
Article 6 ECHR, it is important to note that this raises questions and fears that the rule of law 
may be undermined. Ewing and Tham (2008) believe there is a 'commitment to a weak 
conception of the rule of law...in the sense of (1) the approach to interpretation; (2) the 
acceptance of punishment or restraint without conviction; and (3) the tolerance forms of 
arbitrary conduct by state officials at various levels'.62  
 
Before the repeal and replacement of the control order regime, various independent reviews 
were undertaken, the MacDonald Report (2011) noted that the control order regime was 
obstructing prosecution (2011: 9). The recommendations under the report were intended to 
re-align this preventative measure with the criminal justice system and develop a regime that 
aided in the prosecution, conviction and punishment of terrorists. In Chapter Five it will be 
explained how measures of this nature do not achieve this aim; ultimately supporting Chapter 
Six in its findings that such measures fail to achieve government aims under the UK Strategy 
2011. The MacDonald Report (2011) accepted that there may be circumstances, such as an 
imminent threat to national security posed by a suspect who could not be prosecuted, which 
would require the use of powers to restrict the terrorist suspect. Although the campaign group 
Liberty (2011) welcomed the recommendations under the review and the reforms, Human 
Rights Watch (2011) conversely argued that the recommendations in the MacDonald Report 
(2011) do not go far enough to protect human rights, an argument this thesis will consider 
and conclude upon in Chapter Six.  
 
In relation to measures introduced which work outside of the criminal justice system one 
must examine the suspects’ rights to due process under Article 6 ECHR. In doing this it can 
be determined whether safeguards implemented within those measures satisfy those rights, 
and if not why and extent to which this is the case. It is therefore vital to identify and 
understand the relationship between the ECHR and UK preventative counter-terrorism 
measures. The interaction between the ECHR and control orders is of significance in relation 
to the new TPIMs to understand possible issues and risks that may be replicated by the new 
scheme or reduced. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES IN THE UK 
During the 19th Sultan Azlan Shah Law Lecture, Cherie Booth QC stated that "it is all too 
easy for us to respond to terror in a way which undermines commitment to our most deeply 
held values and convictions, and which cheapens our right to call ourselves a civilized 
nation".63 The Joint Committee on Human Rights believed that "the protection of human 
rights is a key principle underpinning all the Government’s counter-terrorism work",64 and in 
the International Commission of Jurists (2009) Report on 'Assessing Damage, Urging Action' 
the former Labour UK government was urged to 'ensure that respect for human rights and the 
rule of law is integrated into every aspect of counter-terrorism work'.65 Following the 7/7 
London attacks the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair MP, said 'let no-one be in any 
doubt, the rules of the game are changing'.66 Gearty (2005a) states that the dangers facing UK 
democracy and belief in human rights are ‘so evil’,67 that the UK is 'entitled, indeed morally 
obliged, to fight back'68 and believes that in doing so the UK may have to commit evil acts 
which contradict our fundamental principles. However, one would question whether it would 
truly be worth sacrificing the human rights’ principles that the UK holds dear, in the hope 
that by doing so acts of terrorism may be controlled and managed, if not prevented. 
Undermining the UK’s commitment to human rights may be an aim of terrorists and 
therefore, one may argue, contradicting those fundamental principles through the introduction 
of risk-filled counter-terrorism measures may be considered a victory to terrorism. Some may 
support the remarks of Tony Blair MP and possibly those arguments raised by Gearty and 
describe them as ‘dispositive of precautionary risk’; this is what Aradau and van Munster 
(2008) describe as a ‘vision of a disastrous future about to unfold [which] produces the 
depoliticised imperative of present action’.69 The notion that fear of future terrorist attacks 
can fuel the decision-making process of government and state officials (eg the police) to take 
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drastic action may be viewed as a precautionary approach and importantly is the sort of 
behaviour the TA 2000 intended to curtail. 
 
During the judgment of the Belmarsh case Lord Hoffman stated that: 
'[This case] calls into question the very existence of an ancient liberty of which this country 
has until now been very proud: freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. The power which 
the Home Secretary seeks to uphold is a power to detain people indefinitely without charge or 
trial. Nothing could be more antithetical to the instincts and traditions of the people of the 
United Kingdom'.70  
 
The House of Lords, when it was still in existence before the introduction of the UK Supreme 
Court, was self-described as guardians to the rule of law and as described by Lord Bingham 
as "specialists in the protection of liberty".71 As suggested by Ewing and Tham (2008) a 
weak rule of law has 'implications for the judicial protection of human rights...leading 
inexorably to low levels of protection of human rights'.72 It is suggested that preventative 
measures increase tension, for human rights this tension tends to be at its most severe 
(Fenwick, 2007; 2010). This may raise concerns and fears of a lack of Convention 
compliance which would have greater negative risks, as will be shown throughout this thesis. 
 
Ewing and Tham (2008: 685) argued that the HRA 1998 in connection to counter-terrorism 
measures has a fruitless function; Kavanagh (2009) disagrees and believes that 'marginal 
gains are better than no gains...and some measure of rights protection is better than flagrant 
violation across the board'.73 The assessment of human rights under the ECHR throughout 
this thesis can either support Kavanagh’s assertion that gains are being made, or show that no 
gains are being made at all. This thesis is likely to show that by the nature of the counter-
terrorism measures used by the UK any gains are best described as ‘pusedo gains’ rather than 
‘real gains’.  
 
It will be argued that those measures taken by the UK government are a greater threat to 
human security than terrorist activities, corroding British values which terrorists target: 
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73 Aileen Kavanagh 'Judging the Judges under the Human Rights Act 1998: Deference, disillusionment and the 
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human rights and the rule of law (Hoffman, 2004: 933; Landman, 2007-2008: 77). Hoffman 
(2004) suggests that historically when societies “trade” human rights for security, neither is 
obtained. Instead minorities and marginalised communities suffer human rights violations, 
consequently increasing the role of disconnected and disenfranchised individuals, becoming 
susceptible to recruitment by terrorists and terrorist organisations, as well as generating 
enmity between the state and the affected communities (Hoffman, 2004: 935-47); a risk that 
this thesis will consider.  
 
Since the 2010 general election human rights have become an issue of debate when 
considering counter-terrorism. The Conservative Party pledged to introduce a British Bill of 
Rights ('BoR') as a replacement of the Human Rights Act. The detail of the BoR was being 
considered by the Commission on a Bill of Rights who reported their findings to the UK 
Government on the 18th December 2012 (see Commission on a Bill of Rights),74 the outcome 
of this report and the government’s response is still outstanding. This thesis will not be 
considering the Commission’s report and its relationship with counter-terrorism measures. 
 
In determining the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures, this thesis will show that 
human rights involve legal discussion supported by evidence and case law; compared to risk 
assessment which involves a holistic discussion on the arguments for and against use of 
measures. Whilst it will be shown with examples of case law that human rights may not be 
breached in terms of the impact on a specific individual when subjected to a specific counter-
terror measure, it is argued that the risk assessment will suggest differently. For example, 
control orders were developed so they were compliant with basic human rights by creating 
the two types of control orders as previously mentioned; however, in examining the wider 
effect of control orders on suspects, their families etc, it will be argued that they are excessive 
and do not achieve the aim of security. 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT: ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND UK 
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
Pre-emptive action involves the identification and separation of the 'suspicious from the 
‘normal’, the ‘risky’ from the ‘at risk’'75 (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2004), whilst pre-emptive 
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security is 'based on a precautionary logic that normalises suspicion'.76 In other words, pre-
emptive measures are similar to the issue of risks; they are used as 'automated means through 
which the ‘suspect’ is sorted from the ‘legitimate’, the ‘abnormal’ is separated from the 
‘normal’'77 (Amoore and de Goede, 2005; Coward, 2006). It was argued by Ericson (2007) 
that pre-emptive security measures require radical reconfiguration of the law by two methods. 
One method is known as 'law against laws'; this is when new laws are introduced which result 
in the erosion or elimination of traditional principles, standards and procedures; the other 
method is known as 'surveillant assemblages'. Here surveillance methods are introduced to 
detect terrorist activity consequently resulting in the erosion or elimination of human rights’ 
traditions etc. It has been acknowledged that such consequences of counter-terrorism 
measures tend to fail to adhere to the ECHR and common law values (Fenwick, 2007) and 
thus supports the view of Ericson (2007). The former method is illustrated by the 
implementation of s44, control orders and other measures of counter-terrorism that will be 
considered; the latter method, to some degree, over-laps with the former and is also illustrated 
by the use of s44 and pre-trial detention, which can form part of the evidence and intelligence 
gathering operations to support subsequent actions (eg conviction, deportation etc). 
 
The previous UK counter-terrorism scheme, as provided under the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1996, illustrated a degree of acceptance of emergency measures at times of 'immediate and 
severe need';78 which it will be argued the counter-terrorism measures post-9/11 have lacked 
and should be a built-in safeguard to reduce risks such as abuse of process. Post-9/11 
language, such as ‘war on terror’, is used to address issues of counter-terrorism which 
asserted the 'existence of a state of exception';79 therefore exceptional measures have become 
more justifiable, for example the courts taking a deferential approach to the use of some 
measures which will be discussed. The Joint Committee on Human Rights explained that this 
becomes an issue when the government suggests 'there is a public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation',80 giving rise to the government’s belief of justification for introducing the 
measures that will be examined in this thesis. However, the lack of evidence or information 
may raise concerns of trust and belief, which may then lead to the public questioning whether 
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there really is any threat (Coutin, 2008: 220). This risk may then result in public distrust in 
the courts if they behave deferentially towards government action rather than act 
independently, defending human rights. 
 
There is little evidence that control orders were an effective form of counter-terrorism, as 
conceded by Lord Carlile in the Independent Terrorism Review 2009 and David Anderson 
QC when giving evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (19th March 2013).81 
Historically, when similar powers have been used during the First and Second World War the 
House of Lords concluded that security outweighed civil liberties. There is an argument that 
the courts show a reluctance or deference to conclude that any of Parliament’s pre-emptive 
measures are a step too far. Whilst giving evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Baroness Hale admitted that it is for 'the judiciary [to] do whatever parliament [tells] them to 
do'82 and Parliament decides what it is the judiciary should do. This supports the argument 
that the judiciary are deferential towards government counter-terrorism measures, which this 
thesis will consider and argue as a serious risk. The deferential attitude by the courts may best 
be labelled as the ‘state of exception’ theory (Agamben, 2005: 2) and practice of homo sacer, 
which enables the state to place its importance above law and order when dealing with 
matters of security. For example, although the government’s introduction and use of s44, 
control orders and deportation are argued as breaching human rights in some way, they have 
been deemed acceptable methods of countering terrorism. In the Court of Appeal in Shafir ur 
Rehman83 it was accepted by the court that the government should determine whether a threat 
to national security exists, giving the government unfettered decision-making to determine 
whether a suspect poses a terrorist threat and is a danger to national security, assertions that 
would not be challenged by an independent court.  
 
It is submitted that human rights and risk are intertwined and non-compliance of human 
rights will tend to result in the existence of greater risks. It was explained by Whitty (2010) 
that areas of public administration such as the criminal justice system 'have been heavily 
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influenced by concerns about risk'84 with awareness of human rights and legal obligations 
increasing (2010: 2). Whitty questioned what the relationship between risk and human rights 
is and what the significance is when living in a high terrorist threat era (2010: 2), however 
when taking his points into account coupled with the UK Strategy, further questions may be 
raised. If the current government intends on re-balancing national security with human rights, 
is the ineffectiveness of the measure inherent or is it caused by the enforcement of the 
measure? This is particularly important when considering the use of emergency police 
powers or executive orders such as control orders or TPIMs/ETPIMs. Also, what 
considerations or safeguards need to be made when formulating any strategy with the view to 
using pre-emptive and preventive measures to counter-terrorism? 
 
Risk and the measurement of risk involve the identification of various issues, which this 
thesis defines as ‘weighing-up’ the positives and negatives of pre-emptive and preventative 
counter-terrorism measures used; this would include considering the balance between 
national security and human rights against public safety. The development and use of 
counter-terrorism measures, such as s44 and control orders, display a number of dominant 
risk trends and concerns of due process which are identifiable within the individual measures 
and collectively. An example of such risks and due process, as identified by McCulloch and 
Pickering (2009: 630), is the labelling of a person as a ‘terrorist’ which is in itself a pre-
emptive decision without evidence; compare this to a person being labelled as a ‘criminal’ 
which is given following due process, consideration of guilt or innocence and evidence. 
However, in the new era of pre-emptive and preventative measures of terrorism, sanctions are 
not as equally ascribed to terrorists as they are to ‘ordinary criminals’, with serious sanctions 
being applied "in advance of or without charge or trial and can be imposed or continued 
despite a not-guilty verdict".85 Rather than the courts playing an integral and independent 
role, the state decides who is guilty and how best to ‘punish’ them. 
 
Whilst s44 and powers of stop and search provide police with the opportunity to disrupt 
terrorist activity, it is evident that such powers are more readily open to abuse. The 
Metropolitan Police accepted that there are risks to consider: 
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'…improve the security of London and enhance community confidence by demonstrating a 
visible, responsive and proactive style of policing...to disrupt, deter and prevent terrorism and 
help create a hostile and uncertain environment for terrorists...'86 
 
The Metropolitan Police, Government and Lord Carlile QC accepted that there were some 
concerns in relation to stop and search powers. When dealing with individuals who present a 
religious or cultural sensitivity the Metropolitan Police suggested that the police 'need to 
balance the likelihood of discovering the article to potential harm you may cause to the 
person'.87 This is clear acknowledgment that ethnic and cultural sensitivities may exist and 
the state or police need to keep this in mind whilst dealing with threats of terrorism. The 
awareness of such concerns is likely to be a reoccurring theme throughout the examination of 
risk in pre-emptive and preventative counter-terrorism measures. This issue most likely to 
occur when terrorists are stigmatised as being ‘Islamist extremists',88 raising further questions 
for consideration: What factors do the police use to identify the ‘risky’ from the ‘at risk’, or 
the ‘normal’ from the ‘abnormal’: by their look, demeanour and conduct? The problem faced 
by the government, as discussed by Hardin (2003) and Humboldt (1854), is setting the right 
balance to achieve security whilst simultaneously preventing itself from violating individual 
freedoms (Hardin, 2003: 77).  
 
As explained in the introduction of this thesis, the UK faces a balance between national 
security and human rights. It will be argued that most preventative measures introduced post-
9/11 have favoured one over the other – usually national security over human rights. Some 
academics consider that there are models which suggest an appropriate course of action or 
measure be taken. There are three main models of countering terrorism: a War Model, a 
Criminal Justice Model and a Human Rights-Based Approach, although Landman (2007-
2008: 103) and Large (2005: 143) suggest there is a fourth, known as ‘Causes of Terrorism 
Model’. It is argued by Walker (2006: 1145) and Allen (1996: 37-40) that since the Diplock 
Report in 1972, the UK has largely adopted the Criminal Justice Model and not the War 
Model (Walker, 2006: 1145; Landman, 2007-2008: 103). The Criminal Justice Model is 
viewed as the correct approach to take to sustain a long-term campaign as it is consistent with 
                                                          
86 Metropolitan Police (fn 41) 7. 
87 Ibid: 11. 
88 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew 'Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the 
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the rule of law and ensures an appropriate response. The War Model on the other hand, which 
is adopted by the US, results in a lack of accountability and is inappropriate to the aims 
pursued, ultimately threatening the rule of law in a civil society (Walker, 2006: 1145). Given 
the arguments and risk concerns discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to preventative 
measures such as s44 and control orders, it will be argued that the Criminal Justice Model 
was suspended post-9/11 and a War Model adopted in its place. There is concern that there 
are temptations for the government to supersede the Criminal Justice Model with a security 
model, which may even be regarded as a ‘Counter Terrorism Model’ (Gearty, 2006), which 
would be founded on fear and suspicion (Gearty, 2006: 137; Landman, 2007-2008: 103) and 
help in the development of a new counter-terrorism justice system. This model, it will be 
argued, would suit the UK Security Services and would be developed to empower the state to 
make decisions which are contrary to human rights and due process protections. Such a 
model would allow the government to make assertions that a threat to public life and safety 
exists requiring emergency powers so action may be taken, with the judiciary taking a 
deferential view; this model would be a further example of ‘laws against laws’ (Ericson, 
2007) as discussed earlier in this chapter.89 
 
The Criminal Justice Model, as suggested by Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin in Charaouis 
v Almeri,90 citing New Brunswick v G91 (both American cases), ensure that prior to the state’s 
detention of individuals for considerable periods of time they will be provided with fair due 
process and judicial involvement, a view supported by Landman (2007-2008: 105). In 
comparison the Human Rights-Based Approach which Landman (2007-2008: 78) argues is 
not a ‘soft option’, adheres to the morals, principles and values which are cherished in 
democracies, strengthening the rule of law, but also controlling the unintended results of 
terrorist attacks. It is not a soft option because it protects those principles such as legality, 
proportionality, non-discrimination, due process and an individuals’ right to seek asylum 
(Landman, 2007-2008: 105). Rather than abandon those principles to tackle terrorism, they 
should be maintained. An appropriate balance may be achieved by an amalgamation of two 
models; Michael German (a former undercover FBI agent) suggests that a balance between 
the Criminal Justice Model and Human Rights-Based Approach should be created because:  
 
                                                          
89 See page 42. 
90 Charaouis v Almeri [2007] 276 D.L.R. (4th) 594. 
91 New Brunswick v G.[1999] 3 S.C.R. 46. 
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'[B]y treating terrorists like criminals, we stigmatize them in their community, while 
simultaneously validating our own authority. Open and public trials allow the community to 
see the terrorist for the criminal he [or she] is, and successful prosecution give them faith the 
government is protecting them. Judicial review ensures that the methods used are in 
accordance with the law, and juries enforce community standards of fairness...Checks and 
balances on government power and public accountability promote efficiency by ensuring that 
only the guilty are punished'.92  
 
As explained by Fenwick (2010), the Joint Committee on Human Rights believed that in 
order to re-set the balance accordingly it was time to 'bridge the gap between the rhetoric and 
the reality in the field of counter-terrorism policy and human rights';93 in other words the 
human rights of the individual, not just the safety of the nation, should be considered when 
enacting and enforcing counter-terrorism measures. The role of the courts is an important one 
with its power to maintain such a balance; however, Keir Starmer QC (the then Director of 
Public Prosecutions) believed that there was a differing view between the government and the 
courts, stating 'our judges are wrongly undermining the war on terror by deliberately 
misinterpreting the law'.94 This raises uncertainty over which approach the government and 
the courts should each take. It is noteworthy that German (2005) moots the notion that a 
parallel model, or holistic approach, rather than necessarily a specific one and instead 
incorporating the better ideas of several models. It is submitted that such a model is unlikely 
to be practical as it could not be achieved or maintained with current preventative measures; 
although this may be attempted in light of the MacDonald Report (2011) and other 
subsequent reviews and reports, forming a Criminal Justice/Human Rights Approach Model 
that Landman (2007-2008) favours which this thesis would argue provides the needed 
balance of national security and human rights.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Undoubtedly the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 have questioned and placed the UK’s 
commitment to human rights under greater pressure due to the counter-terrorism measures 
                                                          
92 Michael German 'Squaring the Error' in 'Law vs. War: Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism' 2005 
(11th July), 14 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA436141&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> 
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introduced. Post-9/11 the former Labour UK government were able to assert that the courts 
supported the measures introduced (Fenwick, 2010: 167) despite some of the concerns raised 
by judges and successful challenges brought. There are suggestions by Landman (2007-2008: 
84-85) that when introducing counter-terrorism laws and enforcement of them there needs to 
be consideration given to the 'intimate and fundamental relationship between the imminence 
of the terrorist threat and the proportionality of the response'.95 This thesis will argue that 
when using controversial counter-terrorism measures a safeguard should be whether the 
threat posed is imminent; this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. Landman 
supports the Secretary-General of the United Nation’s belief that proportionality is one of the 
five criteria: "seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and 
balance of consequences".96 This in itself raises the question of who is best placed to judge 
whether enforcement of counter-terrorism laws is appropriate: the executive or the judiciary?  
 
As mentioned earlier, the 2010 general election saw control orders being debated and whether 
they should be reformed or replaced. Prior to the long awaited MacDonald Report (2011), the 
UK media speculated that the government intended on reforming the control order regime by 
replacing them with 'Surveillance Orders'.97 The media initially reported that whilst control 
orders would be repealed, the main provisions and implications of them would remain, 
meaning control orders would live on in all but name. In January 2011 the then British Prime 
Minister, David Cameron MP, stated that "the control order system is imperfect. Everybody 
knows that...It hasn’t been a success. We need a proper replacement...",98 and following the 
MacDonald Report (2011) TPIMs were identified. 
 
The key theme that emerges from this chapter is the use of risk assessment to determine 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures, which will be analysed in later chapters. This is 
likely to result in consideration of alternative measures, for example bail rather than control 
orders, or alternative safeguards for existing measures, such as increased accountability or 
independent judicial scrutiny. A further theme relates to the unintended risks created by the 
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use of pre-emptive and preventive measures, these include negative perceptions of the police 
and government or alienation of communities. Importantly there remains the main question 
which this thesis seeks to prove: do the pre-emptive and preventative measures used achieve 
the current UK Strategy to counter-terrorism? If they do not, what safeguards can be 
implemented to reduce the risks, increase effectiveness and provide a balance between human 
rights and national security? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLICE POWERS: STOP AND SEARCH UNDER SPECIAL 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POWERS; THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
 
‘It is an old and cherished tradition of our country that everyone should be free to go about 
their business in the streets of the land, confident that they will not be stopped and searched 
by the police unless reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence.’ 
– Lord Bingham99 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will consider the use of the pre-emptive crisis powers under s44 TA 2000, and 
the negative impact or risks that such crisis powers create. S44 itself was a counter-terrorism 
measure that enabled the police to stop and search anyone within a designated area without 
grounds for suspicion. Measures of this kind create a number of risks related to human rights, 
specifically the right to privacy and arguably the right to liberty. In addition there are 
sociological risks caused by such measures, including the creation of social boundaries 
resulting in cultural segregation and ‘suspect communities’ (Greer, 2010; Fenwick, 2010); 
poor relationships between citizens and the police; and a negative perception of the police. 
 
When considering the impact that such a pre-emptive measure has, there will be discussion of 
the legal challenges against the use of s44. Following the case of Gillan and Quinton v 
United Kingdom100 the MacDonald Report (2011) found that although stopping and searching 
suspects without reasonable suspicion is operationally acceptable in exceptional 
circumstances (2011: 4), it recommended the need to be committed to introduce safeguards to 
prevent the risk of misuse (2011: 15). In the Independent Terrorism Review (2006) Lord 
                                                          
99 Lord Bingham House of Lords decision in R (on the application of Gillan (FC) and another (FC)) v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12. 
100 Gillan and Quinton (fn 15). 
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Carlile QC accepted that there was "little or no evidence that the use of section 44 has the 
potential to prevent an act of terrorism as compared to other statutory powers of stop and 
search".101 There are scholars, like Walker (2008) that believe that since the inception of s44 
there have been five patterns that have manifested:  
1. A continual use and renewal of s44;  
2. S44 has a low rate of arrests on grounds of terrorism;  
3. Higher rate of non-terrorist arrests;  
4. Ethnic minorities have been disproportionately impacted upon; and  
5. There has been an imbalanced geographical enforcement of s44. 
 
The MacDonald Report (2011) recommended that there was a need to change the test for 
authorising s44 from 'expedient' to 'necessary', which one might argue is similar to a test of 
immediacy of the threat. A test based on the immediacy of the threat would examine how real 
or necessary it is to act before the terrorist attack is realised; this would therefore be an 
intelligence based analysis of the believed threat. Whilst this may be viewed as an assessment 
of proportionality, it also enables the consideration of effectiveness. Under the report it was 
recommended that powers similar to s44 should only be authorised for a maximum of 14 
days, rather than 28 days. This would help reduce the likelihood of a continuous rolling-
programme of such crisis powers as seen post- 9/11 with s44. 
 
The report supported the idea of increased accountability and transparency as safeguards 
within crisis powers like s44. This would be achieved through clear communication as to why 
such powers were authorised and restricting the use of those powers to a specific 
geographical areas, therefore preventing such powers from being applied to ‘the whole of 
London’ as was seen during the lifetime of s44. Furthermore on accountability, the report 
suggested the police should be given discretionary use of crisis powers but there needs to be 
robust statutory guidance on its use. Lord MacDonald believed that s44 needed to be repealed 
                                                          
101 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew 'Report on the Operation in 2006 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the 
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and replaced – a view shared by Lord Carlile QC,102 conceding that s44 had been proven to 
be an ineffective power to counter-terrorism commenting: '[He was] offended by its [s44] use' 
and that it was a 'very major problem', describing it as 'oppressive'. This met its demise when 
it was challenged at the ECtHR, where it was accepted to be 'coercive'.103 
 
The decision of the ECtHR in the Gillan and Quintion case lead to a Parliamentary statement 
by the then Home Secretary (House of Commons, 2010-2011, 8th July 2010), as mentioned 
earlier the former coalition UK government sought to pass the Protection of Freedoms Bill 
('PoFB') 2011 and receive its Royal Assent.104 S59 PoFA 2012 repealed s44 TA 2000 and 
replaced it with s61 PoFA 2012.105 The s61 provisions purports to tighten the use of crisis 
powers of stop and search, although this thesis will establish that whilst s61 is an 
improvement on s44, the provision retains the same risks relating to human rights and 
sociological impact which still fails to subsequently support the UK Strategy to counter-
terrorism. 
 
This chapter will focus on s44 underpinning as it does the extent to which s61 is an 
improvement to counter-terrorism and therefore remains a risk. It will be argued that crisis 
powers such as s44 that provide no or insufficient safeguards, such a lack of accountability, 
create such risks. It will be argued that the consequences of the risks created by such crisis 
powers support terrorist propaganda and restricts, if not prevents, the police from pre-empting 
and preventing terrorism. It will also support the conclusion in Chapter Six, that pre-emptive 
and preventative counter-terrorism measures are ineffective because they do not assist in the 
intelligence and evidence gathering process to secure prosecution. This chapter will argue 
that safeguards, such as accountability and a test of suspicion should be created in order to 
reduce risks and strengthen the effectiveness of such measures. 
                                                          
102 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew (fn 8). 
103 Gillan and Quinton (fn 15) [59]. 
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Determining whether s61 is an effective and necessary crisis power is important because it 
was one of the failings of s44 raised by the ECtHR in the Gillan and Quinton case. The test 
of 'expedient' (s44(3)) gave no requirement or consideration of a risk assessment (Middleton, 
2011b: 244); the s44 crisis powers were "neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to 
adequate safeguards against abuse...[and therefore, not] in accordance with the law".106 
Proportionality could assist in the assessment of effectiveness, this was best described by 
Rodin (2004) as a ‘quasi-consequentialist’ principle that deems there is a moral limit of the 
prima facie justified actions (i.e. stop and search under s44) and is triggered when actions do 
more harm than good. Crisis counter-terrorism measures like s44 and s61, are exhibited when 
a person’s human rights are being harmed, or exposed to further risks of harm, without there 
being justification (Rodin, 2003: 768). For example, detaining a person or many people 
without reasonable belief that they are a terrorist or involved in terrorist activity, which may 
be based on an incorrect assertion may be viewed as unreasonable and therefore 
disproportionate; as such it is important that the potential terrorist threat is assessed. 
Safeguards determining the immediacy of the threat can inform the decision-maker whether it 
is necessary to act, this would assist in determining whether enforcement of a crisis power 
was proportionate and effective. Whilst one may view s44 and s61 as a way of deterring 
terrorist activity, if the measure restricts the opportunities to collect intelligence and evidence 
to secure subsequent control, management or prosecution of terrorists then the measure, it 
will be argued, is ineffective and contradicts the UK Strategy 2011. 
 
As part of the assessment of considering proportionality and effectiveness, the timing of any 
response needs to be considered. Under s44 the power could be used when it was ‘expedient 
to do so’ or when it was understood to be advantageous, as described in the Gillan and 
Quinton case, without defining when this should be. The progression of the Gillan and 
Quinton case to the ECtHR107 will be discussed to support this thesis argument that pre-
emptive crisis powers, like s44, should only be enforced when a terrorist threat will be 
realised or imminent. This will enable the identification of risks and issues pertaining to 
human rights. It will be argued that human rights, specifically ones right to privacy, are being 
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negatively impacted upon either because of the courts deferential attitude towards the 
governments approach or they are gripped by the fear of ‘what if...?’. This becomes evidence 
to support the doctrine of ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) as mentioned in the 
Introduction of this thesis. Ultimately, the questions that need to be answered are: Do the pre-
emptive measures support the UK Strategy to counter-terrorism? Are they an effective way of 
countering terrorism? In light of the risks identified, do the police have a role in countering 
terrorism? 
 
THE ROLE OF THE POLICE 
The British Police are considered to be 'the most visible of all criminal justice institutions'108 
in the UK, providing a strong link between the police and citizens which is created by the 
style and tactics adopted by the police (Messenger, 2008: 4). This link is created by the 
notion that citizens work as police, arguably strengthened by the Police Reform Act (RFA) 
2002 which enables members of the public to be trained as Police Community Support 
Officers (PCSO’s)109 to work alongside ordinary police officers.  
 
The Police Foundation and Policy Studies Institute in 1996 defined the role of the police as 
being responsible for fairly and firmly upholding the law and bring offenders to justice; 
preventing crime; protecting and reassuring the community; and to be seen executing their 
duties with 'integrity, common sense and sound judgment'.110 The police are considered to be 
responsible for upholding the law and meeting public expectations (Goldsmith, 2010: 916). It 
is acknowledged by some that the police are 'primarily concerned with preventing and 
detecting crime' (Reiner, 2000: 170), although there is recognition of historical and 
sociological evidence which shows that 'crime-fighting has never been, is not, and cannot be 
the prime activity of the police', although this would be a popular perception by the media, 
public and is reflected in government policy (Reiner, 2000: 170). 
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The police have faced profound changes in law, transforming their powers and accountability 
as well as covert changes in policy and practice (Reiner, 2000: 167). Some scholars have 
remarked that policing has become a ‘social good’ and is an important component between 
the state and its interaction with the agents (eg the police) in their execution of justice 
(Loader and Walker, 2001). Reiner (2000) suggests that the police and chief constables have 
become less accountable at local level over the years, whilst accountability to government has 
increased (2000:167) and yet despite this view, UK policing is considered “public policing”. 
This change in accountability may be considered defining characteristic of state power and 
control (Zedner, 2006a: 78; Messenger, 2008: 3) and a risk to the concept of public policing 
if accountability to the public were reduced. It will be argued that when enforcing counter-
terrorism measures public support and perception is important, meaning there should be clear 
accountability when a measure is enforced by police.  
 
The enactment of PACE 1984 was a landmark codification of police powers including stop 
and search, arrest and detention of suspects, by providing safeguards when those powers are 
executed (Reiner, 2000: 167). This development fundamentally transformed the ‘doctrine of 
constabulary independence’ (Reiner (2000:167) which supported the constables independent 
behaviour of having an unprompted sniff, instead PACE created a system of balance and 
checks which resisted arbitrary decisions. Reiner (2000) suggests that developments and 
changes in police identity and regulation were exposed to theories of a ‘rational deterrent 
model’ to policing crime, which consisted of: 
More police power + Greater deterrence = Less crime 
Although this formula was intended to apply to ordinary police powers, it will be argued that 
the wider police powers intended on tackling terrorism, such as s44, did not necessarily result 
in a reduction of terrorist-related activity. On the contrary such powers have a coercive 
impact, causing greater harm to public perception of the police and do not tackle terrorism 
effectively. If the role the police are expected to play in the fight against terrorism is 
criticised or questioned, then they will face greater difficulties in maintaining positive public 
perception which may have a consequential negative impact on how the police are viewed. 
For example, if the police are seen to exploit the use of crisis powers without safeguards 
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providing accountability or remedy when an abuse of process occurs, the wider public may 
perceive the police as not meeting the core duties as set out by the Police Foundation and 
Policy Studies Institute in 1996 (see page 51of thesis).  
 
Differences between ordinary policing & counter-terrorism policing. 
There has been debate to the effect that since the 1980s policing has moved from a 
‘consensus’ style of policing towards a more militaristic and coercive approach, which can be 
seen in powers linked to targeted surveillance and pre-emptive intelligence-gathering (Hall et 
al, 1978; Maguire, 2000; Sheptycki, 2000; Reiner, 2000:174). The traditional style of 
policing was considered to be reactive and incident-driven, focusing on response rates to 
incidents and retrospective investigation (Peak, Bradshaw and Glensor, 1992: 26). It is 
noteworthy that ‘consensual policing’ occurs when the police and citizens clash and can be 
contrasted with the ‘law enforcement’ style of policing commonly seen in the United States 
(Messenger, 2008: 4). The latter creates a divergence between citizens and the police, or 
state; however, the former is believed to reconcile these concepts by presenting the police as 
“citizens in uniform” (Loader, 1997: 5; Messenger, 2008: 4), which one would argue is a 
positive form of policing and in line with traditional British policing as already discussed.  
 
A positive relationship or perception between the police and citizen can support the police in 
their duties to detect and investigate criminal behaviour; it can further support them in pre-
empting and preventing terrorism by working with communities and the general public. The 
public’s role in supporting the police in gathering information about terrorist suspects can be 
seen from a number of UK anti-terrorism campaigns (eg Metropolitan Police ‘Counter 
Terrorism Campaign, 2012).111 Some counter-terrorism experts have expressed the 
importance of reducing or minimising the number of campaigns raising public awareness of 
terrorism due to the suspicion and fear such campaigns can instil without there being a need 
to do so (Benoît Gomis, 2013a). Later in this chapter it will be discussed in greater detail that 
a negative perception of the police, or negative relationship between them and the public, 
does not assist them in their duties to protect the public or tackle terrorism. 
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As mentioned in Chapter One, the TA 2000 was enacted pre-9/11 at a time when the UK 
government and Parliament had hoped such powers would not be needed and amalgamated 
previous counter-terrorism legislation; the intention to stop a cycle of introducing emergency 
powers (Walker, 2006: 1142). When s44 was presented to Parliament it was believed it did 
not fall foul of Article 8(1) ECHR, and if it did, it would meet one of the exceptions under 
Article 8(2).112 Following 9/11 the police developed a greater risk management approach 
which supported their proactive style of policing to counter-terrorism, as confirmed by 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke (pages 14 and 15 of this thesis). At the 
Counter- Terror Expo 2011 John Yates, the then Metropolitan Police Service Assistant 
Commissioner Specialist Operations, stated that the terrorist threat is even more severe than it 
has ever been, evolving “in a way that few could have predicted”,113 requiring an equally 
agile response.114 As policing terrorism became preventative, it meant there had to be a 
difference between preventing terrorism and investigating terrorism. Although preventative 
policing is the focus of this chapter, investigative policing and negative impact of counter-
terrorism measures will be considered in more depth in Chapter Five.  The ‘National Counter 
Terrorist Policing Network’, as described by John Yates, was therefore ‘interwoven’ into the 
mainframe of UK policing. The network itself consists of the Metropolitan Police’s Counter 
Terrorism Command (henceforth 'CTC') which is seen as the ‘operational nucleus’; then 
regional structures; and frontline police. The frontline police officer that provides support at a 
local and regional level is considered an integral part of counter-terrorism policing. This level 
of counter-terrorism policing may prime facie give the impression that police are still citizens 
in uniform, similar to ordinary policing as previously discussed in this chapter. This 
‘pyramidal model of command’ under the CTC can support in the detection and management 
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of the terrorist threats across the UK, a model described by John Yates as 'the envy of our 
international partners'.115 
 
It is argued however, that John Yates fails to understand that traditional policing is supported 
by the consensus or co-operation of the citizen, rather than a public perception that the police 
are citizens in uniform. Whilst non-compliance with ordinary stop and search powers (eg s1 
PACE) can create an offence, counter-terrorism policing has taken on a form that amounts to 
‘proactive coercion’, as will be shown by s44. Non-compliance under ordinary stop and 
search powers would not create an inference of guilt or suspected criminal activity, whereas 
non-compliance with a s44 stop and search command would have entitled the officer to draw 
inferences, supporting suspicion and arrest of the suspect for non-compliance under s47 TA 
2000. The pyramidal model of command provides a useful insight into the policing command 
structure and therefore the ladder of accountability. When examining the structure in greater 
detail and understanding the requirements laid out under the TA 2000, for example obtaining 
the Secretary of State’s confirmation to grant use of s44 power, one can see a wider picture of 
structural authority forming, as shown in Diagram 2 (below):  
 
Diagram 2: Authority structure under section 44 Terrorism Act 2000.  
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(3) Regional counter-terrorism units 
(4) Frontline police 
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It is understood that s44, and now s61, are adaptations of the criminal justice norms with 
minor adjustments. The police at all times remain players of the criminal justice system and 
specialist police are undistinguishable from counter-terrorism police when using such 
legislative powers. By doing this, the government has created a sense of normalization of a 
security measure or extraordinary power. The risk of normalizing counter-terrorism measures 
may result in the desired effect of the measure from being lost; this particular risk will be 
discussed throughout this thesis and considered in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
 
In this chapter it will be shown that counter-terrorism policing, specifically s44 stop and 
search, was over broad, enforced in a broad fashion and breached Article 8 rights. The Gillan 
and Quinton case will show that other rights, including those under Article 5, had been 
considered by the court as potential breaches. To support this argument reference will be 
made to the more recent case of Austin v United Kingdom,116 which is not a counter-terrorism 
matter but considers Article 5 ECHR. In the Austin case those within a cordoned area, 
intended to isolate and contain a large crowd of people in dangerous and volatile conditions, 
had not been deprived of their liberty within the meaning of the Convention. The application 
was in relation to the specific tactic used by the police to disperse or control crowds of people 
known as ‘kettling’, which was done on grounds of public order. Not only will this be 
discussed below, it will be argued that s61 also would result in a breach of Articles 5 and 8 
ECHR. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, accountability is an important safeguard to regulate 
police conduct in ordinary policing (see s1 PACE). Accountability reduces the possibility of 
an abuse of process occurring and is underpinned by the prerequisite of ‘reasonable 
suspicion’. S44 however did not provide this safeguard and that lack of accountability 
allowed the police to take action which may be considered an abuse or disproportionate when 
enforcing the s44 powers. A lack of accountability could be seen at each level of the authority 
structure under s44 as shown in diagram 2 above, although this may extend to the judiciary 
who fail to regulate the actions and conduct of those implementing and enforcing counter-
terrorism powers. Although other chapters of this thesis, like Chapter Three and Five, will 
                                                          
116 Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14; 55 EHRR 14; [2012] ECHR 459; [2012] Crim LR 544; 32 BHRC 
618 (Application Numbers 39692/09, 40713/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09). 
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show labelling or stigmatising of ‘suspect terrorists’ happening by the government (eg 
Secretary of State), s44 would enable the police to do the same. This allowed the police to act 
in a quasi-judicial manner and create ‘suspect communities’ (Fenwick, 2010; Choudhury and 
Fenwick, 2011)117 through such labelling, yet were not accountable for the decisions-made or 
grounds to stop and search an individual under s44.  
 
 
The importance of accountability as a safeguard in counter-terrorism policing. 
It may be argued that accountability does not lie with any particular individual but with every 
key player from the Secretary of State, to the authorising officer of s44 power and the 
frontline police officer that enforces s44. Based on this chapter’s intended discussion of the 
mentioned negative consequences and risks of s44, it will conclude that the repeal of s44 was 
an appropriate course of action by the UK government. S44, and similar crisis powers, should 
only be enforceable at times when there is a genuine belief that there is an imminent threat of 
a terrorist attack, making the enforcement of those powers a necessity and an inherent 
safeguard to reduce any risk of abuse of process. Under the Impact Assessment of s44118 
completed by the Home Office (2011c) s61 was intended to achieve this inherent safeguard, 
although it will be argued that it does not far enough. However, it is important to note that 
following the Gillan and Quinton case and the MacDonald Report (2011), s44 was repealed 
and instead counter-terrorism stop and search powers were implemented under s43 of TA 
2000 which requires reasonable suspicion, similar to ordinary stop and search powers.  
 
If any similar powers to s44 were introduced consideration should be given to ways of 
preventing or reducing the negative risks created, which Ashworth (2006) believed could be 
done by the ensuring the rule-of-law values are safeguarded (2006: 76). Under s44 there was 
a focus on the management of risk posed by terrorism by implementing a precautionary 
approach. This precautionary approach is a typical feature of pre-emptive feature as 
mentioned in Chapter One and fails to appreciate the importance placed upon human rights. It 
                                                          
117 Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick 'The impact of Counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities' 
2011 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 25(3): 151-181. 
118 Home Office 'Terrorism Stop and Search Powers (Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000) Impact Assessment' 
2011c (18th January) HO0033 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/legislation/freedom-
bill/ia-terrorism-stop-search?view=Binary> accessed 15th April 2012. 
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is therefore important that as the replacement of s44, s61 supports human rights and reduced 
the risks s44 created. By doing so, s61 will support the ‘Criminal Justice and Human Rights 
Approach Model’ rather than adopt a wholly new system as demonstrated by the ‘Counter-
Terrorism Model’ (see Chapter One). 
 
It is considered that the emotional attachment of fear experienced by the public and police 
and the perceived terrorist threat, enables the government to promote the counter-terrorism 
model (Edkins, 2007; Donoghue, 2010), this supports the state of emergency doctrine with 
various conflicts and risks. This chapter will argue that the courts should hold the government 
to account in its belief that such powers are necessary by establishing on what grounds they 
believe a terrorist threat exists and the immanency of that threat. This, it will be argued, 
would ensure that the enforcement of the crisis powers are proportionate to the threat and 
ensures accountability for the decision to enforce such powers. 
 
‘CRISIS’ STOP AND SEARCH POWERS COMPARED WITH TRADITIONAL STOP 
AND SEARCH POWERS 
The criminal justice and human rights approach model is considered a model of ‘operational 
accountability’ (Police Foundation and Policy Studies Institute, 1996: 11) and is manifest in 
the ordinary police powers of stop and search. Under s1 PACE and other ordinary police 
powers which are supported by statute, give regulation to police conduct and accountability 
therein. Powers providing regulation and protection to the police and public ensure the police 
can do their job without fear of legal action if adhered to; they maintain or build a positive 
perception of the police; and provide a remedy to those that are unfairly treated by those who 
act unfairly. As briefly mentioned earlier, s44 does not provide such stringent safeguards and 
allows uniformed police to stop and search vehicles or people within a designated area or 
place (s44(1)) without reasonable suspicion if this is authorised by a senior police officer and 
confirmed by the Secretary of State. In the Gillan and Quinton case the House of Lords found 
safeguards to exist within the TA 2000, which they believed provided protection to the public 
when traditional stop and search powers and ordinary guarantees are no longer applicable. 
They identified the safeguards as: 
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(1) Authorisation is only to be given if the authorising person reasonably considers it 
expedient to do so in 'the prevention of acts of terrorism' (s44(1) and (2)); 
(2) Authorisation should be directed to the overriding objective. Whilst this is not stated 
within the TA 2000 this point raised by Lord Bingham indirectly identifies a 
proportionality test for authorising the risk of terrorist attacks, however the Court of 
Appeal understood that given the modern world the UK is under constant risk of 
terrorism; 
(3) Authorisation cannot extend beyond a police area. However, it was acceptable to 
authorise the use of s44 to a broad area such as ‘London’ rather than specific 
borough’s or districts of London; 
(4) Authorisation is limited to 28 days, although it may be continually renewed thereafter; 
(5) Authorisation may be provided only by a senior police officer and must be reported to 
the Secretary of State immediately whom must confirm the authorisation within 48 
hours or it lapses; 
(6) The Secretary of State may alter the term in which s44 is authorised for or indeed 
cancel it; 
(7) S44 may only be authorised and exercised to search for articles which may be used in 
connection to terrorist-related activity; 
(8) In line with s126, the authorisation and use of s44 had to be reported to the 
Independent Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism; and 
(9) Any misuse of s44 may expose the authorising senior officer, police officers and the 
police force, and Secretary of State to legal challenges. 
 
The TA 2000 has been broadly condemned as "immensely broad and imprecise" (Fenwick, 
2002: 734; Zedner, 2009:130), and these identified safeguards would support this criticism. 
Unlike s1 PACE, s44 does not require the police to have reasonable suspicion that a person or 
group of people might be about to commit or have committed an act related to terrorism. The 
broad nature of s44 and its discretionary enforcement is such that some consider that the 
police should use their “copper’s nose” (Lord Carlile QC, 2007b; Walker, 2008: 278), basing 
their actions and decision-making on intuition instead of using rational indicators. It is argued 
that this is wrongly condoned by Lord Carlile QC (2007b) and Walker (2008), as allowing 
the police the occasional unprompted ‘sniff’ (2008: 278) further empowers the police and 
state to become more intrusive. It would also be incorrect to allow police an unprompted sniff 
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because it would be a return to the ‘doctrine of constabulary independence’, which would be 
a return to policing pre-PACE and would be an erosion of high standards of policing. Despite 
this, under s45(1)(b) and s44 enforcement was given "whether or not the constable has 
grounds"119 and gives the police the unprompted sniff.  
 
S44 was undoubtedly a pre-emptive measure adopted by the UK to counter terrorism as its 
focus is on identifying future terrorists (McCullock and Pickering, 2009: 629-630); this can 
only be achieved by means of suspicion which is one of the natural characteristics of pre-
emption as discussed in Chapter One. Whilst improved legislation could have provided an 
applicable test which police could have used to establish grounds of suspicion; an alternative 
way would have been for senior member of the authority structure, such as the Home 
Secretary providing circulars, explaining what factors police should be vigilant for when 
establishing grounds for suspicion. Clarity of this kind would have enabled the courts to hold 
those within the authority structure accountable for the decisions to authorise, confirm and 
enforce measures such as s44. 
 
S44 enabled the police and the courts to support and facilitate the government’s view that the 
threat of terrorism is constant and required continued vigilance, otherwise failure to act could 
result in serious attacks. This has similarities to the powers introduced in the United States 
after 9/11 under the Patriots Act and in Germany when the Reichstag Fire Decree was signed 
into law in 1933. Whilst the UK has not resorted to such extremes per se, the argument by the 
UK government is the same in that; similar to these examples, the feared risks posed by 
terrorism requires ‘emergency powers’ to tackle the threat, resulting in a state of exception as 
previously discussed. So far from discussions within this chapter, the way in which the state 
of exception is being formulated and used by the state, is best illustrated in a simple equation: 
Fear + Extreme Powers = State of Exception 
 
Without the safeguards of ‘reasonable suspicion’, or similar, as required under ss42 and 43 
TA 2000 or in ordinary policing, crisis powers such as s44 increasingly step away from the 
                                                          
119 Terrorism Act 2000, Section 44. 
64 
 
traditions of the criminal justice system. It also creates a further risk of enabling arbitrary 
decision-making to take place by those within the authority structure. S44 is an 'all-risks 
policing measure', treating anyone and everyone as a risk and potential threat (Walker, 2008: 
276). Whilst intelligence may lead or result in certain suspects being stopped and searched, 
the lack of transparency and accountability of decision makers, particularly in circumstances 
when there is a lack of intelligence, raises questions about decisions made and the intrusive 
measures enforced such as s44 (Walker, 2008: 276).  
 
When utilising s44 the police would treat the surroundings of the designated area and 
everyone therein as a risk without an assessment of the risk, this would support the CTC’s 
new risk management attitude. Broad discretion over a wide designated area could become 
unmanageable and result in inconsistency in the enforcement s44 as it will be shown later in 
this chapter. This would mean strong intelligence would be needed to ensure s44 is enforced 
effectively and directly tackles the threat. Walker (2008) suggests that in circumstances when 
there is a lack of intelligence the police will focus their attention or suspicion, not on a 
particular individual, but rather the vulnerability or importance of specific targets which form 
the basis of their focus (eg Houses of Parliament, Buckingham Palace and Canary Wharf etc); 
these are also known as ‘Critical National Infrastructure’.120 In these circumstances the 
calculation of risk transfer from people to actions and objects (Walker, 2008); therefore is it 
appropriate to shift the identification of risk or suspicion from individuals to property or 
conduct, particularly when s44 is a coercive measure? The end result is that with insufficient 
information or intelligence, terrorism is tackled by treating everyone as a suspect for such 
innocuous activity as standing outside a government building or tourist monument; although 
this is the characteristics of pre-emption as discussed in Chapter One. It should not be 
acceptable to formulate suspicion on grounds that are not based on accurate intelligence or 
evidence, members of the public should be entitled to ask why they are being stopped and not 
face detention or prosecution for non-compliance as they could have been under s44 and may 
cause a person to suffer from embarrassment.121 Ordinary policing empowers the public to 
                                                          
120 Critical National Infrastructure, also known as ‘CNI’, was referred to by Lord Carlile QC of Berriew, interview 
on Youtube <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M299YduyXZI&feature=player_embedded> accessed 29th 
April 2012. 
121 The problem with s44 is not necessarily that coercion is used, rather the problem relates to the very broad 
discretion such powers are given to the police. Under s44 the police have no regulation or test to control on 
what grounds or basis they can enforce s44, therefore they can stop and search a person on a whim. 
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ask why they are being stopped and is good practice of accountability. For these reasons 
crisis powers such as s44 is coercive policing, and have retreated from community policing. 
 
As explained earlier, these issues help demonstrate that in comparison to ordinary stop and 
search powers, s44 is exceptionally wide. As mentioned, this itself creates issues relating to a 
lack of transparency and accountability in the system, creating further risks and concerns of 
arbitrary decision- making and a negative impact upon a person’s right to privacy (Bayley 
and Weisburd, 2009; Weisburd et al, 2010: 726). Whilst the TA 2000 provided the police 
with wide discretionary powers to stop and search individuals, the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (henceforth ‘IPCC’) described how police should not exercise their 
powers of stop and search to ‘simply be within the law’,122 instead the powers should be used 
in a way that demonstrably meets the objectives of the police:  
(i) Fairness – the police should consider and be able to answer the question “why 
did you stop me?”;  
(ii) Effectiveness – achieved by regular monitoring; and  
(iii) Public confidence. 
 
These objectives set out clear criteria that should be achieved to ensure stop and search is 
proportionate in day-to-day operations of ordinary stop and search powers, they could have 
been used by police to guide them in their use of s44. When considering whether s44 or the 
enforcement of s44 is proportionate, consideration should be given to Article 15 ECHR 
which allows derogation from the Convention rights so long as the "measures [go] no further 
than required by the exigencies of the situation".123 In order to determine whether the use of 
s44 is proportionate in this context is best balanced by the immediacy of a terrorist threat 
(Sofaer, 2003: 209) and therefore making it necessary to enforce s44. Sofaer (2003) 
suggested there are arguments that pre-emptive action 'must be limited to actions in response 
                                                          
122 Independent Police Complaints Commission 'IPCC position regarding police powers to stop and search' 2009 
(June) 
<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/guidelines_reports/stop_and_search_policy_position.
pdf> accessed 7th August 2011. 
123 Fenwick (fn7) 1436. 
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to an attack that is imminent and unavoidable by any other means'.124 Sofaer (2003) 
supported the argument of Stevens (1989) who believed that "the necessity must be 
imminent, and extreme, and involving impending destruction".125 This thesis would support 
some of Sofaer’s and Steven’s opinions to help determine whether s44 is proportionate and 
effective by adopting the following factors: 
(1) The nature and magnitude of the threat; 
(2) The likelihood of the threat being realised; and 
(3) The exhaustion of alternatives so that all other reasonable means of prevention have 
failed in order to make the use of s44 necessary. 
Only when an 'action that is necessary and proportionate' is it ipso facto reasonable (Rodin, 
2004: 764). Whilst meaning of ‘necessity’ will be considered in more detail later within this 
chapter, it is important to note that some scholars such as Sofaer (2003) believe that 
necessity, or necessary action, would occur when the threat is "imminent, and extreme, and 
involving impeding destruction",126 in other words the realisation of the threat would give 
proportionate rise to taking action. A further factor to consider is ‘justifiability’. As Rodin 
(2004) explained, an element to the reasonableness test that goes beyond necessity and 
proportionality is whether it is 'justifiable to inflict such a risk upon this particular person?'127 
This question needs to be considered in the way that Rodin intended it to be looked at: '[t]he 
fact that the risks are necessary...and proportionate...is not sufficient to defeat the personal 
right not to be endangered or used in this way'.128 
 
The IPCC objectives mentioned above played no part when s44 was utilised and can 
therefore lead to the question: on what grounds did the police base their suspicions to stop 
and search under s44? Although s44 may have facilitated the police in their ability to manage 
and control threats of terrorism by being more proactive in the detection of terrorism (Peak, 
Bradshaw and Glensor, 1992: 26; John Yates, Counter Terror Expo 2010), the courts did not 
                                                          
124 Abraham D. Sofaer 'On the Necessity of Pre-emption' 2003 European Journal of International Law 14(2): 
209-226, 209. 
125 Ibid: 215. Also see: K R. Stevens 'Border Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod affairs in Anglo-American-
Canadian relations, 1837-1842' (University of Alabama Press, 1989), 35. 
126 Sofaer (fn 124) 205, 215 and 216. 
127 David Rodin 'Terrorism without Intention' 2004 Ethics: Symposium on Terrorism, Wars, and Justice 114(4) 
(July): 752-771, 764.  
128 Ibid. 
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analyse the police conduct, their assessment of the threat or grounds for suspicion when 
enforcing s44. As discussed previously, whilst the change in policing style has been widely 
welcomed by many, including Peter Clarke the former Assistant Deputy Commissioner, the 
array of risks becomes evident. It can be concluded that s44 and similar pre-emptive counter-
terrorism strategies are disproportionate and ineffective in their use. When using powers such 
as s44, safeguards such as those discussed in this chapter (accountability and transparency) 
should be provided for; ensuring the effective prevention of terrorism and remedy provision 
to those who suffer an abuse of process stemming from the measures enforcement. 
 
Role of the courts in relation to crisis counter-terrorism policing powers. 
There is support for the use of s44, notably at government level, despite the aforementioned 
risks of abuse of process and erosion of human rights (Zedner, 2007a; Fenwick, 2007). As 
mentioned earlier, the ECtHR in the Gillan and Quinton case recognised that s44 breached 
human rights, specifically Article 8 ECHR. Since 9/11 the use of s44 was authorised over the 
whole of London and remained in-force until it was repealed in 2011; even though the life-
span of s44 was 28 days under s46 TA 2000, s44 was authorised on a rolling basis. 
 
During the rolling programme of s44 in September 2003 at the Excel Centre in Docklands, 
East London, there was a Defence Systems and Equipment International Exhibition 
(henceforth “the arms fair”) which was the subject of protests and demonstrations. On the 9th 
September Mr Gillan, the first applicant in the Gillan and Quinton case, was riding his 
bicycle with a rucksack near the arms fair on his way to the demonstration. Under s44 two 
police officers stopped and searched him looking for articles that might be used in connection 
with terrorist related activity and although nothing incriminating was found print-outs about 
the demonstration were seized; a notice to this effect was served on him. Mr Gillan gave 
evidence explaining that the police explained to him that 'because a lot of protesters were 
about...the police were concerned that they would cause trouble'.129 It was believed that Mr 
Gillan was detained for approximately 20 minutes. Later Ms Quinton, the second applicant, 
who is a journalist and was wearing her photographer’s jacket, camera bag and camera, was 
                                                          
129 Gillan and Quinton (fn 15). 
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also stopped. Despite showing her press card she was told to stop filming and, like Mr Gillan, 
was also stopped and searched by the police. Both Gillan and Quinton were informed by the 
police officer that their powers to stop and search emanated from s44. Nothing was found to 
suggest either were connected to terrorist activity nor did their conduct give such suspicion; 
whilst police records recorded a stop and search of five minutes in length, Ms Quinton 
believed the detention lasted 30 minutes. She stated that the experience of being stopped and 
searched made her feel 'intimidated and distressed'130 and unable to return to the 
demonstration; a potential risk identified earlier in this chapter. 
 
In the first instance both applicants wanted to challenge the legality of s44 by way of judicial 
review. The Secretary of State offered them a procedure enabling a High Court review 
hearing in a closed court, facilitating the use of special advocates and the underlying 
intelligence that formed the basis of the Secretary of State’s confirmation of s44; a process 
similar to the control order regime and TPIMs/ETPIMs which will be discussed in Chapter’s 
Three and Five respectively. This offer was rejected as both applicants did not seek to 
question the assertion that there was a ‘general threat of terrorism against the United 
Kingdom’, instead they sought to challenge: 
(1) The authorisation and confirmation for use of s44, which formed part of a 'rolling 
programme of authorisations covering the entire London area'. The argument was that 
this was ultra vires and unlawful as Parliament had intended to only authorise s44 in 
response to an imminent terrorist threat, at a specific location for which ordinary 
policing would be inadequate; 
(2) The use of s44 at the arms fair was in contradiction to the Acts legislative purpose and 
unlawful in it application. With any communication and guidance given to police 
officers was 'non-existent or calculated to cause officers to misuse the powers';131 
(3) Authorisations of s44 and the execution of these powers by police was a 
disproportionate interference with human rights under Articles 5 and 8-11 ECHR. 
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The Court of Appeal 
The legal challenge by Gillan and Quinton arguing that s44 was an intrusive power on human 
rights, specifically Articles 5 and 8 ECHR, was defeated in each domestic UK court. It was 
the opinion of the Court of Appeal132 that it does not necessarily follow that the mere 
existence of this power results in a breach of human rights; rather it is the manner in which 
the power is exercised that creates the breach. It therefore follows that accountability of the 
police officers enforcing crisis powers, like s44, is a relevant factor for the court to take into 
consideration, yet the Court of Appeal also believed that the police should be allowed 
discretion in their enforcement of s44. The view of the Court of Appeal is concerning 
particularly when the Metropolitan Police Commissioner conceded that stop and search 
measures do amount to infringements with Article 8 ECHR; it was also accepted by the court 
that s44 is "an extremely wide power to intrude on the privacy of the members of the 
public".133 This arguably shows the courts accepting there is an assessment to balance the 
rights of individuals with security, however in contradiction behave deferentially and favour 
security. 
 
The Court of Appeal suggested frontline police should not only be accountable for their 
actions but be allowed discretion. It was also suggested accountability remains with the 
Secretary of State due to the safeguard of confirming the authorisation of s44. If this is 
correct, taking into account the observations by Lord Carlile QC in the Independent 
Terrorism Review (2007b) when he remarked that the Secretary of State should have refused 
the use of s44 on a number of occasions (2007b: 32, 115), there is a clear argument that the 
“safeguards” under s44 were ineffective. 
 
Although the Court of Appeal discussed the importance accountability plays as a safeguard in 
policing, it did little to assess and consider matters relating to the deprivation of liberty. 
Instead the court spent much of its judgment supporting s44 explaining that the legislative 
safeguards were sufficient to prevent arbitrary actions and decisions being made. Ultimately 
                                                          
132 R (on the application of Gillian and another) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and another 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1067. 
133 Ibid. 
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the court’s opinion was sided with the government and that s44 could not be disproportionate; 
the "disadvantage of the intrusion and restraint imposed on even a large number of 
individuals by being stopped and searched could not possibly match the advantage that 
accrued from the possibility of a terrorist attack being thereby foiled or deterred".134 The 
Court of Appeal also considered that in the case of Gillan and Quinton the location of the 
arms fair had been the scene of the attempted IRA terrorist attack in 1992, this being a CNI 
which has been explained earlier in this chapter . This supports the observation of Salter 
(2008) that the use of “imaginary numbers” help aid the argument for measures such as s44; 
emphasis must be given to the term ‘imagination’, the government, police and Security 
Services are unable to provide data that determines the quantification of terrorism because it 
is an uncertain threat. As a consequence of this, “catastrophic thinking” is used (Salter, 2008; 
Muller, 2008) to support the argument and need for counter-terrorism measures meaning that 
calculation of risk is based on the potential impact, which in terrorism cases will always be 
serious, rather than the frequency of such threats. Interestingly, Gearty (2005a) believed that 
the Court of Appeal revealed ‘flickers of anxiety’ concerning the implications of their 
reasoning to find s44 and its use as lawful. 
 
The House of Lords 
When being appealed from the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords 135 judgment was led by 
Lord Bingham, who considered whether stop and search created a deprivation of liberty as 
well as the applicant’s argument that a rolling-programme of s44 amounted to ultra vires. 
Ultimately the House of Lords, as well as Lord Carlile QC in the Independent Review (2004), 
considered the rolling-programme acceptable because London itself is a ‘special case’ 
because it has a number of 'critical national infrastructures'.136 The House of Lords failed to 
appreciate that a rolling-programme of s44 was arguably counter-productive to its underlying 
aims, ultimately if the threat does not exist then there should be no need for such a measure 
being enforced. Lord Bingham had some concern with the rolling-programme of s44 because 
it would become a product of a routine and bureaucratic exercise that would lack detailed 
consideration (Lord Bingham, paragraph 18). This was an early indication by His Lordship 
                                                          
134 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew (fn 101). 
135 R (on the application of Gillian (FC) and another (FC)) (fn 99). 
136 Critical National Infrastructure (fn 120). 
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that s44 was becoming normalised because of the rolling-programme. This would mean that 
the emergency crisis power was being enforced when an emergency did not necessarily exist 
and was therefore arguably disproportionate to enforce. 
 
In relation to the deprivation of liberty argument, Lord Bingham gave consideration to the 
general principles of Guzzardi v Italy137 and found the stop and search process naturally has 
features that deprive a person of their liberty. Although, he considered deprivation under 
ordinary stop and search to be brief which would interrupt a person that “kept [them] from 
proceeding or kept waiting”,138 it was viewed as a mere inconvenience, it was His Lordships 
belief, similar to Parliament, that had there been a deprivation of liberty, Article 5(1)(b)139 
would justify the deprivation because authorisation of s44 was “prescribed by law”.140  
 
His Lordship then gave consideration to the arguments surrounding Article 8 ECHR. It was 
felt that, similar to those with Article 5, if Article 8(1) were engaged, paragraph (2) would be 
satisfied. As stated by Fenwick and Phillipson (2010; 2011), Lord Bingham took a minimalist 
stance with the meaning of Article 8 as evidenced by his remark that “intrusions must reach a 
certain level of seriousness to engage the operation of the Convention”141 and took the view 
that “ordinary superficial search of the person...can scarcely be said to reach that level”.142 
Whilst Lord Bingham believed that enforcement of s44 “must still be necessary in a 
democratic society, and so proportionate”, if the crisis power were authorised and confirmed 
(as prescribed by the TA 2000) then proper enforcement can be nothing other than 
proportionate (Lord Bingham, para. 344). This conclusion by His Lordship does not seem to 
have considered the issues of proportionality as discussed already. The House of Lords 
believed that s44 did not breach Article 8 because the search itself could not show a lack of 
respect for an individual’s private rights because the power was prescribed by law (ECtHR 
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decision, 2010: 28); one may argue that this deferential attitude by the House of Lords in 
Gillan and Quinton is an example of the laws against law risk as discussed in Chapter One.  
 
The House of Lords considered that the safeguards and Codes of Conduct in place were 
sufficient to protect the public; therefore the police would not make arbitrary decisions. 
However, as argued earlier, without the appropriate test or standards the police were free to 
design their own selection process to suspect a person and the courts would not hold officer 
accountable for those decisions or actions. It was observed by Lord Hope that there was no 
legislative criteria under s44 that identified what the police officer’s state of mind should be 
when they enforced s44. This means that the police could stop and search a person under s44 
by using factors such as race, religion, or ethnic look (racial and religious profiling) despite 
there being no link between ethnicity and terrorism as discussed in Chapter One; despite this 
there is little the court would do. With the lack of proportionate safeguard, as discussed in 
this chapter, and only ‘expedient’ safeguards, the rolling-programme and conduct of the 
police when enforcing s44 was precautionary. The failure by the House of Lords to review 
proportionality regarding the enforcement of these crisis powers or the risks they create was 
obvious: they considered proportionality to be a question of whether the actions or measures 
are either advantageous or disadvantageous, for example "the travelling public are reassured 
by what they see when they see the police...at the barriers" (Lord Hope, ECtHR: 48).  
 
The European Court of Human Rights 
The House of Lords acceptance of a minimal application of Article 5 led Gillan and Quinton 
to take their case to the ECtHR.143 It was rightly argued by Gillan and Quinton that the 
restriction imposed on a person’s movement under s44 was intended to secure compliance. 
To determine whether a person had suffered a deprivation of liberty the ECtHR identified 
four criterions to be considered: 
(i) Type of detention; 
(ii) Duration of detention; 
                                                          
143 Gillan and Quinton (fn 15) [344]. 
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(iii) Effects of the detention; and 
(iv) The manner in which the detention was implemented. (paragraph 56) 
The court conducted a brief assessment of s44 as a close paradigm to deprivation of liberty 
cases relating to arrest and detention. The court focussed on the factors of compliance or 
coercion and considered the Guzzardi case and obtained support from Foka v Turkey:144 
"[Those searched] were obliged to remain where they were and submit to the search and if 
they had refused they would have been liable to arrest, detention at a police station and 
criminal charges. This element of coercion is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the 
meaning of Article 5(1)".145  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the case Austin v United Kingdom146 the ECtHR 
believed Article 5 was not applicable. The ECtHR reached its decision by considering: 
(1) The importance of not making it 'impracticable for the police to fulfil their duties of 
maintaining order and protecting the public'; 
(2) Consideration to be given to the duty placed on the police to protect the public from 
violence and injury; 
(3) The context the measure is taken, for example members of the public may endure 
temporary restrictions when travelling on public transport.  
This would mean that 'commonly occurring restrictions could [not] properly be described as 
"deprivations of liberty";147 worryingly, if emergency crisis powers such as s44 were deemed 
normalised then the case could have failed. The court considered this on the basis that it was 
necessary to avert the risk of injury or damage. When taking into account the above factors, it 
would have arguably meant the ECtHR would have concluded s44 breached of Article 5. 
Whilst s44 may have assisted the police in the execution of their duty and role in countering 
terrorism, it was not possible to determine that the whole of London was at risk of a terrorist 
attack, nor that their deprivation would have been ‘temporary’. Furthermore, and most 
                                                          
144 Foka v Turkey (Application No. 28940/09); (24th June 2008). 
145 Gillan and (fn 15) [57]. 
146 Austin (fn 116). 
147 Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights judgment of Austin and Others v United Kingdom, 
press release by the Registrar of the Court (15th March 2012) <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-
press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-3877995-4465858> accessed 20th March 2012. 
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importantly, it was impossible to determine whether the enforcement of s44 was ever 
necessary because of the lack of safeguards, as this chapter has explored. 
 
The UK government argued that s44 was the equivalent to checks at an airport, meaning that 
for members of the public to go about their daily activities they would have to comply with 
the commands made by police under s44, or face prosecution for disobeying the police; 
alternatively, they should not leave their homes. The government argued for the protection of 
the ‘greater good’ grounds explaining why such powers should prevail with the UK making 
reference to Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom,148 arguing that not every act or omission of 
s44 would impinge on a person’s autonomy or integrity so as to amount to a serious 
interference with Article 8. When considering the application of Article 8 the ECtHR did not 
accept this line of reasoning, with reference to Peck v United Kingdom149 the court remarked 
that just because a person leaves their home and enters a public place does not mean they 
automatically forfeit their right to privacy under Article 8. The court found, surprisingly 
unlike the House of Lords, that s44 did not satisfy the “in accordance with the law” test of 
Article 8 and held that there had been a breach of the ECHR. This related to the statutes lack 
of reasonable clarity: Article 8(1) was engaged because s44 searches were clear interferences 
with one’s private life, clearly suggesting the Gillan and Quinton case was not a borderline 
case (Fenwick and Phillipson, 2011). 
 
When determining whether interference caused by s44 was in accordance with the law and 
necessary (as per Article 8(2)), it was held that it was not because s44 no longer used the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ requirement: “[t]he powers of authorisation and confirmation as well 
as those of stop and search under sections 44 and 45 of the 2000 Act are neither sufficiently 
circumscribed nor subjected to adequate legal safeguards against abuse”.150 The coercive 
nature of s44 enabled the ECtHR to identify the breach of Article 8 because the right to a 
private life also covers aspects of physical and psychological integrity and it found that a 
                                                          
148 Costella-Roberts v United Kingdom [1994] 1 FCR 65; [1993] ECHR 16; 19 EHRR 112; (1993) 19 EHRR 112; 
(1995) 19 EHRR 112 (Application No. 13134/87). 
149 Peck v United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 44; [2003] Info TLR 221; [2003] EMLR 15; (2003) 36 EHRR 719; (2003) 
13 BHRC 669; (2003) 36 EHRR 41; 36 EHRR 41 (Application Number 44647/98). 
150 Gillan and Quinton (fn 15)  [85]. 
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person subjected to s44 may suffer embarrassment or humiliation (paragraph 63); this is 
contrary to the findings of the domestic UK courts. The ECtHR found that the public should 
be made aware that this measure was being used so a person could regulate their approach to 
willingly participate with s44 rather than coercively, this could be achieved by having a 
safeguard of transparency. Ultimately, the ECrtHR found that there were insufficient 
safeguards providing transparency, accountability and understanding of wider implications 
cause by this measure, points that thesis argues. 
 
The concern for the UK government and judiciary from this decision was that the ECtHR 
placed human rights at a higher standard than the UK did. The decision made clear that 
broad, simple, lack of clarity and insufficient safeguards would result in emergency crisis 
powers to counter-terrorism being non-compliant with human rights. As mentioned earlier, 
following the ECtHR decision the Home Secretary replaced the s44 powers with provisions 
that would only be utilised when it was necessary rather than expedient. The decision to no 
longer use s44 was welcomed by many campaign groups such as Liberty and Human Rights 
Watch and remained in place until the publication of the MacDonald Report (2011).  
 
RISK ASSESSMENT IN RELATION TO THE USE OF AND IMPACT OF ‘CRISIS’ 
STOP AND SEARCH POWERS 
It is argued below that the use of these crisis powers can create various adverse effects and 
grievances (Home Office, 2011c). The Home Office documented that grievances were held 
by the public because "the public are most likely to have direct experience"151 of crisis 
powers like s44, undoubtedly the same can be said for s61. The Impact Assessment by the 
Home Office (2011c) suggests that the perception of s44 was that it would be 
disproportionately used against people from Asian communities, although as statistics will 
show below Caucasian people were more likely to be stopped and searched under s44. 
Despite this, there were concerns that s44 would "fuel perceptions that the police employ 
                                                          
151 Home Office 'Terrorism Stop and Search Powers (Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000) Impact Assessment' 
(18th January, 2011c) HO0033 <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/legislation/freedom-
bill/ia-terrorism-stop-search?view=Binary> accessed 15th April 2012. 
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racial profiling"152 and such counter-terrorism crisis powers were being used against all 
aspects of society. Counter-terrorism crisis powers, like s44, also result in ‘suspect 
communities’ (Greer, 2010; Fenwick, 2010) which is arguably fuelled by the perceptions of 
how terrorist suspects are identified. The decision of the Gillan and Quinton case lead the 
Home Office to reassess the use of crisis powers like s44; this was aided by the completed 
Impact Assessment which demonstrates that the Home Office (2011c) believed powers like 
s44 should be proportionate.  
 
As explored previously when discussing the Gillan and Quinton case, counter-terrorism crisis 
powers would only be considered proportionate under Article 8(2) ECHR153 when it is 
necessary for the interests of national security or public safety. The Home Office Impact 
Assessment (2011c) of s44 seems to accept that there is a link between the risk assessment of 
crisis powers and the proportional use, although it is important to remember s44 was 
adjudged by the ECtHR as not being proportionate, breaching Article 8 ECHR. The UK 
courts failed to consider the negative impact s44 may cause, compared to the ECtHR who 
recognised the risks that a person stopped and search under s44 may suffer, specifically 
embarrassment and harassment.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this thesis believes that had the courts considered the 
risks posed by s44 they may have reached a different view, similar to the ECrtHR. Risk 
assessment is a vital tool to aid in the determination of whether an act, omission or idea is 
proportionate and is one that can be used in counter-terrorism, similar to the criminal justice 
system. For example, risk assessment can be seen as being similar to plea-in-mitigation at an 
offender’s sentencing hearing when defence counsel outlines the offender’s family history 
and personal circumstances to explain why the offence has been committed, or issues that 
may explain the offending behaviour so a proportionate and fair sentence may be imposed. 
  
                                                          
152 Ibid. 
153 Article 8(2) European Convention of Human Rights: "There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well0being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others". 
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Failure by the courts, police and government to understand and recognise the potential and 
actual risks caused by measures, such as s44, through a holistic assessment means 
effectiveness of a measure cannot be truly understood. The threat of terrorism is not just felt 
or experienced in one part of the UK, there has been a terrorist attack in Scotland in 2007 
when Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed attempted to blow up Glasgow Airport with a car 
bomb. Despite this attempted terrorist attack Scotland has never authorised the use of s44 
(Lord Carlile QC, Independent Terrorism Review, 2009). A reason why the UK courts might 
be unwilling to question in detail the conduct and thought processes of the police when 
enforcing s44 might be best explained by Lord Bingham in the Belmarsh case,154 in which he 
believed the assessment of the risk or threat of terrorism and appropriate course of action 
requires political resolution and is not a legal matter; this means that the courts should play a 
smaller role (Lord Bingham, Belmarsh case: paragraph 29) and supports the argument of the 
courts deferential attitude in favour of government.  
 
Given that s44 was enforced when it was ‘expedient’ to do so, the meaning of which was 
explored in the Gillan and Quinton case and discussed earlier in this chapter, the courts 
would be unable to assess the subjective opinion of the police. This is another example of 
deferential attitude, however this was supported by the act itself. It would therefore mean that 
difficulty exists for the applicants to establish ultra vires or abuse of power allegations 
against the police when they enforce s44. It is the belief of this thesis that the ECtHR 
understood the need to clarify under what circumstances s44 would be needed, which this 
thesis aims to show is done through a test of necessity or immediacy of a threat. 
 
S44 had no formal requirement that established the proximity of time to the threat 
materialising. It therefore supported the UK government’s war model approach to counter-
terrorism as discussed in Chapter One. As a consequence of this a huge negative impact 
would have been felt by ethnic minorities, or so believed, and would have caused an indirect 
negative perception of the police. When one considers the terrorist attacks post-9/11 the 
predominant stereotype of a terrorist has been associated with origins from the Muslim 
Community. Edwards and Gomis of Chatham House (2011) confirmed that surveys show that 
                                                          
154 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department; X and Another v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 AC 68. 
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amongst British Muslims there are extremist views that support Sharia Law or Muslim 
caliphate in the UK. A British documentary for Channel 4 found 'a third [out of 1,000 
Muslims] would prefer to live under Sharia Law, and some 40% said Britain was a country of 
bad moral behaviour'.155 These were understood not to be mainstream views of UK 
government and 'considered extreme when compared with Western values'. 156 It must be 
remembered that despite a third of 1,000 Muslims held these views there was no evidence 
that they or a large number of Muslims support terrorist-related violence (Edwards and 
Gomis, 2011). The stereotyping of terrorists has caused some to call upon the Muslim 
Community to play a great role in counter-terrorism, the then British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair MP, stated before the Commons Liaison Select Committee: 
'…if you want to defeat this extremism you have to defeat its ideas and you have to defeat in 
particular a completely false sense of grievance against the West. That has to be done, yes, by 
Government but it also has to be done by mobilising that moderate majority within the 
Muslim Community to go into the community and take these people head-on, not just in 
terms of their methods but also in terms of their ideas, in terms of their sense of grievance 
against the West, the whole basis of that ideology, because this is a global ideology that we 
are fighting.'157 
This commentary by Tony Blair MP to some extent denounces the use of extremism and 
gives support for the use of community action. However, this remark may inflame attitudes 
by dismissing Islamic ideologies and the opinions some may have of the West and Britain. 
The concern here is that attitudes such as his and counter-terrorism measures, such as s44, 
create a perpetual cycle of resentment, reinforcing arguments that the Muslim community is 
unfairly targeted by Western governments which can be used to aid in radicalisation. This is a 
further example that profiling and stereotyping place unnecessary strain on community 
relations and individuals. A respondent158 to a survey carried out by Pickery et al (2008) 
expressed his opinion on this issue best: 
                                                          
155 Jay Edwards and Benoit Gomis 'Islamic Terrorism in the UK since 9/11: Reassessing the ‘Soft’ Response' 
2011 Chatham House (June) – International Security Programme Paper (ISP PP 2011/03), 16. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Liaison Committee 'Rt Hon Tony Blair' 2005-2006 (4th July 2006) House of Commons 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmliaisn/709/6070404.htm> accessed 7th 
September 2013. 
158 The identity of the respondent to the survey is unknown due to the confidential nature of the survey, 
however the respondent is known to be male, aged between 35 and 45 and of Middle Eastern origin. 
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"violence by anti-apartheid groups in South Africa did not make white people in Australia 
criminal if they supported the anti-apartheid cause. So why am I made to feel like a criminal 
because others use violence in the name that I also happen to support? Supporting the cause is 
not the same as supporting the violence. Why am I not allowed to have views because of the 
actions of violent criminal like Bin Laden?"159 
 
It is clear from examples given including those by government ministers mentioned in this 
chapter and Chapter Two, post-9/11 profiling has stigmatised ethnic minorities; Lord Carlile 
QC in the Independent Terrorism Review (2009) suggested that s44 should be used in such a 
fashion that an ‘ethnic imbalance’ should be the trend, believing this would have been a 
'proportional consequence of operational policing'.160 Despite this, statistical data by the 
Home Office (Tables A, B, C.1, C.2, D, E and F) shows that the large majority of those 
stopped and searched did not have a ethnicity that one may consider not to correspond with 
the post-9/11 terrorist stereotype. Whilst those convicted for terrorist offences and 
subsequently imprisoned do fit within the ethnic stereotype. Tables A-F show that those that 
face trial and are dealt with via the traditional criminal justice system are more likely to fit 
the stereotype, compared to those affected by pre-emptive measures like s44.  
 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, s44 had no assessment process to determine 
suspicion which was a lacking safeguard the ECrtHR was critical of; s61 provides a degree of 
assessment. Under s61 an assessment of the risk is required and places a level of 
accountability with the authorising officer who completed the assessment. Despite this, it is 
still possible that fear of the threat may affect the risk assessment itself, however this is a 
positive step in creating safeguards. This risk assessment that needs to be undertaken before 
acting can mean that the action taken is more likely to be proportionate. One may argue that 
in light of the Gillan and Quinton case and process adopted under s61, when enforcing 
emergency stop and search powers the police should use existing powers under the ordinary 
criminal justice system (eg s1 PACE); this would be fairer, just and balanced in tackling 
terrorism. As discussed previously, ordinary stop and search powers requires the police to 
                                                          
159 Sharon Pickery, Jude McCulloch and David Wright-Neville 'Counter-Terrorism Policy: Community, Cohesion 
and Security Communities Respond to Counter-Terrorism Policing' in ‘Counter-Terrorism Policing’ (Spriner, 
2008), 113. 
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formulate reasons when enforcing their powers, using such an approach when deciding to 
stop and search terrorist suspects is likely to reduce any possible risk of racial and religious 
profiling from prejudicing an officers judgment. It would not require the enactment of new 
legislation and would return to the preferred community style policing as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
 
Racial and religious profiling. 
As discussed earlier, the use of stereotypes creates a risk of profiling which may result in the 
creation of suspect communities; this is seen regularly within the context of terrorism. Walker 
(2008) accepts that profiling plays an important role in identifying who to stop and search but 
is mostly used in circumstances where there is an absence of intelligence. Profiling may be 
based on behaviour such as purchasing one-way tickets, travelling to known Islamist 
extremist countries or flying lessons; although one would suggest alone neither would be 
sufficient to identify a potential terrorist. However, a perceived stereotypical terrorist is 
formed from a person who looks as though they are from an Asian ethnicity or Islamic faith 
(Schneider and Susser, 2003; Marcuse, 2006: 920). There are examples of terrorist attacks 
that illustrate it is not possible to stereotype terrorists. Walker (2008) commented that 'whilst 
foreigners remain a threat, the menacing figures in the contemporary stage of terrorism are 
often our neighbours from within'.161 Hemmingby (2013) explained at the Counter Terror 
Expo Conference 2013 that a new modern terrorists has evolved: ‘solo-terrorists’. These are 
terrorists who are not directly linked or associated to a terrorist organisation but support the 
organisations extreme ideologies and carry out attacks on the organisations behalf 
(Hemmingby, 2013); this is similar to the ‘lone-wolf’ idea (Hemmingby, 2013; Gomis, 2012; 
Gomis, 2013a; Walker, 2013). The 7/7 London Bombings were carried out by terrorists162 
who were British born, second-generation young Muslims who came from well-educated and 
wealthy backgrounds with stable family homes. Whilst this may illustrate those stereotypes 
of modern terrorists originating from Islamic backgrounds, there are terrorists who are not 
isolated aberrations who are British citizens and plan to engage in terrorist activity at home 
and on foreign jurisdictions who do not originate from a Muslim background, for example 
                                                          
161 Clive Walker 'Know thine enemy as theyself’: Discerning friend from foe under anti-terrorism laws' 2008 
Melbourne University Law Review 32: 275-301, 276. 
162 The bombers of the London 7/7 Bombings in 2005 are recorded as: Mohammad Sidque Khan, Shehzad 
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Richard Reid. In 2001 Reid earned his title as the ‘Shoe Bomber’; he came from a Jamaican 
family background, born in the UK and after a lifestyle of criminal activity he converted to 
Islam. A further example is Adam Yahiya Gadahn who was born in Oregon into a family 
with Jewish ancestry and raised in California and was educated in a Christian environment; 
he has appeared as one of the FBI’s most-wanted American members of al-Qaida.163 Edwards 
and Gomis (2011) considered twelve British terrorists and terrorist plots, within each there 
were factors about each terrorist that would not necessarily fit the stereotype. 
 
Post-9/11 the stereotypical terrorist has been depicted on the imagery of Osama bin Laden, a 
person who is viewed 'as an alien, uncivilised cave-dweller'164 or a mentally unstable or 
vulnerable person (Walker, 2008). Following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks there is evidence and 
recognition of home-grown terrorists which supports the argument that a stereotypical 
terrorist profile cannot be created because a terrorist does not necessarily come from an 
obvious ethnic group. As previously explained, Hazel Blears MP and Lord Carlile QC 
believed an ethnic imbalance against the Muslim people should have been seen during the 
enforcement of s44, however Home Office statistics (see Tables on pages 83-88) doesn’t 
support this; does this mean that the police weren’t enforcing s44 correctly? 
 
The stereotypical view of a terrorist or the terrorist profile held by Hazel Blears, Lord Carlile 
QC and others is profiling known as ‘racial profiling’ and is described as:  
'[w]hen race or nationality is used as a factor in determining whom to stop, search, question, 
or arrest – whether in an investigative stop and frisk, a motor vehicle pretext search, or a 
security search – unless there is a suspect-specific or crime-specific exception to this general 
rule'.165  
Walker (2008) accepts that profiling exclusively based on race, ethnicity or religion does 'not 
constitute a useful counter terror tool'.166 Although such stereotypes exist, Lord Carlile QC 
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confirmed that s44 was being used either poorly or unnecessarily against individuals who 
were 'obviously far from any known terrorism profile that, realistically, there is not the 
slightest possibility of him/her being a terrorist'.167 As such, Lord Carlile QC criticised the 
use of s44 because the measures was being used more towards ethnic minorities and was 
therefore disproportionate. He formed the view that s44 was not being used as a measure to 
counter-terrorism, rather an instrument to “balance the statistics” (Lord Carlile QC in the 
Independent Terrorism Review, 2009: 142); an attempt to remove the label of being 
institutionally racist.168 Lord Carlile QC failed to consider that the broad power of s44 
provided sufficient ambiguity to enable the police to use it disproportionately.   
 
Whilst it can be argued that suspicion should arise from many factors, it should not be based 
solely on racial origins or ethnicity; Walker (2008) suggests that this should be acceptable or 
achievable when considering the perceived threat otherwise the selection or suspicion process 
used would be inherently discriminatory (Walker, 2008:290). Here, Walker fails to explain 
who should identify the perceived threat, if it is the government then based on his point the 
perceived terrorist threat has always existed and would mean stopping and searching a person 
based on their ethnicity alone would be acceptable. If however the police were to perceive the 
threat, then the risk that police would be capable of using their intuition or the ‘copper’s 
nose’, would also result in disproportionate conclusions. In R (European Roma Rights 
Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Intervening)169 (‘Roma case’) the House of Lords found that it was unlawful to 
target Roma passengers at Prague Airport, as they had been "routinely treated with more 
suspicion and subjected to more intensive and intrusive questioning" compared to other 
potential asylum-seekers because of their ethnicity. Lord Brown distinguished the Gillan and 
Quinton case from the Roma case, remarking that there was no other factor in the minds of 
immigration officers other than to stop a specific race of people, whilst those police enforcing 
s44 do not just solely focus on ethnic origins of suspects when deciding to enforce s44 
(Walker, 2008: 290). Lord Brown failed to identify that s44 does not require the police nor 
allow the courts to determine on what factors the police base their suspicion to enforce s44, 
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given the opinion of government ministers and Lord Carlile QC there is a clear focus on 
ethnicity. 
 
During the Gillan and Quinton case the House of Lords confirmed that the police should not 
base their decision to enforce s44 solely on race or ethnicity. With no statutory safeguard 
under s44 preventing the use of racial profiling, the police may base suspicion on these 
factors. One would argue that the UK courts should have and had power under the TA 2000 
to question the use of s44. If the courts are unable to determine whether s44 is enforced 
proportionately and fairly without unfounded prejudice, then they are unable to hold the 
police accountable for their actions. One would suggest that despite the differentiation made 
by the House of Lords between the Gillan and Quinton case and the Roma case, s44 was 
publically intended for ethnic groups which highlight the discriminatory nature of 
stereotyping terrorism. Clearly the only way to prevent individuals from being stereotyped 
and being subjected to the disproportionate effects of s44 is through clear intelligence, tests 
for police to formulate suspicion (eg reasonable suspicion) and power for the court to 
independently assess the use of such powers. 
 
Section 44 enabled the police to make arbitrary decisions. 
Whilst s44 was being challenged, it was being argued that the measure was an ineffective 
method of countering terrorism. As described earlier, S44 was a pre-emptive measure and by 
its nature of using suspicion, removing and ignoring the need of mens rea as found in 
ordinary policing, it utilised a wider ‘probabitis reus’ (Amoore and de Goede, 2008). With 
police being able to design their own grounds of suspicion, a reserve burden of proof became 
established which would require suspects to separate themselves from the ‘risky’ with the ‘at 
risk’ etc (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2004). Ultimately, if suspects fail to satisfy police suspicion 
that they are a terrorist, they would likely remain a suspect.  
 
With a lack of intelligence or guidance s44 was broadly applied, which was disproportionate 
and discriminatory, as mentioned earlier. S44 was used to control the public in circumstances 
where there is no known threat of terrorism, therefore became a generic police operational 
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tool when normal policing could not be used due to the safeguards in place. The abusive use 
of s44 can be illustrated by the case study of Walter Wolfgang who in 2005 was 82 years old 
when he attended the Labour Party Conference, with whom he was politically associated to. 
He heckled Jack Straw MP the then UK Foreign Secretary on issues relating to the War in 
Iraq; Walter Wolfgang was forcibly removed and detained under s44. Whilst one may argue 
he was obviously not a terrorist, his detention was based on his behaviour towards Jack Straw 
MP and not behaviour that might be construed as akin to terrorism. This thesis has 
consistently argued within this chapter that where there is a lack of intelligence or evidence, 
enforcement of s44 should not have taken place. If intelligence were adequate s44 would 
have been targeted towards specific suspects, it would have remained being a pre-emptive 
measure and whilst becoming more preventative.  
 
 
Using an ‘imminent threat’ test rather than ‘reasonable suspicion’ to create police 
accountability. 
S61, the replacement for s44, can only be authorised when a senior police officer 'reasonably 
suspects' an act of terrorism will take place (s61(1)(a) PoFA 2012); one may argue that such 
decisions can only be reached with the support of intelligence. Not only is this seen through 
ordinary stop and search powers (s1 PACE) but it was one of the lacking safeguards under 
s44, which this chapter has persistently argued. However, the authorising officer also needs to 
consider whether the authorisation is 'necessary to prevent such an act' (s61(1)(b)(i)), which 
itself requires analysis of whether an act is imminent and therefore pre-emptive action is 
required. Further consideration of the specific area or place and duration of authorisation is 
required (s61(1)(b)(ii) and (iii)) and this should not be greater than ‘necessary’; providing an 
assessment of proportionality under s61. Under the PoFA 2012 the authorising officer has 
greater accountability placed upon them and is underpinned by the responsibility placed upon 
them to risk assess the terrorist threat. Whilst the initial test is reasonable suspicion, the 
ultimate determination by an individual officer whether or not to enforce s61, can only be 
formulated with knowledge of the immediacy of the threat and therefore the risks involved, 
which should be disseminated from the authorising officer to frontline police.  
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Although the assessment of whether the threat is imminent is not a required consideration, it 
still means that the police can authorise and enforce crisis powers under s61 when there is no 
cause to do so. The low standard of ‘reasonable suspicion’ allows the police to authorise and 
enforce the use of crisis powers in the absence of an ‘imminent threat test’. The 
implementation of the crisis powers requires that the authorising and enforcing officers have 
the ability to accurately predict the threat and risk to allow them to determine the 
proportionate response in pursuit of security. This is a characteristic of pre-emptive measures 
as discussed earlier in Chapter One. 
  
Whilst making the police more accountable through legislation the courts can play a vital 
role. The courts should be capable of questioning the police about their conduct and 
decisions, particularly when under s44 there was evidence of disproportionate use and 
intended discriminatory enforcement. The suggested use of the ‘coppers nose’ (Walker, 
2008) would arguably enable only the experienced officer to formulate a suspicion of terrorist 
activity. This would be likely to result in similar prejudicial decision making similar to s44, 
particularly if suspicion were formulated in the absence of intelligence. When stop and search 
is grounded on the standard of ‘reasonable suspicion’ as required by s1 PACE, stop and 
search cannot be based on personal or individual factors alone without using reliable 
intelligence. The provision of a guiding test or standard enables the prevention or limitation 
and detection of those police who base suspicion of suspects on notions, ideas, 
generalisations or stereotypes (Walker, 2008) reducing the risk of arbitrary decision making 
at the frontline, for example the authorising officer disseminating evidence/intelligence to 
frontline officer as explained above. 
 
S44 itself is an example of an arbitrary process intended to give more power to the 
government and its emanations and identifies such powers as crisis powers. This supports the 
argument of Edkins and Pin-Fat (2004) and Amoore and de Goede (2008) that sovereign 
powers are being dispersed rather than centralised, powers which may also be seen as a form 
of ‘complex assemblage’. Without a risk based analysis, which this chapter has explored in 
detail, crisis powers such as s44 create a quasi-judicial role for the police. Butler (2004) terms 
this process as ‘petty sovereignty’ through which the police would be seen as a bureaucratic 
institution that has been empowered to decide who to detain and arrest without legal recourse 
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for their decisions when they become disproportionate or abused. Furthermore, Cameron 
(2006) explains that when a norm is not laid down, it is not possible for the police to breach 
what would be considered the norm which would subsequently mean there is no legal 
recourse available against the police. The risk of no remedy being available, as Vlcek (2006) 
assessed, would mean that there was "...no avenue to recover their [the suspect’s] presence in 
society".170 This collectively becomes akin to Agamben’s (2005) ‘homo-sacer’ theory, as 
discussed in Chapter One. In other words, once a person is stigmatised as a “terrorist” and are 
unable to prove on the spot that they are not a terrorist, they have little or no legal recourse to 
remedy this and lose their identity in society. Given that the UK courts were deferential to the 
authorisation and enforcement of s44 (see Gillian and Quinton case discussion above), it was 
impossible for any member of the public to regain a positive status in society once they had 
already been suspected of posing a threat. 
 
With the police and executive being capable of profiling suspects support is given to the idea 
of ‘petty sovereignty’ as discussed above, merges with the ideas of ‘governmentality’ as 
Butler (2004: 59) describes: "they are...part of the apparatus of governmentality; their 
decision, the power they wield to ‘deem’ someone dangerous and constitute them effectively 
as such, is a sovereign power, a ghostly and forceful resurgence of sovereignty in the midst of 
governmentality".171 As the government confirmed the use of s44 the police enforced it; as 
the police could no longer be described as citizens in uniform, instead agents of the state or 
state police when using such crisis powers, too much power can be seen as being yielded by 
the government. S44 enabled the state to label everyone as a risk, discriminate against some, 
argue it was all in aid of national security and provide no remedy to those falsely accused. 
 
Is ‘expediency’ or ‘imminent threat’ an appropriate test to use? 
To reduce the risk of viewing all members of the public as terrorist suspects pre-emptive 
powers, like s44, should only be enforced when supported by intelligence and there is an 
imminent threat. The lacking of such provisions was shown in s44(s)172 was criticised in the 
                                                          
170 W Vlcek 'Acts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism: Common Foreign and Security Policy at the European 
Court of Justice' 2006 European Foreign Affairs Review 11(4): 491-507, 506. Also see: Amoore and de Goede 
(fn 5) 109. 
171 Vlcek (fn 170) 506. Also see: Amoore and de Goede (fn 5) 109. 
172 Terrorism Act 2000, section 44(3): “expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism”. 
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Gillian and Quinton case, as previously mentioned. What this chapter has consistently shown, 
the use of s44 was a reaction of fear and the unknown, so for the government to take control 
and manage this ‘unknown threat’ they had taken a precautionary approach. The use of fear 
to drive government to enact effective counter-terrorism powers results in ineffective 
decision-making. Fear is considered a result of the unknown, Grotius (2006) stressed it is not 
enough to fear the attack, but argued there needs to be a ‘degree of certainty’173 that the 
attack will happen or is imminent.  
 
Supporters of the Just War Model ordinarily support Grotius and believe that the immediacy 
of a threat is an important guide on whether pre-emptive action would be justified; as 
explained by Grotius: "War in defence of life is permissible only when the danger is 
immediate and certain, not when it is merely assumed".174 It was remarked by Fisher and 
Wicker (2010) that the doctrine of pre-emption is objectionable because its natural 
presumption favours action against a threat rather than imminence of that threat (2010: 85), 
this is a fundamental risk of pre-emption. As observed by Grotius (2006): 
"Fear with respect to a neighbouring power is not sufficient cause. For in order that defence 
may be lawful it must be necessary and it is not necessary unless we are certain not only 
regarding the power of our neighbour but also regarding his intent, the degree of certainty 
being what is accepted in moral matters".175 
 
Ultimately, a safeguard such as ‘imminent threat test’ would ensure that measures such as s44 
are not used on the back fear and the need to regain control until the threat is likely to be 
realised. Unlike senior police or the authorising officer (as per s61), the Secretary of State, 
would be capable of holistically assessing the gravity of the threat, high probability of its 
occurrence, the effect the measure would have on the UK Strategy and proportionality of 
enforcement. If a threat was imminent then one would argue it would be reasonable to believe 
there is intelligence to suggest that ‘time was of the essence’ and alternative action, such as 
preventative measures, might not be enough therefore pre-emptive action is required – an 
                                                          
173 David Fisher and Brian Wicker 'Just War on Terror?: A Christian and Muslim Response' (Ashgate Publishing 
2010). 
174 H Grotius 'De Iure Belli ac Pacis' in G M. Reichberg, H Sysc and E Begby  (eds) 'The Ethics of War' (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 403. Also see: Fisher and Wicker (fn 173) 86. 
175 Grotius (fn 174). Also see: Fisher and Wicker (fn 173) 86. 
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argument supported by Grotius (2006) and Fisher and Wicker (2010). A test of imminence 
has been supported for quite some time and under international law and practice states accept 
that other states should not suffer an attack if they are capable of lawfully protecting 
themselves in the presence of imminent dangers of attack; scholars and jurists condition the 
lawfulness and legitimacy of pre-emptive action on the existence of an imminent threat 
materialising, even if there remains uncertainty in the time and place of an attack anticipatory 
action to protect the state when an attack is known/expected to take place (Fisher and Wicker, 
2010: 83-84). 
 
There may be some who argue that requiring a test of an ‘imminent threat’ before taking pre-
emptive action can be justified. Some scholars such as Fisher and Wicker (2010) suggest that 
the best form of assessment should be the gravity or degree of danger posed by an imminent 
threat and this should justify pre-emptive action. One may argue that supporters of this 
approach fail to understand that the gravity or danger posed by terrorism may always exist 
but may not be realised for some time if at all. If this approach were followed the UK would 
remain in a constant state of fear and enforce counter-terrorism measures which support the 
Just War Model. Just War theorists believe that imminent threats assist in identifying what 
sort of measure would be an appropriate and proportionate measure to take: pre-emptive or 
preventative.  
 
As has been suggested in this chapter, pre-emptive action should only be taken because 
intelligence is available to suggest the threat is imminent, otherwise if it is not utilised 
cautiously it can lead to abuse as demonstrated by s44 when enforced. It is believed by some, 
such as Bobbitt (2009),176 that there are circumstances were pre-emptive action remains an 
absolute necessity to manage or control a threat (Fisher and Wicker, 2010). Although it is 
understandable why one may conclude this, although one would argue, it needs to be applied 
with caution and those who authorise, confirm and enforce measures such as s44 need to be 
accountable. 
 
                                                          
176 Phillip Bobbitt 'Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century' (Penguin, 2009). 
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Whilst pre-emptive action remains a necessity to aid the state in its ‘War against Terror’ it 
must be fashioned to ensure that any harm caused is proportionate to the averted threat and is 
effective in the short term and long term goal of the UK Strategy. By not having a test or 
similar safeguards to assess and provide such assurances s44 provided police with a quasi-
judicial role, as discussed earlier. If intelligence suggested that an attack was expected to 
destroy an architectural monument pre-emptive action might be proportionate. There are 
some that suggest a test based on the gravity of a threat having high probability of occurring, 
a test based on the threat being imminent remains a better one. A test of imminence 
encompasses both proportionality, the threat being realised in a short space of time and the 
need to have emergency powers will be for the limited period of time that the threat is 
expected to be realised. If a terrorist threat is believed to happen, then it goes without saying 
the threat is of serious gravity and the determination of probability that a threat will take 
place is an assessment of the credibility of the intelligence and evidence obtain (Fisher and 
Wicker, 2010). Given the broad powers of s44 and the criticism raised in this chapter 
regarding accountability, a structure of accountability should be identified; this may be 
similar to those that form the Terrorism Review Group, as discussed in Chapter Five. With 
this structure the court be able to see what intelligence has been obtained. 
 
The importance of intelligence and its relevance in identifying suspects to stop and search 
under crisis stop and search powers. 
Ordinary stop and search is naturally based on intelligence because this is how the police 
form ‘reasonable suspicion’, however intelligence for crisis powers may be used and if so 
may originate from domestic sources as well as international sources. The latter raises risks 
of origins of the intelligence and how it was obtained, more so after the allegations made by 
Human Rights Watch in August 2011 following the rebel revolt of Libya 2011. It was alleged 
that UK Security Services were complicit and knowingly accepted intelligence that had been 
obtained by means of torture; although this is a topic of debate for others, it will be touched 
upon in more detail when considering the Deportation with Assurances ('DWA') measures in 
Chapter Four. In essence questions of the risks relating to the validity and reliability of 
intelligence used to authorise and legitimise s44 are raised. Intelligence facilitates a person’s 
ability, like the authoriser of crisis powers, to assess the risks involved and the threat itself 
and consequently determine whether the authorisation of crisis powers is proportionate or 
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not. Despite this logical idea, Walker (2008) believes that no matter how vague in detail 
intelligence is, the responsibility, post-authorisation of crisis powers, lies solely with the 
frontline police and it is for them to evaluate the intelligence and authorisation to determine 
where and when crisis powers may be used. One may disagree because this still provides the 
police unaccountable decision making powers, and argue that the authorising officer of any 
crisis powers and the Secretary of State should be held responsible to clearly communicate to 
frontline officers:  
(i) what intelligence has been received;  
(ii) what intelligence provides so that they may formulate suspicion; and  
(iii) the relevance and applicability of that information to authorise the use of measure 
such as s44 and s61.  
In doing so they create clear lines of communication and transparency of information, 
identifying the profile of a suspect, this in turn means the police can establish reasonable 
suspicion to stop and search a terrorist suspect under s43 or ordinary stop and search powers 
rather than using wide measures such as s44. It would also create accountability from those 
who provide the information, its communication and distribution and its use by the police to 
formulate grounds of suspicion to stop and search; this would make each player accountable 
for their role for using such emergency powers. When dealing with intelligence there is 
support for the idea of improving accountability; Isaacson and O’Connell (2002) and Cutter, 
Richardson and Wilbanks (2003) believe that intelligence can be "highly fragmentary, 
lacking in well-defined links, and fraught with deception"177 and therefore intelligence 
requires analysis to support counter-terrorism measures such as s44. Failure to clearly 
communicate these matters with frontline officers, and for frontline officers to enforce s44 
according to the intelligence, could lead to legal challenges, as accepted by LJ Brookes in the 
High Court of the Gillan and Quinton case. In ordinary circumstances if police received 
vague intelligence this would be used to support the police to have reasonable suspicion to 
stop and search members of the public under s43 or s1 PACE.  
 
                                                          
177 Susan L. Cutter, Douglas B. Richardson and Thomas J. Wilbanks 'The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism' 
(Routledge, 2003) 131. See also: Jeffery A. Isaacson and Kevin M. O’Connell 'Beyond Sharing Intelligence, We 
Must Generate Knowledge' (RAND Review, 2002) 26(2). 
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If s44 were authorised in circumstances where there is a lack of intelligence available its use 
becomes, as Aradau and van Munster (2008) explain, a ‘dispositif of precautionary risk’ upon 
which visions of a disastrous future are envisaged; this is also known as ‘availability 
heuristic’ where there may be inaccurate assessments of the probability or likelihood that a 
risk will come to light and stems from events and instances when the risk might be repeated 
(eg 9/11 anniversary) (Amoore and de Goede, 2008). In such circumstances where there is a 
lack of intelligence s44 may well be deployed to profile people and their practices in order to 
detect suspects (Yaghmanian, 2006; Amoore and de Goede, 2008), build possible terrorist 
profiles or obtain intelligence; Yaghmanian (2006) recalls his experience of this having to 
him when travelling in America: 
"The car being clean, they now turned to my life, which was far harder to search. They 
questioned me about my identity, activities, exchanges and purchases, friends, travels and 
above all what made me different from the men and women allowed to zip across the border 
without question or a thought. Every card, every piece of paper in my wallet was checked. I 
was asked to explain my credit card receipts. A bill for $500 from a small-town garage for the 
purchase of four new tyres aroused suspicion and led to more questions. A receipt for an 
airline ticket to Atlanta raised alarm. ‘What was the purpose of your trip to Atlanta?’ asked 
the officer. ‘A book I had written was featured at a conference,’ I replied. What, he asked 
suspiciously, was the subject of that book?" 
A further problem that Walker (2008) fails to understand is that s44 was not authorised on a 
‘force-wide’ basis due to the cultural diversity of the United Kingdom. One would say this is 
because one type of measure does not necessarily fit all; this is exemplified by Scotland not 
enforcing the s44 power. 
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TABLE A – Home Office, 'Operation of police powers under Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops & 
searches'178 
Self-defined ethnicity 2008/2009 2009/2010 Totals 
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White 60 141 380 241 196 210 139 109 822 654 
Mixed 3 3 11 7 11 9 7 6 24 33 
Black or Black British 13 47 109 53 45 33 16 29 222 123 
Asian or Asian British 25 62 126 110 64 80 69 79 323 292 
Chinese or Other 5 14 23 28 4 14 15 10 70 43 
Not stated 20 17 69 34 22 28 15 14 140 79 
Total 126 284 718 473 342 374 261 247 1601 1224 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
178 Home Office 'Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops & searches' 2009-2010 (28th October 
2010), Home Office Statistical Bulletin, HOSB 18/10 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/hosb1810.pdf> 
accessed 10th September 2011. 
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TABLE B – Home Office, 'Operation of police powers under Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops & 
searches'179 
 Self-defined by ethnicity 
Area Year Quarter White Mixed Black or 
Black British 
Asian or 
Asian British 
Chinese or 
Other 
Not stated Total 
England & Wales 2009/2010 Apr – Jun 17,372 628 3,169 4,741 1,171 1,646 28,727 
  Jul – Sep 14,615 524 2,688 3,621 1,165 1,137 23,750 
  Oct – Dec 10,629 358 1,811 3,525 745 854 17,922 
  Jan – Mar 7,931 341 1,436 2,728 552 744 13,732 
  Total 50,547 1,851 9,104 14,615 3,633 4,381 84,131 
          
Great Britain 2009/2010 Apr – Jun 21,689 827 5,146 4,207 1,465 2,729 36,063 
  Jul – Sep 17,986 680 3,985 3,552 1,450 2,416 30,069 
  Oct – Dec 12,166 426 3,640 2,247 873 1,550 20,902 
  Jan – Mar 8,174 350 2,745 1,538 569 838 14,214 
  Total 60,015 2,283 10,005 17,055 4,357 7,533 101,248 
 
 
                                                          
179 Ibid 43. 
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TABLE C.1 – Home Office, 'Operation of police powers under Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops & 
searches'180 
 Year of Stop and Search 
 2008/2009 2009/2010 Totals 
Police Force Area 
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Cumbria 42 20 62 59 58 7 0 0 183 65 -65% 
Essex 681 468 496 536 301 330 0 55 2,181 389 -82% 
Greater Manchester 0 823 249 92 49 32 25 45 1,164 151 -87% 
Hampshire 633 416 441 95 49 0 4 0 1,585 53 -97% 
London, City of 468 607 834 676 319 426 313 328 2,585 1,386 -46% 
Metropolitan 39,049 43,736 54,631 47,670 27,246 22,831 17,202 13,030 185,086 80,309 -57% 
North Yorkshire 56 39 34 38 36 45 40 33 167 154 -8% 
South Wales 662 539 222 271 187 0 0 0 1,694 187 -89% 
Surrey 613 287 53 49 0 0 0 0 1,002 0 -100% 
Sussex 184 320 429 274 423 309 303 225 1,207 1,260 4% 
 
 
                                                          
180 Ibid. 
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TABLE C.2 – Home Office, 'Operation of police powers under Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops & 
searches'181 
 Year of Stop and Search 
 2008/2009 2009/2010 Totals 
Police Force Area 
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Other forces 55 48 9 32 59 67 35 16 144 177 23% 
England & Wales 42,443 47,303 57,460 49,792 28,727 23,750 17,922 13,732 196,998 84,131 -57% 
British Transport Police 15,256 15,983 15,378 11,905 7,312 6,293 2,973 480 58,522 17,058 -71% 
Scotland 30 56 52 22 24 26 7 2 160 59 -63% 
Great Britain 57,729 63,342 72,890 61,719 36,063 30,069 20,902 14,214 255,680 101,248 -60% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
181 Ibid. 
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Table D – 'How we are doing: Stop and search borough breakdown' for June 2010182 
 
London Borough Total 
Number 
of S.44 
stop and 
search 
Age Ethnicity of suspect as it appeared 
to the Police 
Ethnicity as defined by suspect Gender 
U
nd
er
 
21
 
21
 - 
40
 
O
ve
r 4
0 
W
hi
te
 
A
si
an
 
B
la
ck
 
O
th
er
 
W
hi
te
 
A
si
an
 
B
la
ck
 
O
th
er
 
M
al
e 
Fe
m
al
e 
City Airport 184 2 70 88 97 36 19 7 93 33 16 11 149 11 
Greenwich 99 1 46 28 62 9 1 3 62 9 1 1 68 7 
Heathrow 155 12 104 36 70 46 15 23 68 47 14 18 14 11 
Tower Hamlets 436 12 182 101 213 56 7 19 181 49 2 14 261 33 
Westminster 156 7 63 48 75 192 15 9 73 190 13 9 104 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
182 Metropolitan Police 'How are we doing: Stop and search borough breakdown' 2010 (January 2011) 
<http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/corporate/mps_stop_and_search_borough_breakdown_report_june_2010.pdf> accessed 9th 
September 2011. 
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Table E – 'How we are doing: Stop and search borough breakdown' for July 2010183 
 
London Borough Total 
Number 
of S.44 
stop and 
search 
Age Ethnicity of suspect as it appeared 
to the Police 
Ethnicity as defined by suspect Gender 
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City Airport 30 6 12 7 13 11 1 0 11 9 1 2 25 0 
Greenwich 19 2 8 3 11 0 2 0 11 0 1 1 13 0 
Heathrow 40 7 24 9 18 8 7 7 18 7 6 6 32 8 
Tower Hamlets 70 0 36 18 40 16 1 0 29 10 0 4 51 6 
Westminster 397 22 154 118 198 38 31 26 177 44 28 25 261 32 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
183 Ibid. 
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As previously explained, precautionary principle and quality of intelligence may result in the 
use of crisis powers due to fear, rather than knowledge of an imminent threat. S44 was 
described, as set out at the beginning of this chapter, to prevent terrorism by deterring 
terrorists. The data in Tables A, B, C.1 and C.2 show that during 2009/2010 the number of 
s44 stop and searches fell by 60% compared to 2008/2009 figures; however no explanation is 
given for this, although one might argue that it is due to the Gillan and Quinton case as it 
developed through the courts. These tables also show that most stop and searches occur in the 
London/Metropolitan Police Area. Data released by the Metropolitan Police Service of the 
London Boroughs was broken down for June and July 2010 (Table D and E respectively);184 
it can be concluded that those most at risk of being stopped and searched under s44 were 
those categorised as white, male and aged 21 and over: clearly they are suspects that do not 
fit the perceived stereotypical profile of a terrorist as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
 
In the Home Office’s Impact Assessment185 of s44 it was confirmed from the last available 
statistics taken between April 2009 and March 2010 in Great Britain: 
• 79% of s44 was enforced by the Metropolitan Police Service; 
• 59% of those stopped were white; 
• 10% of those stopped were black; and 
• 17% of those stopped were Asian. 
Furthermore, figures released by the Home Office (2009-2010) shows that of those 
imprisoned for terrorist-related offences at 31st March 2010 were made up of: 
• 72.2% British nationality – they would also be known as ‘home-grown terrorists’;  
• 91% were of British nationality imprisoned for offences relating to domestic 
extremism/separatism;  
 
Of those imprisoned for terrorist related offences: 
• 86.6% declared themselves of Muslim religion;  
                                                          
184 The London Borough’s shown in Table’s D and E were selected because they show the most use of Section 
44, this does not mean Section 44 was not used in other London Borough’s. 
185 Home Office (fn 118) 8. 
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• 45.8% of those imprisoned for domestic extremism/separatism were of no religion; 
and  
• 0% were identified as actually being from a Muslim religion (2009-2010).  
 
Although this information provides a mixed picture of those who are and are not terrorist 
suspects, it goes to strengthen the argument that the police should not stereotype or label 
people as ‘terrorist’ so easily. Despite such evidence, Lord Bingham in the Gillan and 
Quinton case used the ‘old woman scenario’ to explain that stop and search should not be 
used when a person is “obviously” not a terrorist. However, no clarification was given by His 
Lordship on how the police were expected to identify those who are “obviously” terrorists, 
particularly in circumstances when the police may have been enforcing s44 with a lack of 
intelligence to support any profiling. As explained earlier in this chapter, Lord Carlile QC and 
government Ministers believed there should be an ‘ethnic imbalance’, but the statistical data 
does not support this. Lord Carlile QC has since take the view that s44 was being misused, 
describing them as almost certainly 'unlawful and in no way an intelligent use of the 
procedure'186 and would have invaded peoples human rights (Independent Terrorism Review, 
2009: 140), recommending s44 should have been refused more often by the Secretary of State 
(Lord Carlile QC Independent Terrorism Review, 2006).  
 
In light of his findings, and to support his conclusions, Lord Carlile QC suggested that the 
police should use an objective approach to assess who to stop and search (Independent 
Terrorism Review, 2009: 140). The failure of Lord Carlile QC to realise the importance of 
safeguarding against arbitrary decision making is worrying; throughout the Independent 
Terrorism Reviews by Lord Carlile QC it was openly commented that there was confusion 
why some police forces used s44, and in some cases had multiple rolling-programmes of the 
measure, whilst others used it less if at all. This strengthens the argument for better 
safeguards of clarity, transparency, accountability and independent scrutiny in the use of pre-
emptive measures such as s44. 
 
                                                          
186 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew (fn 88) 29: 140. 
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The statistics in Tables A, B, C.1, C.2, D and E (pages 83-88), the points raised earlier in this 
chapter and those opinions of Lord Carlile QC, may suggest that the police have enforced s44 
to control the general public rather than terrorism. If the police have intelligence of a suspect 
their selection to stop and search becomes clear and provides grounds of suspicion. Walker’s 
(2008) notion of ‘all-risk policing’ to identify terrorist suspects would require everyone to 
prove their innocence and might arguably enable the police to develop a test of 
‘trustworthiness’ with the public (Yaghmanian, 2006; Amoore and de Goede, 2008: 97). A 
test of this kind may have supported s44 because every member of the public would have 
been considered an equal threat. Although this would still have been no different to airport 
security checks, which as explained earlier, was not accepted as rationale by the ECtHR in 
Gillian and Quinton. A lack of safeguards, which this chapter has explored, creates a number 
of identifiable risks, including: the creation of sociological borders and borderlands within 
society that negatively impacts on specific cultures and creates suspect communities; and 
creates a negative public perception of the police. Awareness of these risks may prevent the 
overuse of s61 because greater use of intelligence would be needed and a rolling-programme 
of the measure would more likely be scrutinised.  
 
Counter-terrorism ‘crisis’ powers creating racial and ethnic “borders” that divide 
communities. 
When s44 was enforced by the police post-2000 the potential negative impact went beyond 
racial profiling; s44 was a measure used and intended to be used by the police to control the 
risk posed by terrorism through stop and search. Some social science scholars argue that s44 
created borders and borderlands which enable control over the risk posed to national security 
by identifying suspects through racial and religious profiling; a vetting system is created 
requiring those stopped and searched to prove they are 'good, law abiding citizens' (Brunet-
Jailly, 2011), although one may argue that this is similar to creating the ‘trustworthiness test’ 
discussed earlier in this chapter. If stereotypes are followed and those stopped and searched 
are from ethnic minorities then a control border is created around those communities which 
creates ‘suspect communities’ (Greer, 2010; Fenwick, 2010); this is not only destructive since 
it stigmatises cultures and communities, it tends to segregate them from the rest of society. 
Furthermore, if this is allowed to happen then it creates propaganda opportunities for terrorist 
organisations and similar extremist groups, such as Muslims Against Crusades, the British 
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National Party and English Defence League. The risk hidden within this is that it may support 
and aid radicalisation due to the negative impact such measures may have if the appropriate 
safeguards are not in place. 
 
As argued within this chapter, profiling without intelligence can cause problems for the 
police. Racial profiling and abuse of powers to counter-terrorism can also create risks related 
to, if not exacerbate, poor community relations and negative perceptions of the police. 
Former Assistant Commissioner John Yates has stated that 'counter terrorism policing does 
not operate in a vacuum'187 and managing the risks posed by terrorism requires strong 
relationships with Security Services, government and the international community. The 
strongest relationship to prevent terrorism however is 'rooted in the local policing';188 as 
supported by the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair MP. 189 As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, frontline police provide extensive knowledge and developed relationships with 
their community and if this were negatively affected, the frontline police would be unable to 
play a key role in local policing and countering terrorism within those communities. Whilst 
commenting on the practices police should use, as set out by the Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire Sir Norman Bettison, John Yates stated that four key objectives need to be 
accomplished:  
(i) better engagement with the Muslim Community;  
(ii) improve information-sharing with other authorities;  
(iii) improved support for those vulnerable to terrorist propaganda; and  
(iv) improved standard practices in understanding Prevent and Pursue and vice versa 
of the UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
No matter the strategy, it is important that the police when in the execution and enforcement 
of their duties under the powers given to them, do not abuse the power or trust bestowed upon 
them. As the most visible of the criminal justice system, they are a critical component of how 
they are perceived and construed by the public with the public being invited to assess the 
propriety (or rectitude) of their behaviour (Tyler, 2005). The perceived visibility of the police 
is usually based upon direct experience or observation, this would include through the use of 
                                                          
187 Yates (fn 113). 
188 Ibid. 
189 Liaison Committee (fn 57). 
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crisis powers. However, the development of mass circulation of newspapers and media has 
enabled secondary visibility and therefore assessment of policing on a wider scale: members 
of the public far removed from particular situations could be made aware of policing 
activities and thus be able to assess their conduct (Goldsmith, 2010).190 The exposure of 
misdeeds, misconduct or negligence can reflect badly on the police as a whole and not just 
the individual officer, as exemplified by the death of Ian Tomlinson and his death at the G20 
summit in 2010.  
 
Maintaining and developing strong relationships with local communities is vital, particularly 
in counter-terrorism policing; it can support the police in their aim to manage the risk posed 
be terrorism and identify terrorists; for example Isa 'Andrew' Ibrahim was arrested in 2008 
following reports given to the police by the Muslim Community in Bristol of his terrorist 
activities. Retaining a good relationship with the local community is important to the police, 
particularly frontline police. It maintains a high level of public regard and trust (Police 
Foundation and Policy Studies Institute, 1996) and further supports the traditional idea of the 
police being citizens in uniform, a positive relationship with the community can mould 
positive public attitudes (Wirths, 1958; Correia, Reisig and Lovrich, 1996). However, history 
has shown that the police are not far from criticism for their practices, particularly in relation 
to stop and search. The Sir Macpherson Report 1999 (also known as the Stephen Lawrence 
Inquiry) concluded that when stopping and searching the police were ‘institutionally racist’ 
because the majority of those stopped and searched came from black or Asian backgrounds 
(Miller, 2010). Such conclusions are undoubtedly negative but research has shown that 
perceptions of the police have generally been negative (Peak, Bradshaw and Glensor, 1992; 
Correia, Reisig and Lovrich, 1996; Brown and Benedict, 2002; Weisburd and Eck, 2004); 
however, scholars have revealed that Caucasians tend to hold more positive views of the 
police compared to ethnic minorities (Campbell and Schman, 1972; Furstenberg and 
Wellford, 1973; Smith and Hawkins, 1973; Correia, Reisig and Lovrich, 1996).  
 
Whilst considerable quantities of research that has reached this conclusion were pre-9/11, 
perceptions of the police post-9/11 do not improve or alter this. Arguably a reason for the 
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police being negatively perceived may be a result of products of 'ineffective communication, 
cultural conflict and perceptions of discrimination' (Correia, Reisig and Lovrich, 1996: 18). 
However another explanation to explain poor relationships between the police and 
communities, particularly with younger individuals, is because the youth value their freedom 
whilst older generations are more security and safety orientated (Gaines, Kappeler and 
Vaughan, 1994). This means the police need to be seen to provide security and safety when 
using counter-terrorism measures, whilst simultaneously providing fairness to all and where 
this is not done there needs to be accountability and the option of legal remedy. 
 
Certain negative perceptions of the police generally relate to their use of police powers such 
as ordinary stop and search (Correia, Reisig and Lovrich, 1996). With powers as broad as s44 
that enabled arbitrary decision-making and make the police holding a quasi-judicial role, one 
would reasonably expect enforcement of s44 was never going to assist the police in the way 
they are perceived; rather the public will become more aware of the police and their conduct. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, due to s44 having no test to safeguard against its 
enforcement (eg ‘imminent threat’ test), the public are more likely to scrutinise police 
conduct further. At the Tomlinson Inquiry evidence by Sir Paul Stephenson, the then Police 
Commissioner for London admitted "concern over the imagery of the actions of a small 
number of officers" and accepted that "the presentation of that, and the way in which that 
video evidence looks, does stand the potential of damaging public confidence".191 The image 
and tone set by the police through their actions when enforcing s44 or similarly broad 
measures need to be considered by every police officer because they each have an interest in 
how their actions are perceived by outsiders (Mawby, 2002). This further supports this thesis’ 
argument that accountability, transparency and adequate safeguards to protect the public and 
the police would be of benefit. 
 
Section 61 and segregation, radicalisation, suspect communities. 
The division crisis powers, like s44, can create through the categorisation and stereotyping of 
communities can be counterproductive. Bowling and Phillips (2007) argued, with support of 
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the remarks made by Bernie Grant MP, that the relationship with the police and communities, 
specifically the black community, was ill-judged because of stop and search (2007: 936). 
This particular police power provided the most 'humiliating experience...[which became 
viewed as a] fact of life'.192 This demonstrates that like those subject to ordinary stop and 
search powers, the crisis powers of s44 would have also caused those subjected to the stop 
and search to become powerless and humiliated; the danger is that such powers become 
‘normalised’ in the name of countering-terrorism, an issue that will be discussed in further 
detail in later chapters. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a person who may share or 
understand a person’s view does not necessarily make them a terrorist, yet they are made to 
feel as though they are. As De Mesuita and Dickson (2007) explained, when referring to Pape 
(2003), recognised that terrorism can be a powerful tool for generating support for a violent 
extremist movement (2007: 364). The underlying intention of terrorists is that they utilise 
violence to provoke a counter-terrorism response that is 'harsh and indiscriminate' so that they 
[the terrorists] can radicalise and mobilise a population of people who the terrorists claim to 
represent (De Mesuita and Dickson, 2007); the risk that this thesis considers is whether UK 
counter-terrorism measures do this. In British history an example of this can be seen by the 
Irish Catholics during the “Rising” in Dublin (1916) when the British responded with harsh 
counter-measures. English (2003) argues that the response by the British to the republican 
subversion “frequently involved punishing the wider population for IRA activities” which 
had an unintended counterproductive effect that strengthened the support given to the IRA 
(2003: 17). There were arguments by de Figueiredo and Weingast (2001) and Rosendoff and 
Sandler (2004) that suggest when government cracks down on radicalised moderates, the 
consequence is an increase in violence (De Mesuita and Dickson, 2007). 
 
How the government responds and the powers they enact must be questioned in light of the 
wider risks that may be caused. Therefore, as the replacement for s44, the question is whether 
s61 prevents segregation and radicalisation? It is difficult to say given the power has not been 
actively used since the PoFA 2012 came into force, however one can be certain that the 
power itself is an improvement on s44 for reason explained in this chapter. All the same, 
whilst it is an improvement there is still the possibility that arbitrary decisions are made. Yet 
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this is slightly curtailed by the fact that the authorising officer of s61 would need to carry out 
a risk assessment before authorisation for which they will be accountable. Despite this there 
does not seem to be any clear test that frontline police should employ and it is here that 
arbitrary decision-making may continue to be seen. It is therefore possible that if s61 is not 
properly enforced then it will be just as counterproductive as s44 was. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In 1996 Lord Lloyd carried out a review of the anti-terrorism legislation193 and described the 
right balance to be: 
"(i) Legislation against terrorism should approximate as closely as possible to the ordinary 
criminal law and procedure; (ii) Additional statutory offences and powers may be justified, 
but only if they are necessary to meet the anticipated threat. They must then strike the right 
balance between the needs of security and the rights and liberties of the individual; (iii) The 
need for additional safeguards should be considered alongside any additional powers; (iv) 
The law should comply with the UK’s obligations in international law."194 
As discussed by Walker (2006) counter-terrorism legislation since the Diplock Report in 
1972, adopted a criminal justice model, and should reject the war model adopted by the US. 
As discussed in this chapter, the criminal justice model is a more appropriate model to follow 
and Walker believes this to be the case because it is consistent with the 'rule of law and 
proportionate responses' (2006: 1145). Walker (2006) and Allen (1996) note that the war 
model approach is conducive to a lack of accountability and proportionality, as well as a 
threat to civil society. However, from the analysis of s44 in this chapter, it becomes clear that 
pre-9/11 when the TA 2000 was enacted the UK government was willing to adopt the war 
model and did so post-9/11. Turk (2004) believes that political pressures exist with the 
intention to lessen the legal restraint on the police to enable them to respond to terrorism, but 
in doing so ordinary legal protections are eroded and methods used by the police become 
more intrusive resulting in arbitrary detention (Turk, 2004: 280).  
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The Gillan and Quinton case supports this argument because the UK courts were willing to 
erode or lessen human rights to arguably support the government’s aim to tackle terrorism, 
although it is possible that the courts were in fear of what might happen if they ruled against 
s44 (eg terrorist attack). However, the ECtHR rebalanced this and adopted the human rights 
model approach. As suggested in this chapter, the most ideal model to adopt is a criminal 
justice and human rights approach model and this would most likely achieve the balance Lord 
Lloyd suggested in 1996. Although does s61 support or adopt this approach? 
 
Until s61 has been widely used so that statistical data can be collected and examined it 
remains too early to determine whether s61 adopts this model. However, when taking into 
account the areas of concern and the identified risks within this chapter, s61 is of little 
improvement from the former s44 measure. Those areas of concern and risk issues are factors 
that assist in addressing whether the power is a proportionate and an effective counter-
terrorism measure and may also be viewed as safeguards for such counter-terrorism powers:  
(i) The need for an imminent threat test; 
There needs to be a clear test that determines when such a pre-emptive measure like s44 
should be used – this thesis places greater emphasis on the ‘imminent threat test’; s61 
improves on this by requiring the use of the measure to be necessary. As Fenwick and 
Phillipson (2012) commented if there is a 'very strong risk, or immediate threat of an attack 
that would cause large-scale fatalities, the ability of police officers to search on instinct 
would be a necessary price to pay for preventing the loss of life.'195 By introducing this sort 
of test it means that responses are not necessarily based on fractured intelligence. It also 
ensures that the enforcement of such emergency powers are restricted to the areas that are at 
threat and a blanket ban is not imposed, which may prevent emergency powers from 
becoming normalised. 
(ii) Transparency in communication between the Home Secretary, authorising officer 
and frontline police officers; 
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There needs to be transparency from the Home Secretary to the frontline police identifying 
what the threat is, where the threat is expected to take place and who the threat is believed to 
be posed by. Doing this ensures that the police have information which they can use to 
formulate suspicion of individuals and reduce any possible biased, racial or religious 
profiling. It would also ensure that each of those key players (Home Secretary, authorising 
officer and frontline police) become accountable for their decisions and actions. 
(iii) The need for accountability at each stage of the process to use such powers; 
There should be accountability at every level. This chapter has expressed accountability 
should come from those who confirm, apply and enforce such emergency. In addition this 
would aid in transparency and reduce any possible biased or incorrect profiling. Currently, 
s61 places the authorising officer as the accountable person which is an improvement on s44, 
supporting the need for transparency of intelligence so that they may prioritise the 
'immediately applicable results rather than theoretical knowledge whose applicability is 
problematic' (Turk, 2004: 280). Once authorised, similar to s44, the frontline police do not 
have to have reasonable suspicion to stop and search or conduct their own risk assessment; 
instead they may continue to stop and search anyone because the authorising officer has 
deemed it necessary to allow the use of such powers. In this regard it is still possible that s61 
would breach Articles 5 and 8 ECHR. 
(iv) Independent scrutiny by the courts and Parliament. 
There should be independent scrutiny which comes from the courts and Parliament. It is 
important that the public has a right of remedy when police powers are used and are abused, 
otherwise if there is no remedy then the police can be free to use and abuse the powers given 
to them. The processes of risk assessment and accountability in decisions taken are 
maintained through independent scrutiny. A concern is that the courts, both UK and 
European, believe that the risk assessment by government cannot be challenged; Woolf LCJ 
stated at the Court of Appeal of Gillan and Quinton:196 
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"the courts will not readily interfere with the judgment of the authorities as to the action that 
is necessary. They will usually therefore not interfere with the authorities assessment of risk 
and the action that should be taken to counter the risk".197 
 
With this in mind, given s61 requires an assessment of necessity it is even less likely that the 
UK courts will find against the police for its use, but it is more possible they will be held to 
account for their actions. Ultimately this chapter has examined, in detail, the impact of a 
controversial pre-emptive counter-terrorism measure that had been adopted by the UK 
government. This chapter has understood that pre-emptive action is generally based on 
fractured and inaccurate intelligence and as a consequence of this the state and emanation of 
the state behave in a precautionary manner. This approach and behaviour will impact 
negatively upon the UK Strategy to counter-terrorism. It must remembered that s44, now s61, 
are measures that are intended to provide police presence at times of an emergency when 
national security is in danger; in other words the measure becomes a deterrent. Consequently, 
if intelligence has been used to activate the pre-emptive counter-terrorism measure, as a 
deterrent one may argue concern that it removes the opportunity for the government and 
Security Services to gather more intelligence and evidence to support the UK Strategy 2011 
to detain, arrest and prosecute terrorists.  
 
As terrorists have been viewed as opportunists, police presence will not deter a terrorist from 
setting off a bomb, but may for example deter two terrorists from meeting in a public place to 
exchange information/plots – being a deterrent they would be less likely to meet and 
exchange such information when there is a strong police presence. This does not mean 
terrorist activity reduces or stops, instead it means that terrorists have to consider alternative 
ways to advance their activities; therefore being aware of terrorist networks becomes more 
important as will be explained in Chapter Five. In addition, the safeguards identified within 
this chapter prevent the normalization of security measures, which should be unique and 
reserved for times of emergency. What s44 has shown is that the government takes traditional 
criminal justice norms and adapts them into pre-emptive and preventative counter-terrorism 
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measure, giving the impression that they should only be used for a specific purpose, although 
s44 was clearly overused and abused by government and police. This allows the power to 
become adopted as a normal power whilst simultaneously continues to support the 
government’s argument that a state of emergency exists – more so when the courts fail to 
question this; this is exemplified by the rolling-programme of s44 across the whole of 
London. As a deterrent, pre-emptive and precautionary powers such as s44, and similar 
counterterrorism powers, are an early measure when little information or intelligence is 
available. For the reasons given, preventative measures like s44 only prevent the government 
from obtaining more information and intelligence. In this regard one can only conclude that 
s44, and similar counter-terrorism measures, are ineffective because they hinder the UK 
Strategy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONTROL ORDERS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL UNDER 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POWERS; THE IMPACT ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
"Few things would provide a more gratifying victory to the terrorist than for this country to 
undermine its traditional freedoms in the very process of countering the enemies of those 
freedoms."198 
- Roy Jenkins MP, Former Home Secretary 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter an examination of the preventative measure of control orders and its 
relationship between human rights, notably Article’s 5 and 6 ECHR,199 and the risks the 
measure created. The assessment undertaken under this chapter will support and add to the 
concerns identified in Chapter Two when understanding that pre-emptive action can have a 
negative impact on detecting suspect terrorists and the states relationship with the wider 
community, exacerbated by a lack of safeguards in counter-terrorism measures. The findings 
of this chapter will achieve two things: firstly, identify issues and concerns that can be carried 
forward into Chapter Five when discussing the replacement preventative measure for the 
control orders – Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) and Enchanced 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (ETPIMs); and secondly, it will assist in 
addressing whether the impact of pre-emptive and preventative measures to counter-terrorism 
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in the UK post-9/11 support the UK Strategy, providing a balance between human rights and 
national security. 
 
In 2007 the Security Services (Mi5) alleged that they had identified at least 2,000 individuals 
involved in terrorist-related activity in the UK, each posing a threat to national security and 
public safety (Anderson QC Independent Terrorism Report, 2013).200 Based on this, there 
was a clear need for appropriate and effective counter-terrorism measures that redress the 
threat those suspects posed. Despite this it is known that since 9/11 and up until 31st 
December 2011 a total of 454 suspects were charged with terrorism related activity, of which 
only 273 were convicted (see Table F below.  
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Table F – Home Office: 'Persons charged and prosecuted for terrorism-relate offences' Statistical Bulletin 07/12:201 Persons charged and prosecuted for 
terrorism-related offences 
Number   Great Britain 
 Date of arrest  Total year ending 
Persons charged and 
outcome 
Jul – 
Sep 
2009202 
Oct – 
Dec 
2009 
Jan – 
Mar 
2010 
Apr – 
Jun 
2010 
Jul – 
Sep 
2010 
Oct –
Dec 
2010 
Jan – Mar 
2011 
Apr – 
Jun 2011 
Jul – Sep 
2011 
Oct – 
Dec 2011 
31 Dec 
2010 
31 Dec 
2011 
Change Since 11 
Sep 2001 
Charged 3 16 4 4 1 11 6 6 16 8 20 36 16 454 
Prosecuted 3 16 3 1 1 11 4 5 4 2 16 15 -1 367 
Not proceeded against - - - 3 - - 1 1 - 4 3 6 3 73 
Awaiting prosecution - - 1 - - - 1 - 12 2 1 15 14 18 
Convicted 1 14 1 1 1 11 4 5 2 2 14 13 -1 273 
Terrorism Act offences 1 5 1 - 1 9 - 2 2 - 11 4 -7 136 
Other legislation 
(terrorism-related) 
- 9 - 1 - 2 4 3 - 2 3 9 6 135 
Other outcomes of 
prosecutions 
2 2 2 - - - - - 2 - 2 2 - 95 
Found not guilty 2 2 2 - - - - - 2 - 2 2 - 92 
Other - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 
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During the lifetime of the control order regime (2005-2011) a total of 52 suspects were 
placed under a control order (Anderson QC Independent Terrorism Report, 2012: 4), of 
which 24 were British citizens and 28 foreign nationals (2012: 30). Whilst the number of 
identified suspects does not match the number of those convicted (454/2000) or those placed 
under a control order (52/2000), the Security Services had identified a large number of 
suspects that posed a threat 'which the government accepted'.203 The government understood 
that it was impossible to tackle each one through the criminal justice system (Bright, 2012) 
and therefore alternative pre-emptive and preventative measures were utilised. The control 
order regime gave support to the government’s preventative pillar of its CONTEST strategy, 
which was intended to provide control and management of the terrorist threat, essentially by 
'executive-based risk management' means (Walker, 2007: 1395).204  
 
The control order regime (henceforth ‘the regime’) was superseded by a new ‘light-touch’ 
control order regime (Fenwick, 2011:129) known as TPIMs,205 there is also the use of 
ETPIMs. The issues raised within this chapter can be applied to the examination of TPIMs 
and ETPIMs in Chapter 5 since they strongly resemble the former control order regime, 
despite the differing terminology (Fenwick, 2011). Similar to the control order regime, 
TPIMs are intended to prevent those suspected of being involved in terrorist-related activity 
by limiting their liberty; therefore similar criticisms could be levelled against TPIMs as can 
be against control orders. The question for Chapter Five to consider is – to what extent do the 
two measures differ in terms of human rights and risk? 
 
The control order regime would manage suspected terrorists or those the Secretary of State 
believed to be engaged in terrorist related activity (s2(1) Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005) 
through the use of ‘obligations’, or 'substantive restrictions' (Zedner, 2007b), imposed 'for the 
purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism'.206 
Furthermore, it provided the government with a way of managing those suspects rather than 
prosecute them because of lack of evidence, as explained in the Introduction of this thesis and 
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Chapter One. As the regime operated outside of the criminal justice system, it developed a 
reputation for being a "regime [that] acts as an impediment to prosecution",207 an observation 
made some time earlier by various academics, including Fenwick (2008).  
 
The nature of the regime meant it would side-step and run parallel to the criminal justice 
system; by doing so it circumvented the guarantees ordinarily provided by a criminal trial (eg 
due process). Walker (2007) rightly described control orders as a provision giving 'short-term 
abeyances from criminal justice'208 and warned that they should not be used as a long-term 
solution (2007: 1463). Given this, the control order regime is a typical example of 
‘securitization’ (Bright, 2012: 861). Securitization denotes the concept that certain acts are 
permitted despite breaking various rules; in other words, the right to a fair trial and other 
protections given by human rights and the criminal justice system are intentionally not 
adhered to; the concept was developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998),209 and 
supported by Bright (2012). Securitization occurs at times when an existential threat 
legitimises the use or need for emergency measures (eg following a terrorist attack) and is 
ordinarily asserted by the state or government by claiming 'a right to handle the issue through 
extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game.'210 Taureck (2006) 
suggests that securitization consists of three stages: 
(1) The identification of the existential threats; 
(2) Emergency actions; and 
(3) The effect on various relations (including societal) through the breaking of ordinary 
rules. 
Determination of whether a securitization measure is successful is not easy. As Bright (2012) 
explains, knowing who the audience is becomes worthy of consideration, this would take into 
consideration experts, academics, legal professionals etc. Strizel (2007), Bright (2012) and 
Buzan and Wæver (2009) understand that at times the audience must accept the declarations 
or assertions made by the state. This principle would be the courts accepting the Home 
Secretary’s assertion that a suspect is involved in terrorist related activity. The judiciary, as 
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an audience, had the power to quash a control order or any of the imposed obligations, direct 
the Secretary of State to revoke the order, or amend the imposed obligations (s3 (10)-(12) 
PTA 2005). It will be shown within this chapter that despite having such powers, case law 
illustrates a trail of deference by the courts towards the government: rather than argue against 
the need for securitization towards a suspect or question the existence of a threat, they would 
simply modify control orders enabling them to continue.  
 
Detention without trial under Part IV ATCSA 2001 
This securitization measure of control orders and then TPIMS has not simply appeared, nor 
has it been created after much consideration and scrutiny. In fact it was created in response to 
the House of Lords’ decision in the Belmarsh case,211 confirming that the former 
securitization measure (indefinite detention without trial) breached human rights, as will be 
discussed. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the control order regime has notable 
similarities with previous emergency powers, particularly powers of internment used during 
the IRA struggles. Control Orders replaced the indefinite detention without trial measure as 
provided by Part IV ATCSA 2001212 (henceforth 'Part 4') which was introduced two months 
after 9/11. The Part 4 measure was itself described as being one of the most draconian 
measures by Lord Carlile QC (2011b). 
 
When the 2001 Act was being passed through Parliament the then Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett MP, explained the powers contained in Part 4 were necessary to protect our human 
rights and democratic way of life by 'strengthening our democracy and reinforcing our values 
is as important as the passage of new laws...the legislative measures which I have outlined 
today will protect and enhance our rights, not diminish them...'213 The ATCSA 2001 was 
designed to comply with the ECtHR judgment in Chahal,214 under which the UK would 
breach Article 3 ECHR (Prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) 
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if it expelled terrorist suspects to jurisdictions where torture was a considerable possibility; 
consequently, compliance with this ruling placed some restrictions upon what the government 
could do with foreign terrorist suspects in the UK. Walker (2007: 1404) explained that in 
2004 the Home Office deemed it was unacceptable that total liberty is given to terrorist 
suspects because they cannot be convicted under the conditions of due process under the 
criminal justice system. It was a similar concern of Dame Eliza Manningham-Butler, Former 
Director-General of the Security Services: 
"This is one of the central dilemmas of countering this sort of terrorism. We may be confident 
that an individual or group is planning an attack but that confidence comes from the sort of 
intelligence I described earlier, patchy and fragmentary and uncertain, to be interpreted and 
assessed. All too often it falls short of evidence to support criminal charges to bring an 
individual before the courts, the best solution if achievable."215 
 
The Part 4 measure became politically unpalatable (Walker, 2007); on the 18th December 
2003 Lord Newton chaired a Privy Counsellors Committee216 and published the report, 
pursuant to ATCSA 2001 s122, setup by the Home Secretary. The committee objected to the 
Part 4 measure because the system of detention lacked safeguards against injustice and the 
protection of British terrorists, which Walker (2007) described as ‘neighbour terrorists’. The 
report clearly understood that the criminal justice system was made to have a secondary role 
in dealing with terrorist suspects, and therefore suggested an aggressive stance be taken to 
prosecute or greater restraints be placed upon the movement and communication of terrorist 
suspects. 
 
The Belmarsh case 
As previously mentioned, the Part 4 measure was successfully challenged in the House of 
Lords and ruled unlawful in the 'Belmarsh case.217 The majority of the House of Lords 
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accepted that at times of a public emergency it was sufficient to warrant derogation of rights 
under Article 15 ECHR. The court explained that it did not have any fixed opinion with 
regard to the ‘doctrine of deference’ and should apply a 'greater intensity of review' of 
counter-terrorism measures taken (Lord Bingham, paragraph’s 42 and 44). The court 
considered that the Part 4 measure was disproportionate and discriminatory on the basis that:  
(i) It was only applicable to deportable aliens; therefore it did not reflect the fact that 
some terrorists were British nationals (breach of Article 14 ECHR). As Baroness 
Hale remarked, 'if it is not necessary to lock up the nationals it cannot be 
necessary to lock up the foreigners';218 and  
(ii) It created a 'prison with three walls'219 which enabled terrorist suspects to escape 
the UK jurisdiction and plot terrorist attacks abroad, which the court was of the 
opinion made no sense. 
Although the House of Lords supported the declaration of a ‘state of emergency’, their 
Lordships suggested that a continued declaration would be difficult to sustain over a long 
period of time; however despite this point, as Chapter Two discussed the House of Lords did 
allow a rolling programme of s44. With regard to the ‘state of emergency’ Lord Bingham was 
of the opinion that it was a political matter, rather than a legal one.220 Lord Hoffman stated 
that 'freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is a quintessentially British liberty, enjoyed 
by the inhabitants of this country when most of the population of Europe could be thrown 
into prison at the whim of their rulers'.221 There was concern that with the passing of time 
those detained had bleaker prospects of freedom and this would raise issues of a possible 
breach of Article 3 due to the negative impact on the detainees’ mental health (Walker, 
2007).  
 
Such an argument would be supported by Bimberg Pierce Solicitors who acted on behalf of 
three of the detainees subject to the Part 4 detention, describing two of their clients as having 
"already expressed [their] nervousness at re-entering the world abruptly; each expressed 
                                                          
218 Ibid [231]. 
219 Ibid [81]. 
220 Ibid [29] (Lord Bingham): 'The more purely political a question is, the more appropriate it will be for political 
resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision. The smaller, therefore, will 
be the potential role of the court. It is the function of political and not judicial bodies to resolve political 
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[their] concern that [they] would not be able to cope...”.222 During their Lordships assessment 
of the detention, Lord Hoffman remarked that the "real threat to the life of the nation, in the 
sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes, 
not from terrorism but laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may 
achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory".223 This 
thesis argues that the counter-terrorism measures being assessed herein which have been 
implemented post-9/11, go against the traditional laws and political values of Britain and give 
terrorists a victory due to the risks the measures create. Whilst this point is supported by 
others such as Gearty (2005c) and was expressed by Lord Hoffman, the judiciary rarely 
intervene against these measures and become deferential towards them. It will be argued that 
this is because the judiciary 'do not swim into the deep end of policy where they are 
manifestly out of their depth', (Gearty, 2005c: 33) despite the recognised impact these 
measures can have on a person’s human rights. With such a negative finding from the House 
of Lords, it was unsurprising that the Part 4 regime was held incompatible with the ECHR 
(Articles 5 and 14) and a declaration of incompatibility was made in accordance with s4 HRA 
1998.224  
 
As previously mentioned, the Part 4 regime was a form of securitization which, this thesis 
will argue, had a process that under the criminal justice system a breach of human rights 
would be caused; however under the legislative framework of Part 4, breaches of Article’s 5 
and 6 became possible. At the time the government did not legitimise the threat posed by the 
Belmarsh detainees, failing to take into consideration the terrorist threat posed by home-
grown terrorists and were discriminative in dealing with the terrorist threat. The declaration 
of incompatibility by the House of Lords placed the UK government in a difficult situation 
and raised an important question: what happens next? For the government the Belmarsh 
detainees were identified as being a risk to national security and public safety, yet the 
government could not simply indefinitely detain them. The solution became two-fold: on the 
one-hand, the government could introduce a new regime that in practice met the aims of the 
                                                          
222 Ewing and Tham (fn 59) 671. 
223 A and Others v SSHD (fn 24) [97]. 
224 Human Rights Act 1998 section 4(2): 'If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a 
Convention rights, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.' Section 4(4): 'If the court is satisfied – (a) 
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Part 4 regime but would be deemed ECHR compatible – this became the control order 
regime; on the other-hand, the government could utilise alternative processes to legitimately 
remove foreign national terrorists – this developed into the Deportation with Assurances 
('DWA') mechanism that will be considered in Chapter Four. 
 
THE CONTROL ORDERS REGIME 
As a direct result of the Belmarsh case, the government withdrew its derogation of Article 5 
ECHR as allowed under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001.225 
This would enable to government to introduce the ‘control order’ regime under the PTA 2005 
and by-pass the issues raised by the House of Lords in the Belmarsh case. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, a control order would impose obligations on the suspect to whom it 
applied, in this context the role of bail in the criminal justice system is similar because it is 
used to deter people from absconding and meet the needs of the system (Hickey, 1969-1970), 
specifically the 'protection of the community from a defendant during the time it takes the 
system to operate'.226 Zedner (2007b) has suggested that the control order regime became the 
model for other preventative measures within the criminal justice system, such as the Serious 
Crime Prevention Orders (SCPO). 
 
Taking on board the criticisms and findings of their Lordships in the Belmarsh case, the 
government introduced two types of control orders: derogating and non-derogating. Of these 
two, the former was never activated whilst the latter imposed obligations which were given as 
an alternative to detention; the obligations were considered by the Secretary of State not to be 
in breach of Article 5 ECHR, pursuant to s1(3) PTA 2005. MacDonald (2007) remarked that 
matters of proportionality would be addressed under the regime; this is because the 
obligations imposed would be 'tailored to meet the threat posed by the particular suspect'.227 
These obligations are considered, in comparison to the former Part 4 regime, to be less 
                                                          
225 Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (Statutory Instrument 2001/3644), under this 
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invasive of human rights (Fenwick, 2008). It is argued by Gearty (2005a) that non-derogating 
control orders were modelled on the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO).228 The derogating 
control order required the derogation from Article 5 ECHR because it required the detention 
of suspects without trial, this essentially allowing the government to retain the former Part 4 
regime. However, as rightly noted by Zender (2007b) the PTA 2005 provided no 
distinguishable cut-off point between the restriction of a person’s liberty and deprivation 
under Article 5 ECHR, nor was it clear which orders would require derogation (Fenwick, 
2008: 1441). This meant that the government could impose obligations under a non-
derogating control order that would arguably remove a person’s liberty almost entirely as one 
would expect under a derogating control order. However, this would only be possible until 
the courts ruled that the obligations cumulatively amounted to a deprivation of liberty.  
 
Imposing a control order and the standard of proof 
It was remarked by Lord Lloyd, and mentioned by Walker (2007: 1409), that the regime 
involved "risk assessment" and "not a decision".229 This is a similar exercise to the one 
undertaken by the courts daily when assessing the risk posed by a suspect, weighing up 
whether to grant or refuse bail and if so what conditions to impose, a view supported by 
Walker (2007: 1409). However, as suggested by Walker (2007) there are those that assume 
they are unable to deal with matters of anticipatory risk, for example Charles Clarke MP, the 
then Home Secretary, remarked that the senior judiciary would 'carry out the will of 
Parliament, as they rightly should'.230 Lord Carlile QC reported that the basis of obtaining a 
control order was through intelligence, therefore making the regime ‘intelligence-led’: 
"Much of the information is derived from intelligence. The sources and content of such 
intelligence in most instances demand careful protection in the public interest, given the 
current situation in which there is needed a concerted and strategic response to terrorism (and 
especially suicide bombings). The techniques of gathering intelligence, and the range of 
opportunities available, are wide and certainly in need of secrecy. Human resources place 
themselves at risk – not least by any means those who offer unsolicited information out of 
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disapproval of conduct and events at which they may have been and could continue to be 
present."231 
The former Home Secretary seems to suggest that courts should operate under the doctrine of 
deference when dealing with case involving alleged ‘terrorists’. However, as Lord Carlile QC 
explains, the assessment of risk and determination of whether a control order should have 
been imposed comes down to the evidence, which had been obtained by intelligence. The 
court would simply support the government in its assertions and allegations against the 
controlee, causing judicial involvement to become very limited and in this way could force 
the doctrine of deference upon the judiciary; which is a risk that will be considered later 
within this chapter. The Secretary of State was able to make non-derogating orders which 
would then receive permission from the court without the controlee knowing it had been 
obtained (s3(1) PTA 2005). If the order was urgent, the Secretary of State had to apply to the 
court within seven days of making the control order. Yet derogating control orders could only 
be made by the court.  
 
When applying for a control order there was a different standard of proof for a derogating and 
non-derogating control order: the latter required ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the suspect was 
involved with terrorist-related activity; compared to the former which was based on a balance 
of probabilities (House of Commons, 2004-2005c: column 1588). When considering that 
ordinary criminal proceedings have a standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and civil matters 
on the ‘balance of probabilities’, the lesser standard under non-derogating control orders 
provided the government with an 'extremely low threshold' (Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, 2005-2006b: paragraph 59). The use of a lesser standard is particularly worrying 
when the suspect has not undergone a criminal trial or civil action to support the imposition 
of the obligations. Whilst derogating control orders were never activated, the civil standard 
that is applied to it was condemned by the Joint Committee on Human Rights: '[d]eprivation 
of liberty on a balance of probabilities in an anathema both to the common law’s traditional 
protection for the liberty of the individual and to the guarantees in modern human rights 
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instruments which reflect those ancient guarantees'.232 The lesser standards of proof used 
under the control order regime was not satisfactory to the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
and received criticism in the House of Commons (2004-2005a) by many including David 
Davies MP (the former Shadow Home Secretary).233 It is important to note that TPIMs can 
only be applied under a standard of ‘reasonable belief’, which is a slight elevation in 
comparison to non-derogating control orders; whilst ETPIMs, which this thesis will suggest 
are more closely aligned to non-derogating control orders, retain the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
standard. These points will be revisited in Chapter Five.  
 
The obligations imposed under a control order 
As previously mentioned, the obligations imposed under a control order were intended to 
prevent or restrict a person’s involvement with terrorist related activities; s1(4) PTA 2005 
provided an illustrative list of such obligations that could have been imposed,234 however this 
list was not exhaustive. TPIMs and ETPIMs have continued the use of imposing obligations, 
unlike the control order regime TPIMs have restrictions on what obligations can be imposed, 
whilst ETPIMs do not; this will be discussed further in Chapter Five. Under the control order 
regime it was the discretion of the Home Secretary as to the nature and number of obligations 
that should be imposed, this power remains under TPIMs and ETPIMs. It was important 
those obligations imposed were proportionate in that they prevented or restricted the 
suspect’s involvement with the terrorist activity; for example a suspect transferring money to 
a listed terrorist organisation might be subject to having his assets frozen. As mentioned 
earlier, breaching any of the obligations imposed would have resulted in a criminal offence 
which was punishable to imprisonment of up to five years (s9(4)(a) PTA 2005); one may 
argue that imposes a strict coercive characteristic upon control orders, similar to s44 as 
discussed in Chapter Two. As mentioned by Fenwick (2008) the level of involvement a 
person might have with terrorism was not necessarily taken into account, meaning 
disproportionate obligations may be imposed and there may even have been miscarriages of 
justice; this was an issue raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2004-2005c).  
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To ensure they did not breach their obligations, controlees would have to self-regulate their 
behaviour and actions and participate in 'self-surveillance and self-policing', adversely 
affecting their quality of life as well as their family and friends (Zedner, 2007b). The impact 
of being under the supervision of a control order was best explained by Cerie Bullivant in his 
interview with Liberty (2010b), giving up his ambition to study mental health nursing due to 
the control order imposed against him because: 
"[i]t became impossible to live an ordinary life. As more and more restrictions and conditions 
were added, normal activities like working and studying became impossible. Not only did 
inflexibility of the hour that was set for the daily signing in make it difficult...but any places 
of work or study had to be vetted by the Home Office. What employer is going to take the 
risk of hiring someone on a control order! Your life is no longer your own – you can’t plan 
anything....More and more restrictions were added to my control order; I couldn’t work, I 
couldn’t study, I couldn’t plan anything, friends had turned against me, the pressure had 
caused my new wife to leave me. I felt isolated. I became depressed; I was having 
nightmares, and would wake up in the night terrified, thinking the police were at my door."235 
 
It is explained by Zedner (2007b) that such adverse effects included the exacerbation of 
controlee’s anxiety and stress caused by their attempts to ‘self-police’ their obligations; 
which is supported by Cerie Bullivant account (Liberty, 2010b). The regime demonstrated a 
level of coercion by making it a criminal offence to breach any of the imposed conditions 
(s9(4)(a) PTA 2005) by requiring self-surveillance to ensure compliance. This is similar to 
the s44 measure (see Chapter Two); the Gillian and Quinton case can support this argument 
which explained that coercion is indicative of depriving a person of their liberty under Article 
5(1),236 therefore the criminal penalty caused by non-compliance to a non-criminal matter – 
the obligation under a control order – may be viewed as coercive, although it is unlikely to be 
viewed as a deprivation of liberty alone it may support any argument that it contributes to a 
breach of Article’s 5 and 6 ECHR.  Knowing this, it becomes worrying given that Lord 
Carlile QC in the Independent Terrorism Review (2006) stated that the nature of some 
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obligations imposed would make it 'all too easy for technical breaches to occur'.237 Whilst 
this is still possible under both TPIMs and ETPIMs, s23 TPIMA 2011 provides a suspect a 
defence of reasonable excuse, although it is not specified who would assess whether an 
excuse is reasonable or not, it is likely to be the courts. Zedner (2007b) questioned the 
restrictions imposed and viewed them as being 'patchy and inconsistent'; for example, 
controlees who were restricted from having visitors attending their home without prior 
vetting and permission by the Home Office, would still be allowed to attend group prayers at 
a place of worship of the controlees choice. A further example concerned those placed on 
curfews because they may be able to move freely outside of those hours, as illustrated in the 
case of Mahmoud Abu Rideh who stated "I go everywhere now – on the underground, buses, 
the mosque. But I must be home by 7pm...the government is playing games. If I am a risk to 
society, why are they letting me out to be with people?”238 This raises an important question: 
were control orders effective in preventing or restricting a terrorist suspect from being 
involved in terrorist activity? One may argue in Mahmoud Abu Rideh’s case that outside of 
his curfew he could have carried out an act of terrorism and still have been compliant with 
the imposed obligations. It is also worth considering whether the regime supported the UK 
Strategy 2011, particularly in terms of prosecution? Although this thesis will answer this in 
the negative, it will allow consideration of whether TPIMs and ETPIMs have improved upon 
this in Chapter Five. 
 
In February 2010 when talking to Liberty, Cerie Bullivant recollected that he had technically 
breached his control order on a number of occasions, mainly for signing into a police station 
late: 
"Everyday I would have to travel to a particular police station to sign in. It wasn’t my local 
police station – it had to be 24hour station, even though I had a set one hour period to sign in. 
Often the police station would be busy and I would have to wait in a queue – one of my 
‘breaches’ for being late happened as I was in the police station waiting to sign in!"239 
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Lord Carlile QC (2006) did originally find that the obligations imposed on controlees did not 
fall 'very far short of house arrest, and certainly inhibit normal life considerably'.240 However, 
as mentioned earlier, the government did not identify at which point obligations could, 
individually or collectively, amount to a deprivation of liberty and instead this prima facie 
seemed to be a matter for the courts. Under the enactment of PTA 2005 judicial involvement 
was part of the process to securing a control order. The High Court was remitted to annually 
review the obligations imposed under the control order to checker they were 
appropriate/proportionate to the suspected threat posed by the controlee, pursuant to s2(4) 
PTA 2005. As already mentioned in this chapter and Chapter Two, there were risks of the 
judiciary being deferential towards government opinion; therefore would be arguable as to 
whether the judiciary would truly assess the proportionality of the imposed obligations. As 
Chapter Five will discuss, under TPIMs there has been the removal of the Home Secretary to 
impose forced relocation, however ETPIMs revert back to the obligations available under the 
control order regime – including forced relocation.  
 
Judicial involvement in control orders 
Under the PTA 2005 the control order regime provided limited judicial involvement, 
something that John Yates may have welcomed because it was considered that "[the] balance 
between the countering the threat whilst preserving the liberty of the citizen is of course for 
Parliament to decide and determine."241 A lack of judicial scrutiny when a person faced 
deprivation of liberty was heavily criticised; Charles Clarke MP, the then Home Secretary, 
claimed that the lack of judicial involvement was justified:  
'The Bill [which subsequently became the Act] gives certain responsibilities to the Secretary 
of State. I know that some honourable Members would prefer those responsibilities to be 
allocated entirely to the judiciary... [However], the Government’s and my, prime 
responsibility is to protect the nation’s security. In many ways, that is our paramount task. 
Decisions in this area are properly for the Executive, who are fully accountable to Parliament 
for their actions.'242  
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This was described by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2004-2005a: 12) as 'an 
eccentric interpretation of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers’, insisting 
that parliament and government have 'long accepted and respected the judiciary’s 
responsibility for the liberty of the individual. To invoke national security to deny that role is 
to subvert our traditional constitutional division of powers' (Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, 2004-2005a: 11-12; MacDonald, 2007). It is important to note that the government 
did ‘reluctantly accept’ the criticisms of the Joint Committee and allowed more judicial 
involvement when depriving a person of their liberty, via a derogating control order, because 
it 'was such a serious matter that it could not be left in the hands of a Minister'.243 Insofar as 
non-derogating control orders were concerned the Minister would only be restricting a 
person’s liberty,244 but the judicial involvement would still be 'necessary and desirable'.245 
However, under the legislation there was a process of continual review of the imposed 
control order and its obligations (s8(4) PTA 2005). 
 
The police and the Control Order Review Group (CORG) were responsible for the continual 
review of control orders imposed and determine whether prosecution was possible, this 
process of review remains under the TPIMs and ETPIMs conducted by the Terrorism Review 
Group’. Despite this ‘review process’, there were views that control orders were being used in 
'preference to prosecution' (Fenwick, 2008). This form of internal review was criticised and 
held not to be adequate. In the case of E,246  Mr Justice Beaston observed it as 'a process 
which simply relied on the chief officer of the police force or the police officer present at the 
relevant meeting of CORG to bring matters forward is insufficient'.247 For the court, s3(1) 
PTA 2005 required the court to consider whether the decision of the Secretary of State was 
"obviously flawed"248 and whether the decision to impose specific obligations was likewise 
"obviously flawed".249 As remarked by Fenwick (2008), the court at this stage may only 
refuse permission if such a decision was obviously flawed, which made it unlikely that 
permission would be withheld. In determining whether the imposition of a control order was 
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obviously flawed the court would take into account the information the Secretary of State had 
at the time when making the decision; this was a process of assessing the Secretary of State’s 
subjective opinion.  
 
As seen with s44 powers, the courts are less likely to question the thinking of the person 
enforcing a counter-terrorism power that Parliament has enacted, which is supported by Lord 
Bingham’s remark in the Belmarsh case (Belmarsh: 29). Whilst the judiciary do not get 
involved in matters outside of their depth (Gearty, 2005c: 33), their role should be limited to 
the assessment of the measures taken to ensure that the actions are proportionate (Gearty, 
2005c) and were not excessive. To assist the court, Gearty relies upon de Freitas v 
Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing250 which 
explains that the court should ask: 
"[w]hether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally 
connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective'.251 
 
In comparison, given that control orders were a typical example of securitization, Salter 
(2010) suggests “we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has 
to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and gain enough resonance for 
a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures.”252 These 
may give the court support in determining whether the enforcement of a control order was 
legitimate or not and in evaluating the individual obligations. The difficulty with Salter’s 
remark and the concept of securitization, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, is that by the 
very nature of ‘securitization’ the state is under no requirement to demonstrate sound 
reasoning. Through securitization, limitations can be imposed upon key players, like the 
judiciary, by invoking and declaring a state of emergency (Bright, 2012); this can be 
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demonstrated by the former regime by limiting judicial involvement under PTA 2005. 
Fenwick and Phillipson (2011) explain that the difficulty faced by the judiciary is the 
assessment of intelligence and risk posed by suspects typically remains as the prerogative of 
the executive; this can also be seen as part of the ‘state of emergency’ theory by Agamben 
upon which the circumstances and issues being dealt with are of such that the government are 
in a better position to decide the best course of action. One would argue that the best form of 
independent scrutiny comes from the judiciary, they should have questioned the evidence 
used by the government that gave foundation to the imposition of a control order. It is the 
view of Gearty (2005c) that the courts could have determined whether the imposition of a 
control order or individual obligations were proportionate or effective by applying the de 
Freitas case. Of the criteria, the third criterion is particularly important for consideration due 
to the arguments of deprivation of liberty caused by control orders, which will be discussed in 
more detail. 
 
Although this would be an alternative way for the judiciary to be involved, under the regime 
they would follow a special procedure; similar to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC), control order hearings would use of closed material and special 
advocates (see Fenwick, 2008: 1429-1430). Fenwick (2008) best describes the judicial 
supervision of these proceedings as a ‘thin veneer’. This is due to the lack of judicial 
involvement and its compliance with Article 6(1) ECHR; this argument was raised in Re 
MB253 where the Secretary of State applied to the court without notice (in accordance with 
s3(1)(a) PTA 2005) for a non-derogating order against the suspect. Subject to some minor 
amendments, permission was granted by Ouseley J under s3(2)(b) PTA 2005. Some of the 
obligations imposed included the restriction of residence and movement, subject to home 
searches by the police and the passport of MB being surrendered. In a subsequent hearing, 
Judge Sullivan held, under s3(1) PTA 2005, that s3 of the Act which related to the 
supervision of the court of control orders was incompatible with the suspects rights to a fair 
hearing as per Article 6(1) ECHR. As a consequence, the judge made a declaration of 
incompatibility under s4(2) HRA 1998. Despite this ruling the judge decided, under s3(13) 
PTA 2005, to keep the imposed control order in force. 
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The Secretary of State appealed this decision. At the Court of Appeal254 it was argued that the 
decision of the Home Secretary to impose a control order could be quashed, if the decision 
was ‘obviously flawed’. At the appeal, it was accepted that the control order interfered with 
the civil rights of MB, therefore to comply with the Convention it had to be possible for him 
to challenge the control order in proceedings satisfying Article 6 ECHR. In MB’s case 
justification for the obligations imposed was contained within closed material. Whilst MB or 
his special advocate did not challenge the withholding of closed material, it is important to 
know that MB had not been provided a summary of the closed material or the case against 
him.  
 
Whilst Sullivan J confirmed he was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in A v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,255 which held that the proceedings under s3 
PTA 2005 did not amount to the determination of a criminal charge for Article 6 ECHR; 
although the judge did conclude that it came as close as it possibly could. Although the 
special advocate for MB argued the courts finding was correct, it was submitted that criminal 
proceedings under Article 6 ECHR had been instigated; an argument supported by JUSTICE. 
The control order regime not only provided a lack of judicial involvement, it gave way to the 
Secretary of State holding a quasi-judicial role, similar to the police with s44 powers, which 
raises questions of separation of powers. This was contributed to by the deferential attitude 
held by the judiciary to the Secretary of State. Considering the discussions in Chapter Two, 
the judiciary’s limited role in both pre-emptive and preventative measures is caused by their 
own judicial willing practice or legislative framework. Unlike s44, the control order regime 
was subject to annual review (s1-9 PTA 2005) which enabled Parliamentary scrutiny, 
although these debates were poorly attended and the Secretary of State was unable to publicly 
discuss the reasons for imposing the control orders or obligations. In comparison, TPIMs are 
not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny which Walker (2013)256 identifies as one of the main 
features between the two measures which will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTROL ORDERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Despite the lack of or restricted judicial involvement under the PTA 2005, there have been a 
number of significant cases257 that challenged the regime and questioned its compliance with 
human rights, specifically Articles 5 and 6 ECHR. In relation to Article 6 concerns, many of 
the challenges that have been seen deal directly with the processes involved namely due 
process and right to a fair trial. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there were concerns that 
the regime did not allow for the provision of sufficient information or access to evidence. 
Non-compliance of this would consequently prevent a suspect from explaining or defending 
the allegations, this altered the presumption of innocence as the suspect would be 
permanently labelled as a terrorist threat without having the means to prove their innocence. 
In addition, there were concerns regarding the legal representation of special advocates due to 
this unfairness. Those legal challenges that related to Article 5 ECHR considered the 
meaning, interpretation and application of ‘deprivation of liberty’ and determined whether the 
obligations imposed under the regime caused such a deprivation. When comparing the 
opinion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, whom determined that the regime created 
a 'virtual house arrest', an opinion not shared by the courts who (Fenwick and Phillipson, 
2011) created a narrow interpretation of the meaning ‘deprivation of liberty’. The courts 
considered this issue in the cases of JJ,258 E259 and MB260 which were dealt with 
simultaneously at the House of Lords.  
 
Control orders and the concerns of deprivation of liberty under Article 5 ECHR 
In the JJ case261 the controlee was subject to 18 hours house detention along with a number 
of other conditions.262 The Secretary of State argued that due to the current climate, the 
concept of deprivation should be interpreted with especial narrowness when applying the 
                                                          
257 The main cases to consider include: Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45; 
[2007] 3 WLR 642; Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46; [2008] 1 AC 499; 
[2007] 3 WLR 681; Secretary of State for the Home Department v E [2007] UKHL 47; [2007] 3 WLR 720; and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2011] 2 AC 1; [2010] UKHRR 748; [2010] 3 WLR 51; [2010] 
UKSC 24. 
258 SSHD v JJ (fn 55). 
259 Secretary of State for the Home Department v E [2007] UKHL 47; [2007] 3 WLR 720. 
260 SSHD v MB and AF (fn 54). 
261 SSHD v JJ (fn 55). 
262 JJ’s obligations included 18 hours house detention, visitors to be pre-checked by the Home Office, searches 
of his residence, confined to remain within urban areas. 
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criteria as set out in Guzzardi v Italy263 to determine deprivation of liberty has occurred. In 
considering whether deprivation of liberty is achieved by other forms other than 
incarceration. Lord Hoffman’s view, which Lord Carswell shared, was that deprivation of 
liberty should relate to "actual imprisonment which is for practical purposes little different 
from imprisonment".264 With reference to Engel v The Netherlands No 1,265 Baroness Hale 
remarked that when determining whether a control order amounted to deprivation of liberty, 
it was important to understand that 'deprivation of liberty does not amount to a mere 
deprivation of the freedom to live life as one pleases, but means to be deprived of one’s 
physical liberty'.266 From these opinions, the court considered the difference between 
deprivation of and restriction upon liberty as being 'merely one of degree or intensity and not 
one of nature or substance'.267 
 
The majority of their Lordships identified that the most severe orders, which are those 
imposing an 18 hour curfew, did amount to a breach of Article 5 ECHR. Lord Bingham 
remarked that: 
'The effect of the 18 hour curfew, coupled with the effective exclusion of social visitors, 
meant that the controlled persons were in practice in solitary confinement for this lengthy 
period every day for an indefinite duration, with very little contact with the outside world, 
with means insufficient to permit the provision of significant facilities for self-entertainment 
and with the knowledge that their flats were liable to be entered and searched at any time. 
The area open to them during their six non-curfew hours was unobjectionable in size...but 
they were……located in an unfamiliar area where they had no family, no friends or contacts, 
and which was no doubt chosen for that reason.'268 
As an 18 hour curfew under a control order was deemed a deprivation of liberty, the question 
remained what was an acceptable period of time? In the E case269 Lord Bingham remarked 
                                                          
263 Guzzardi v Italy (fn 137) [362]-[363]: 'In order to determine whether someone has been “deprived of his 
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that the deprivation of liberty should focus specifically upon the extent to which the suspect 
is actually confined; with other obligations being deemed ancillary and "[can] not of 
themselves effect a deprivation of liberty if the core element of confinement...is insufficiently 
stringent".270 In other words, the court considers each obligation individually rather than 
assessing the collective impact upon the controlee. However, compared to bail conditions 
wherein the court will assess the conditions, individually and collectively, to determine the 
impact they have on the suspect to ensure they avert the risk(s) they pose. Unlike bail, the 
former regime was intended to deal with risks of terrorism, as such Lord Hoffman believed 
there was "too great a restriction on the power of the state to deal with serious terrorist threats 
to the lives of its citizens",271 supporting the governments need to protect the UK. Ultimately 
the House of Lords in the E case determined that a 12 hour curfew was acceptable, with Lord 
Bingham observing: 
'The obligations imposed on E do, however, differ from those imposed on JJ and others in 
respect accepted by the courts below as material. The curfew to which he is subject is of 
twelve hours’ duration…not eighteen hours. The residence specified in the order is his own 
home, where he had lived for some years, in a part of London with which he is familiar. By a 
variation of the order his residence is defined to include his garden, to which he thus has 
access at any time. He lives at home with his wife and family, and Home Office permission is 
not required in advance to receive visitors under the age of ten. Five members of his wider 
family live in the area, and have been approved as visitors. He is subjected to no geographical 
restrictions during non-curfew hours, is free to attend the mosque of his choice and is not 
prohibited from associating with named individuals.'272 
 
The comparison by Lord Bingham of the JJ and E cases demonstrated the courts application 
of distinguishing between deprivation and restriction of liberty, in essence it comes down to 
the consideration of other obligations. In the JJ case, Lord Brown was of the opinion that a 
16 hour curfew was an acceptable obligation to impose. A minority of the House of Lords 
appeared to believe that national security should influence the ambit of Article 5 ECHR, 
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narrowing its application. Based on this it is unsurprising that in the E and MB cases,273 
where the suspects were subjected to a 12 and 14 hour curfew with electronic tagging 
respectively, the House of Lords held that there had been no breach of Article 5 ECHR. In the 
case of AF (No 3)274 the House of Lords considered the imposed control order and the 
obligations of a 14 hour house detention, electronic tagging, police searches of property and 
premises, restriction on visitors and identified parameter. Their Lordships relied upon the JJ 
case and formed the view that the imposed house detention of 14 hours and other obligations, 
collectively did not amount to deprivation of liberty. The unanimous findings in MB and AF 
were that 14 hours house detention, along with other restrictions, does not amount to 
deprivation of liberty, whilst 18 hours house detention does as confirmed in JJ. Fenwick 
(2011) remarked that these findings gave the government the indication that control orders 
were supported by the courts so long as house detention did not go beyond 16 hours. This 
may be understandable given that the House of Lords did not make any form of declaration of 
incompatibility as it had previously with the Part 4 regime; instead it identified where there 
were breaches in the control order regime, following which the Secretary of State complied 
with. 
 
Following on from the House of Lords findings, the issue surrounding deprivation of liberty 
was reignited in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP.275  In the AP case it was 
confirmed that the determination for deprivation of liberty is achieved by assessing the 
physical restriction of liberty and all of the obligations imposed. AP was subject to a 16 hour 
curfew and relocation obligation to the Midlands, which was 150 miles away from his family 
home. At the Court of Appeal Maurice-Kay LJ confirmed that the social isolation suffered by 
AP differed from that of JJ who was relocated within or close to London. Despite this 
difference the Court of Appeal stated it believed that the isolation AP would feel would be 
due to the imposed obligations under his control order interfering with his right to a family 
life under Article 8 ECHR; however, this infringement could be remedied by his family 
visiting him occasionally. 
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274 SSHD v MB and AF (fn 54). 
275 SSHD v AP (fn 19). 
134 
 
The case was appealed to the UK Supreme Court where their Lordships supported the remedy 
identified by the Court of Appeal. Despite this the UK Supreme Court overruled the Court of 
Appeals decision and identified that a breach of Article 5 ECHR had occurred. The UK 
Supreme Court understood the 16 hour curfew imposed to be in breach of AP’s Article 5 
rights when taking into account the relocation obligation which collectively became 
destructive to AP’s life that he might otherwise live (as per Lord Brown, paragraph 4). AP 
was obligated to be relocated away from family, which would cause internal exile, hence 
giving cause to argue that this sort of obligation would cause a ‘deprivation of liberty’ under 
Article 5 ECHR. Lord Brown confirmed that obligations that provide proportionate 
restrictions upon a person’s Article 8 rights can 'tip the balance'276 into causing a deprivation 
of liberty under Article 5. Lord Brown supported the conclusions of Keith J at the High 
Court, finding that this aided in constituting a deprivation of liberty under Article 5. 
Consequently this goes back to the criteria set out in Guzzardi v Italy277 exploring the type, 
duration, effects and manner in which a measure is implemented to determine deprivation of 
liberty. Ultimately, the UK Supreme Court recognised that an Article 8 argument existed, but 
dealt with it as part of the argument for breaching Article 5 to determine a deprivation of 
liberty. Fenwick and Phillipson (2011) question whether if the imposed hours had been less 
or had relocation been less of an inconvenience, would the court have reached the same 
conclusion? An alternative question may be: had AP not been required to relocate, would 
there have been a breach of Article 5? The likely answer to the latter is ‘no’, which explains 
why under the new TPIMs scheme, the relocation obligation has been removed but retained 
under ETPIMs. 
 
Given the history of legal challenges and the narrow interpretation used by the courts since 
JJ, it is highly possible that the court would not have reached the same decision. The 
behaviour of the judiciary appears to support the doctrine of deference when determining 
whether the imposition of the control order by the Secretary of State is correct. The process 
clearly circumvents the traditions of the criminal justice system and standards which can be 
provided for through the bail procedure. The arguments of deferential behaviour by the 
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judiciary towards government decisions when dealing with matters of national security, may 
have been reasoned due to the nature of the issue. However, this is another way of explaining 
the risk of securitization as previously mentioned. 
 
Concerns of the control order regime regarding 'due process' under Article 6 ECHR 
Academics have recognised that the regime created a number of problems within the sphere 
of human rights, specifically in respect of due process (eg Fenwick and Phillipson, 2011). It 
was confirmed in MB & AF that control orders do not amount to a criminal charge, therefore 
specific rights guaranteed in terms of criminal proceedings do not apply; this is further 
evidence of securitization being used. It is important to remember that Article 6 ECHR 
provides no stated exceptions to the basic right to a fair hearing, with no specified exceptions 
as found under Article 5 ECHR or general public interests (Fenwick and Phillipson, 2011). In 
DS v Her Majesty’s Advocate278 Lord Hope observed that “Article 6(1) [is] a fundamental 
right which [does] not admit of any balancing exercise...the public interest could never be 
invoked to deny that right to anybody in any circumstances".279 Despite this, as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the regime enabled the use of closed materials in closed hearings which 
restricted the representations a special advocate could make or the suspect’s ability to refute 
the allegations. One would argue this had ramifications on the presumption of innocence that 
should naturally apply whether criminal proceedings are present or not.  
 
The case against a suspect was known to be based wholly upon the closed material (also 
referred to as secret evidence), as explained by Sullivan J in MB and AF,280 whilst the open 
case before the suspect was no more than a ‘bare assertion’.281 Lord Bingham recognised that 
the obvious issue was that the suspect is 'confronted by a bare, unsubstantiated assertion, 
which he could do no more than deny'.282 Naturally, the problem with terrorism cases is that 
the information which may justify the imposition of a control order is highly sensitive, 
disclosing such evidence may have further implications on covert operatives and national 
security. The regime got around this by creating a complex system of open and closed 
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“National Security Statements”. The closed material was not disclosed to the suspect, 
however the special advocate could receive and examine the closed material relied upon by 
the Home Secretary. Once the special advocate was given sight of this material within a 
closed hearing, the special advocate was prevented from further communicating with their 
client/the suspect (paragraph 76.25 of Sch. 1, para.7 – Civil Procedure Rules 1998).283 As a 
result of this restrictive process for disclosure, only the special advocates would be able to 
challenge the closed material with little instructions being given previously by their client.  
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (2009-2010a) supported the findings of the Control 
Orders Renewal Report 2010, affirming that the use of secret evidence and special advocates 
under the regime could not operate in a way that was compatible with the "basic fairness 
inherent in both the common law and Article 6 ECHR".284 The Court of Appeal considered 
the procedure in the case of MB285 and concluded there was no breach to a person’s right to a 
fair trial under Article 6(1); disagreeing with the verdict of Sullivan J.286 The basis of the 
decision, as remarked by Lord Philips CJ, was that the proceedings did not amount to the 
determination of a criminal charge and the ECtHR had accepted there were circumstances 
that required the use of or reliance upon closed material, therefore the proceedings were not 
incompatible with Article 6. In so far as special advocates were concerned, the court was of 
the opinion that the rules of the court in such proceedings 'constitute appropriate 
safeguards'.287 
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (2009-2010b) accepted that the special advocates 
provided a safeguard by adding some protection against 'otherwise purely arbitrary decision-
making'288 process. However, they rightly argued that they should not be used to 'reduce the 
standards of fairness where the common law, or statute, or human rights law, or Article 6 say 
that it is a minimum requirement that you must know the case against you'.289 A problem 
with the special advocates is the restrictions placed upon them to obtain instructions from 
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their clients, particularly when they have been given sight of the closed material; only their 
client may be able to explain the evidence and provide instructions that put the evidence into 
context. This is particularly important given that intelligence used to impose a control order 
may be disjointed or lack clarity, an issue discussed in Chapter Two. 
 
Towards the end of the control order regime there was a legal challenge, AT v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,290 which considered Article 6 and the a lack of sufficient 
knowledge and information to defend the allegations from being disclosed. ‘AT’ was a 
Libyan national and member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an organisation 
that opposed Colonel Gaddafi and assisted in deposing him and his regime from power in 
2011. ‘AT’ was granted asylum in the UK in 2003, a control order was placed upon him on 
3rd April 2008 with the permission of Collins J, upheld in March 2009 and 2010 by Mitting J. 
The 2010 review of the control order gave rise to the Court of Appeal examining the case 
brought by AT. Whilst a number of grounds were argued against the imposed control order, 
the key consideration, as recognised by Carnwarth LJ, was the adequacy of disclosure to AT 
of the case against him to enable him to respond. There is a strong argument that this should 
breach an individual’s right of knowing the case against them, a fundamental part of 
procedural fairness as prescribed by Articles 6 and 5(4). Here, AT was supplied with three 
open National Security Statements which alleged he remained “a significant and influential 
member”291 of LIFG and given the opportunity would "attempt to involve himself in 
terrorism-related activity in the future, utilising and/or influencing the LIFG associates in the 
UK and overseas to help progress the pan-Islamist agenda of the LIFG".292 AT argued he no 
longer remained a member of the group and that he retained no meaningful links with the 
organisation. With no information of the Security Services rationale for making such 
assertions, AT was unable to do much more than make the denials. 
 
Providing such limited information to AT and considering whether it was sufficient for the 
requirements of fairness, as per Articles 5(4) and 6, reference was made to A v United 
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Kingdom.293 The fundamental nature of that ruling was described by Lord Phillips in AF (No. 
3)294 at paragraph 59: 
"…the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to 
enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations. Provided that this 
requirement is satisfied there can be a fair trial notwithstanding that the controlee is not 
provided with the detail or the sources of the evidence forming the basis of the allegations. 
Where, however, the case against the controlee is based solely or to a decisive degree on 
closed materials the requirements of a fair trial will not be satisfied, however cogent the case 
based on the closed materials would be." 
Carnwath LJ supported the test and concluded that the allegation that AT remained a 
supporter of the LIFG, which was the reasoning used to justify the imposed control order, had 
not been made out within the open material. Therefore, such material must have been within 
the closed material and therefore had not been disclosed to the controlee. On this basis, AT 
not being given adequate disclosure and unable to respond to the allegations his control order 
was quashed. 
 
It is important to understand that for a controlee, access to the information which gives the 
basis of the control order is important. They are not required, nor should they be expected to 
accept the assurances or assertions made by the state, as illustrated in AT. 295 There are those 
within the risk society that argue that a lack of information creates suspicion (Aradau and van 
Munster, 2008), as described in Chapter Two this is known as ‘consciousness-raising’ or 
‘unintelligibility’. Whilst this suspicion might be of an individual it may also be of the acts or 
omissions of the state, for example a person subjected to a control order may become 
suspicious of government and judiciary when restrictions are imposed and no information as 
to why they are imposed if given. Whilst one may argue this can be the consequence of 
securitizaion, this also supports Gilling’s (2010) suggestion that 'levels of public trust and 
confidence in public institutions have been declining'.296 Aradau and van Munster (2008) and 
Amoore and de Goede (2008) confirm this as ‘unintelligibility’ and state “the absence of 
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information becomes regarded as suspicious in itself”.297 This is further evidence of a re-
occurring issue, similar to s44 (as discussed in Chapter Two), the burden is placed upon the 
controlee to prove their activities, which the state deems to be risky and abnormal, are 
“normal”. However, with a lack of information a controlee was less likely to be capable of 
achieving this. 
 
Towards the end of the control order regime there does seem to be some judicial fight back 
by questioning the Secretary of State’s decision to impose a control order by assessing the 
evidence, both open and closed material. Knowing the case against you so that you may 
challenge the allegations is a natural right seen in the criminal justice system and is 
embedded within the bail process, which is one of the reasons why bail is compliant with 
human rights. If such rights are not protected then a miscarriage of justice may be the result, 
as suggested by Fenwick (2008). The legal challenge of AF (No3) was a significant 
development in the courts response; rather than simply accept the governments suspicion the 
court had taken the view that the suspect was 'confronted by a bare, unsubstantiated assertion 
which he could do no more than deny.'298 The control order process had developed in a way 
that successive Home Secretaries adopted a ‘precautionary’ approach to refuse or argue 
against disclosure of evidence on grounds that “the slightest possibility” it may damage 
national security (Fenwick and Phillipson, 2011). The regime was a one-sided process that 
stood in favour of the government and placed suspects at a procedural disadvantage as 
already explained. Each legal challenge for the court progressively became a process of 
observing the rights of the individual with the concerns of national security. AF (No3) 
established the need to provide minimum disclosure to enable a suspect and/or their special 
advocate to make representations and put forward a defence. This progress is one which 
TPIMs will have to take note and be cautious of; otherwise, it will face similar legal 
challenges and most likely allow the courts to make further progress in protecting human 
rights. 
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Concerns about miscarriages of justice 
Lack of knowledge and information through limited (if any) disclosure of evidence clearly 
has an impact upon an individual’s ability to refute the allegations made against them. 
Ultimately the courts have enabled the government to remove a controlee’s right to a fair trial 
and access to due process by narrow interpretation of Article 6(1). If a person is unable to 
challenge the allegations or provide an explanation, concerns should be raised about the risk 
is causes, as previously mentioned; particularly in light of the issues regarding Agamben’s 
‘state of emergency’ theory and the concept of securitization. For justice, there is a concern 
that by being subjected to a control order the controlee and their family would become 
victims to a miscarriage of justice (Fenwick, 2008).  
 
An example of such a miscarriage is demonstrated by Cerie Bullivant who wanted to study 
Arabic in Syria and work with orphans. At the UK airport he was stopped and detained by 
police, who obtained his fingerprints and questioned him for 9 hours about his family life. 
Under his account given to Liberty,299 Cerie Bullivant explained that although the police said 
he was ‘free to go’, an MI5 officer was waiting to further interview him, which included 
matters relating to Syria. He was then released, but his passport was retained for 3 months 
and this was the only time he was questioned by the authorities about terrorism. Once he had 
his passport returned he decided not to go to Syria, instead to go to Bangladesh because he 
could still learn Arabic there and help at an orphanage. Two weeks prior to travelling MI5 
contacted a friend of his mother and asked whether she believed he was a terrorist and 
whether he should be allowed to travel; following this he was placed on a control order in 
2006.  
 
Cerie Bullivant recalls the police illegally searching his mother’s address, rather than the one 
he was registered to live at under the control order. During the search police confirmed they 
'weren’t privy to the intelligence against [him] but they could assure [his mother] that it was 
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irrefutable'.300 Cerie Bullivant described that the effect of the control order on him caused 
him to abscond for 5 ½ weeks, resulting in the Home Office releasing his identity and 
describing him as 'one of the most dangerous people in the country'.301 He then handed 
himself in on a Saturday through his lawyer, who was used as an intermediary, and was 
advised by the police that he could turn himself in on Monday. If a person under a control 
order absconds, then hands themselves in and is advised to do so at a later date then the 
question is: how dangerous are they? For Cerie Bullivant he was dealt with as a criminal for 
breaching the control order, although he 'didn’t feel guilty' and the court agreed.302 Months 
later in R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Cerie Bullivant,303 Cerie Bullivant 
had his control order quashed in the High Court on the 22nd February 2008. Ultimately, 
control orders exemplify the poor relationship between human rights and securitization 
giving rise to the question of what risks does securitization create? This is relevant 
considering TPIMs and ETPIMs superseded the regime and are a similar form of 
securitization.  
 
THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF CONTROL ORDERS 
As explained in the Introduction and Chapter One, risk assessment enables a holistic analysis 
when considering whether a measure can cause a deprivation of liberty or breach a person’s 
right to a private and family life. Here, this thesis assesses the potential risks control orders 
created, including: (i) the government undermining the faith and trust imposed upon them; 
(ii) the moral standing and perception of government being negatively perceived, as seen with 
the police in Chapter Two; and (iii) they create a blur between the government protecting the 
nation from terrorism with the government interfering in people’s lives, providing examples 
to support terrorist propaganda. This falls in line with the consideration of whether these 
measures are effective and support the UK Strategy 2011 to counter-terrorism, which this 
thesis will answer. The consideration of the harm that control orders may cause is a vital 
assessment to determine whether control orders were really an effective way of managing the 
threat of terrorism. This will in turn assist when considering whether TPIMs and ETPIMs 
could be an effective measure and replacement to the control order regime. Furthermore, 
                                                          
300 Ibid 2. 
301 Ibid 3. 
302 Ibid. 
303 R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Cerie Bullivant [2008] EWHC 337 (Admin). 
142 
 
discussions of risk can support an argument that human rights have been breached. The main 
risks to consider when looking at control orders, which have been previously mentioned in 
this chapter, are: firstly, the ‘collateral impact’ (Zedner, 2007b), which is the consideration of 
the impact of the measure upon the suspect, their family and community. The impact may 
include mental well-being, isolation and segregation; and secondly, the courts deferential 
attitude which supports Agemben’s theory of ‘homo-sacer’. The ultimate risk that may exist 
as a result of these is that communities become disillusioned and vulnerable to radicalisation. 
This was recognised by Mitting J in CA v Secretary of State for the Home Department:304 
'[the risk of a permanent marriage breakdown was] as an event which, if it were to occur, 
would not only have an adverse impact upon her and her children, but might also increase the 
risk of re-engagement in terrorism-related activities by CA.'305 
 
The impact of control orders on others other than the controlee 
Whilst control orders were imposed to control and manage the activities of suspects, the 
orders themselves impacted upon others that were not subject to a control order, such as the 
controlees’ family. As explained earlier, Cerie Bullivant was the sole care giver to his ill 
mother and he attempted to conceal from her that he was subject to a control order. He was 
able to do so until the police unlawfully searched his mother’s residence, at which point Cerie 
Bullivant had to explain why the police were searching her property.306 A control order was 
believed to have a 'negative effect'307 on those who were relatives and associates of the 
controlee, despite not being subject to the regime. The Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(2005-2006b) explained that this negative effect is the consequence of shame, trauma and 
uncertainty suffered because under a control order a 'family is now subject equally to the 
restrictions placed upon the intended object of the obligation. The families believe 
themselves to be imprisoned in their own homes, to be stigmatised and isolated from society, 
to be no longer able to enjoy privacy or security within their homes without fearing at every 
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moment entry by the police or disruption from telephone calls especially throughout the 
night, and an atmosphere of fear and apprehension that is constant'.308  
 
The link with human rights may be connected to Article 8 ECHR because one may argue that 
being indirectly subjected to a control order impacts upon the family’s privacy. Furthermore, 
there may be an argument that it would breach Articles 3 and 5; in light of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights findings, namely control orders may be seen as degrading 
treatment or depriving the family of their liberty and security in one form or another. The 
Joint Committee on Human Rights had raised concerns that the regime would also be an 
affront to the families religious and cultural sensitivities provided under Article 9 (Right to 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion), particularly towards women. 
 
The negative impact on the family of the controlee was recognised by the House of Lords in 
JJ,309, MB310 and E311 stating that 'it cannot be doubted that the consequences of a control 
order can be...’devastating for individuals and their families".312 However, despite this it was 
their opinion that control orders, as a preventative measure, were ‘necessary’.313 This finding 
by the House of Lords again raises concerns with the adoption of the doctrine of deference, as 
previously discussed. One would argue that unless the court has fully assessed the control 
order regime and considered alternative preventative measures, it would be inappropriate for 
the court to suggest the regime was necessary. In the case of Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AH,314 the principles from the JJ case were adopted by Mitting J and he found 
that 'social isolation is a significant factor, especially if it approaches solitary confinement 
during curfew periods.'315 The difficulty for the court is the balance of precisely how long a 
curfew should operate and the degree of social isolation it may cause to the controlee as well 
as the family, particularly given the two are incommensurable.  
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In CD v Secretary of State for the Home Department316 the controlee (‘CD’) had a control 
order imposed against him in February 2011, which was modified shortly afterwards 
requiring him to relocate from his family home in London to the Midlands. CD was allegedly 
a leading figure in a group of Islamist extremists in north London and had detailed 
knowledge and awareness of security, endeavouring to obtain firearms from those associates. 
It was believed that relocating him within Greater London would not be sufficient to prevent 
him from meeting his associates. The legal challenge by CD focused on the residency 
requirement, requiring the court to determine whether the modification was proportionate, as 
well as the obligation itself. CD argued that the relocation was “devastating” because it 
placed him in an area where he did not know anyone and spent considerable time apart from 
his family. Whilst his legal challenge was to relocate back to his family home, as an 
alternative it was suggested a travel subsidiary should be provided for his family and friends 
to visit him. CD informed the court that a close associate also suspected of being involved in 
terrorist related activity moved to Rochdale, placing them closer to each other than CD would 
be if he remained in London. Ultimately, CD argued that the residency requirement placed 
upon him breached his right to a private and family life (Article 8 ECHR).  
 
Whilst it was conceded that the 'obligation to move from one’s home to a relatively distant 
place, live for at least 12 months in a property which is not one’s own and which has been 
chosen by someone else, is a substantial infringement of Article 8 rights'.317 It was further 
argued that the conditions did not prevent his family from living with him in the Midlands. 
The presiding judge, Mr Justice Simon, noted that a large number of the restraints imposed 
upon CD 'extend[ed] far beyond any usual bail conditions...they provide a comprehensive 
interference with CD’s rights under Article 8 (as well as 10 and 11)."318 There had been 
evidence confirming that the Secretary of State was aware that “relocating a person can have 
a detrimental impact on his social life.”319 Despite the concessions made by the Secretary of 
State and the court, it was believed that the fear he would engage in terrorist-related activity 
(CD case: paragraph 51) was justifiable, therefore the obligation to relocate was necessary 
and proportionate. Despite this the judge recognised that the interference caused was 
                                                          
316 Ibid. 
317 CD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 1273 (Admin) [46]. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid. 
145 
 
‘substantial’.320 The judge appears to try and prevent the breach of Article 8 and keep the 
obligation of relocation proportionate by requiring the families expenditure to visit to be 
recoverable thereby creating an 'appropriate way of reducing the onerous and isolating effect 
of the…obligation'.321 This decision by the judge supports the earlier discussion about the 
judiciary attempting to create a balance which favours the government. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Patrick Mercer MP described the similarity of control orders with the 
use of internment control orders were considered to be similar to internment that was used 
during the IRA conflict. The risk of isolation and segregation under interment remained just 
as much of a risk with control orders, both on suspects and their families. It may be suggested 
that the catalyst for this is dependent on the quality of the intelligence, with fragmented and 
unclear intelligence causing the government to adopt a precautionary approach and enforce 
measures which have risks such as those mentioned, including resentment towards the 
government, the UK and its laws (Middleton, 2011b). This would in turn be available to 
terrorist organisations to use as propaganda material to support their campaigns to recruit or 
radicalise individuals and communities (De Mesuita and Dickson, 2007). As reported by the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (2009-2010b),322 the control order regime was viewed as 
being counterproductive due to its impact on communities. 
 
Concerns within risk: the doctrine of deference and ‘homo sacer’ 
As explained, the legal challenges against control orders have demonstrated the courts’ 
willingness to provide a narrow interpretation of human rights, notably the meaning of 
deprivation of liberty under Article 5. The deferential behaviour demonstrated by the courts, 
giving support to Agamben’s homo-sacer theory, enabled the government to place its own 
importance and goals above law and order, providing the executive considerable power. 
Whilst this may occur on the back of a catastrophic event, creating a ‘state of emergency’ 
enables the use of powers long after the catastrophic event itself (eg 9/11 or 7/7). One of the 
greatest risks that can result from this is that it creates a new 'juridico-political paradigm' 
(Amoore and de Goede, 2008: 114). This paradigm lends support to the argument of the 
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government placing its own importance above law and order, known as ‘laws against laws’ 
(see Chapter One or Two for further discussion on this), eg the enactment of the PTA 2005 
over the Human Rights Act 1998; some within the risk society that support this course of 
action such as Dershowitz (2002), Ignatieff (2004) and Posner (2004). In so far as Posner is 
concerned, he strongly believes in greater surveillance and imposition of restrictions on day-
to-day life (Amoore and de Goede, 2008). In CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service323 the 
House of Lords accepted, without evidence, the government’s claim that national security 
was at risk. In 2000, the Court of Appeal considered the case of Shfir ur Rehman324 and 
accepted that assessing whether the threat to national security existed is a matter for the 
government alone. This again shows the deferential attitude taken by the judiciary towards 
government assertions when little evidence exists (Fenwick, 2008).  
 
Post-9/11 the government introduced legislation that was restrictive and intrusive on human 
rights, making judicial involvement to question the government when using such powers ever 
more important. When Zedner (2007b) considered this, she formed the opinion that when the 
judiciary ‘interfere’ with the executives aims further restrictions may result; this perfectly 
demonstrated by the Belmarsh case which resulted in the implementation of control orders. 
Despite this Dershowitz remarked that there is a need for “preventative intervention” from 
the courts, particularly when the formal processes of criminal justice and safeguards are 
circumscribed, reducing the possibility of conviction (Dershowitz, 2006). Judicial 
intervention during the control order regime was relevant because there needed to be an 
understanding of what is meant by a suspect being involved in ‘terrorist related activity’; as 
Fenwick (2008) recognised, the meaning of this could be on a ‘very flimsy basis’ (2008: 
1443). This was particularly evident under the PTA 2005 when the courts would consider 
whether the Secretary of State’s decision to impose the control order, as well as the 
obligations, was obviously flawed; more so when the quality of the intelligence may be 
questioned.  
 
When a person has a lack of knowledge about the grounds and evidence to which the 
Secretary of State basis their decision to detain or restrict their freedom, the court should 
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protect the suspect and their rights from arbitrary decisions and the risks they may create. The 
risk of unintelligibility and an inability to recover their position in society (Vlcek, 2006) after 
a control order was imposed, the risk those individuals and their families become outsiders 
became real. Cerie Bullivant  described feeling isolated and suffering from depression, but 
came to realise that after his control order was quashed 'there was no way [his] life would 
return to normal...[he] still gets abused in the street, shouted and spat at. The police still stop 
[him]...[he’s] lost friends...'.325 In the case of AM v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,326 AM unsuccessfully challenged the control order imposed against him, 
arguing that whilst studying for his university degree, the obligations imposed caused him 
stress and frustration which resulted in anxiety. The range of legal challenges and accepted 
risks discussed in this thesis, appear to have failed in persuading the courts in their findings. 
Ewing and Tham (2008) considered whether the judiciary were responsible for their lack of 
upholding human rights; instead blame was directed towards the government. With the 
support of the ‘laws against laws’ theory, Ewing and Tham (2008) believe that 'weak 
commitment to the rule of law which the cases appear to reveal has important implications 
for the judicial protection of human rights, with a weak conception of the rule of law leading 
inexorably to low levels of protection of human rights, of which the control order decisions 
provide some further evidence'.327 Although the argument of laws against laws may, in part, 
explain why judicial involvement has become minimal under the PTA 2005, it is important to 
remember that the judiciary have a mandate to provide declarations of incompatibility.  
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007-2008) was of the opinion that to be consistent 
with the adherence to human rights (specifically the Human Rights Act 1998), the House of 
Lords should be giving declarations of incompatibility. This would force Parliament to 
consider alternative ways of balancing "the control order legislation between the various 
competing interests."328 It was the conclusion of Ewing and Tham (2008) that there was a 
'commitment to a weak conception of the rule of law in practice, and indeed a telling claim 
by Lord Brown who, in providing the synthesis between two extremes, appeared to suggest 
that this was barely a legal issue, but simply “a matter of opinion”. A weak commitment to 
the rule of law was evident in the sense of (1) the approach to interpretation, (2) the 
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acceptance of punishment or restraint without conviction and (3) the tolerance of various 
forms of arbitrary conduct by state officials at various levels.'329 By not taking these points 
into consideration, the courts ultimately fail to protect the individual and their rights. The 
concern follows from the earlier discussion on human rights and its relationship with control 
orders as a form of securitization. The discussion on risk further shows that risk and human 
rights are closely interlinked, for example the AF (No3) case illustrates that obliging a suspect 
to relocate creates a new risk for consideration, specifically the impact of the obligation upon 
the suspect’s family. One may argue that the courts have a poor record of considering the risk 
implications of control orders and the obligations that are imposed. Had they considered 
factors of risk it may have resulted in the court understanding and placing greater emphasis 
on the deprivation of liberty suffered as a result of the imposed counter-terrorism measure, 
consequently enforcing and protection human rights above the measure. Through the 
consideration of risk it is reasonable to suggest that securitization as a measure is intrusive 
and erodes human rights, particularly without independent judicial scrutiny. As mentioned 
earlier, TPIMs are similar to the control order regime operating in a similar manner; however, 
this is similarly seen by the bail process and bail conditions used within the criminal justice 
system. Unlike control orders, the bail process is not a securitization measure because it 
works within the criminal justice system, abiding by fairness and justice as set out in the 
Criminal Procedure Rules, legislation and human rights. Could the bail process under the 
Criminal Justice System be a better alternative?  
 
BAIL AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTROL AND PREVENT TERRORISM 
As mentioned earlier it was a criminal offence to breach the control order and any of its 
imposed obligations. Given that during the history of control orders not a single controlee had 
a trial for terrorism offences, they had strict compliance imposed upon them through the 
obligations. The compliance expected under the obligations created a similarity seen under 
the bail process and bail conditions; suspected criminal offenders are required to comply with 
bail conditions in accordance with the Bail Act (BA) 1976. The process of being granted or 
refused bail or remanded is a process that works within criminal proceedings, making it a 
‘desecuritization’ measure. According to McGhee (2010) it is an under-theorised process that 
has been described in various ways, but he views it as the adoption of a democratic 
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‘unexceptional’ procedure. On the other hand, its application is a response to possible 
‘undemocratic’ or exceptional measures as seen by securitization and control orders 
(McGhee, 2010: 47). There is a presumption in favour of granting bail (s4, BA 1976). Those 
accused of participating in criminal activity can be granted bail by the police on condition 
they attend the Magistrates’ Court or in custody to appear before court within 24 hours of the 
arrest or as soon as practicable; this was confirmed by R v Culley330 and s7(4) BA 1976.  
 
Bail conditions that can be imposed on a person include, but are not limited to, an exclusion 
area, reporting to a police station requirement and not to communicate with certain people by 
any means. It is important to note that bail conditions must be specific and justifiable in order 
to ensure they are effective and enforceable (Crown Prosecution Service Online Legal 
Guidance, 2012)331 and can be onerous through the restriction of liberty, expression and 
privacy332 etc. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the process of determining 
proportionality of the conditions and risk of a threat to be averted, is similar for bail as it is 
under the control order regime, as supported by the case of R (Crown Prosecution Service) v 
Chorley Justices.333 Under the assessment of risk when considering whether or not to grant 
bail, the court will consider whether: 
(a) The individual is unlikely to surrender to custody when required to do so; 
(b) The individual has broken or is likely to break any bail conditions imposed; and 
(c) Concerns that future risks that are outlined by the CPS prosecutor may occur. 
“Future risks” is a form of risk assessment conducted by the prosecutor in ordinary criminal 
proceedings and those assessments are communicated to the court. Under Schedule 1 of the 
BA 1976, the prosecutor is to have regard to future risks including the suspect’s history or 
offending and factors that may impact upon compliance with any conditions. In so far as 
alleged terrorists are concerned, the court would most likely give consideration to: 
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(a) The suspects history of offending; research by Hoffman (2002) has shown that those 
involved with terrorist activity may have been involved with other criminal acts to 
help fund their terrorist activities such as petty thievery; 
(b) The suspect committing offences whilst on other court orders and any previous 
breaches of bail, as this can illustrate the suspects failure to comply with court 
orders/directions; 
(c) Allegations of violence, either immediate or historically, because this may show that 
the suspect has a propensity to act violently and given terrorism can be an act of 
violence there would be concerns about releasing the suspect into the community; 
(d) The degree of temptation the suspect will have to abscond; 
(e) Factors that would impact upon the suspect being able to or prevent from compiling; 
and 
(f) The seriousness of the proceedings. However this is a futile point to consider because 
‘terrorism’ is automatically considered a serious matter. 
 
The assessment of risk in relation to control orders is not as clear as in matters relating to 
bail. Whilst, for reasons explained in this chapter, the government could "neither successfully 
prosecute nor deport”334 a suspect; the Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith (2007) explained that the 
regime was available where there was "reasonable suspicion that an individual is involved in 
terrorism and it is considered necessary to impose the order to protect the public from the risk 
of terrorism".335 In light of the similar characteristics between the two preventative processes 
to control and manage suspects, it is worth considering whether a counter-terrorism 
preventative measure, such as control orders or TPIMs, are needed if ordinary preventative 
measures such bail can be used and achieve the same goals. 
 
There have been debates, particularly within the UK Parliament, as to whether those 
suspected of terrorism should be entitled to bail (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2009-
2010b).336 In the Operation Pathway Report, Lord Carlile QC (2009b) considered the 
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relevance of bail being granted by a judge with conditions for a period of 28 days after arrest 
to allow further enquiries to be made. However, this recommendation was rejected by the 
government and the then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith MP, explaining this was due to "the 
risks to public safety"337 and refusal to give bail to this class of suspect is not in breach of 
Article 5(5). The government suggested that rejecting Lord Carlile QC’s recommendation 
was also based on advice given by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Whilst the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2009-
2010b) was aware that ACPO were against such provisions being made available to terrorist 
suspects, it was surprising to discover this advice by the CPS given it had never provided a 
public statement on this matter at the time. The Committee remained adamant that refusal of 
bail to terrorist suspects was a breach of Article 5(3) and that bail should be available for the 
court to grant. The concern of the Committee was that some suspects may be involved in the 
'periphery of terrorist-related activity'338 rather than centrally involved, therefore the option to 
grant bail with conditions should be available to those suspects. 
 
Why bail should be used to control and manage terrorist suspects. 
Currently bail is unlikely to be granted to those who are suspected of terrorist-related activity 
due to the seriousness of the ‘offence’. It is worth remembering that a person suspected of 
terrorist related activity may never be subject to ‘criminal proceedings’ and therefore bail 
should be granted. However, the suspicion that they are involved in terrorist activity is 
serious that would most likely cause the court to refuse bail and keep them in custody under 
the current process. Under the current standards of criminal proceedings this would arguably 
breach the presumption of innocence, as per Article 6, and work against the current 
presumption in favour of granting bail (s4 BA 1976). It is worth remembering that a person 
accused of a committing a criminal offence should, in principle, retain their liberty until a 
“judicial determination of guilt”.339 However, freedom would be conditioned to ensure the 
attendance of the accused to their trial (Hickey, 1969-1970). 
 
                                                          
337 Ibid 85. 
338 Ibid 88. 
339 Hickey (fn 226) 288. 
152 
 
As Hickey (1969-1970) best explains, bail within the criminal justice system establishes a 
deterrent to the accused from absconding, whilst simultaneously being used for the 
'protection of the community from the defendant during the time it takes the system to 
operate'.340 In this context bail can work to intervene with suspect terrorists and their 
activities, which is the main objective of control orders and TPIMs. When the court is 
considering whether to grant or refuse bail the accused person is already a part of the criminal 
justice system, however as mentioned earlier, those subjected to a control order were part of a 
system running parallel to the criminal justice system.  
 
When the control order regime was enacted, it was sought against the ten Belmarsh detainees 
who had been detained under the Part 4 regime. Eight of those had their control orders 
revoked, in August 2005 some were detained whilst others were given bail pending 
deportation or they left the country of their own accord (Fenwick, 2008). On the 12th January 
2012 the ECtHR gave its judgment in Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom,341 which 
will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Four, in which the court unanimously ruled in 
favour of Abu Qatada who was one of the original 8 detained without trial in Belmarsh.342 
The Othman ruling prevented him from being deported to his native Jordan. The decision 
departed from that of the House of Lords343 which had unanimously supported his 
deportation. Abu Qatada had been convicted twice in Jordan, in his absence, for serious 
terrorist related offences and he was described by SIAC as a “truly dangerous individual” for 
his links to terrorism and Al-Qaeda.  When Mr Justice Ouseley from SIAC originally 
released Abu Qatada and Mahmoud Rideh on bail from Belmarsh prison, the bail conditions 
imposed would in time become control orders (Walker, 2007). This gives support to the 
argument that bail proceedings can be used as a measure to kerb behaviour, protect the public 
and national security, in the same way control orders and TPIMs intend. A major advantage 
of the bail process is that the risks associated with granting bail and attaching obligations to 
bail, are automatically considered. This built in process of considering risk together with the 
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transparency of the criminal justice system and protection of human rights, exemplifies a 
process and safeguarding that the control order regime failed to replicate. 
 
Bail and control orders – similarity of risks 
Given that bail and control orders are characteristically similar, save that the former is a type 
of desecuritization and the latter securitization, it follows that they are likely to be similar in 
terms of the risks they pose. A suspect under bail and a suspect under a control order must 
self-police their activities to ensure they do not breach the imposed conditions/obligations. As 
described earlier in this chapter, restrictions placed upon a person can affect their liberty and 
quality of life, placing a psychological burden upon the individual (Zedner, 2007b; 2009). 
However, the difference between a suspect on bail and a suspect on a control order is that: the 
former is monitored under the umbrella of the criminal justice system; whilst the latter was 
monitored by the courts annually and CORG. The psychological burden imposed by control 
orders was much greater due to the inability to challenge the decision (Zedner, 2007b). 
 
A further risk showing similarity between the two is the calculation of risk posed by a person, 
both processes require the courts to 'connect the dots'344 and calculate the threat posed by the 
individual. This requires the understanding of the various ills and insecurities in society 
through the identified risks (eg threat posed against the risk to the individual and others), 
enabling the court to identify that the obligations/conditions imposed are proportionate to 
taming or eradicating the threat (Ericson and Doyle, 2004; Amoore and de Goede, 2008). It is 
important to note that both preventative measures, bail and control orders, assess the gravity 
of anticipated risk which is itself uncertain and cannot be accurate (Zedner, 2006b; 2007b). 
This enables the court to transparently show suspects compliance and adherence with human 
rights, legal standards and traditions of the processes; however in light of the legal challenges 
discussed in this chapter, this could only be achieved by the bail process.  
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The concerns that are attached to TPIMs, which were introduced on the 23rd May 2011 and 
came into effect in January 2012, are similar to the concerns and risks related to control 
orders. However, the discussion of bail as an alternative to controlling and managing terrorist 
threats whilst maintaining the human rights of the individual is important. The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2009-2010a) explained that extraordinary measures 'must not 
only be demonstrated to be necessary and proportionate, but should be time-limited to ensure 
that there is a proper opportunity to scrutinise whether the original justification still 
subsists'.345 TPIMs are intended to work more closely with the criminal justice system and 
support the avenue for bringing convictions; in other words, the aim of the measure is to 
allow surveillance of suspects to try and develop a case to prosecute. The problem TPIMs 
face is that they have to deal with the findings of AP (No3) and remove itself as a 
securitization measure and become more desecuritized like bail. The use of bail as an 
alternative to control orders or TPIMs would be a temporary measure providing safeguards 
against: (i) the courts becoming deferential and providing a great independent role because 
the criminal justice rules would apply; (ii) executive emergency powers from becoming 
normalised and strengthens the use of desecuritization over securitization; and (iii) 
establishment and development of the ‘counter-terrorism model’, which was discussed in 
Chapter One.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction of the control order regime was in response to the Belmarsh case; however 
one must not forget that the atrocity of 9/11 was still fresh in people’s minds. Its introduction 
led to the creation of a regime that had an overriding effect on established political 
conventions and political and legal process (Zedner, 2008). One may argue that this 
securitization measure was a derivative of fearing the consequences of another terrorist 
attack. Walker (2007) believes that the control order regime operated under an anticipatory 
risk method which one would suggest is similar to the precautionary principle as used with 
s44 as discussed in Chapter Two. The government believed that they should be 'trusted to 
employ wide-ranging powers responsibly'346 by contrasting the regime with their enactment 
of the HRA 1998 (MacDonald, 2007). This attempt to build up trust from the public arguably 
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led the way to securitization and the deferential attitude of the courts, which has created a 
sense of normalization towards government opinions and counter-terrorism measures. 
 
Due to the nature of the control order regime they were viewed as a ‘non-criminal control’ 
(Gearty, 2005c: 43) and were negatively perceived to be 'internment by the back door'.347 
Walker (2007) best described the control order regime as an operative dynamic that 
encompasses the imperative to 'respond to anticipatory risk' and extend action to the 
‘neighbour’ terrorist. Whilst this again identifies the measure as a precautionary one, it brings 
into question whether the government actually had sufficient intelligence given that 
precautionary attitudes are linked with pre-emptive action, which in turn is a result of 
fragmented intelligence; this was likewise the findings of s44 as concluded in Chapter Two. 
As discussed, the regime was far removed from the practices and norms of the criminal 
justice system, giving support to the concept of securitization. The regime itself supports 
Ericson (2007) and the suggestion that pre-emptive security requires radical reconfiguration 
by having 'laws against laws', a theory which enables the introduction of new laws which 
erode and eliminate traditional principles, standards and procedures. Although this would 
further explain how control orders were a form of securitization, particularly when discussing 
judicial deference.  
 
The discussions in this chapter regarding judiciary deference has highlighted the worrying 
impact securitization can have. Whilst some may believe the judiciary should be actively 
involved in the management of suspects whose human rights are being restricted, others such 
as Glees (2012) 348 believe the courts have no role to play. The courts have become victims of 
securitization, one may argue, which has resulted in them taking a narrow interpretation of 
deprivation of liberty under Article 5. Securitization itself is imposed by government and 
whilst long-term suspension of the rule of law would be highly improbable, it may be 
possible if viewed as a temporary imposition by legitimately derogating from traditions and 
norms (Werner, 1998; Bright, 2012). The use of securitization and the judiciary prima facie 
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being deferential to government opinion, as seen by Lord Bingham’s remark that such issues 
are political not legal, has empowered government by continuing to trust what they say and 
normalise this. His Lordship seems to have omitted the importance of the judiciary to ensure 
that the rights of the public are protected from the interference of government.  
 
The relationship between Article 6 and control orders had seen a shift. Article 6 provides no 
exceptions to the rights it provides. Firstly, there had been an erosion of the protections of a 
fair hearing by being brought before an 'independent and impartial tribunal'349 given that the 
judiciary have behaved deferentially in ways already discussed. Secondly, there was a 
reduction in the right to be brought before a 'fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time'350 in that the regime enabled the presumption of innocence to be removed by adopting a 
suspicious approach. This issue had also been seen under the s44 measure, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, when suspects who had been stopped and searched were effectively required to 
prove their behaviour was normal and they were not a risk. Similarly the control order regime 
would require a controlee to prove the same, challenging information and intelligence that 
they had no access to. It should be remembered that this is a distinctive feature of pre-
emptive security because it is based on precautionary logic and it normalises suspicion 
(Amoore and de Goede, 2008). This latter point about disclosure has been an issue of 
scrutiny, the government was evidently against providing information to controlees which 
formulated the basis for which they were suspected of being involved in terrorist-related 
activity; for a controlee it was naturally impossible to challenge such information. This also 
gives raises questions under the ‘unintelligibility’ issue; with a lack of information being 
provided to suspects the government faces questions of whether the intelligence gathered is 
even accurate or exists; a matter raised with s44 in Chapter Two. 
 
Ultimately, this behaviour came to support the UK government in achieving its importance 
over the suspect and above legal safeguards. The matter of disclosure was improved under 
the AF (No 3) case and brought the matter more in line with Article 6(3)(a) ECHR 
protections: 'to be informed promptly…of the nature and cause of the accusation against him' 
and required the government to give the controlee a ‘gist’ of the case against them so they 
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may adequately instruct their legal representatives. Difficulty arises however when special 
advocates are unable to converse with their client freely without the courts permission after 
seeing the closed material. The UK Supreme Court confirmed in the AP case that the courts 
should examine each control order and the obligations imposed as a whole when determining 
whether they collectively cause a deprivation of liberty. The government has sought to 
remove the need for this under TPIMs; obligations under a TPIM are intended to never 
amount to a deprivation of liberty, but would only restrict a person’s liberty which was the 
intention of non-derogating control orders.351 
 
For TPIMs there needs to be consideration as to whether they improve upon the risks created 
by the control order regime, such as: (i) the use of obligations that negatively impact upon the 
suspect and their family; (ii) the executive decision making process which reduces 
independent scrutiny; and (iii) collectively the potential long-term impact such as 
radicalisation and resentment. The discussion and assessment of bail and bail conditions 
establishes that a more effective and proportionate way of engaging and intervening with 
terrorist activity can be met through desecuritization measures. Having a desecuritization 
measure in place, such as bail, would not criminalise activities that are remote from the 
commission of the actual act of terrorism, yet may work as an effective preventative measure 
when enforced before the anticipated threat can be realised. MacDonald (2007) recalled the 
Home Secretary and Prime Minster candidly say they introduced this exceptional control 
order regime so that they could 'not be accused of not doing more to protect the public in the 
event of a terrorist attack succeeding'.352 He rightly argued that the greatest independent 
safeguard of a person’s liberty is best provided by the courts, yet the legal challenges 
discussed in Chapter Three show securitization measures can disable the courts from doing 
this. A measure that aids in the detection, prosecution, imprisonment of terrorists and safety 
of the public, whilst guaranteeing and maintaining human rights is best viewed through the 
courts; Lord Phillips rightly remarked in AF v Secretary of State for the Home Department353 
that confidence in the criminal justice system is justice that needs to be seen. Since the 
inception of control orders there was support by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and 
                                                          
351 House of Commons (fn 244) 698-699. 
352 Joint Committee on Human Rights (fn 230) 16. 
353 AF v SSHD (fn 20) [68]. 
158 
 
Lord Carlile QC to use bail in this way, rather than use extraordinary measures like control 
orders.  
 
Gearty (2005c) reports that Lord Carlile QC remarked that the obligations that could be 
imposed by control orders could have 'inhibit[ed] normal life considerably'.354 This was a 
massive understatement by Lord Carlile QC given that the regime created a number of long 
term risks, including: (i) issues relating to the mental health of the suspect placed on the 
control order; (ii) suspects segregation from their community, society and in some cases their 
family; and (iii) the victimisation or collateral impact of the family, friends and associates of 
the suspect. Whilst these unintended consequences or risks of the control order regime were 
factors which the court was not required to take into account, the courts have at times shown 
signs of recognising the existence of them. In CA v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,355 Mitting J heard evidence from the suspect’s wife and found her to be 
compelling when she described the impact that the relocation obligation and control order 
had on the family: "[the] hopelessness, anguish and extreme anxiety manifests itself in 
constant arguments, loneliness and in the case of our eldest child who had just turned four, 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder".356  
Following the evidence of CA’s wife, the judge held that: 
'[the relocation obligation] has imposed an unendurable strain upon her and risks the 
permanent breakdown of the marriage – an event which, if it were to occur, would not only 
have an adverse impact upon her and her children, but might also increase the risk of re-
engagement in terrorist-related activities by CA.' 
 
One would argue that these effects may indirectly lend support to any terrorist propaganda 
campaign against the UK, as well as aid in radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists (De 
Mesuita and Dickson, 2007; Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Choudhury, 2012). Other risks 
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created by the control order regime relate to public confidence and trust in the courts to 
protect people’s human rights, which may cause the criminal justice system to have a 
perceived lack of legitimacy. Without support and confidence of the public in the courts, 
there are extending concerns that the public would not comply with the law which gives rise 
to serious consequences for system effectiveness (Gilling, 2010). Whilst TPIMs are arguably 
a rebranding of the control order regime. The scheme should be capable of ensuring that 
procedures engage with human rights and risk assessment, facilitating the courts in its 
assessment of the evidence which give rise to the suspicion that a person’s human rights 
should be interfered with; it would also ensure the courts may determine whether the 
interference is proportionate and effective. Anderson QC (2013) confirmed that the control 
order regime reduced the risk of terrorist activity; although Gomis (2013a) confirmed that 
there is no correlation between counter-terrorism measures and the number of terrorist 
activities reduced or terrorist attacks, which this thesis supports. The debate on whether the 
consequences of the control order regime, which this chapter has considered, were 
outweighed by the regimes intended benefits is difficult to determine due to evidence of this 
being unavailable. However, in light of the matters discussed throughout this chapter, it is 
appropriate to argue that the control order regime and judicial attitude towards them, were an 
affront to British standards and traditions. Due to this, if terrorists intended on causing 
governments to disproportionately react, then they have won. With suspects on a control 
order it becomes harder to gather any further intelligence or evidence to support subsequent 
prosecution; this is evidence by the fact that during the lifetime of the regime, not a single 
controlee underwent a trial. In this sense the control order regime fails to support the UK 
Strategy 2011. 
 
Chapter Five will confirm that the new TPIMs will not remove the risks created by a pre-
emptive and preventative measure as seen by control orders; although will soften some risks 
whilst exacerbate others, for example there will continue to be a lack of judicial involvement 
and independent scrutiny. This will further support the conclusion of this thesis in affirming 
that such measures do not support the UK Strategy to secure the prosecution of those 
involved in terrorist-related activity, and wrongly support a counter terrorism model which 
has become increasingly normalised. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEPORTATION WITH ASSURANCES OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS, 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 6 EUROPEAN COURT 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS & THE RISKS OF DEPORTATION 
 
'Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. The Court is 
well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern times in protecting their 
communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these circumstances, the Convention 
prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
irrespective of the victim’s conduct. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the 
Convention…Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is 
permissible under Article 15 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation.' 
- Chahal v United Kingdom357 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Continuing with the assessment of the pre-emptive and preventative measures adopted by the 
UK government post-9/11; this chapter will use the tri-relationship model to assess the use of 
Deportation with Assurances (henceforth 'DWA') and its conflict with human rights, 
specifically Articles 3 and 6 ECHR. There has been some controversy surrounding the use of 
the DWA measure in circumstances where there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
suspect (or deportee) would face a real risk of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
contrary to Article 3. Unlike the attitudes of the judiciary towards deprivation of liberty under 
the control order regime, Article 3 is an absolute right and is non-derogable (Article 15(2) 
ECHR; see also Turner, 2011) providing no availability for a deferential attitude. As an 
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absolute right it "enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society";358 this 
stance falls in line with the judgment by the ECtHR in Soering:359 
'…It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that 
‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ to which the 
Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State 
where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed.'360 
It is for this reason ‘greater scrutiny’361 is needed when a state seeks to deport a person and 
there is a risk their Article 3 rights may be breached, a view held by Brown LJ in R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Turgut.362. Brown LJ confirmed that 
anxious scrutiny will be given to Article 3 with no “special deference” being afforded to the 
Secretary of State because Article 3 is "…not a qualified right requiring a balance to be 
struck with come competing social need".363 
Despite this, it will be shown that the use of ‘appropriate’ assurances, also known as 
‘Memoranda of Understanding’ (‘MOU’) and ‘diplomatic assurances’ (Tooze, 2010; Lester 
and Beattie, 2005), between the UK and receiving countries would be sufficient; providing 
leeway for the government to by-pass the absolute right of Article 3, even where there was a 
‘real risk’ of a breach occurring. By attempting this, the UK government has taken various 
risks which this chapter will explore by analysing assurances in a similar way to the 
formation of contracts, including: (i) there being no remedy for breach of assurances; (ii) the 
paradoxical situation created by the use of assurances and the negative reputation caused to 
the UK; and (iii) the absolute non-derogable protection of Article 3.  
 
The assurances themselves are speculative assessments of the uncertain future which is 
difficult to assess, requiring the UK to place trust on the receiving state to abide to the 
assurances. This chapter will consider that one of the significant risks to the UK by using 
DWA is its loss of moral standing in the protection of human rights. There is also an impact 
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on cultural relativism because in order for the UK to deport suspects, the receiving state may 
be required to make constitutional changes (eg Jordan) which may affect their constitution, 
culture, traditions and practices. Subsequently the use of DWA may be seen as a way of 
passing on the ability to manage and control a threat posed by a suspect, which create long-
term implications which do not support the UK Strategy 2011. The DWA measure is 
different to those this thesis considers in other chapters, it uses the immigration system under 
which deportation is possible when it is 'conducive to the public good' to do so (Immigration 
Act 1971 s5(1)). As asserted by Roach (2011), the DWA is an example of the 'United 
Kingdom revert[ing] to irrational uses of immigration law as antiterrorism law in the wake of 
9/11.'364  
 
Through the course of this chapter discussion will be dominated around the legal challenges 
made by Abu Qatada (Othman); the first legal challenge against the UK’s policy of deporting 
suspects labelled a threat to national security (Human Rights Watch, 2007), to countries 
where they faced a risk of torture. In 2013 the deportation of Abu Qatada was achieved after 
twelve years of trying following numerous legal challenges by him. It was only achieved 
after Jordan (the receiving state) changed their constitution, guaranteeing the protection of his 
Article 3 rights. Throughout the legal challenges by Abu Qatada consideration was given to 
various human rights issues, more specifically the use of torture which encompasses 
deliberate inhuman treatment that would cause severe or cruel suffering and which can be 
physical or mental harm (Ireland v United Kingdom).365 Whilst any mistreatment that may be 
deemed to fall short of torture, there remains the level of severity which would cause a breach 
under Article 3 ECHR (Tyrer v United Kingdom;366 Soering v United Kingdom);367 the 
matter is determined on a case by case basis and depends upon all the circumstances in the 
case (Soering case, paragraph 89).  
 
As explained in Chapter Three, the decision of the Belmarsh case,368 which held that 
indefinite detention without trial of foreign nationals (as per ATSCA 2001) was 
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discriminatory. This exacerbated the problem from the executive perspective as previously 
explained. It is understood that UK counter-terrorism strategy over the years has been 
influenced by a perception that the threat of terrorism emanates from foreign nationals 
(Elliott, 2010); see discussion on stereotyping and profiling in Chapter Two. Being unable to 
detain foreign terrorist suspects or put them on trial and having to adhere to the principles set 
out in Chahal v United Kingdom369 which prohibited deportation regardless of the risk posed 
by the suspect when there is a real risk of Article 3 mistreatment. Due to these hurdles the 
government needed to find an acceptable way of dealing with foreign terrorist suspects. Lord 
Goldsmith QC, former Attorney-General, stated it caused the government to face a choice of 
“…either leave them to roam free in the country, or detain them unless and until they left the 
country voluntarily.”370 Whilst subjecting a terrorist suspect to a control order/TPIM its 
enforcement would remain at the expense of the public. Alternatively, the government has 
sought to deport foreign terrorist suspects and this has grown in its use following the 9/11 and 
7/7 terrorist attacks (Human Rights Watch, 2005; 2007). 
 
 Following the 7/7 bombings the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair MP, publicly stated 
that “…the rules of the game are changing”,371 and the use of deportation increasingly 
became an avenue for the government to manage and control terrorist suspects; an alternative 
to prosecuting them (Elliott, 2010). Many governments on the other hand transferred them 
and simply argued that diplomatic assurances had been given to protect suspects from torture 
(Human Rights Watch, 2005; 2007). The MacDonald Report (2011) supported this counter-
terrorism measure and suggested that it should be expanded further: 
'…the overall supervision of the courts, to which all potential deportees have access, provides 
clear reassurances that their rights are appropriately respected during the deportation process. 
The evidence turned up by the Review is strongly supportive of the government’s programme 
of safe returns, which should be continued and, wherever possible, extended.'372 
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Within the UK Strategy 2011 it is recognised that action is needed against foreign terrorists 
based within the UK. The development of DWA can be seen as an attempt to continue to 
uphold ECHR standards and liberal democratic values, although paradoxically while making 
certain inroads into them (i.e. due to the risks posed by the use of assurances) (Elliott, 2010). 
This chapter continues to address the same issue the government has faced with s44 stop and 
search and control orders; the tension between universal and particular human (citizens’ 
rights) rights, which Žižek (2002), supported by McGhee (2010), refer to as "the rebirth of 
the old distinction between human rights and the rights of citizens".373 
 
Controversy grew with the DWA measure because of the conflict it created with Article 3, 
when the government knowingly deported a suspect to a country with questionable human 
rights records. Under these circumstances the UK government developed the practice of 
assurances as a way of protecting the deportee’s human rights, particularly those under 
Article 3. In Chapters Two and Three it has been possible to consider the element of 
proportionality when discussing Articles 5 and 6 ECHR; however Article 3 provides no 
proportionate exceptions (for example see Article 8(2)).374 DWA is another example of 
securitization being used to aid the government in its aims. The DWA measure is similar to 
s44 and control orders; it is pre-emptive in nature because the process is implemented against 
a person who is a ‘suspect’, believed to be a ‘threat to national security’ without a conviction 
being sought by the state. Similar to the use of control orders, the suspicion leading to 
deportation would be based on sensitive material that would not be disclosed fully to the 
suspect or their legal representatives. 
 
So far, Chapters One to Three have identified that a lack of knowledge and information 
means uncertainty plays a vital part in the process of consideration, known as 
‘unintelligibility’. Uncertainty is a significant consideration when the government is unable to 
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guarantee the protection of human rights once deported, questions regarding whether it is 
appropriate to deport should be considered. If the UK is unable to guarantee the protection of 
a person’s Article 3 right through the assurances provided then the risk remains real, 
Amnesty in particular take the stance that the suspect cannot therefore be deported. Even 
when the assurances given are of high quality, the precautionary principle of risk, which has 
been discussed in Chapters Two and Three, would suggest that it remains unsafe to try and 
place trust in the assurances made. 
 
DEPORTATION WITH ASSURANCES: GENERALLY 
When a terrorist suspect alleges that deportation would result in a breach of their Article 3 
rights it is for them to establish that there are 'substantial grounds for believing that there is a 
real risk of ill-treatment'375 in the receiving state (R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.376. Concerns of this kind coupled with state obligations under Article 3 
were considered in the Chahal case. Chahal was a Sikh extremist claiming that he would be 
tortured if deported from the UK to India. The ECtHR held that it was a question of whether 
there was a substantial ground for believing that there was a ‘real risk’377 of ill-treatment 
upon his return. By raising this argument the deporting state (also referred to as the 
‘Contracting State’) was not permitted to argue the risk posed to its own citizens and national 
security by the suspect.  
 
The decision of the Chahal case has been widely discussed by academics (Tooze, 2009; 
2010; Cernic, 2008; Turner, 2011) therefore there is no need to discuss the case in detail here. 
However, in the Chahal case the court believed that the issue was not the risk posed by the 
potential deportee to the UK, rather the issue was whether the argument of risk to national 
security could be considered by the court as a ground for deportation even if the deportee 
would face a risk of mistreatment, breaching Article 3 upon his return. The court ruled that 
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the risk to national security could not be taken into account at all (Lord Goldsmith QC, 2007). 
Therefore, the use of assurances would solve the issues faced by the government in dilemmas 
of this nature. The MOU is a non-legally binding, bilateral political agreement enabling the 
government to try and proportionally balance human rights obligations with the states desire 
to remove a terrorist suspect. Roach (2011) refers to these agreements as "paper promises 
from torturers"378 because the assurances are being made with countries poor human rights 
records. By having to obtain assurances for the safe return of a suspect, it is argued that the 
deporting state acknowledges that the receiving state will not guarantee freedom from torture 
or ill-treatment (Lester and Beattie, 2005: 569). These are designed to obtain guarantees of 
non-torture and any other form of mistreatment that would be contrary to Article 3 (Jones, 
2006; Tooze, 2010). Such assurances have been brokered with various countries, including 
Jordan, Libya and Lebanon (Jones, 2008; Crowther, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2007). This 
may be seen as the government’s attempt to curtail the interpretation and implementation of 
human rights in a similar way as seen with control orders, or at least dilute their obligations 
under human rights to support the government in its securitization endeavours (Lester and 
Beattie, 2005). The process of agreeing assurances between states is questionable: the 
contracting state has an interest in the successful deportation of the suspect, whilst the 
receiving state may well have an interest to have the suspect returned to them (eg Abu 
Qatada). There is wide condemnation by Non- Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) such as 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International of this process, principally because of poor 
human rights records and the uncertainty of the deportee’s future once deported. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the material and cases, the SIAC was established to deal with them; 
consequently SIAC became recognised as 'an expert tribunal'.379 
 
Recognition as an expert tribunal has subsequently led to domestic courts, such as the House 
of Lords, placing a high level of reliance on the findings of SIAC, Baroness Hale remarked: 
"…it is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field, the 
tribunal will have got it right…They and they alone are judges of the facts. Their decisions 
should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law."380 
The development of DWA of foreign terrorist suspects has developed through the UK’s focus 
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on balancing the prevention of the threat posed by terrorists with its obligations under Article 
3, and more recently those under Article 6. As part of the legal process, similar to the control 
order regime and TPIMs, there is a use of special advocates, closed material and closed 
hearings; for more information about these see Chapter Three. Given these similarities, the 
human rights issues are the same as those identified with those counter-terrorism measures, 
although for DWA Lord Goldsmith QC (2007) remarked that a balance should be struck 
between 'the rights of the deportee and…the national security of the deporting state and the 
safety of its citizens'.381 The main question, which this thesis seeks to answer, is whether this 
[DWA] counter-terrorism measure supports the aims of the UK Strategy 2011 to counter 
terrorism? 
 
DEPORTATION WITH ASSURANCES: INTERACTION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
The enactment of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act (SIACA) 1997, which 
established SIAC, was in response to the ECtHR decision in the Chahal case after it was held 
that the panel that originally heard Mr Chahal’s case and had agreed to deport him on 
national security grounds, "could not be considered as a ‘court’ within the meaning of Article 
5 para 4."382 This was formed on the basis that although he was not entitled to legal 
representation at the hearing, the panel itself had "no power of decision and that its advice to 
the Home Secretary was not binding and was not disclosed."383 During the judgment of the 
Chahal case, the court identified a better system in operation in Canada where the use of 
special legal representatives to challenge sensitive material was used (Airkens, 2008). 
 
By implementing the SIACA 1997 the government designed a deportation system which 
introduced ‘special advocates’ as well as ‘open’ and ‘closed’ hearings; a concept discussed in 
Chapter Three. As mentioned earlier, the system itself was replicated under the control order 
regime and now TPIMs/ETPIMs, from discussions in Chapter Three these types of 
‘safeguards’ have received criticism. DWA has also been controversial (Crowther, 2010), 
particularly with the standard of proof; in Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
                                                          
381 Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith QC (fn 335) 1164 and 1165. 
382 Chahal v United Kingdom (fn 214) [130]. 
383 Ibid. 
168 
 
Rehman,384 the House of Lords found that the civil standard of proof (balance of 
probabilities) would apply for the Home Secretary to prove the suspect is a threat to national 
security, compared to SIAC where the standard is ‘reasonable suspicion’. Metcalfe (2009) 
stated on behalf of Justice,385 that a seized terrorist phone call recording made to a student 
dwelling would give rise to reasonable suspicion for action to be taken against each occupant 
in the property, despite the fact that only one individual might be an associate of terrorist 
activity. Whilst there may be a legitimate or innocent explanation, the nature of closed 
material is that those suspected would have no knowledge it was a particular phone call 
giving rise to the suspicion (Metcalfe, 2009). As Crowther (2010) explained this would leave 
a 'sizeable scope for injustices to occur'.386 Other examples of controversy come from the use 
of special advocates and closed hearings; however given that this has been discussed in 
Chapter Two there is no need to consider those points here. 
 
The main difficulties the UK government faces come from the judgments of the Soering case 
and Chahal case. In the Soering case it was explained by the court that there should be a ‘fair 
balance’ to be struck between an individual’s rights and the interests of the wider community. 
However, the case related to the death penalty being imposed upon the suspect when returned 
and not matters of terrorism. In the Chahal case the court was mindful of the importance of 
national security and the arising difficulties faced by government to counter-terrorism, 
remarking that 'the court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced…in modern times in 
protecting their communities from terrorism violence'.387 Despite this, as explained earlier, 
the court reaffirmed that '…Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no 
derogation…[not] even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation.'388 
The then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke MP, argued that "the right to be protected from 
torture and ill-treatment [is] considered side by side with the right to be protected from the 
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death and destruction caused by indiscriminate terrorism."389 The DWA measure has faced 
criticism in other areas of human rights and legal challenges, most notably those brought by 
Abu Qatada (Othman v Secretary of State for the Home Department),390 which expose the 
relationship between the risks of deporting terrorist suspects with Articles 3 and 6.  
 
The UK’s legal battle to deport Abu Qatada (known as Omar Mahmoud Othman) was a long 
one, with the most recent legal challenge concluding in 2013.391 Since 2001 his case has been 
dealt with by three governments and numerous Home Secretaries. Abu Qatada was labelled 
as an 'exceptionally high risk terrorist'.392 The deportation of Abu Qatada commenced 
because the Secretary of State deemed that doing so was to be 'conducive to the public good' 
as per s5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971. The basis of the threat he posed was supported by 
his conviction in his absence in April 1999 for terrorist offences by a Jordanian court.393 At 
the time Abu Qatada alleged that the evidence against him had been obtained through the 
torture of his co-defendant Al-Hamasher; the State Security Court and the Court of Cassation 
in Jordan rejected this allegation.394 In 2000, Abu Qatada was tried again in his absence by a 
Jordanian court395 and he again alleged that the evidence against him was obtained by 
torturing his co-defendant Abu Hawsher. The co-defendant was convicted and sentenced to 
death, whilst the Court of Cassation again dismissed the allegation made by Abu Qatada. 
 
Whilst the UK government had labelled him a terrorist and the Jordanian authorities have 
convicted him of terrorist offences, others have viewed him as a leader calling upon people in 
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the Middle East to 'rise up against the brutal dictators who made their lives a misery'.396 He 
fled Jordan in 1993 and arrived in the UK as an asylum seeker (which was granted in 1994); 
if returned to Jordan he would face a retrial as per Jordanian Constitution. Abu Qatada argued 
that if he returned to Jordan: (1) there was a real risk of him receiving ill-treatment, inhuman 
or degrading treatment; and (2) a real risk that evidence obtained by torture would be used 
against him in the re-trial. These would become the fundamental arguments against his 
deportation. In 2001 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office advised the UK government that 
there was a real risk Abu Qatada would face torture or other forms of ill-treatment, breaching 
Article 3, therefore preventing the government from being able to deport him. Consequently 
assurances were being obtained by the government to prevent such risks from materialising. 
By 2005 assurances obtained between the two countries provided compliance with Article 3 
and 6 rights. 
 
Article 3 and the absolute prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
As explained earlier in this chapter, the very nature of Article 3 is such that even during times 
of war and public emergency individuals are still entitled to enjoy the protections this right 
offers; this is distinctively different from the Convention rights discussed in Chapter Two and 
Three, which provide availability for interpretation and proportionality. The difficulty for the 
UK government has been the growth of suicide violence post-9/11 (Turner, 2011). In the case 
of Limbuela v Secretary of State for the Home Department397 Laws LJ explained that it 
would be wrong to allow considerations of proportionality when the conduct of the state is 
directly responsible for the treatment that a person suffers. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, unlike control orders and TPIMs, DWA does not have the ability to derogate 
responsibilities under the ECHR as confirmed by Article 15(2) and the ECtHR in Aksoy v 
Turkey:398 
'Article 3…enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society. Even in the most 
difficult of circumstances, such as the fight against organised terrorism and crime, the 
Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention…Article 3 makes no 
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provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 even in the 
event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.'399 
 
In the RB (Algeria) case the Chahal case was interpreted with emphasis being placed upon 
the deporting state for the ‘safeguarding’ against treatment that would contravene Article 3:  
'whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a 
real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another state, the 
responsibility of the contracting state to safeguard him or her against such treatment is 
engaged in the event of expulsion'.400  
 
Taking into account the Limbuela case and the RB (Algeria) case, the deporting state would 
be considered responsible for any mistreatment the deportee would suffer because had the 
suspect not been deported they would not have suffered such mistreatment. The post-9/11 
case of Saadi v Italy401 reaffirmed that assurances can provide a degree of protection, 
although they do not necessarily constitute a sufficient safeguard as the ECtHR found 'the 
weight to be given to assurances from the receiving state depends in each case, on the 
circumstances prevailing at the material time'.402 The Saadi case considered reports from 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organisations which suggested that 
Tunisia (the receiving state in the Saadi case) was engaged in torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment against prisoners; this was despite the fact Tunisia was a party to 
international legislation. Whilst the Saadi case reaffirmed the degree of importance 
assurances can have, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have identified occasions 
when the government has presented evidence of safe return when in fact they were 'pandering 
to the sensitivities'403 of the receiving state (Justice Report, 2009: 118-33).404 This 
demonstrates the importance of the terms within the assurances and verification of 
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compliance post-deportation, otherwise the UK would be unable to effectively alleviate any 
real risk of Article 3 breaches. 
 
The prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is such that states are expected to actively prevent 
such treatment from occurring. Where allegations have been made extensive scrutiny and 
investigation should follow before deportation. This active prevention of such treatment has 
been confirmed by the ECtHR in Assenov v Bulgaria;405 in which the court considered the 
applicant’s complaint about his alleged ill-treatment at the hands of the Bulgarian police, 
saying: 
'The Court considers that…where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been 
seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of 
Article 3 that provision…requires by implication that there should be an effective official 
investigation. This obligation…should be capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible. If this was not the case, the general legal prohibition of 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental 
importance, would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents 
of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity.'406  
 
This provides a clear understanding of the obligation on the state to protect and prevent harm 
coming to deportees. When applying this to the deportation of terrorist suspects it is 
understandable why it becomes complicated for the UK government to do so. The long 
history of legal challenges since the Belmarsh case, and those between the UK and Abu 
Qatada, demonstrate the complexity of trying to protect national security and the deportees 
Article 3 rights. Under assurances given by the Jordanian authorities in Othman v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department407 and VV v Secretary of State for the Home 
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Department,408 SIAC concluded that assurances removed the real risk of Othman’s Article 3 
rights from being breached. SIAC found that the assurances could be relied upon because of: 
 '[i] the close and friendly relations which have existed at all levels in the governments of 
both countries for many decades; and [ii] the general coincidence of interests of the two 
countries in those aspects of international affairs which affect them both.'409  
This would suggest that in determining whether an assurance can be relied upon, the court 
initially considered the relationship between the two states as part of the process to protecting 
the Article 3 rights of the deportee and supporting deportation.  
 
(i) Othman v United Kingdom: Article 3 ECHR 
In MT (Algeria) and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department,410 SIAC gave 
strong views in respect of Abu Qatada: 
'[h]is deportation is necessary in the interest of national security, by which we mean that it is 
necessary as a measure of defence for the rights of those who live here.' 
In February 2009 the House of Lords411 heard the appeal of Abu Qatada against the SIAC412 
decision that he could be safely deported to Jordan due to the assurances given. This was 
primarily based upon the high profile of Abu Qatada, coupled with the assurances: 
'So far as Article 3 was concerned, in the absence of special circumstances there would have 
been a risk that Mr Othman’s deportation would infringe his rights under Article 3. There 
would have been a real risk that he would be ill-treated in custody. As it was, the fact that he 
would have a very high profile coupled with the MoU, and the diplomatic capital invested in 
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it, meant that the Jordanian authorities were likely to make sure that he was not ill-treated in 
custody…'413 
 
The House of Lords went on to consider Abu Qatada’s rights under Article 6 following the 
Court of Appeal decision. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the findings of SIAC under 
Article 6, a decision that was subsequently overruled by the House of Lords, which will be 
discussed below; from which Abu Qatada appealed to the ECtHR.414 The Strasbourg Court 
agreed with the findings of SIAC and the House of Lords of Qatada’s Article 3 rights. The 
court believed that despite the Jordanians use of torture, the assurances under the MOU 
between the UK and Jordan provide sufficient guarantees enabling the court to find that he 
would not face a ‘real risk’ of ill-treatment. However, although the court did not find a real 
risk of Article 3 being breached, it agreed with the Court of Appeal that deportation to Jordan 
would involve a flagrant denial of justice for the deportee under Articles 6. The assessment 
by the court in relation to Qatada’s Article 6 right will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
These judgments by the domestic and European courts show a contrary application of Article 
3 not being an absolute right. The legal challenges by Abu Qatada confirm that DWA can be 
used as a way of circumventing the absolute nature of Article 3. The danger of this is that it 
can empower the executive to enter bi-lateral agreements with states that are not signatories 
of the ECHR, expecting the receiving state to comply with the terms of the DWA; the risks 
involved in this will be examined later. Overall this assists in this thesis consideration of 
whether DWA is an effective measure to counter-terrorism and support of the UK Strategy 
2011. Whilst it does assist in the deportation of terrorist suspects, which is one of the aims of 
the strategy, the protections provided by the ECHR can be watered-down, including non-
derogable rights. This questions whether it is possible to re-balance the rights of the 
individual with national security. 
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(ii) When would a risk of mistreatment be ‘real’? 
It is important to understand that in many cases it is unlikely that a deportee will be aware of 
the case against them, the grounds upon which the allegation of terrorism is made or how 
such evidence has been obtained; all they will know is that they are a terrorist suspect and are 
being deported. It is incumbent upon them to raise the argument and prove that they face a 
‘real risk’ of mistreatment which would be in contravention of Article 3. Whilst the 
contracting state has a duty not to deport a person to a country where there is a ‘real risk’ they 
will be mistreated, it is worth asking: to what degree does the risk need to be ‘real’? Justice 
and Human Rights Watch made clear in their written submissions in the Othman v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department415 that due to the absolute nature of Article 3 there can be 
no ‘acceptable level’ of mistreatment (RB and U, OO cases). In the Soering case the 
deporting government would bear responsibility 'for all and any foreseeable consequences',416 
which was reaffirmed by Nnyanzi v United Kingdom.417 This creates a strict responsibility 
upon the UK government to ensure that its deportees face a zero risk of harm upon their 
return. Cynically one may argue that this requires a precise calculation of certainty, which is 
not possible due to the nature and characteristics of ‘pre-emption’ and ‘prevention’ (see 
Chapter One).  
 
As previously mentioned, the responsibility on the deporting state is to protect the deportee 
and their Article 3 rights; it was recognised in Salah Sheekh v Netherlands418 that this 
responsibility comes into play the moment the threat to the deportees’ rights is 
‘foreseeable’.419 When assurances are being used with a receiving state known to have 
atrocious human rights record, the question is: can any assurance given be enough? In terms 
of risk assessment, the calculation of foreseeability comes from the regularity of previous 
incidents which can easily be confirmed by public records such as the news, or independent 
reports from various organisations (eg Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch). 
Independent organisations have proved instrumental in assisting SIAC, as well as domestic 
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and international courts, to determine whether a person could safely be deported (see the joint 
submissions drafted by them in the case of RB (Algeria) and U (Jordan)).420 
 
 
 
(iii) During a state of emergency should the government be able to deport suspects? 
UK politicians have considered whether it can be justified to deport a suspect knowing that 
there is a real risk to their Article 3 or 6 rights; they have expressed a belief that the human 
rights principles should change. This argument was strengthened by the then Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Falconer, when instructing British judges that they should interpret and 
apply Article 3 more restrictively than the Chahal case provides and give weight to the 
national security argument (Bennion, 2005). In a similar context the then Home Secretary, 
Charles Clarke MP, remarked that the Convention was “outdated and unbalanced”,421 this 
opinion is shared by Lord Carlile QC (2011) when suggesting that the ECHR needed 
updating to fit 'the modern world.'422 In 2006 the then Leader of the Conservative Party, 
David Cameron MP, stated that: 
"A Home Secretary must have more flexibility in making a judgment in the public interest, 
balancing the rights of terror suspects against the rights of British citizens. At present the 
jurisprudence from cases such as Chahal prevent this happening…I believe it is wrong to 
undermine public safety – by allowing highly dangerous criminals and terrorist to trump the 
rights of the people in Britain to live in security and peace."423 
This remark suggests that there should be deferential attitudes by the judiciary in support of 
government opinion, an issue discussed in Chapter Three when examining the control order 
regime and risks linked to securitization. Turner (2011) believes that 'legitimate acts of ill-
treatment should be confined to special circumstances such as war or public emergency',424 
therefore by relaxing the requirements of Article 15, this would require states to show it is 
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necessary for them to act outside of the obligations prescribed under the ECHR. The 
Strasbourg Court has considered whether it should be possible to create a balancing act 
between the individuals’ rights under the ECHR with the need to protect national security; in 
doing so they referred to the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v Canada.425 In the Suresh 
case the deportation of a terrorist suspect who faced a risk of torture upon arriving in the 
receiving state was deemed acceptable in extreme circumstances, this became known as the 
‘Suresh exception’. The UK sought to introduce a proportionality test, similar to the Suresh 
exception’, in the ‘test case’ of Ramzy v The Netherlands,426 this was an attempt to overturn 
the Chahal case. Although the Ramzy case was overtaken by other countries, including the 
UK, the ECtHR was left to consider the Saadi case instead (Horne and Gower, 2013). It 
rejected the Suresh exception and any process by which Article 3 could be varied, reaffirming 
its belief that Article 3 is absolute and no provisions should be made to derogate from this 
(Turner, 2011). 
 
Whilst Turner (2011) argues for a system to allow the government to breach ECHR 
obligations under exceptional circumstances, there is concern that the UK on one hand is one 
of the world’s champions of human rights but is 'fast becoming one of the world’s notorious 
abusers of human rights' (Fekete, 2005: 25; McGhee, 2008: 12). Case law at domestic and 
international level demonstrates that deportation of suspects is acceptable when evidence is 
adduced to prove the real risk the deportee would face has been removed. However, 
assurances are not necessarily safeguards from harm, as Cernic (2008) suggests they should 
be 'assessed with a pinch of salt, particularly in states where systematic human rights 
violations occur.'427 The case of AS (Libya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department428 
where the Court of Appeal considered the MOU between the UK and Libya carefully due to 
the controversial practices of the latter state, held that assurances are not sufficient in and of 
themselves because they failed to protect Article 3 rights. Cernic (2008) remarks that for the 
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courts a ‘hypothetical prospective assessment’ (2008: 488) is used and considers the 
probability of the future, describing it as a '“pure hypothesis” of risk'.429  
 
Assessing risk in this way is best viewed as an activity similar to calculating future risk and 
whether terms of a contract, or the given assurances, prevent that risk and assist the UK in its 
obligations under Articles 3 and 6. It becomes difficult if not impossible for such assurances 
to give any guarantee of protecting human rights, there will remain the risk of harm given 
historical practices and traditions of states. Therefore the precautionary approach, as 
discussed in Chapters One to Three, would take the view that courts should not support DWA 
due to the uncertainty of the future. The Othman legal challenges demonstrated that the 
human rights concerns are not just related to Article 3 ECHR, it also extends to matters 
relating to Article 6 when evidence obtained by torture may be used in subsequent legal 
proceedings. The risks of torture being used against a deportee was not the only issue that 
required assurances to safeguard, there have also been concerns relating to procedural 
fairness and other protections offered by Article 6. 
 
Article 6 and the right to a fair trial 
When considering the legal procedure guaranteed under the criminal justice system with that 
of counter-terrorism measures, specifically control orders and TPIMs, Article 6 guarantees 
have been widely interpreted and applied by government. The government introduced 
procedural requirements which have been viewed as procedural safeguards, such as special 
advocates and closed hearings; these have enabled the UK government to enforce 
questionable counter-terrorism measures (see Chapter Two and Three). S44 and control 
orders have seen the use of limited judicial involvement or introduced quasi-judicial roles 
which favour the executive and emanations of state (eg the police). As each chapter 
discusses, safeguards have been developed in an attempt to retain basic procedural rights, 
such as disclosure of the case and innocence until proven guilty; Chapter Three discusses 
matters regarding special advocates and closed hearing process which are relevant when 
discussing DWA. With DWA, the two main procedural issues relate to a suspect knowing the 
case against them and their inability to prove their innocence; similar to control orders. 
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However, unlike control orders suspects subject to DWA have more to lose than just their 
liberty as discussed earlier in this chapter. As this section of the chapter will explain, non-
compliance with the Article 6 rights and poor safeguarding exposes the suspect to a risk of 
mistreatment and miscarriage of justice. 
 
(i) Procedural fairness: disclosure and flagrant denial of justice 
As seen in Chapter Three, disclosure of the evidence and material has been considered 
extensively by the courts. Following those discussions, this chapter can extend the analysis of 
the rights of a suspect and procedural fairness, or their right to know the case against them 
through disclosure of the evidence. Although related to control orders, AF (No 3) provided a 
clear requirement that minimal disclosure providing sufficient information to instruct their 
legal representatives, known as 'gisting'.430 The argument for strengthening the information 
disclosed to suspects has developed in light of A v United Kingdom.431 In reference to Re K 
(Infants)432 Dinah Rose QC, at the Atkin Memorial Lecture (2011), reaffirmed the remark by 
Upjohn LJ that an: 
"…interested party must have the right to see all the information put before the judge, to 
comment on it, to challenge it and if needs be to combat it, and to try to establish by contrary 
evidence that it is wrong. It cannot be withheld from him in whole or in part. If it is so 
withheld and yet the judge takes such information into account…the proceedings cannot be 
described as judicial."433  
This Dinah Rose QC described as “natural justice”;434 although this is not necessarily the 
principle being applied in deportation matters. 
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The process of deporting foreign nationals on national security grounds has similarly raised 
this issue of disclosure under Article 6. The cases of  IR, GT, AN and AK v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department435 came to consider whether the Article 8 protections of 'no 
interference by a public authority'436 enabled the same level of procedural fairness under 
Article 6 as that provided by AF (No 3) for controlees. The case was an appeal from SIAC437 
in which Mitting J held that 'Article 6 does not apply to these proceedings'438 and that 
protections and entitlements are contained in the SIAC Procedure Rules; therefore Article 8 
does not apply to provide protections under Article 6. Interestingly, Mitting J held that Article 
8 was engaged because they had been in the UK for a period of time they would have a 
private life, whether they had family or not, which may be interfered with as a result of 
deportation; however, this did not change the findings of SIAC. Maurice-Kay LJ upheld 
SIAC, finding that it had not erred in law meaning that Article 8 does not provide the same 
level of procedural fairness in deportation matters as seen with Article 6 and control orders. 
 
This judgment echoes concerns and risks discussed in previous chapters about the importance 
of knowing the case and allegations made and on what grounds they are based. Firstly, 
knowing the grounds on which the Home Secretary has made their decision may assist in 
identifying any flaws in the decision itself. Secondly, as discussed in Chapters Two and 
Three, the intelligence used to form such decisions may be based on inaccurate and 
fragmented information, which could be easily explained or re-butted. More importantly, it 
may help in identifying those sources of information obtained by torture or other forms of in-
humane treatment. The impact of the decision of the IR and Others case goes further to 
support the concerns that measures of securitization support the executive to achieve its aims 
in ‘national security’ whilst individuals have little remedy. The decision of IR and Others 
demonstrates a willingness to deprive suspect’s natural justice, which one may argue has a 
negative impact on the moral standing of the UK and may have significant repercussions for 
individuals yet to be convicted of any wrongdoing. 
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In the most recent Othman case at SIAC439 it was found that 'an issue might exceptionally be 
raised under Article 6 by an expulsion or extradition decision in circumstances where the 
fugitive had suffered or risked suffering a flagrant denial of justice in the requesting 
country'.440 It was explained that the breach had to be towards the principles of having a fair 
trial as guaranteed under Article 6 and had to be flagrant. The issues surrounding Article 6 
are not just related to evidence being obtained by torture, it also applies to the basic 
protections the deportee would be entitled to in the receiving state. To do this the UK would 
be responsible for assessing and ensuring the procedures are in place to guarantee the basic 
protections under Article 6. Whilst the UK deportation process need not take into account 
Article 6, it is a matter it considers if the deportee is at risk of suffering from a flagrant denial 
of justice. 
 
(ii) Procedural fairness: Burden of proof 
The Saadi case has been used to understand the burden of proof when considering the 
relationship of Article 3 with DWA. The same principle is applied to Article 6 and it was 
determined that the appellant must adduce evidence to prove there are substantial grounds to 
believe they would be exposed to a 'flagrant denial of justice'441 if deported. It therefore 
follows that once the evidence is adduced, the government must dispel the identified doubts. 
In this context, the government only needs to demonstrate that there is not a real risk of the 
deportee being exposed to a flagrant injustice, which assurances may assist with. In Othman v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department442 Buxton LJ cited the Strasbourg Court and 
identified that a 'high degree of assurance' is required before a person may be deported to face 
trial which may involve evidence obtained by torture (Othman v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department 2008: 49). 
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In the recent Othman case443 after finding that the assurances given by Jordan could be relied 
upon, the central issue was whether there was a real risk that the evidence obtained by torture 
would be used at his trial. Applying Gafgen v Germany444 the court believed that admittance 
of such evidence would be a ‘flagrant denial of justice’,445 determining whether the risk was 
real required consideration of some factors, including: 
(1) The history of the accused trials; 
(2) Provisions of the receiving states constitution and criminal procedures; 
(3) The receiving states case law; 
(4) The attitude of the state authorities with regard to the suspects return and prospective 
retrial; 
(5) Nature and composition of the court which will try him. 
These factors provide the court with a basic holistic assessment, enabling real consideration 
of the risk and whether it has been or can be averted through the assurances. Not forgetting 
the above discussion on Article 3, signatories to the ECHR are expected to actively prevent 
the use of torture from being used or applied to suspects. It would appear that Articles 3 and 6 
adopt a positive approach to Conventional obligations when applied to deportation cases, 
whilst for governments it may appear that application of the Convention make it harder to 
deport suspects.  
 
(iii) Evidence obtained by torture 
As explained in Chapter Three and earlier in this chapter, being aware of the case against you 
is of fundamental importance, enabling the accused to defend and rebut the allegations made. 
Disclosure in deportation cases is not required, the state does not have to provide a gist of the 
evidence unlike other counter-terrorism measures following the AF (No 3) decision. The 
deportee needs to establish that torture or mistreatment has been used, either against him or 
others or that it would be used. Unlike Abu Qatada who knew of the evidence against him, 
the same cannot necessarily be said for others. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
evidence which is intelligence-led can be fragmented, disjointed and unclear or vague. It is 
important to remember, as it was in Abu Qatada’s case, the evidence may have been obtained 
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by torture, if a deportee is unaware of the evidence against them, they are unable to 
legitimately question or raise concerns over their Article 3 and 6 rights. 
 
Some may argue that the utilitarian approach of saving many lives is welcomed, even if that 
outcome is achieved by obtaining evidence by the torture of an individual. Securing the 
removal of a terrorist threat is the objective and Lord Phillips, the then President of the UK 
Supreme Court, suggested that where torture may have been used the actions could be 
“forgiven” if used to find a bomb: "[t]he classic answer is that the law can never justify the 
use of torture, but in a situation such as that the [individual] might be forgiven for acting in a 
manner that was unlawful."446 Adhering to values, such as human rights and the rule of law, 
is '[t]he core role of any state which is to guarantee basic human rights: life, security, the rule 
of law' (Bulley, 2008: 85) and the contradiction to this by Lord Phillip raises the debate of 
whether torture can ever be justified; a debate that will not be examined here. In the Belmarsh 
case, Lord Hope ruled out any support for torture and its ‘use’ to obtain evidence or achieve 
advantageous outcomes (eg deportation): '[o]nce torture has become acclimatised in a legal 
system it spreads like an infectious disease, hardening and brutilising those who have become 
accustomed to its use.' By not following the AF (No 3) case and providing minimal 
disclosure, it means that the courts may well accept evidence in closed hearings that have 
been unknowingly obtained by torture or mistreatment; if this then forms the basis for which 
the suspect is identified as posing a terrorist threat, it becomes unsafe to deport them and the 
UK has a responsibility not to do so.  
 
The Belmarsh case confirmed that information obtained by torture could not be taken into 
account when determining whether to detain foreign terrorist suspects. It is important 
therefore, that the courts account for the means by which evidence has been obtained in order 
to facilitate the assessment of the quality and validity of any assurances. In the Belmarsh case 
Lord Bingham cited the US Supreme Court Justice Felix Franfurter from the US case Rochin 
v California;447 Frankfurter remarked that due process rested on whether the actions by a 
party had offended: "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of 
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous 
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offenses." (Donohue, 2008). The poor human rights records of receiving states have to be 
considered as it becomes more likely that any evidence obtained by that state may originate 
by acts of mistreatment. It is therefore important that the deportee can identify whether they 
believe such evidence has been obtained in such a way. Lord Hoffman in the Belmarsh case 
stated that "the use of torture is dishonourable. It corrupts and degrades the state which uses it 
and the legal system which accepts it".448 Ultimately therefore, creating or allowing a 
counter-terrorism immigration system that does not allow the deportee an opportunity to 
identify and challenge such evidence, may be considered dishonourable. Dishonourable 
behaviour such as this, risks the UK losing any recognition and stance it has on pro-human 
rights and anti-torture. 
 
 
Othman v United Kingdom: Article 6 
As discussed earlier, Abu Qatada had challenged his deportation notice on the belief that his 
Article 3 and 6 rights would be breached upon his return to Jordan. Having considered the 
Article 3 arguments earlier, it is now worthwhile turning to the decisions regarding Article 6. 
Originally SIAC had concerns relating to Abu Qatada’s Article 6 protections, particularly in 
relation to the use of evidence obtained by torture in a retrial. SIAC concluded that it was for 
the deportee to prove to the Jordanian authorities that the statements had been obtained by 
means of mistreatment, even though it was accepted by SIAC that the court and prosecutor 
were not independent. Despite the courts suspicions of the origins of the evidence obtained, 
SIAC held that the test whether 'there was a real risk of a “total denial of the right to a fair 
trial”'449 was not satisfied. There was not a ‘total denial’ because Qatada may challenge the 
evidence which it was suspected had been obtained by torture, thus it was held that Abu 
Qatada’s Article 6 rights were not at risk of being breached. In a subsequent appeal, Buxton 
LJ450 determined that the deportation of Abu Qatada would involve a breach by the UK of his 
Article 6 rights given that evidence obtained by torture would be used at his retrial. Therefore 
Qatada could not be deported on Article 6 grounds. 
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When the UK government appealed the Court of Appeals findings, the House of Lords went 
on to consider Abu Qatada’s rights under Article 5 and his belief that the Jordanian 
constitution enabled the authorities to detain him for long periods of time; depriving him of 
his liberty. Ultimately the court held that 'there was no real risk of a flagrant breach of Mr 
Othman’s right to liberty under Article 5.'451 The House of Lords452 clarified that for there to 
be a violation of the deportees rights, there must be substantial grounds for believing there is 
a real risk: 
(i) That there will be a fundamental breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by 
Article 6; and  
(ii) That this failure will lead to a miscarriage of justice that itself constitutes a flagrant 
violation of the victim’s fundamental rights. 
The House of Lords confirmed in its judgment that SIAC had recognised that Articles 3 and 6 
are linked by the fact that evidence obtained by torture, and used in proceedings, breached 
Article 6 as it would be unfair; however, it would be a breach of Article 3 given that the 
ECHR prohibits the use of and acceptance of torture. The House of Lords agreed with SIAC 
and found that there was not a total flagrant denial of justice as Qatada may challenge it in 
court, therefore by this reasoning SIAC had not erred in law and unanimously upheld the 
earlier ruling, overruling the Court of Appeal.453 Following this decision the Home Secretary 
served a deportation notice upon Qatada (Duffy, 2012).  
 
The House of Lords decision was a disappointment to human rights groups, such as Justice, 
due to the 'well-established reputation of both countries for torturing detainees',454 Metcalfe 
(2009) described the decision as: 
‘…a step backwards in the international fight against torture.  
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A promise not to torture from a regime that tortures its own people is worth nothing. It is 
shameful that the government negotiated these deals in the first place, and saddening that the 
courts have refused to intervene to stop them. 
…today’s ruling shows that the UK is still clinging to paper promises from tortures.’455 
 
Appealing the House of Lords’ decision, the ECtHR456 reaffirmed the ‘flagrant denial of 
justice’ test as originally set out in the Soering case: 
'It is for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial 
grounds for believing that, if he is removed…he would be exposed to a real risk of being 
subjected to a flagrant denial of justice. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the 
Government to dispel any doubts about it.'457 
The flagrant denial of justice test is a stringent test of unfairness, giving consideration to the 
principles guaranteed by Article 6. The court deemed that evidence obtained by methods 
considered to breach Article 3 and then used in trials, does amount to a flagrant denial of 
justice. Admitting such evidence is considered 'manifestly contrary, not to the provisions of 
Article 6, but to the most basic international standards of a fair trial'.458 The ECtHR identified 
two questions to consider: 
(1) Whether a real risk of the torture evidence being admitted was sufficient to breach 
Article 6; and 
(2) If so, whether there would be a ‘flagrant denial of justice’. 
 
The court agreed with others that the evidence from Abu Hawsher and Al-Hamasher had 
been obtained by torture, the court still assessed whether there was a ‘real risk’ of torture 
evidence being used; it relied upon the general knowledge of the receiving states practices.459 
Considering submissions by various international bodies, the United Nations Committee 
Against Torture expressed concern of widespread practices of force being used to obtain 
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confessions later used in court; the Jordanian State Security Court provided guarantees to 
defendants. The ECtHR was unconvinced that the legal guarantees under Jordanian law had 
practical value. Consequently the court stated: 
'…given the absence of clear evidence of a proper and effective examination of Abu Hawsher 
and Al-Hamasher’s allegations by the State Security Court, the applicant has discharged the 
burden that could be fairly imposed on him of establishing the evidence against him was 
obtained by torture.'460 
'…in the court of the proceedings before this Court, the applicant has presented further 
concrete and compelling evidence that his co-defendants were tortured into providing the 
case against him. He has also shown that the Jordanian State Security Court has proved itself 
to be incapable of properly investigating allegations of torture and excluding torture 
evidence…'461 
 
Having believed that Abu Qatada proved that there was a real risk that evidence obtained by 
torture would be used against him at his retrial, the court needed to consider if there would be 
a flagrant denial of justice as a consequence. Consideration was given to the findings of SIAC 
from its judgment on the 26th February 2007, finding that it was highly probable that the 
evidence obtained against Qatada would be used against him at trial and would be of such 
importance in the case against him. Likewise, the ECtHR agreed with the Court of Appeal 
and held that a flagrant denial of justice would arise with the evidence obtained by torture 
being used against him.462 The Strasbourg decision meant the UK was unable to deport Abu 
Qatada because there was a real risk that evidence obtained by torture would be used in a 
retrial. The then Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, did not appeal the decision to the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR and was criticised by political opponents for not doing so; she 
responded by stating that doing so '…would have jeopardised the government’s wider 
deportation with assurances programme and would have risked the blockage of many other 
deportation cases.'463 
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Both the UK and Jordan continued with their negotiations to secure further assurances that 
would comply with the Strasbourg decision and enable his deportation. Assurances included 
the 'qualification that the Jordanian government could not interfere with the judicial decision-
making…they would do everything in their power to ensure that a retrial was fair'.464 The 
primary focus of the assurances would be to ensure 'the court at the retrial would be impartial, 
independent and could approach the case fairly and conscientiously.'465 Following these 
assurances, the Secretary of State notified Abu Qatada of her intention to deport him again as 
it was believed that the real risk identified by the ECtHR had been removed. Refusing to 
revoke the notice Abu Qatada appealed to SIAC; the judgment given by Mitting J, Upper 
Tribunal Judge Lane and Dame Holt allowed his appeal on the 12th November 2012.  
 
 
 
(i) The SIAC appeal (12th November 2012) 
SIAC had identified three key elements of risks to assess in order to determine whether 
Qatada could be deported: 
(1) The risk that Abu Qatada would to retried for offences of conspiracy to cause 
explosions; 
(2) The risk that evidence had been obtained by torture; and 
(3) The risk that evidence obtained by torture would be used against him in his retrial. 
The former two had already been predetermined by the ECtHR which meant that SIAC only 
needed to assess the existence of the third element. Not forgetting that the ECtHR had already 
found that there existed a high probability that evidence obtained by torture would be used 
against Abu Qatada at his retrial; SIAC was presented with new assurances drafted following 
the Strasbourg decision between the UK and Jordan. SIAC rejected submissions from 
Qatada’s legal representative that unless Jordanian law satisfactorily established that the risk 
had been removed, there would remain a real risk of a flagrantly unfair trial. In reference to 
the Strasbourg decision, it was explained that the ECHR standards binds contracting states (as 
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affirmed by Drozd & Janousek v France and Spain).466 Instead the application of a ‘high 
degree of assurance’ is relevant before a person may be deported and face a trial where 
evidence obtained by torture may be used, as stated by Buxton LJ in Othman v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department467 and as cited by ECtHR.468 
 
Although SIAC initially believed that Qatada did not face a flagrant denial to a fair trial, it 
conceded that this was not enough to dispose of the Article 6 protections. Instead, they had to 
consider whether Jordanian law would continue to present a real risk that impugned 
statements would be admitted at a retrial.469 In answering this, SIAC considered Jordanian 
law and identified two 'critical questions': 
(1) Irrespective of how the evidence was obtained, would the ‘impugned statements’ be 
admissible under criminal practice? 
(2) Would recent amendments to Jordanian Constitution alter the rules of the 
admissibility of confessions obtained by torture so to satisfy Article 6 ECHR 
requirements? 
 
When considering the first question and following much discussion and debate with the 
expert evidence, SIAC believed that until a ruling had been given by the Jordanian courts 
(Court of Cassation) on this matter, the Secretary of State had failed to establish there was no 
real risk of impugned statements being admitted as evidence. When turning to the second 
question, SIAC considered amendments made under Jordanian Constitution. It was believed 
that the amendments made 'may have the effect of making it easier to challenge confessions 
allegedly procured by torture.'470 SIAC believed that given the effect of the amendment being 
unknown, there would 'remain at least a real risk'471 that the impugned statements would be 
admitted.472 Again, a ruling by the Jordanian courts on the matter and imposing a 'burden of 
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proof that the statements were not obtained by torture on the state prosecutor'473 would likely 
address SIAC’s concerns.  
 
The SIAC ruling itself reaffirmed the ECtHR stance of having a low burden of proof placed 
upon deportees alleging there is a real risk of evidence obtained by torture will be used 
against them. This is because, as the ECtHR explained, proving such 'will be difficult to 
discharge'.474 Calculating the risk level, SIAC have begun to consider the legal parameters of 
the receiving state and whether it can remove the real risk alleged by the deportee.  
 
(ii) The Court of Appeal (27th March 2013) 
As a consequence of the SIAC [2012] case,475 the Secretary of State appealed to the Court of 
Appeal on the grounds that: 
(1) SIAC’s finding that there was a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice unless it could 
be established, under Jordanian law, with the prosecutor proving to a high standard, 
that the impugned statements would not be admissible at his retrial; 
(2) SIAC failed to consider whether there had been a real risk of flagrant denial of justice 
in the round. 
 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the findings of SIAC in that the provisions of the law in 
Jordan regarding the burden of proof, are important factors when considering whether there is 
a real risk of flagrant denial of justice; this was not a determinative factor. Ultimately the 
court found in favour of SIAC’s case by case evaluation as being 'the only way of eliminating 
a real risk that the impugned statements would be admitted as evidence at the retrial would be 
to place the burden of proof on the prosecutor to a high standard'.476 It found that it was not 
irrational to believe that due to the amount of time that had passed since the impugned 
statements were taken 'it may simply be “too late and too difficult” for Mr Othman to 
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discharge the burden of proof if it were placed on him.'477 The findings of the Court of 
Appeal upholding the original decision by SIAC, both gave support and application to the 
earlier ECtHR ruling. 
 
The second ground for appeal, which related to the consideration of risk and ‘critical 
questions’ identified by SIAC had already been established by the ECtHR, the impugned 
statements had been obtained by torture; the ECtHR had noted that Abu Qatada had presented 
"further concrete and compelling evidence that his co-defendants were tortured into providing 
the case against him."478 SIAC had to consider the risk that the statements had been obtained 
by torture and then take into account the 'seriousness of the risk of the evidence being 
admitted'.479 As the ECtHR had already adjudicated on the first consideration, SIAC only 
needed to focus on the risk that it would be used at Abu Qatada’s retrial. To determine this, 
the Court of Appeal acknowledged that whilst SIAC identified the two critical questions to 
consider, other factors were worth taking into account, including: (i) the nature and 
composition of the court; and (ii) attitude of the judiciary. Agreeing with SIAC, the Court of 
Appeal believed there was uncertainty in the matters, requiring them to reach the only 
conclusion that there was a real risk that evidence obtained by torture would be admitted. 
Mindful that the ECtHR considered whether a state should be prevented from deporting a 
person to face trial, the Court of Appeal made clear that no distinction should be made 
between those deemed extremely dangerous with those who are not (Othman v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department). Instead, the Court of Appeal made clear that preventing 
deportation under Article 6 was about distinguishing the difference between a ‘real risk of a 
breach’ over a ‘risk of a breach’ to Article 6. The Strasbourg decision set a high standard 
creating a level of ‘unfairness’ in relation to the burden of proof which the contracting state 
would have to reach. In the conclusion of its judgment the Court of Appeal explained that 
torture is abhorrent and cannot be used as a method of obtaining evidence. SIAC’s 
assessment rightly deemed that there remained a real risk that Abu Qatada would be retried 
with evidence obtained by torture which is a flagrant denial of justice.480 
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SIAC as the expert tribunal applied the judgment of the ECtHR, meaning the appeal could 
only be based on whether SIAC had erred in law. This process interestingly demonstrates the 
impact that counter-terrorism measures have in terms of the process to deport a terrorist 
suspects. Jones (2008) describes this appeal process as 'an extensive judicial safeguard'481 
because appeals can only be made from SIAC to the Court of Appeal on points of law, 
followed by the UK Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) then the ECtHR. 
Importantly, this level of judicial scrutiny positively demonstrates the help risk assessment 
can have for the courts, but how serious risks should not be taken in the name of national 
security. This safeguard does not support the government in its end goal to deport foreign 
nationals which the government label ‘extremely dangerous’, or unable to prosecute. The 
Home Secretary announced that immigration laws would be toughened to ensure greater ease 
to deport:  
'I am also clear that we need to make sense of our human rights laws and remove the layers of 
appeals available to foreign nationals we want to deport. We are taking steps – including 
through the new Immigration Bill – to put this right.'482  
It is important to note that the Immigration Bill 2013 did not alter the deportation process of 
terrorist suspects. Although the Bill was later enacted and won’t be discussed at any great 
length in this thesis, the announcement at the time risked causing further damage to the UK’s 
reputation. The Immigration Bill was intended to prescribe and codify the application of 
alleged Article 8 breaches in immigration and deportation cases; it was believed that MF 
(Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department483 provided "an over generous 
interpretation of Article 8".484 The proposed system under the Immigration Bill would 
provide courts with a ‘tick-box’ approach to Article 8, therein creating a predictable system 
which fails to take a holistic or total risk assessment approach to the existence of any ‘real 
risk’ (Ganguin, 2014) which SIAC had under after the ECtHR judgment in the Othman case. 
The response by the Home Secretary perfectly demonstrates the consequences the executive 
would consider if the courts do not find in their favour. 
                                                          
481 Kate Jones 'Deportations with Assurances: Addressing Key Criticisms' 2008 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 57: 183-194, 186. 
482 Home Office 'Home Secretary statement on Abu Qatada' (7th July 2013d) 
<http://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-statement-on-abu-qatada> accessed 7th July 2013. 
483 MF (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1192. 
484 Vanessa Ganguin 'Immigration: A hard bill to swallow' The Barrister (13th January – 16th April 2014) 59: 16-
18, 17. 
193 
 
 
Although this is the response of the executive, the case of Abu Qatada exemplifies the courts 
attitude to the receiving states’ values and principles. The courts have not rejected the use of 
assurances, but require them to provide clear and fair guarantees that receiving states provide 
the basic rights which many others enjoy under the ECHR. This is particularly important 
when dealing with countries that has a history of failing to adhere to human rights, otherwise 
the UK would be unable to deport suspects. On the 10th May 2013, Abu Qatada announced 
his willingness to return to Jordan once the recently agreed assurances with the UK were 
ratified into the Jordanian Constitution. This has not only allowed Abu Qatada to dictate 
when and under what circumstances he would return to Jordan, but has placed the ball firmly 
in the court of the executive to make sure Jordan changes its Constitution to provide Article 6 
protections. This gives rise to the issues of cultural relativism and importing western values 
to other states, which will be discussed in due course. In July 2013 Abu Qatada left the UK 
after the Jordanian Constitution had been amended accordingly. Whilst Qatada was 
considered a terrorist threat, he clearly had legitimate concerns that his human rights would 
be breached and such findings were not reached after one appeal. Through its reforms the 
government had already started changing the power of the judiciary and their ability to assess 
evidence, making it a step further towards securitization and downgrade of human rights. 
 
ASSURANCES AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH RISK 
The discussion of human rights and DWA demonstrates that a paradoxical situation has 
arisen: the risk of the deportee being mistreated or denied justice are breaches that may be 
reduced by agreement between two states. Assurances are an attempt to side-step, override or 
avert the breaches those protections provide and this has created a counter-terrorism 
immigration system, similar to a counter-terrorism justice system as discussed earlier in this 
thesis. As seen in the Abu Qatada cases, the evaluation of risk assists in the determination of 
those assurances. This thesis argues the way in which assurances operate is similar to the 
formation of contracts, whereby parties identify the terms of a contract, although unlike 
ordinary contracts, with DWA there is no available remedy to the deportee if those terms 
were breached. The assurances between two states are based on speculation with the terms 
being created on the ‘unknown and uncertainty future’, as a result there are dangers involved 
including the UK’s ability to control and manage the threat posed by the terrorist suspect. 
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Cernic (2008) describes the process to agree the terms of the assurances as ‘hypothetical 
prospective assessment’ (2008: 488). Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for the Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe, has criticised assurances saying: 
"[s]uch pledges are not credible and have also turned out to be ineffective in well-
documented cases. The governments concerned have already violated binding international 
norms and it is plain wrong to subject anyone to the risk of torture on the basis of an even less 
solemn undertaking to make an exception in an individual case. In short, the principle of non-
refoulement should not be undermined by convenient, non-binding promises of such 
kinds."485 
Another risk is the impact of cultural relativism and multiculturalism when another state is 
required, by another states judiciary or negotiated assurances, to adopt or amend their 
constitution and legislation contrary to their traditions and ideologies. 
 
Memoranda of Understanding: a contract between states 
As identified by Fenwick (2007), deportation as a counter-terrorism measure deters any 
justification for deportation of a suspect on grounds that their Article 3 rights would be 
breached by using a proportionality test. Instead the government would naturally look at 
alternative ways to ensure the obligations of Article 3 are met and ensure they can deport the 
terrorist suspect. As mere ‘paper promises’ (Roach, 2011) and as seen with SIAC’s decision 
in the most recent Abu Qatada decision, the reliability and credibility of the assurances must 
be assessed case by case to protect from any real risk of infringements towards Article 3 and 
6 (see also MT (Algeria) case; 486 Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department).487  
 
When compared with other counter-terrorism measures, such as s44 stop and search and 
control orders/TPIMs, when there exists a level of uncertainty in knowing the full or true risk 
posed by a terrorist suspect, the UK government has adopted a precautionary approach. Yet, 
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when they are unable to be certain of compliance with the assurances they do not act so 
cautiously by refusing to deport and use alternative measures to control and manage the 
suspect. In RB (Algeria)488 Mitting J established criteria (set out below) for assurances to 
cover to allow the deportation of RB. The criteria derived from the Chahal case and are 
considered worthy criteria to apply in all DWA cases: 
(1) Terms of the assurances, if fulfilled, would allow for the safe return of the deportee 
and would not be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3; 
(2) Assurances were given in good faith; 
(3) There had to be a sound objective  basis to believe the assurances would be fulfilled; 
(4) Fulfillment of the assurances had to be capable of being verified. 
The court applied the fourth criterion widely; in the RB case, the deportee was being deported 
to Algeria a country which had refused to allow any monitoring system to be imposed under 
the assurances. Despite this the court believed that verification of compliance with the 
assurances could be obtained by NGO’s who could independently report back. Although the 
decision was pre-SIAC’s decision in the most recent Abu Qatada challenge, this decision by 
the court demonstrated a level of deference. In this case there was issue with the safety of the 
deportee against non-state agents, it was argued that assurances do not operate outside of the 
state’s powers and therefore cannot be agreed within assurances (Lester and Beattie, 2010: 
569) meaning RB remained at risk of harm.  
 
The House of Lords in R (on the application of) Bagdanavicius & Another v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department489 confirmed that the principles from the Soering case apply 
to deportation cases even when the risk arises from actions of non-state agents. The very fact 
that the Algerian authorities in RB refused verification processes to ensure the fulfillment of 
assurances was another example of cultural relativism not being considered and impacting 
upon the negotiation of assurances, which is discussed below. Whilst the court in RB believed 
monitoring can be determined by NGO’s, the fact remains that once a suspect is deported 
their safety cannot be guaranteed. Whilst MOU need to negotiate adequate safeguards for the 
return of the deportee, Lester and Beattie (2010) rightly remark that 'it is laughable to seek to 
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apply human rights standards in other countries with a bad record of gross violations, but 
such agreements must not be used as devices to circumvent international human rights 
obligations.'490 The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association explained to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights that 'the reality is that reliable assurances are simply not within 
the gift of highly placed officials where security services and those charged with the day to 
day care of those detained are able in practice to perpetrate torture with impunity'.491 In the 
recent case of XX v Secretary of State for the Home Department492 the Court of Appeal was 
aware that SIAC applied the fourth criterion even more widely, determining that verification 
of the assurances being fulfilled would be achieved if "…no contact occurs, it will be obvious 
that something has gone wrong."493 This wide interpretation allows the government not to 
negotiate safeguards for verifying compliance, but presents a disillusioned attitude by the 
courts on the protection of human rights. If safeguards cannot be imposed and guaranteed 
before a suspect is deported and monitored post-deportation, surely a precautionary approach 
would deem it risky to deport a suspect at all? 
 
In the RB case, Mitting J gives mention to ‘good faith’ and yet there should be concerns 
regarding the trustworthiness of assurances. SIAC have themselves scrutinised assurances 
and have found some to be insufficient, for example a MOU with Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya. 
The former UK government clearly believed that assurances have relevance and can be 
trusted; yet during the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
MP stated “we mobilised the international community to protect the Libyan people from 
Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. We have degraded his war machine and prevented a humanitarian 
catastrophe."494 If a state is capable of causing a humanitarian catastrophe, there should be no 
doubt that any assurances given by them could not be trusted, yet the UK government did see 
fit to negotiate assurances for the deportation of a suspect; this argument is supported by the 
UN Rapporteur Against Torture.495 This continues to support the argument that under a 
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precautionary approach deportation of suspects to countries with questioned human rights is 
unsafe and any assurances would be untrustworthy. 
 
The scrutiny of assurances has at times been problematic for the government and prevented 
deportation, particularly when given assurances cannot be held in good faith. The long legal 
battle to deport Abu Qatada is an example of the problem the government faced at times, in 
March 2012 the then British Prime Minister, described the frustration at being unable to 
deport Abu Qatada because: 
 '[T]he Court said, ‘You can’t deport this man to Jordan because there’s a danger, if he goes 
to Jordan, he’ll be tortured’. So we thought, ‘Right, okay, fair point’. We went off to Jordan 
and we did a deal with Jordan; signed a deportation-with-assurances agreement that there was 
no way he would be tortured if he was sent to Jordan.'496  
 
This remark demonstrates a biased tendency but a degree of naiveté by the government. The 
earlier discussions on the Abu Qatada cases shows that although the government had made 
assurances, they fell below that required standard to remove the real risks posed to his human 
rights. It is important to understand that once a deportee is in the care of the receiving state, 
the UK has no jurisdiction to hold that state accountable for failing to uphold the agreement. 
The Chahal case helpfully illustrates that assurance guarantees cannot be sufficient when 
there is a history of human rights violations by the receiving state: 
'Although the Court does not doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the 
assurances…the violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces…is a 
recalcitrant and enduring problem. Against this background, the Court is not persuaded that 
the…assurances would provide Mr. Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety.'497 
The Chahal, Bagdanavicius and Abu Qatada cases demonstrate that the creation of the 
assurances must take into account the real risks the deportee faces and insulate them from 
those risks by adopting realistic safeguards. The unstable and calculative aspect of 
assurances, caused by the unknown future, shows that speculative assessment is needed with 
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the government taking cautious action. Ericson (2005) best describes the situation as: 'if in 
doubt about a risky activity with potential for severe consequences pre-empt it through heavy 
preventative and regulatory efforts…if that fails, ban it altogether'.498 
 
‘Speculative Assessment’ of assurances between states 
The process of ‘speculative assessment’ is best considered as a practice of risk assessment. 
This sort of process may allow the authorities to conduct a holistic assessment to ensure that 
safeguards are achieved for the safe return of the deportee; although compliance with the 
assurances post-deportation is one of the hardest safeguards to achieve, yet one of the most 
important. As Lord Goldsmith QC remarked '…[an] important factor…was that there was 
adequate provision for compliance with the assurances to be verified.'499 Provisions which 
provide continuity and compliance are vital to ensure assurances are not falsely given by a 
state seeking the deportation of a suspect. Ericson (2005) explains that risk assessment is 
rarely based on perfect knowledge and ‘frays into uncertainty’,500 as was suggested earlier in 
this chapter. It is best understood that forms of uncertain knowledge are calculated by 
‘foreseeability’, ‘reasonable foresight’ and ‘expectation’ which Ericson identifies as 
pragmatic tools of assessment used by contract and tort law. Similarly, O’Malley (2004) 
describes contract law as being a practice to the ‘law of uncertainty’ because contracts look at 
how to deal with reasonably foreseeable outcomes through the use of contractual stipulation 
and agreed terms; in this sense the same principle can be applied to the assurances agreed 
between states. Utilising this principle would enable countries to identify terms that assure 
short-term and long-term protections to Article’s 3 and 6 and then a suspect could be safely 
deported. Such an approach deals with risk, taking into account uncertainties that are believed 
to exist such as fluctuations in the market. Therefore, terms are negotiated to protect both 
buyer and seller in a contract of sale (Ericson, 2005). Interestingly, Ericson (2005) furthers 
this discussion, detailing the use of gambling, speculation and insurance within which risk 
calculation is used to identify 'risks of future events'.501 The issue of agreeing and enforcing 
the remedies in the eventuality those assurances are breached remains in issue, this is a 
natural characteristic of uncertainty. 
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As mentioned in Chapter One uncertainty is ‘incalculable’, meaning the courts and 
government can only negotiate assurances on ‘estimation’. It is for this reason that attempting 
to be aware of the possible catastrophes, as well as their probability and magnitude, remain 
unclear. Applying this principle to DWA it is not possible to know whether specific 
assurances will work. However, as explained earlier in this chapter, it is possible to calculate 
the likelihood and magnitude of the receiving state breaching human rights when taking into 
account its past record. The inability to guarantee remedies to a deportee if assurances are not 
adhered to, means it is not possible to give assurances that are proportionate (Fenwick, 2007), 
instead they must eliminate the risk (see the Saadi case). This argument was supported by 
Gil-Robles, a former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights: '[d]ue to the 
absolute nature of the prohibition of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, formal 
assurances cannot suffice where a risk nonetheless remains.'502 
 
The strict obligation of Article 3 coupled with states known to have poor human rights, 
means negotiating assurance will not be straightforward. Achieving this would require the 
‘precautionary principle approach’ to be taken, as previously mentioned. As Beck (1998) and 
Ewald (2002) explained this would only be used when there is uncertainty or co conclusive 
evidence until the realisation of harm. In deportation cases, to wait until the realisation of 
harm would be impossible to remedy, as mentioned previously, once the deportee is deported 
the UK has no control or management of the threat they pose. As mentioned earlier, when 
states enter negotiations over the deportation of a suspect, there can be a risk that there will 
be a conflict between one another’s traditions and ideologies in an attempt to protect the 
deportees human rights; this can best be labelled as a cultural relativism issue. 
 
Multiculturalism and cultural relativism 
One of the risks involved in negotiating assurances comes from universal multiculturalism 
and the part cultural relativism plays within those negotiations. Jabri (2008) has remarked 
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that since the adoption of the ‘war on terrorism’, multiculturalism has been associated with 
insecurity and the perception that cultural difference is the potential source of the existence of 
the threat and danger. When negotiating assurances, the UK government has to be aware that 
they cannot force upon another state western ideologies or opinions. This means that the UK 
cannot force Jordan and others to accept and embrace Articles 3 and 6, as confirmed by the 
ECtHR in Drozd & Janousek v France and Spain.503 Interestingly, as remarked by Bulley 
(2008), Jack Straw MP the then UK Foreign Secretary, believed that measurement of the 
success of states comes from their adoption and use of human rights and the rule of law: 
"[T]he key measure of a state’s success is the extent to which it guarantees the human rights 
of its population."504 It was further explained that these can be used as an ‘early warning 
system’ of future crises and failures (Bulley, 2008). If this is true, then negotiating terms of 
human rights compliance with a state known to have poor regard to such rights, should 
provide an early warning that they are unlikely to comply with such assurances; this gives 
rise to the precautionary principle discussed earlier. 
 
Post-9/11 emotive language was used by the former UK prime Minster, Tony Blair MP, 
suggesting that when other countries fail in their responsibilities, it is for other states to act 
(Doorstep press conference in Beijing, 21st July 2003).505 Following from this, Jack Straw 
MP supported state intervention where relevant: 
'States have the right to non-interference in their international affairs; but they also have 
responsibilities, towards their own people, and towards the international community and their 
international engagements. Where those responsibilities are manifestly ignored, neglected or 
abused, the international community may need to intervene: the cost of failing to do so in 
Rwanda or in Bosnia still haunts us today.'506 
Bulley (2008) and Jabri (2008) explain that the reason such language or such a political 
stance is taken is to achieve ‘securitization’ (see Chapter Three). Although it can apply to 
deportation cases when intervention by one state to deport a suspect does so by 're-shap[ing], 
re-form[ing], re-design[ing] the very subjectivity [of such as deportation]…in the name of 
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security'. 507 This sort of behaviour is used against foreign terrorist suspects because the 
courts have held it illegal to detain these suspects indefinitely (the Belmarsh case). When 
taking this point and considering the perceived threat or problems multiculturalism and 
cultural relativism can create in negotiating assurances, the UK government runs the risk of 
being viewed as racist and xenophobic (Bulley, 2008). Furthermore, activities of this nature 
may contribute to radicalisation, a concern seen in former measures such as s44 and the 
control order regime. 
 
Those at risk of radicalisation are risks themselves (Jabri, 2008). If a foreign terrorist suspect, 
such as Abu Qatada, is successfully deported the UK loses any jurisdiction and control over 
the risk that individual poses. The inability to manage or control the terrorist threats by 
suspects falls outside of the intention of the CONTEST strategy. Edwards and Gomis (2011) 
discussed the five main objectives of the CONTEST strategy and recognised that the UK 
strategy was to address those risks seen to be a root cause or contributing factor to 
radicalisation.  Yet it may be argued that seeking deportation of foreign nationals may be a 
factor creating ideologies which indoctrinate others to be radicalised, which does not support 
the UK’s strategy. Whilst it may be politically unpalatable or unpopular with the media or 
public, if the threat posed by foreign nationals is greater whilst abroad, it would surely be 
better in the management of that risk to keep them under surveillance and control in the UK? 
 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike the government’s earlier attempts to deal with the threat posed by foreign terrorist 
suspects (ie indefinite detention without trial), the system of deportation has provided an 
acceptable alternative. The use of immigration law and the immigration system, rather than 
adapting the criminal justice system to manage counter-terrorism (Roach, 2011) demonstrates 
the wide approach taken by the UK government. Various commentators suggest that the 
government has gone down this route as a consequence of the Belmarsh case (Hallo de Wolf 
and Watson, 2009). The immigration processes are an accepted and ordinary system used by 
the UK; however, the UK government has adapted an ordinary process to create a unique 
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counter-terrorism immigration system, supporting the argument that a counter-terrorism 
justice system has been developed to replace pre-existing systems. As seen with S44 and 
Control Orders, the process of deportation operates on a restricted knowledge basis which 
supports the findings of Chapter’s Two and Three, namely that the extraordinary measures 
created to empower the executive achieve securitization which if not challenged or 
questioned can become normalized. The deportation process however has become acceptable 
and normalized, likewise has the use of assurances which means that one is unable to legally 
challenge the system itself because it is an acceptable practice. However, one may challenge 
the decision-making process and conclusions reached, particularly the negotiated assurances. 
 
The DWA measure has primarily focused on Article 3, although the legal challenges of Abu 
Qatada demonstrate Article 6 is also an area of consideration. The importance of alleging that 
a human right would be breached is to establish that there is a ‘real risk’ of that breach under 
Article 3 or to suffer a flagrant denial of justice contrary to Article 6. The contracting states 
are then imposed with a higher burden to prove that the agreed assurances between them 
remove such risks. This process of reversed burden is substantially different when compared 
to the other measures previously discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The case of Abu 
Qatada raises issues regarding the UK strategy to counter-terrorism; the CONTEST strategy, 
the UK aims to attain greater control and management of the risks posed by terrorists. Some 
measures have been held incompatible with human rights, either because they are 
controversial or unworkable; once enforced DWA does not allow the government to have 
control or management of a risk. As discussed in Chapter Two and Three, S44 stop and 
search and control orders – as well as TPIMs – provide the executive with the ability to 
control and manage the terrorist threat; the control order regime empowered the executive to 
impose more stringent obligations and restrictions on a person’s day-to-day life. Measures 
such as these were expected to support the UK in its endeavour to prosecute terrorists and 
thereby neutralising the threat they posed, however deportation of terrorist suspects does not 
enable the UK to manage or control them. The deportation of a suspect negates the UK’s 
jurisdiction over that individual, which may result in the potential loss of vital intelligence of 
a terrorist network. This in turn means that the UK is unable to explore the wider network or 
identify other terrorist cells and networks, either domestically or internationally. Discussion 
regarding terrorist networks in considered in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
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Edwards and Gomis (2011) compiled twelve case studies of terrorists and terrorist suspects in 
the UK and found that in nine the internet contributed to the terrorist acts, whether by 
indoctrination, research, communication or to spread terrorist ideology. At the introduction of 
this chapter Lord MacDonald was quoted as supporting the use of DWA, believing it should 
be expanded upon (MacDonald Report, 2011), whilst simultaneously believing more should 
be done to detect and prosecute: 
'Where people are involved in terrorist activity, they must be detected and, wherever possible, 
prosecuted and locked up. The Review rightly recognises this to be a primary purposes of 
public policy, so that any legislative scheme that appears to impede this important aim needs 
the most careful scrutiny, in order to determine whether, nevertheless, it may be justified on 
any other grounds.'508 
By deporting a terrorist suspect it becomes increasingly difficult to detect and therefore 
prosecute other terrorists; as explained throughout this chapter, once deported the UK has no 
jurisdiction over the deportee, removing its ability to control and manage them as a threat. 
This means that the suspect could have access to various means which could spread terrorist 
ideology and radicalise vulnerable people which the UK would have no control over.  This 
contradicts the ‘primary purpose of public policy’ as mentioned by Lord MacDonald above. 
This is a risk that this thesis argues is possible under this particular counter-terrorism 
measures enforced by the UK government. 
 
Deportation forms part of the UK’s preventative approach within its strategy; risk society 
thinkers, such as Dillon, Agamben and Edkins, view this approach by government as a way 
of either 'governing terror' or using 'sovereign power' (Amoore and de Goede, 2008). When 
addressing arguments relating to the SIAC process and the ‘suspects’ rights during the course 
of those hearings, there are criticisms over the use of special advocates and closed hearings; 
for an effective and fair trial there needs to be open justice, an issue discussed at length in 
Chapter Three. Crowther (2010) argues for the removal of closed hearings, easier access to 
expert witnesses that support the suspects’ case and an improved system of communication 
between the appointed special advocate and suspect. Compared to control orders and the risks 
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faced by a controlee, those suspects deported could face ill-treatment or be subject to an 
unfair trial that is based on evidence obtained by torture to which they have no remedy of 
rebuttal; it may be argued that there is more to lose for someone not convicted for any 
terrorist offence. 
 
Alternatively, the government should consider counter-terrorism measures that are part of the 
ordinary legal system, but enable the state to control and manage those that pose a genuine 
terrorist threat. With this in mind, it is important to remember Abu Qatada has never been 
convicted of any criminal offence in the UK. If he truly was a risk to the UK, would 
alternative measures such as TPIMS provide the government sufficient control and 
management of those risks? Measures which enable him to interact with others in a manner 
that would allow intelligence-gathering could then be used to detect and prosecute other 
terrorists, an approach that this thesis would recommend be adopted. Chapter Five will 
consider whether TPIMs can provide such opportunities and support the UK’s CONTEST 
strategy in detecting and prosecuting terrorists in this manner. 
 
From the history of measures taken by the UK government post-9/11, there has been a clear 
on-going fight between the state and human rights. The relationship that both of these factors 
have with risk assessment is important and visible. Whilst the executive argue for the 
proportion of national security by introducing measures empowering the government to act 
pre-emptively and preventatively, such measures have a negative impact upon the suspect 
and wider community. As explained in Chapter Two, Zedner (2007b) argued that judicial 
interference would result in further restrictions being applied by the government, following 
the Belmarsh case control orders were introduced and DWA were utilised to control the 
foreign terrorist suspects. This steady progressive approach undertaken by government to 
establish and normalize it securitization agenda was further seen when the then Home 
Secretary expressed her intention to make it harder for deportees to challenge the executive’s 
decision to deport; similarly, make it harder for the courts to rule against the decision or the 
contents of the DWA. 
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A similar risk shared between DWA, Control Orders and S44, which is discussed earlier in 
this thesis, is the risk of ‘unintelligibility’ (Berks, 2010). As Vlcek (2006) argues, this risk 
comes into play when a person is placed under restraint and has no means to recover their 
situation. For suspects facing deportation they face this risk because:  
(i) they are unable to challenge the evidence heard in closed hearings due to the 
‘national security concerns’;  
(ii) they play no part in the negotiation of the assurances to protect their rights;  
(iii) if deported, they have no available right to remedy the situation if the receiving 
state fails to adhere to the terms of the assurances; and  
(iv) being labelled as a ‘terrorist suspect’ and facing deportation to a country with a 
poor human rights record, could mean the individual is unable to re-establish their 
position or status in society.  
On the second point, one way of tackling the risk of unintelligibility was considered by 
Human Rights Watch (2005)509 reporting on a number of points that should be adopted in the 
deportation process, allowing the deportee an opportunity to challenge their position:  
(i) The process of deporting and the return should be challenged prior to the suspect 
actually being deported; 
(ii) All matters should be before an independent and impartial tribunal. For the 
government this comes from the existence of SIAC; similar tribunals have been 
praised (Chahal case: 131; Airkens, 2008); 
(iii) There should be the right to an appeal which suspends the deportation of a 
suspect; 
(iv) The suspect can challenge the reliability of the assurances provided as well as the 
terms of the assurances; and 
(v) Adequate post-return monitoring arrangements should be in place. It should not be 
sufficient for the court to believe that if "…no contact occurs, it will be obvious 
that something has gone wrong"510 (XX case). 
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As the risks which a deportee truly face if deported are uncertain and are therefore 
incalculable, for the courts and SIAC, this is problematic for government. For the courts, 
being unable to guarantee that the ‘real risk’ faced by the deportee has been removed, the 
strict obligations under Article 3 make it impossible to deport. As Ruddock (2003) described 
the problem the UK government faces: 
[W]e live in a world where we must accept the costs associated with protecting ourselves 
from terrorism. There will always be a trade-off between national security and individual 
rights. The task of government is to recognize these trade-offs and preserve our security 
without compromising basic rights and liberties.'511 
 
Unlike the other counter-terrorism measures that this thesis examines, DWA has an 
underlying sense of morality when considering potential ECHR breaches. The argument of 
morality comes from the non-derogable nature of Article 3 and principles encapsulated within 
Article 6. As Lord Justice Neuberger’s dissenting judgment in A (No 2) said: '…even by 
adopting the fruits of torture, a democratic State is weakening its case against terrorists, by 
adopting their methods, thereby losing the moral high ground an open democratic society 
enjoys.'512  
It is for this thesis to consider whether the loss of morality in the name of national security by 
adopting counter-terrorism measures, such as DWA, is an effective measure which supports 
the UK strategy. Some commentators, such as Lord Goldsmith QC and the MacDonald 
Report (2011), support the use of deportation when it is not possible to achieve the balance or 
aim of the UK’s strategy, namely detection and prosecution (Dershowitz, 2006). The loss of 
jurisdictional control and management of a suspect by deporting them does not deal with the 
threat posed by the suspect and questions the UK’s stance on torture and the use of 
questionable evidence in legal proceedings. These are some of the risks the UK will 
encounter by continuing to adopt DWA, as Roach (2011) argued that deporting suspects can 
be seen as “exporting terrorism”; an opinion expressed by the Newton Committee.513 It has 
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been possible for the UK to deport terrorist suspects to countries without the need for 
assurances, but there remains the need for this ‘safeguard’ with other countries. Whilst this 
thesis does not advocate the removal of the entire system, it does argue against its use when 
assurances are needed to negotiate the protections, particularly when the deportee could be 
better managed and controlled from within the UK so that further intelligence may be 
gathered. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TERRORISM PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES AS A 
REPLACEMENT FOR CONTROL ORDERS; THE ON-GOING HUMAN 
RIGHTS ISSUES AND RISK IMPLICATIONS 
 
'Our approach will combine tough, targeted restrictions under the new Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Measures with significantly increased resources for covert surveillance and 
investigation, new measures to support prosecutions… [t]he TPIMs package gives us the 
public protection measures we need, combined with increased resources for the police and 
Security Service, which are aimed at producing more evidence for use in possible 
prosecutions.'514 
- Theresa May MP, the former Home Secretary 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter will continue the discussions of the previous chapters to assess the UK’s 
counter-terrorism measures post-9/11, specifically Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measure scheme ('TPIMs') and Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure 
scheme ('ETPIMs'), as replacements of the control order regime (see Chapter Three). By 
assessing the on-going issues with human rights and relevance of risk assessment, this 
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chapter will review whether TPIMs and ETPIMs provide a re-balance between national 
security and human rights, which control orders did not achieve. By assessing whether some 
or all of the controversies of the control order regime have been remedied and made 
proportionate by these new measures, it will be possible to determine whether they provide 
an effective way of countering terrorism and support to the UK’s Strategy. This chapter is 
expected to demonstrate that measures such as these, which are more closely aligned to the 
criminal justice system, continue to support a preventative approach enabling securitization 
by the government to become normalized. 
 
In the 2010 general election the first UK coalition government was formed since the Second 
World War, between the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats. Both parties made 
election promises to review and consider the counter-terrorism powers available in the UK. In 
the MacDonald Report 2011 support was given to the review of UK Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Powers (the 'Security Review, 2011').515 From the report and review, the control 
order regime was not believed to be working as the former UK Labour government had 
hoped. Lord Carlile QC (2010) described the former regime as a system that remained 
‘necessary’ to deal with suspects that present a "considerable risk to national security and 
conventional prosecution is not realistic."516 Despite Lord Carlile’s view, as explained earlier 
in this thesis, this was the beginning of the end for control orders. 
 
The findings of the MacDonald Report (2011) and Security Review (2011) recommended the 
repeal of the former regime. As a replacement and in keeping with political promises made at 
the 2010 general election, the coalition government introduced the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Bill 2011 (TPIMB 2011), which was later enacted and brought about 
the TPIMs. Similarly, the government later introduced ETPIMs implemented by the 
Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 2011. The introduction of 
TPIMs was initially described as being a “cautious rebalancing in favour of liberty”.517 
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Unlike the preceding regime was described as a ‘temporary measure’ (Fenwick, 2013; 
Walker, 2013), under which 52 suspects were made subject to obligations during its 
enforcement from 2005 until 2011 (Anderson QC, 2013); TPIMs may be viewed as a long-
term measure (Wood, 2014). This Chapter will explain on what grounds TPIMs are believed 
to provide a re-balance between national security and human rights, re-focusing on 
prosecuting terrorist suspects (MacDonald Report, 2011), because doing so is an 
"institutional self-interest".518 Since coming into force in January 2012 little data and 
information is widely available; however, the scheme was criticised for being a re-brand of 
the former regime, meaning the discussions in Chapter Three remain relevant. It is for this 
reason TPIMs would be viewed as an 'instrument of securitization' Balzacq (2008: 79).  
 
Despite the re-balance TPIMs is believed to provide, this Chapter will show that their 
resemblance to the former regime means TPIMs as executive orders still do not give suspects 
the benefit of a trial and therefore contravene basic criminal justice values; values protected 
under Articles 5 and 6 ECHR. Similar to the discussion in Chapter Three, TPIMs and 
ETPIMs will be shown to be similar to the use of internment because they deprive suspects of 
their liberty due to the absence of any charge, trial, conviction for any criminal wrongdoing 
(McSherry et al, 2009; de Londras, 2011: 549; Zedner, 2014); they provide a coercive threat 
of criminal proceedings for non-compliance with obligations imposed upon their liberty. This 
reflects the change in counter-terrorism law and policy post-9/11, a move towards reliance on 
risk and uncertainty rather than guilt (de Londras, 2011: 549; Zedner, 2014). In terms of a 
risk-based process the control order regime provided a typical example of ‘securitization’ 
(Bright, 2012), and whilst the implementation of TPIMs may be viewed as representing a 
movement towards ‘desecuritization’, it nevertheless is securitization. As a consequence of 
this, this chapter will identify elements of risk which explain that through securitization in 
counter-terrorism measures such as TPIMs there is a ‘de-humanization’ which causes risks of 
social isolation and may give rise to opportunities of radicalisation. 
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Through the comparison and assessment of the control order regime with TPIMs, it will be 
contended that as counter-terror law becomes increasingly politically based and moves away 
from the rule of law or Criminal Justice Model, it tends to be strategically misguided. The 
TPIMs has been in force for a few years and received criticism in the earlier years; Yvette 
Cooper MP, the Shadow Home Secretary, described it as 'a political fudge',519 whilst Liberty 
labelled TPIMs as 'control orders lite'.520 The TPIMs will be shown to be a lighter version of 
the previous regime, although its counterpart scheme, the ETPIMs which operates in a similar 
manner to the former regime, will be identified as a scheme which returns to the practices 
seen previously save that it is restricted to unspecified emergency circumstances. In 
comparison with other counter-terrorism measures considered in the previous chapters, this 
chapter will show that ETPIMs replicate the same risks as control orders, whilst TPIMs 
create similar risks and harm to the UK through the alienation and radicalisation of suspects 
which could cause a backlash of increased terrorist activity (Lafree et al, 2009;521 de Londras, 
2011: 549). Ultimately this discussion will lead to discussions in Chapter Six which examine 
the effectiveness of UK pre-emptive and preventative counter-terrorism measures post-9/11, 
and whether they support the UK Strategy 2011. It will consider whether government “re-
balancing” improves protections to suspects and the public. 
 
The discussion of TPIMs will provide Chapter Six with evidence to argue that counter-
terrorism measures used to control and manage terrorist suspects, who apparently cannot be 
prosecuted (or deported), has counter-productive effects. Although it is recognised by some, 
such as Middleton (2011a; 2011b), that terrorist suspects cannot be prosecuted for various 
reasons, those that were subject to a control order and now a TPIM are highly unlikely to ever 
be prosecuted because the Security Services and government have cut off the ‘blood supply’ 
to gather evidence for them to do so. This will support the final conclusions in Chapter Six; 
pre-emptive and preventative measures, such as TPIMs and ETPIMs, stifle the progress of 
                                                          
519 House of Commons 'Counter-terrorism Review' 2010-2012 (Hansard) 26th January 2011 522-106: 306-327, 
310. 
520 Liberty 'Progress on Stop and Search But Control Order by Any Other Name' (26th January 2011) 
<http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2011/progress-on-stop-and-search-but-control-orders-
by-any-ot.php> accessed 5th April 2011. 
521 Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan and Raven Korte 'The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political 
Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models' 2009 Criminology 47(1): 17-45. Also 
see Fiona de Londras 'Can Counter-Terrorist Internment Ever be Legitimate?' 2011 Human Rights Quarterly 
(August) 33(3): 593-619. 
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obtaining a conviction against the suspect and is therefore an ineffective way of countering 
terrorism. 
 
This chapter will establish that TPIMs is aimed at controlling and managing the uncertain 
threat allegedly posed by a terrorist suspect. Similar to control orders, it operates outside of 
the criminal justice system; it continues to use special advocates; it relies on restriction of the 
information that is disclosed to terrorist suspects; it imposes obligations that restrict a 
person’s ordinary day to day life; it arguably breaches Articles 5 and 6 ECHR. Glees (2012) 
described TPIMs as being “more or less a reversion to the old control orders.”522 It will be 
shown that despite the government’s “tweaks around the edges”.523 Ultimately, TPIMs and 
ETPIMs will be shown to raise the same issues as the former regime and demonstrate the 
government's continued allegiance to the use of “executive interference without a criminal 
trial”,524 despite the government’s attempt to rebalance security powers in favour of civil 
liberties. In Chapter Three it was argued that the Bail Act 1976 may be used as an alternative 
to the former regime, this chapter will argue that for the purposes of re-balancing human 
rights and the need to gather intelligence and evidence, no non-trial-based measure should be 
invoked to control and manage terrorist suspects. This argument will support the ‘Criminal 
Justice Model and Human Rights Approach’ which this thesis believes should be taken, as 
will be explained in Chapter Six.  
 
FROM CONTROL ORDERS TO TPIMS 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the former regime was a controversial executive counter-
terrorism measure which had been implemented following the Belmarsh case.525 It is 
important to recall that the creation of the former regime was the development of the 
government’s response to judicial interference (Zedner, 2007b). Following numerous legal 
challenges in the domestic courts, which have been discussed at length in Chapter Three, the 
                                                          
522 Glees (fn 348). 
523 Sophie Farthing giving evidence before the Joint Committee on the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Measures Bill (24th October 2012) <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-
committees/Draft%20ETPIMS%20Bill/HC%20495%20iii%2024%20October%202012%20Corrected.pdf> 
accessed 19th December 2012. 
524 Fenwick (fn 517). 
525 A and Others v SSHD (fn 24). 
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regime survived and was adapted to ‘fit’ the judgments of the courts. But the former regime 
has not been tested in the ECtHR as explained to the Joint Committee at Parliament by 
Fenwick (2012b), '[t]herefore it does not have a clean bill of health at Strasbourg. In a sense it 
has a clean bill of health domestically but not at Strasbourg.'526  
 
The longest period of time a suspect was subjected to a control order was in excess of 55 
months, whilst the shortest period of time was two months (Anderson QC, 2013: 40). It was 
confirmed in the Anderson QC Review (2013) that a total of 52 suspects were subjected to a 
control order during the lifetime of the regime; of the 52 control orders, the time individual 
suspects spent under the regime is outlined in Table G below, of these 45 were revoked, 
quashed or expired, nine remained when the regime came to an end, however the table does 
not include those that absconded. 
0-1 years 1-2 years 2-3 years 3-4 years 4-5 years 
16 14 8 4 3 
Table G: Time periods when suspects were placed under a control order (Anderson QC, 2013: 40) 
 
This is particularly relevant for the discussions of the time limits under the new scheme 
(below). The former regime was widely criticised for the duration of time suspects were 
placed under a control order, but mainly for the obligations imposed against them; which at 
the time were 'tailored to meet the threat posed by the particular suspect.'527 The MacDonald 
Report 2011 criticised the former regime and held that the obligations themselves were 
'intrinsically hostile to evidence gathering'528 and therefore naturally made it harder to 
prosecute those terrorist suspects. This was relevant because prosecution of terrorist suspects 
was the ultimate goal of the UK Strategy 2011, as per CONTEST529 (Middleton, 2011b). As 
the former regime inhibited the ability to secure future prosecutions, the MacDonald Report 
2011 recommended TPIMs in order to '…protect the public but will be less intrusive, more 
                                                          
526 Fenwick (fn 517). 
527 MacDonald (fn 227) 604. 
528 MacDonald Report (fn 23) 21. 
529 HM Government 'Pursue, Prevent, protect, prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
International Terrorism' (March 2009) Cm 7547. 
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clearly and tightly defined and more comparable to restrictions imposed under other 
powers….'530 
 
Walker (2010a) explained that whilst the regime was considered “odious” it remained an 
'imperative [means] of responding to [the] anticipatory risk of terrorism….'.531 As Watkins 
(2008) explains, 'control orders are flawed but [it is] equally clear that some controlling 
mechanism is required on potentially dangerous individuals'.532 It was intended that TPIMs 
would help balance and bridge the gap between sensitive security issues and the difficulties 
when prosecution was not possible, without compromising sensitive intelligence or 
intelligence gathering techniques (Security Review, 2011: 37). TPIMs were also believed to 
be the solution for providing early intervention in order to protect the public when there was 
not a 'realistic prospect of conviction.'533 Despite this, TPIMs just like control orders are 
'extraordinary schemes of executive power, which despite the gravity of the measures at 
stake, stand outside of and are largely independent of the criminal justice system.'534 Despite 
this criticism, Anderson QC described the government’s introduction of TPIMs as the 
government injecting 'a greater degree of liberalism into its counter-terrorism policy.'535 
 
Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure scheme: a new emergency 
measure 
The Security Review (2011) identified that there might be exceptional circumstances when 
the government would need to seek Parliamentary approval for 'more extensive and intrusive 
measures than TPIMs'.536 Anderson QC remarked that some would prefer to use other 
legislative powers, such as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Anderson QC, 2013); although 
                                                          
530 MacDonald Report (fn 528). 
531 Clive Walker 'The Threat of Terrorism and the Fate of Control Orders' 2010a Public Law (January) 4-17, 7. 
532 Los Watkins 'Control Orders: The Beginning of the End?' Undated, 7 and 8 <http://www.inter-
disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/watkinspaper.pdf> accessed 12th April 2011. 
533 Ben Middleton 'Rebalancing, Reviewing or Rebranding the Treatment of terrorist Suspects: The Counter-
Terrorism Review 2011' 2011b Journal of Criminal Law 75(3): 225-248, 227. Also see: HM Government (fn 529). 
534 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 'Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill' 
2010-2012 Nineteenth Report (15th September 2011) HL 198, 5. 
535 Joint Committee on the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 'Draft 
Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill' 2012-2013 First Report (27th November 2012) 
HC 495/HL 70. 
536 Anderson QC (fn 47). 
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Fenwick (2012b) evidenced to a Parliamentary Joint Committee that this option has been 
viewed as being contrary to the government’s aim of introducing more liberal policies (Joint 
Committee on the Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, 
2012-2013). The MacDonald Report (2011) recognised that 'there may be exceptional 
circumstances where it could be necessary for the Government to seek parliamentary 
approval for additional restrictive measures';537 hence why the government drafted and 
published draft primary legislation known as the ETPIMB 2011, accompanying the TPIMA 
2011. Lord Lloyd understood that having such a mechanism provided advantages: '[t]he 
existence of a fall-back Bill containing the former powers may help diminish concerns, at a 
time of continued uncertainty, about initiatives to liberalise anti-terrorism laws, and so 
provide the impetus for such liberalisation to take place.'538 
 
The scrutiny of ETPIMB 2011 in Parliament has caused controversy, it was considered 
'necessary to do so by reason of urgency' 539  and regarded as being similar to the Henry VIII 
clause (Wagner, 2011). Whilst the Bill has not been enacted, the TPIMA 2011 provides 
limited provision for the Secretary of State to temporarily enforce ETPIMs in accordance 
with s26; only at times the Secretary of State 'considers that it is necessary to do so by any 
reason of urgency' (s26(1) TPIMA 2011). ETPIMs cannot be enforced until the Bill receives 
the Royal Assent, which means that in the interim period until that happens, s26 TPIMA 
2011 will be available to enforce temporary ETPIMs, including times when Parliament is 
dissolved or in recess. The measure would be activated at times of exceptional circumstance, 
effectively acting as an emergency power; as it has not been activated discussion of ETPIMs 
can only be academic. ETPIMs is considered a replica of the former regime, Glees (2012)540 
explained that “…the 'E' aspect of this – the enhanced aspect – was a return, effectively, to 
control orders…".541  
 
                                                          
537 Home Office (2011a) 43: 27. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Adam Wagner 'Anti-terrorism powers for a rainy day' 2011 UK Human Rights Blog One Crown Row 
<http://www.ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/09/04/anti-terrorism-powers-for-a-rainy-day/> accessed: 12th 
May 2012. 
540 Glees (fn 348). 
541 Ibid. 
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Whilst TPIMs are considered to introduce 'a greater degree of liberalism into its counter-
terrorism policy',542 ETPIMS by comparison return to the use of stringent measures; stricter 
obligations are available including, the relocation requirement and longer house detention 
periods. Both TPIMs and ETPIMs rely upon the ‘control order model’ (Fenwick, 2013) by 
the design with both measures taking a preventative approach. As mentioned, ETPIMs would 
only be used in exceptional circumstances, however those circumstances are not made clear 
under the Bill. This means that when a suspect is removed from a TPIM, they may become 
subject to an ETPIM so long as the evidence of terrorist related-activity relied upon to impose 
the TPIM could be shown to the civil standard. Both TPIMs and ETPIMs support the 
normalization of preventative non-trial-based counter-terrorism measures (Zedner, 2007b; 
Ruddock, 2008; Walker, 2011; Fenwick, 2013), which for reasons discussed in previous 
chapters is a serious risk. 
 
What are the differences between TPIMs and Control Orders? 
Putting aside the name change of the two measures, the obligations imposed under the former 
regime were imposed based upon the 'threat that the individual is thought to pose'543 and not 
for the purposes of supporting an investigation or for purposes of prosecution (Zedner, 2014). 
Although both are similar in format, TPIMs were to bring about an 'end to the use of forced 
relocation and lengthy curfews that prevent individuals leading a normal daily life.'544 David 
Anderson QC (2013) considered TPIMs a 'significant rolling back of control orders'.545 
TPIMs, like the former regime, imposed a coercive requirement on suspects so that failure to 
comply with imposed obligations amounted to a criminal offence (s23 TPIMA 2011). It was 
hoped that TPIMs would prevent suspects from engaging in terrorist related activity by 
"curbing their liberty",546 with the intention of facilitating the process of criminal prosecution 
(Fenwick, 2011). 
 
                                                          
542 Joint Committee on the Draft ETPIM Bill (fn 535). 
543 Lucinda Zedner 'Terrorizing Criminal Law' 2014 Criminal Law and Philosophy (January) 8(1): 99-121. 
544 Joint Committee on the Draft ETPIM Bill (fn 535). 
545 Ibid. 
546 Helen Fenwick 'Preventative anti-terrorist strategies in the UK and ECHR: Control Orders, TPIMs and the 
role of technology' 2011 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology (November) 25(3): 129 – 141, 
131. 
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Of the available obligations, TPIMs have replaced the curfew restriction with an ‘overnight 
residence requirement’ which will be supported by electronic tagging. It is recognition by 
Middleton (2011b) that TPIMs provide no limit to the number of hours a suspect may be 
ordered to remain indoors, although it may be naïve to think that this would be clarified in the 
legislation itself. This relates to one’s liberty under Article 5 and it was confirmed, through 
case law, that the maximum period of time a person may be under a curfew is 16 hours 
(Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ), although the court deemed that it was 
necessary to assess the effect of other obligations to determine any breach of Article 5. As 
seen in discussions in Chapter Three, the domestic courts would support the counter-
terrorism measure itself but may find a particular obligation to breach the ECHR; alterations 
would be made by government to make the measure compliant (se JJ case and AP case).  
 
David Anderson QC reviewed the former regime and assessed TPIMs (‘2012 Review’).547 It 
was confirmed that in 2007 the Security Services (Mi5) alleged that at least 2,000 individuals 
had been identified that posed a threat to national security and public safety (2012: 29). 548 
Despite this, only 256 individuals were charged under terrorism legislation, with 157 being 
convicted (Home Office, 2010-2011).549 As mentioned earlier, only 52 people were placed 
under a control order (2012 Review, 2012: 4), of which: 
• 24 were British citizens; and 
• 28 were foreign nationals (2012: 30). 
By the end of the regime, four of the nine controlees had been subject to a control order for 
more than 2-years and once TPIMs became enforceable, all nine were placed onto a TPIM. 
Given that the nine suspects would be transferred from a control order to a TPIM, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2010-2012a: 11 and 12) recommended to Parliament that the 
suspects should have the obligations lifted; Parliament rejected this proposal. With the 
majority of suspects being subject to a control order for at least 2 years, when compared to 
the ‘identified 2,000 suspects’, it is apparent that a low number of suspects have been 
                                                          
547 Anderson QC (fn 47). 
548 Ibid referring to Jonathan Evans, Director General of MI5, Address to the Society of Editors (5th November 
2007) <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/intelligence-counter-terrorism-and-trust.html>. 
549 Home Office 'Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, 
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subjected to these counter-terrorism measures or prosecution. This raises concerns over the 
use of intelligence as a trigger for counter-terrorism measures, which will be considered later 
in this chapter. The former regime required the Home Secretary to renew the measure, 
thereby report to Parliament, on an annual basis (pursuant to s2(4) PTA 2005); TPIMs require 
the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as is reasonably practicable on a 
quarterly basis (pursuant to s19(1) TPIMA 2012). Although unlike the former regime, TPIMs 
are not subject to annual renewal. The then Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, was able to 
provide the following statistical data to Parliament of those subject to a TPIM for the first two 
years of TPIMs being enforceable: 
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 31st May 
2013550 
28th February 
2013551 
30th November 
2012552 
31st August 
2012553 
31st May 
2012554 
29th February 
2012555 
TPIM Notices in force as of this date 8 8 10 9 9 9556 
TPIM notices in respect of British citizens  8 7 9 9 9 9 
TPIM notices extended 1 6 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
TPIM notices revoked 1 1 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
TPIM notices expired N/A 2 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
TPIM notices revived 1 1 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices 25 21 12 27 21 4 
Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices 
refused 
4 12 7 12 19 7 
Table H: Active TPIMS between 1st March 2012 and 29th February 2013. 
 
                                                          
550 Home Office 'Written Statement to Parliament: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (1st March to 31st May 2013)' (13th June 2013a) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/terrorism-prevention-and-investigation-measures-1-march-2013-to-31-may-2013> accessed 24th July 2013. 
551 Home Office 'Written Statement to Parliament: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (1st December 2012 to 28th February 2013)' (14th March 2013b) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/terrorism-prevention-and-investigation-measures-1-december-2012-to-28-february-2013> accessed 24th July 2013. 
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<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/terrorism-prevention-and-investigation-measures-1-june-to-31-august-2012> accessed 24th July 2013. 
554 Home Office 'Written Statement to Parliament: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (1st March 2012 to 31st May 2012)' (19th June 2012c) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/terrorism-prevention-and-investigation-measures-1-march-to-31-may-2012> accessed 24th July 2013. 
555 Home Office 'Written Statement to Parliament: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (15th December 2012 to 29th February 2012)' (26th March 2012e) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/terrorism-prevention-and-investigation-measures-15-december-2011-to-29-february-2012> accessed 1st June 2014. 
556 These are the original nine that were on a control order before being transferred and subjected to a TPIM. 
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There is an exhaustive list of available obligations under Schedule 1 TPIMA 2011, including: 
travel restrictions; overnight residence or curfew; telecommunication restrictions; association 
restrictions; work and studies restrictions; reporting requirements; and exclusion zones across 
the UK to name a few.557 The latter of these obligations means that the Secretary of State can 
exclude the suspect from going into certain parts of the UK, which will undoubtedly include 
Critical National Infrastructures such as the Houses of Parliament – such restrictions were 
also seen under the former regime. The obligation of relocating a terrorist suspect to another 
part of the country ended under TPIMs; however, the obligation has been reserved to 
ETPIMs which will be discussed later in this chapter. Under TPIMs one of the newest 
changes to the obligations is the relaxed use of telecommunications, these include access to 
the internet and use of mobile devices. It is anticipated that relaxing this obligation will have 
an impact on the evidence-gathering process undertaken by the security services. Academic 
discussion (Middleton, 2011b; MacDonald Report, 2011; Anderson QC Independent Review, 
2013; Walker and Horne, 2012; Fenwick, 2011; 2013; Walker, 2013) and political debate 
(Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2012-2012b; Joint Committee on the Draft ETPIM Bill, 
2012-2013) have identified the significant differences between the former regime and TPIMs 
and each will be discussed in turn: 
(1) The standard of proof being ‘reasonable belief’; 
(2) Relaxation on the use of telecommunications; 
(3) The removal of the relocation obligation under TPIMs, but its retention under 
ETPIMs; 
(4) The obligations imposed need to be proportionate; 
(5) Time limit for the enforcement of TPIMs and ETPIMs. 
 
(i) The standard of proof being ‘reasonable belief’ 
The former regime had use of derogating and non-derogating control orders. The former had 
a standard of proof based on reasonable suspicion whilst the latter was based on the balance 
                                                          
557 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, Schedule 1, Part 1 gives provisions for the 
following obligations: (1) Overnight residence measure; (2) Travel measure; (3) Exclusion measure; (4) 
Movement directions measure; (5) Financial services measure; (6) Property measure; (7) Electronic 
communication device measure; (8) Association measure; (9) Work or studies measure; (10) Reporting 
measure; (11) Photography measure; and (12) Monitoring measure: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/schedule/1/enacted (Last accessed 2nd June 2014). 
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of probabilities. The criticism here was that with either of them the standard of proof was less 
than the criminal standard, making the threshold an 'extremely low threshold'.558 The 
MacDonald Report (2011) supported the government’s change from that set out under the 
former regime to TPIMs’ new ‘reasonable belief’ standard. Lord Carlile QC (2011a) was of 
the opinion that the new standard of proof made a difference because it was a 'higher 
threshold'. 559 
 
TPIMs and ETPIMs may be imposed by the Home Secretary so long as Conditions A to E, as 
set out in s3(1)-(6) TPIMA 2011 and clause 2 ETPIMB 2011, are met and subject to review 
by the court (s9(2) TPIMA 2011):  
(i) Condition A provides the lower standard of ‘reasonable belief’;  
(ii) Condition B requires a ‘new’ terrorist activity, although Fenwick (2013) describes 
this as misleading because the imposition of a TPIM can be based on previous 
terrorist-related activity. The term ‘new’ is not an adjective that needs to be met 
for a suspect to be placed on an TPIM/ETPIM for the first time, but if placed upon 
either of these measures again, ‘new’ terrorist-related activity is expected to be 
shown;560  
(iii) Condition C prescribes the Secretary of State to reasonably consider it necessary 
to impose a TPIM 'for purposes connected with protecting members of the public 
from a risk of terrorism';  
(iv) Condition D requires that the Secretary of State to reasonably consider it 
necessary to impose TPIMs 'for purposes connected with preventing or restricting 
the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity'. It is important to note 
that Condition D dilutes the requirement seen under the control order regime 
requiring each obligation imposed to be necessary for the purposes of protecting 
the public from the risk of terrorism;  
                                                          
558 Joint Committee on Human Rights (fn 59) 59. 
559 Lord Carlile QC of Berriew 'Sixth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005' (3rd February 2011a) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97989/lord-carlile-sixth-
report.pdf> accessed 6th June 2014. See also: Middleton (fn 533) 236. 
560 Joint Committee on the Draft ETPIM Bill (fn 535) 42. 
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(v) Condition E requires court permission to impose a TPIM or ETPIM, unless the 
Secretary of State deems it urgent – as pointed out by Fenwick (2013), this would 
normally be the case given the seriousness of terrorism.  
Concern remains over the standard of proof to impose a TPIM, as identified by Middleton 
(2011b): the reasonable belief threshold is not very different from the former regime. Lord 
Brown in R v Saik561 found that belief is viewed as being "[t]o suspect something to be so is 
by no means to believe it to be so: it is to believe only that it may be so."562 Middleton 
(2011b) finds that there has been a struggle in understanding or obtaining guidance as to the 
meaning of reasonable belief. With reference to R v Forsyth563 and R v Griffiths,564 
Middleton argues that the standard falls between 'the standard of reasonable belief and the 
full civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities.'565 In Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v CC, CF566 the TPIM standard of proof was confirmed to be higher in 
comparison to the former regime; this was reached when taking into account Law LJ from the 
A and Others case: 'Belief is a state of mind by which the person in question thinks that X is 
the case. Suspicion is a state of mind by which the person in question thinks that X may be 
the case'.567  
 
The new standard of proof under TPIMs raises a few concerns, particularly in light of 
comments by Lord Brown, namely that to believe that 'it may be so'568 means that the 
government should be certain that the individual subject to a TPIM, is the person that may 
pose a threat to security and public safety. This obviously does not mean that the individual 
can be proved to pose a threat beyond reasonable doubt. There remains a risk that suspects 
are placed upon a TPIM based on a low standard of proof threshold, in this sense to remains 
fiar to argue that there is no difference between TPIMs and the former regime. Lord Carlile 
QC (2011a) confirmed that the change in the standard would cause 'no material difference to 
the existing controlees'569 and went further to suggest that the basis on which the majority of 
                                                          
561 R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18. 
562 Ibid [120]. 
563 R v Forsyth [1997] 2 Cr App R 299 [319]. 
564 R v Griffiths (1974) 60 Cr App R 14 [18]. 
565 Middleton (fn 533) 237. 
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567 Ibid [229]. 
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the control orders were imposed would satisfy the civil standard of a balance of probabilities. 
One may then ask the question: why is the civil standard of proof not used? Middleton 
(2011b) explains that the balance of probabilities is flexible in its application and its 
application would depend upon the nature of each measure; in other words it would be judged 
on a case by case basis (McBride, 2009; Mirfield, 2009).  
 
Farthing (2012) explained to the Joint Committee on the Draft ETPIM Bill, that there is no 
difference between the old and new standards because the remaining nine controlees were 
easily transferred onto a TPIM in 2012; she added that '[o]n a balance of probabilities, it 
might make a small amount of difference.'570 Whilst the balance of probabilities is a standard 
not seen under the TPIM, it is applied when the Secretary of State seeks to impose an 
ETPIM. Whilst Conditions B, C and E under the ETPIMB 2011 are similar to those set out in 
the TPIMA 2011, Condition A requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied on 'the balance 
of probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity'.571 
This is the same standard applied when enforcing the temporary ETPIM under s26 TPIMA 
2011. The standard for ETPIMs is the same as non-derogating control orders, evidence that 
ETPIMs is an amalgamation of both non-derogating and derogating control orders.  
 
Middleton (2011b) considers the balance of probabilities as a better standard of proof due to 
its fluidity when applied by the courts; furthermore, since it is applicable on a case-by-case 
basis, the courts are at liberty to set the threshold at a higher level when it is justified to do so 
(eg when a suspect faces the possible loss of their liberty or right to a fair trial). Despite this 
justification, Middleton cynically believes that the use of the reasonable belief for TPIMs is a 
tactical move by the government so that it may be sure it can manipulate the measure being 
imposed and its implementation once imposed (2011: 237); if this is true, then this is 
evidence of government seeking to utilise securitization for its own benefit. If the courts are 
given too much power to adjudicate on the imposition of control measures (eg indefinite 
detention without trial and control orders), the government is unable to guarantee complicity 
or deferential behaviour, as was arguably seen under the former regime (see Chapter Three). 
As Middleton (2011b) states: '[giving] the flexibility of the civil standard of proof, it might be 
                                                          
570 Farthing (fn 523). 
571 Clause 2(1) Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 2011. 
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that the courts would decide that a higher standard of, close to beyond reasonable doubt, 
should be used in light of the nature of the TPIM; no doubt this would be extremely 
concerning to the government.'572 Although there was some judicial fightback towards the 
end of the former regime (see AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department,573 AF v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department574 and Chapter Three), the seriousness of 
terrorism caused domestic courts to be deferential towards government assertions as to the 
assessed risk posed by a suspect; viewing it as a political not a legal matter (the Belmarsh 
case per Lord Bingham). The change in the standard of proof does not appear to meet the 
criticism of Farthing (2012) and appears to show TPIMs being no more than 'tweaks around 
the edges.'575 The criticisms made by Middleton (2011b) for the government not to want a 
higher standard of proof is because it seeks to influence the process. It is for this reason alone 
that TPIMs require fully independent scrutiny by the courts.  
 
(ii) Relaxation on the use of telecommunications 
Relaxing the use of telecommunications as one of the available obligations under TPIMs, 
may enable the government to achieve its set purposes under the UK Straetgy 2011; it may 
enable the gathering of more evidence against a suspect, identify further networks and 
material that may be viewed as radicalising, and prosecute. This decision to relax the use of 
telecommunications may be considered in the light of R v Smith and Others576 which was an 
appeal of a Sexual Offences Prevention Order ('SOPO’s'), a preventative measure similar to 
control orders and TPIMs. The Court of Appeal considered SOPO’s that had been made 
against four defendants for sexual offences. It was held that when making a SOPO its drafting 
and implementation should be necessary, the terms should not be oppressive and the order 
should be proportionate; this was found to be in accordance with R v Mortimer577. The Court 
of Appeal ruled against an internet ban for the sexual offenders on the basis that: 
'It is disproportionate because it restricts the defendant in the use of what is nowadays an 
essential part of everyday living for a large proportion of the public, as well as a requirement 
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of much employment. Before the creation of the internet, if a defendant kept books of 
pictures of child pornography it would not have occurred to anyone to ban him from 
possession of all printed material. The internet is a modern equivalent.'578 
 
This finding would also apply to terrorist suspects; Wagner (2012) discusses this as a human 
rights matter, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The internet is widely accepted as 
a mode of social media; the relaxing of the limits on use of telecommunication for terrorist 
suspects appears to have been widely welcomed by many (Middleton, 2011b; Fenwick, 2012; 
Glees, 2012). Many believe that modern terrorism is changing; recent behaviour indicates 
that ‘solo-terrorism’ is the new threat, as demonstrated by Andres Breivik (Cato Hemmingby, 
2013), the Boston Marathon bombers579 and the Woolwich attack (Joshi, 2013).580 Irons 
(2008) considered the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre ('JTAC') assessment of terrorism and 
identified a three-tier model (2005) of terrorists:  
(i) Tier one – are those individuals or networks thought to have a direct link with a 
terrorist organisation, such as al-Qaeda;  
(ii) (ii) Tier two – is described as individuals or networks that are loosely affiliated 
with terrorist organisations; and  
(iii) (iii) Tier three – is described as those individuals or networks that are inspired by 
a terrorist organisations ideology.  
By lifting the restrictions on the use of telecommunications one may argue that it becomes 
easier to identify a wider network of terrorism or those individuals that would fall in any one 
of these aforementioned tiers. Under the former regime, a wider network would most likely 
have gone unnoticed or insufficient intelligence would have been gathered to detect terrorist 
related activities. 
 
Edwards and Gomis (2011) compiled research for Chatham House of British terrorist profiles 
and attacks post-9/11 and examined twelve case studies. From the research they determined 
                                                          
578 R v Smith and others (fn 576) [20]. 
579 Boston Marathon bombings took place on the 15th April 2013 and the suspects identified for the bombing 
were Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. 
580 Sharad Joshi 'Woolwich Attack and the Changing Nature of Terrorism' 2013 Chatham House (24th May) 
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that from nine cases the internet had contributed in some way to terrorist attacks 'whether for 
indoctrination, research, communication between attackers or to spread ideology.'581 They 
confirmed that the internet had been used by seven of the case studies for purposes of 
indoctrination and became particularly important for communication/spreading terrorist 
ideology, particularly when a terrorist had no personal links with any terrorist network 
(Edwards and Gomis, 2011). Two examples of the internet being extensively used for 
terrorist activity is Isa Ibrahim and Roshonara Choudhry; the former was known for the 
Bristol suicide bombing in 2009, the latter stabbed Stephen Timms MP whilst holding a 
constituency surgery in 2010. Both terrorists watched radical Islamic preachers 'while not 
having any face-to-face contact with anyone holding radical views'.582 With a relaxed use of 
telecommunications the existence of terrorist networks can be identified along with its 
members or other potential terrorist suspects. 
 
Terrorist networks are best viewed under the main discussion point of ‘degree centrality’ 
(Irons, 2008).583 The degree centrality is made up of the 'in-degree centrality' and the 'out-
degree centrality'; the former relates to incoming links and connections that an individual has, 
the latter refers to the outgoing links and connections a person has. This creates what Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt (1996)584 and Krebs (2002a)585 refer to as an '’all-channel’ network' which 
forms part of their analysis of ‘Netwar’ (see Krebs, 2002a; 2002b). An example of this 
network is shown below in Diagram 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
581 Edwards and Gomis (fn 155). 
582 Ibid. 
583 Larry R.Irons 'Recent Patterns of Terrorism Prevention in the United Kingdom' 2008 Homeland Security 
Affairs (January) 4(1) <www.hsaj.org> 
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Diagram 2: Sample network (Irons, 2008: 8) 
 
To explain this network and the applicability of degree centrality to TPIMs, reference is best 
made to those involved in the ‘fertiliser bomb plot’ of 2004 and those involved in the London 
7/7 bombings. The fertiliser bomb plot of 2004 involved seven conspirators – five British, 
one American and one Canadian – each having links in Afghanistan and Pakistan; these 
conspirators were Salahuddin Amin, Jawad Akbhar, Anthony Garcia, Waheed Mahmood, 
Omar Khyam, Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammad Sidique Khan. Each of them were careful 
to avoid the use of mobile phones and emails; they were believed to regularly discard hard 
devices and mobile phone SIM cards (Edwards and Gomis, 2011). As Irons (2008) explains, 
there can be an overlap between in-degree and out-degree centrality when members are more 
connected than others, with those having higher out-degree centrality providing more 
influence; this is exemplified by Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer (2008: 9). 
This means that the network can then influence others who are involved in an in-degree 
centrality way, such as Germaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussein who were involved in the 7/7 
bombings. This particular network is illustrated below in Diagram 3.    
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 Fertiliser bomb plotters from 2004 (the network on the left). 
 London 7 July plotters (the network on the right). 
Diagram 3: Example of the terrorist network between two known terrorist plots (Irons, 2008:8) 
 
The link between the two terrorist plots is seen by Khyam of the Fertiliser bomb plot and 
Tanweer and Khan of the 7/7 bomb plot. Links of this nature are described as ‘betweenness 
centrality’ (Irons, 2008). Individuals that link networks or groups are considered the ‘bridge’, 
or ‘subnetwork’ between the groups (Cross and Parker, 2004;586 Irons, 2008). In relation to 
the illustrated network above in Diagram 2, Irons (2008) considers that Khyam most likely 
played a 'liaison role rather than a broker role',587 meaning that his participation had no 
bearing on the 7/7 bombings, but there nonetheless existed a link between the two groups. 
Irons (2008) agrees that this link required further investigation; imagine that Khyam had been 
placed on a control order and prevented from communicating with or associating with others 
in any way, the security services would have had greater difficulty in identifying Tanweer 
and Khan unless they had already done so. Ultimately the concern of the former regime is 
that it would cut off the ‘blood flow’ of terrorism, allowing for its detection to be 
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significantly reduced; this point may be correct given that the security services considered 
that there were 2,000 active terrorists in the UK and only 52 of them were placed on a control 
order. 
 
As Donald Rumsfeld, former US Secretary of Defense, stated: 
"There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known 
unknowns; that is to say, there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are 
also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don’t know."588 
On a similar line (and some years earlier), Modica and Rustichini (1994) remarked: 
'A subject is certain of something when he knows that thing; he is uncertain when he does not 
know it, but when he knows he does not: he is consciously uncertain. On the other hand, he is 
unaware of something when he does not know it, and he does not know he does not know, 
and so on ad infinitum: he does not perceive, does not have in mind, the object of knowledge. 
The opposite of unawareness is awareness…'589 
 
Krebs (2002b)590 explained that covert networks and operations don’t behave like normal 
social networks, with conspirators not forming many connections beyond their immediate 
connections already in existence, in order to reduce the likelihood of detection. Kerbs 
explains that those within the network are frequently formed years ago in school and training 
camps which itself it related to the risk of radicalisation that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. With this in mind, Irons (2008) suggests that the best way forward is to form a 
judgment based on good information and with full recognition of the threat itself that is 
known to exist, then extend it where possible to the unknown. This can be linked to the use of 
TPIMs. By relaxing the restrictions on the use of telecommunications in TPIMs the security 
services and government have a greater chance of identifying other suspects who are in touch 
with a wider terrorist network, via telecommunications and those who act independently as 
‘solo-terrorists’. But the challenge the security service and government might face is that a 
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suspect under a TPIM, knowing that they are subject to a TPIM, might curtail their use of 
telecommunications, meaning that they do not expose any network.  
 
The MacDonald Report (2011) expressed concerns over the negative impact some obligations 
that could be imposed under a control order could have on evidence gathering and stated: 
"The State has the capacity to monitor both telephone and internet use. It is inimical to the 
process of criminal justice to cut off precisely those means of communication between 
criminals that may readily be monitored, providing evidence for prosecution. In any other 
investigative context, the removal of a suspect’s ability to communicate with his co-
conspirators on easily penetrated technology would be regarded as bizarre and wholly 
counter-productive."591 
The greater concern is that due to the time limits placed on the operations of TPIMs, those 
subjected to a TPIM simply need to wait a maximum of two-years before carrying on from 
where they left off (Middleton, 2011b). As Zedner (2014) explains, TPIMs label suspects as 
being known to the authorities which will ultimately 'limit their movement, communication, 
and associations, which has the effect of inhibiting the collection of evidence',592 reduces 
security services and governments’ ability to identify terrorist networks, as discussed earlier, 
and interferes with any possibility to a successful prosecution. In this regard a two-year 
limitation period could be a hindrance, whilst human rights thinkers would rather have a 
limitation period instead of an indefinite period of time as seen under the former regime. This 
highlights the conflicting considerations affecting the importance of imposing obligations that 
do not hinder the security service or government, but instead support it to prosecute suspects, 
in accordance with CONTEST. 
 
In context of ETPIMs, greater restrictions on telecommunications can be imposed without a 
minimum level of communication being acceptable, giving rise to the possibility of a total 
ban (Schedule 1, clause 8 ETPIMB 2011). Given that ETPIMs may be seen to 'represent a 
return to the old control order regime'593 as a preventative measure it raises some of the more 
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serious risks already discussed, namely: (i) imposing a ETPIM can cut off the blood supply of 
terrorism; (ii) the suspect is made aware that they are being monitored and if they are/were 
involved in terrorist-related activity would be able to curtail that behaviour. As a consequence 
of these two points, the security service, government and police may struggle to identify other 
potential terrorist threats and activity as well as obtain other vital evidence and information to 
potentially prosecute. In light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Smith and Others case 
regarding SOPO’s, it is important to note that restrictions on the use of telecommunications 
have been held necessary and proportionate against terrorist suspects under control orders 
(see: AM v Secretary of State for the Home Department),594 which similarly would apply 
under TPIMs and ETPIMs. The restrictions on the use of telecommunications can affect the 
qualified rights under Article 8 – 11, although may be taken into account when taking a 
holistic evaluation of deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1) (Fenwick, 2013); this will be 
considered later in this chapter. 
 
(iii) The removal of the relocation obligation under TPIMs, but its retention under 
ETPIMs  
The decision to remove the relocation obligation under the TPIMs most likely follows the 
decision of Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP.595 As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the government’s decision to remove the right to impose the obligation of relocation 
under TPIMs was welcomed by many including Liberty; although remains available under 
ETPIMs, and therefore has not been dropped completely. This type of obligation was 
discussed in Chapter Three. There was discussion of CD v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department596 in which CD had a control order imposed from February 2011which was 
modified, requiring him to relocate from London to the Midlands away from his family. The 
Secretary of State was aware that “relocating a person can have a detrimental impact on his 
social life”;597 despite this the court believed that there was justification in that there was 'fear 
that he would engage in terrorist-related activity'598 and therefore the obligation to relocate 
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was necessary and proportionate. Nevertheless, Mr Justice Simon remarked, 'I recognise that 
the interference with CD’s rights is substantial.'599 
 
Relocation had been viewed by the courts as an obligation that would interfere with a 
person’s Article 8 rights; the UK Supreme Court did not find an infringement on the basis 
that it was justified under Article 8(2) (Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP).600 
The UK Supreme Court took account of the relocation as an Article 5 matter, viewing it as 
giving rise to a deprivation of liberty; this was achieved by the court taking into account the 
overall impact caused by other obligations (eg 16 hour curfew) combined with the relocation 
obligation, which might cause the suspect and his family to suffer. The AP case and 
subsequent discussion by Parliament or the government failed to address an important 
question posed by Fenwick and Phillipson (2011): if the imposed hours had been less or had 
the relocation been less of an inconvenience, would the court have reached the same 
conclusion? 
 
In comparison to the AP case, in CA v Secretary of State for the Home Department601 the 
court delivered a potential blow to the government’s power to relocate suspect terrorists. Mr 
Justice Mitting, when hearing the appeal by the controlee, upheld the appeal against the 
relocation requirement. When examining the proportionality of the Home Secretary’s 
decision to relocate CA it was held that '[b]reaking up loose groups of individuals, by 
dispersion of some of them'602 minimised the risk they pose. However, the judge identified 
the effect the obligation had on CA’s family life and accepted the evidence of CA’s wife 
who: 
'…has persuaded me [Mr Justice Mitting] that her husband’s relocation to Ipswich has 
imposed an unendurable strain upon her and risks the permanent breakdown of the marriage – 
an event which, if it were to occur, would not only have an adverse impact upon her and her 
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children, but might also increase the risk of re-engagement in terrorism-related activities by 
CA.'603 
At paragraph 8, the judge identified three reasons which supported him in upholding the 
appeal: 
(1) Keeping the family united would mitigate the risk posed by the suspect, particularly 
given that the judge accepted that CA’s wife was never aware of what he was doing 
and abhors extremism; 
(2) Permanent separation of CA from his family is more likely to exacerbate the risk he 
could pose, which the judge found to be a real risk if the family were separated; and 
(3) 'it is not justifiable to secure the undoubted advantage of removal…at the price of the 
unity and welfare'604 of CA and his family.   
This considered approach to the relocation of terrorist suspects encourages and supports the 
need of government to have an "exit strategy"605 and ‘rehabilitate’ the thinking of terrorist 
suspects so that at the end of their time on a TPIM etc they are less of a risk. It was 
acknowledged in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AM606 that suspects should be 
encouraged to lead a normal life: 
"Deportation is impermissible and prosecution unlikely. The only viable exist strategy is 
encouraging and facilitating a change in outlook by AM. To that end, it is imperative that he 
is encouraged to lead as normal a life as possible…Maintenance of a measure which is either 
over-restrictive or ineffective does not serve that end."607 
It would appear then that the courts have largely accepted that relocation as an obligation can 
breach a person’s human rights; however this infringement comes under Article 5 and not 
Article 8 as one might expect. The domestic courts have interpreted the obligation as a matter 
relating to liberty rather than an impact upon ones family life, although this seems contrary to 
the judgment in the CA case. The judgment in the CA case demonstrates that the courts are 
prepared to engage with risk assessment and with determining proportionality of an 
obligation; the assessment process carried out by Mr Justice Mitting is similar to the process 
carried out when considering bail in criminal proceedings, as discussed in Chapter Three.  
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As mentioned earlier, the relocation obligation remains an open and viable option to the 
Secretary of State under the ETPIMB 2011 Schedule 1 or under temporary ETPIM provision 
under s26 TPIMA 2011. The relocation obligation has been viewed as a particularly effective 
aspect of the control order regime, usefully retained in the ETPIMB 2011: 
"…it is easier to police generally in some locations in others. It is to do with associations and 
demographics, and with the ease of operations. Surveillance in some areas is far easier than in 
others. All those things come into play."608 
It is understood that this opinion is one which Anderson QC (2013) supports, adding that the 
relocation obligation may be a repugnant notion, yet is a useful tool in some cases.609 The 
report by Anderson QC (2014) reported that locational constraints should be strengthened, 
suggesting the re-introduction of relocation of suspects. Although it can be conceded that 
relocation may remove a person from terrorist activity/involvement. It acts as a short-term 
solution, but is not a long-term solution. This assessment can be attributed in two ways: 
(i) At the end of the EPTIM, the suspect may continue to be involved in the terrorist 
activity. By removing the individual it again becomes possible that the terrorist 
network which they are a part of goes unidentified, similar to discussions about 
relaxed use of telecommunications above; and 
(ii) The CA case confirms that relocation of a suspect can have the effect which 
causes the suspect to resent the UK and the government, which in turn potentially 
facilitates and hardens their attitude to be involved in terrorist-related activity 
even at the end of the ETPIM. The impact of relocation can have detrimental 
effects on the suspect’s family life, which one would say breaches Article 8 
ECHR yet case law illustrates that it would be used as a contributing factor to 
support a breach of Article 5 argument instead. 
With these points in mind, if the relocation obligation were to be invoked, if ETPIMs were 
activated, it should only be for cases which would prevent an imminent threat of terrorism; 
otherwise one may argue the long-term consequences do not support the short-term gain of 
prevention. 
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(iv) The obligations imposed need to be proportionate 
When addressing Article 5 ECHR there are no provisions within the Convention which 
overtly demand proportionality from the state towards the citizen. The assessment of 
deprivation of liberty was clearly set out by the criterions in the Guzzardi case; however, it is 
worth recognising that breaches of other Convention rights may support the determination of 
whether a TPIM or ETPIM is Convention compliant. It is therefore important to note that 
other ECHR rights do provide some sense of proportionality; for example, Articles 8 to 11 
provide the rights ‘in accordance with the law’ or as ‘is necessary in a democratic society’ 
which become relevant in assessing proportionately of measures in context of human rights 
opposed to other holistic forms of assessment such as risk assessment. In order for 
obligations under TPIMs to avoid ECHR breaches (and to an extent to avoid hindering any 
possible prosecution), the Secretary of State needs to ensure that the obligations are 
proportionate. Discussion relating to necessity and proportionality became the main subject 
for conversation at the Bill stage of the TPIMA 2012 when the Home Office provided an 
'ECHR Memorandum' (Home Office, 2011b). Under this the Home Office affirmed that 
obligations imposed under a TPIM that interferes with the right of an individual under the 
ECHR will be assessed as being 'necessary and proportionate'610 and achieved with various 
safeguards being available under the TPIMA 2011. Under the 'ECHR Memorandum' the 
Home Office explained that any obligation would be imposed because it was deemed 
'necessary', adding that 'necessity is a high test'.611 It was the Home Office’s opinion that 
under the former regime the courts would assess the proportionality of the obligations 
imposed and it considered that the domestic courts would continue this practice under TPIMs 
(Home Office, 2011b). For example, in the case of BH v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department612 which related to the relocation of the controlee, meaning that Article 8 was 
engaged, Mitting J stated 'applying Wednesbury principles, I would not hold [the relocation] 
to be flawed; but applying the more intensive review required by the proportionality test, I am 
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satisfied that it would be disproportionate on the basis of current information to remove BH 
to Leicester.'613  
 
The Home Office remarked that the domestic courts would be able to determine the 
proportionality of TPIMs as they did of the former regime; the domestic courts would achieve 
this by 'following the law' as set out in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department614 by Lord Steyn who held: 
"First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance 
which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of national or 
reasonable decision. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional 
grounds of review in as much as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight 
accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even the heightened scrutiny test developed 
in R v Ministry of Defence ex p. Smith [1996] QB 517, 554 is not necessarily appropriate to 
the protection of human rights. …In other words, the intensity of the review, in similar cases, 
is guaranteed by the twin requirements that the limitation of the right was necessary in a 
democratic society, in the sense of meeting a pressing social need, and the question whether 
the interference was really proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued."615 
When assessing proportionality under the former regime, and now under TPIMs, as explained 
in Chapter Three reference should be given to the case of de Freitas v Permanent Secretary 
of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing,616 the court should ask: 
"[w]hether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally 
connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective'.617 
Assessment of proportionality through the de Freitas case is considered by Gearty (2005c) as 
an appropriate way of assessing proportionality. From the cases such as JJ and MB there has 
been an assessment of whether specific obligations are proportionate because the courts 
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confirmed that curfew obligations of 14 hours were acceptable (as a maximum), depending 
upon the other imposed obligations. As TPIMs are a lighter version of the former control 
order regime, the obligations that are available to be imposed are likely to be held 
proportionate and as any curfew obligation would run through the night when a person is 
more likely to be at home, this reduces the possibility that a person’s day-to-day life is 
significantly reduced as to cause a deprivation. With ETPIMs being a replica of non-
derogating control orders one can pre-suppose that the measure would likewise be considered 
proportionate, however this would depend upon the imposed measures particularly when the 
Secretary of State has the available option of a relocation obligation.  
 
(v) Time limitation for the enforcement of TPIMs and ETPIMs 
As a way of monitoring individual TPIMs and the obligations imposed in each TPIM, the 
limitation period of two years for a TPIM to be imposed on a suspect has been welcomed 
(Fenwick, 2012b; 2013; Walker, 2013). It is thought that having a deadline of two years, the 
security service, government, police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) will keep the 
suspects ‘detainment’ under review to secure prosecution and determine whether it is possible 
to prosecute (Fenwick, 2012b; 2013), or face the likelihood that the suspect will have to be 
released. 
 
Under the former regime, once a non-derogating control order was made it could be renewed 
every 12 months, compared to derogating control orders which would be renewed every 6 
months (s13 PTA 2005). A control order had no limitation to the number of times it could be 
renewed; similar to the s44 stop and search power, which as discussed in Chapter Two was 
abused by using a ‘rolling-programme’ of renewal. Under the TPIMA 2011, a TPIM may 
only be extended once for a further 12 months (s5(2) TPIMA 2011) beyond the first 12 
months since the TPIM was imposed (s5(1) TPIMA 2011). The Secretary of State may only 
extend a TPIM beyond the two year limitation where evidence emerges and identifies that the 
suspect has re-engaged with terrorist-related activity (s3(2) and s3(6) TPIMA 2011; clause 
2(2) and (6) ETPIMB 2011). This change alters a fundamental characteristic of the former 
regime as compared to TPIMs: the former regime was used in most cases as a long-term 
measure, despite having to be renewed which may have given the impression that control 
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orders were short-term measures; TPIMs are genuinely short-term measures due to the 
limitation period. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there is concern that a suspect under a 
TPIM may wait until the end of the limitation period before re-engaging with terrorist related 
activity (Middleton, 2011b). 
 
When referring to Table G (above), there would be understandable concern that most 
controlees under the former regime remained on a control order for more than two years. 
Despite this there were zero successful convictions, although there had been prosecutions 
against four terrorist suspects who were under a TPIM which all resulted in an acquittal 
(Anderson QC, Independent Terrorism Review, 2013).618 Middleton (2011b) finds that the 
use of a limitation period is an important safeguard under TPIMs. When giving evidence at 
Parliament,619 Fenwick (2012b) remarked that the time limits of TPIMs may lead to the 
security services and government focussing on securing a prosecution, which would support 
the UK Strategy under CONTEST. Many academics give support to securing a conviction 
through the criminal justice system (Waldron, 2010; Middleton, 2011b; Zedner, 2014); this 
falls in line with the Criminal Justice Model, which this study supports. Zedner (2014) 
suggests that use of coercive measures such as control orders or TPIMs/ETPIMs, has resulted 
in the abandonment of prosecution entirely in relation to certain suspects. The 'priority of 
prosecution' is considered a watchword amongst some academics, including Zedner and 
Waldron, viewing the use of the Criminal Justice Model as the best way to ensure the 
protection of rights and effective scrutiny for those suspected of serious offences, such as 
terrorism; a view also supported by Lord MacDonald when appearing before the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2010-2012a). 
 
The scheme is intended to be capable of controlling the suspect through the imposed 
obligations under a TPIM; however, some obligations that were used under the former regime 
were not only intrusive but made it impossible for a suspect to live a normal life which also 
affected the controlees’ families and their communities. The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (2009-2010a) remarked its concerns over this issue with the former regime: 
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'We remain extremely concerned about the impact of control orders on the subject of the 
orders, their families and their communities. There can be no doubt that the degree of control 
over the minutiae of controlees’ daily lives, together with the length of time spent living 
under such restrictions and their apparently indefinite duration, have combined to exact a 
heavy price on the female partners and children of the controlees, including on their 
employment of their basic economic and social rights as well as their right to a family life, is 
an example of the “collateral impact” of counterterrorism measures recently identified by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while counter terrorism.'620 
In response to this, HM Government explained that whilst they take very seriously the 
'impact on the individual and his family, including their physical and mental health',621 it is 
deemed not to 'automatically outweigh the national security case against him'.622 In support 
of this view, the government relied upon the case of Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Abu Rideh:623 
"While account must be given to his mental health problems, they do not trump the national 
security case against him. That national security case means it is legitimate for him to be 
subjected to a control order with consequent restrictions.'624 
This indicates that it is important to impose appropriate, proportionate and effective 
obligations upon the suspect, but also indicated the negative impact that the obligations can 
have upon the suspect and their close connections. Whilst these are issues that existed under 
the former regime, they may also arise under TPIMs, given that some view TPIMs as simply 
a rebrand of the former regime. 
 
When discussing the former regime and the available powers under TPIMs, the Home 
Secretary, Theresa May MP, advised Parliament that it would be disingenuous to think 
TPIMs would be 'more “flexible”'625 given that each control order was tailored to the threat 
posed by and the requirements of each controlee. Given the concerns raised above about the 
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impact upon the suspect and their close connections, this keeps those concerns alive within 
TPIMs.  
 
TPIMS AND ETPIMS: THE ON-GOING RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 
Just like the former regime, TPIMs and ETPIMs deal with persons suspected of terrorist-
related activity who have not been found guilty at trial. Due to the controversial history of 
control orders, it is clear that the government had to be cautious in its drafting and 
implementation of TPIMs and ETPIMs, particularly in relation to human rights. The 
government released the 'ECHR Memorandum'626 during the TPIMB confirming that 'the 
measures that may be imposed on an individual under a TPIM notice will engage Convention 
rights.'627 The former regime faced a range of legal challenges which demonstrated that the 
domestic courts were prepared to adopt a narrow interpretation of human rights, most notably 
in relation to the interpretation of deprivation of liberty (Fenwick and Phillipson, 2011). In 
Chapter Three when this was discussed in relation to control orders, the main human rights 
issues fell under two main ECHR Articles under which followed sub-issues: 
(i) Article 6 ECHR 
a. Disclosure; 
b. Judicial involvement; 
c. Special Advocates; 
d. Due process. 
(ii) Article 8 ECHR 
a. Impact on the suspect’s family. 
It is important to realise from discussions in previous chapters that the latter two sub-issues 
may also relate to Article 5 protections. Whilst TPIMs are considered to be 'control orders 
lite' (Fenwick, 2011; Zedner, 2014) and have been considered as a ‘softened’ control order 
(Walker and Horne, 2012; Fenwick, 2013); ETPIMs are more closely akin to the former 
‘heavy touch’ control order regime (Fenwick, 2013). It is generally accepted that the human 
rights issues under the former regime will be replicated in one way or another (Fenwick, 
2012) by both TPIMs and ETPIMs. There is recognition from some, such as Mylonaki and 
                                                          
626 Home Office (fn 609). 
627 Ibid. 
240 
 
Burton (2011), that the TPIM scheme is more flexible, but still restricts the civil liberties of 
terrorist suspects’ "in the name of public safety and national security".628 Measures such as 
control orders and now TPIMs have led to the emergence of a new tension caused by 
counterterrorism measures. It has long been understood that there exists a tension between 
liberty and security; now there is also a tension between due process and security (Tomkin, 
2011; Ip, 2012) caused by the varying procedural ‘safeguards’, including special advocates 
and closed hearings, introduced to allow the government to impose measures such as TPIMs. 
 
Article 5 ECHR and the Right to Liberty 
The concept of deprivation of liberty is determined by the longstanding case of Guzzardi v 
Italy629 under which the ECtHR established that the difference between "deprivation of and 
restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature 
or substance".630 It is known that from the Guzzardi case the starting point for one to identify 
whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” under Article 5 requires consideration of 
the range of criteria; these criteria were reaffirmed in the Gillan and Quinton v United 
Kingdom631 and discussed in Chapter Two. 
During the course of legal challenges against the former regime, the domestic courts spent a 
great deal of time considering  the argument that control orders caused a deprivation on ones 
liberty; Ewing and Tham (2008) explain that evidence has been heard by the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights which affirmed that the former regime as one which created "domestic 
prisons".632 Under the former control order regime the Secretary of State could impose any 
obligation upon a controlee on the proviso they did not breach Article 5 ECHR. The TPIMA 
2011 and ETPIMB 2011 provide specified obligations under Schedule 1 of both instruments; 
the former provides more restrictions on the obligations the Secretary of State may impose, 
whilst the latter provides measures similar to the ‘heavy touch’ control orders seen under the 
former regime (Fenwick, 2013). Schedule 1 TPIMA 2011 provides a clear attempt of 
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ensuring the TPIM scheme is unlikely to breach Article 5; although both schemes have been 
communicated as avoiding deprivation of liberty as per Article 5(1). Fenwick (2011) 
explains, taking account of the JJ and AP cases, that the PTA 2005 effectively redefined the 
ambit of ‘deprivation of liberty’ under Article 5 and the domestic courts were "drawn into a 
partial acceptance of this in the counter-terrorism context".633 The TPIMA 2011 does not 
recognise the findings or limitations imposed by the JJ case or the AP case. There are no 
provisions expressly limiting the number of hours a suspect may be placed under a curfew 
(Middleton, 2011b) apart from the fact that the curfew can only be ‘overnight’ or a limit on 
the combinations of obligations that may be imposed before a breach of Article 5 ECHR will 
be found.  
 
Earlier in this Chapter there was discussion surrounding the relaxed use of 
telecommunications under TPIMs and the SOPO case of Smith and Others. As explained, in 
that case a complete ban on the use of the internet was held to be oppressive and 
disproportionate as the Court of Appeal regarded internet use as an "essential part of 
everyday living".634 Wagner (2012) explains that telecommunications such as "email, Skype, 
Facebook and Twitter are now essential tools of interaction".635 These findings might be 
taken to indicate that restrictions on the use of telecommunications, including the internet, 
could potentially breach Article 5 or 8 ECHR. Silber J in AM v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department636 ruled that a complete internet ban upon terrorist suspects is lawful, 
which is a questionable decision in light of the Smith and Others case; in the latter case, the 
defendants had been convicted, whereas AM remained a suspect and had not been convicted 
of any terrorist offence. Wagner (2012) views this matter as an Article 8 ECHR matter; yet 
legal challenges under the former regime have seen the domestic courts deal with Article 8 
matters under Article 5, as demonstrated in Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
AP637 and CA v Secretary of State for the Home Department.638 
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The courts held in the AM case that a complete ban on internet use under a control order was 
lawful, and this decision is likely to be upheld if challenged in relation to TPIMs. But when 
taking into account the Court of Appeal decision in Smith and Others, the decision of AP 
when considering breaches of Article 5 and the clear intention of making telecommunications 
more accessible to terrorist suspects under TPIMA 2011, there may be a potential argument 
for suggesting that a curfew, combined with extensive restriction on telecommunications and 
on movement, could create a breach of Article 5. That might also apply if the relocation 
obligation was ever used as part of such a package of restrictions under a Temporary ETPIM 
or an ETPIM. 
 
On the other hand, as explained by Wagner (2012), telecommunications are an essential tool 
of interaction and may be an alternative way of rendering relocation less onerous. Access to 
the internet to keep in contact with family may be the alternative solution to ensure that the 
relocation of suspects is proportionate under ETPIMs, rather than necessarily viewing the 
measure as disproportionate as per CA v Secretary of State for the Home Department.639 
 
The government explained the compliance between TPIMs and deprivation of liberty under 
Article 5. Under the ‘European Convention of Human Rights Memorandum’640 the Home 
Office assesses deprivation of liberty as an individual being 'actually confined'641 which is 
considered to be "the length of the period for which the individual is confined to their 
residence".642 The government explained that consideration would be given to the effects of 
other obligations imposed. The European Convention of Human Rights Memorandum clearly 
does not assess deprivation of liberty in accordance with Guzzardi, but rather views 
deprivation of liberty as the effects of obligations and measures upon a person’s physical 
freedom. Similarly, the memorandum and government have failed to take into account the 
decisions of the E case and AF case, undermining their focus and discussions of the 'notion of 
degrees of restrictions' and the consideration of whether the measures imposed have such an 
impact upon the suspect that they unduly damage their ability to live a normal life (Fenwick, 
2011).  
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There is also the issue of coercion, this arises due to the threat of a criminal sanction that may 
be imposed for breaching an obligation under a TPIM without reasonable excuse (s23 
TPIMA 2011). Whilst any residency obligation will be imposed during the course of the 
night, a period of time when they are more likely to be at home, other obligations that are 
imposed may cause restrictions that are difficult for the suspect not to breach; this was a risk 
mentioned in Chapter Three. The suspects need to self-regulate their behaviour which may be 
recognised as "self-surveillance and self-policing"; this can adversely affect the quality of life 
lived by the suspect, their family and friends (Zedner, 2007b). Use of coercion in certain 
counter-terrorism measures is a factor that can aid in giving rise to a breach of Article 5. This 
was found in Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom643 when the police, as the state 
authorities, used the stop and search power under s44 under Terrorism Act 2000 before it was 
repealed and replaced by s61 Protection of Freedom Act 2011 (although the Court in the end 
decided the case under Article 8). When considering the AP case and more recent cases such 
as CF the domestic courts have taken into account the impact that restrictions have upon a 
suspect and their families and friends when determining a deprivation of liberty.  
 
A further aspect of the deprivation of liberty argument comes from the duration a person is 
subjected to the restrictive measure; duration is one of the factors to consider to determine a 
deprivation of liberty under the Guzzardi criteria. Under the TPIM scheme a suspect is placed 
under a TPIM for one year, which may then be extended for a further year. Whilst most of the 
control orders that had previously been imposed existed for two years or more (see Table G 
above), it is not known how long the remaining nine under the former regime had a control 
order imposed against them before being subjected to a TPIM. It is also important to consider 
that the Secretary of State has the power to impose a Temporary ETPIM (s26 TPIMA 2011) 
or an ETPIM, if the ETPIMB is enacted; therefore so long as the legislative requirements are 
met the current controlees (or some of them) could be subjected to an ETPIM at the end of 
2013. Ultimately, it is highly possible that terrorist suspects who are placed upon a TPIM 
may be subject to the measures for a period of time much longer than the time period under 
the Act provides. Some of those nine suspects previously subjected to a control order are 
likely to have been and will be subject to control measures for a number of years if ETPIMB 
                                                          
643 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom (fn 15). 
244 
 
is enacted. Despite this, unless they engage in fresh terrorist-related activity, they do have a 
guarantee as to the point when the measures will be lifted (the end of 2015). 
 
Given that TPIMs are considered Article 5 ECHR compliant and are a light version of the 
original control order regime, as mentioned earlier there is unlikely to be legal arguments of a 
deprivation of liberty. Even when under a TPIM a suspect is given a curfew obligation, the 
majority of the curfew will cover the evening period when a person would be expected to be 
at home (Secretary of State for the Home Department v BM).644 In comparison, with ETPIMs 
being more akin to the original control order it follows that the legal challenges brought 
against the former regime, particularly those discussed above and in Chapter Three, are 
relevant to ETPIMs. To impose curfew and relocation obligations, the decisions in JJ, E, MB 
and AP are highly relevant. This was similarly confirmed in the ECHR Memorandum 
released by the Home Office (2011b). 
 
Coercion and a deprivation of liberty 
Whilst in the Gillan and Quinton case, in which both applicants were subjected to detention 
for a period of 30 minutes approximately, the ECtHR did not rule on whether Article 5 had 
been breached because it found a violation under Article 8 ECHR. It indicated instead that it 
would have found that the s44 stop and search powers created a breach of Article 5 because 
of the coercive nature of the measure; the court found, with the support of Foka v Turkey:645 
"[Those searched] were obliged to remain where they were and submit to the search and if 
they had refused they would have been liable to arrest, detention at a police station and 
criminal charges. This element of coercion is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the 
meaning of Article 5(1)".646  
Due to their coercive nature, the importance of compliance or the likelihood of facing a 
criminal sanction for non-compliance, and the duration of time that the suspect is subjected to 
the measure, it is arguable that certain TPIMs might be found to create a breach of Article 5. 
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This is even more likely to be the case in respect of ETPIMs, if introduced. Creation of 
deprivations of liberty is a good example of ‘disaggregation’, which stems from 
securitization, because in the process of determining deprivation of liberty or breaches of 
various other rights, the courts have to consider the distinction between incarceration and 
freedom and various aspects of potential freedom which the government may suspend, such 
as placing restrictions on the use of telecommunications, a concept discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
 
Because the courts did not reject the former control order regime and brought it more in line 
with Article 5 requirements (Ewing and Tham, 2008; Fenwick, 2013), the development of 
TPIMs and ETPIMs has been possible. Both measures aim to interfere with the day-to-day 
life of the suspect in order to prevent them from engaging with terrorist-related activity, 
whilst simultaneously remain Article 5(1) compliant by not creating a deprivation of liberty. 
Anderson QC confirmed at the ETPIM Parliamentary debate,647 that TPIMs and ETPIMs are 
compatible with the ECHR. Of the two, compliance issues are more likely to arise under 
ETPIMs which utilises the control order case law, such as JJ and AP, to confirm that only a 
physical restraint or detention causes a deprivation of liberty; this does not take into account 
the holistic criteria of Guzzardi under which it is possible to assess the impact of the 
obligations collectively, and the impact it has in terms of deprivation. ETPIM allow for a 
curfew, relocation and telecommunication restrictions as obligations and has a strict coercive 
compliant nature. Not forgetting that nine of those under a TPIM were originally subject to a 
control order and may become subject to an ETPIM, the application of the Guzzardi criteria 
would likely find a deprivation of liberty can exist. This just demonstrates the long history of 
wide interpretation to the meaning and application of Article 5, to which the courts take a 
deferential approach. 
 
Article 6 ECHR and the Right to a Fair Trial 
Procedural fairness provided much controversy for the former control order regime in light of 
the issues regarding disclosure of closed material; special advocates and closed hearings (see 
Chapter Three). The legal challenges and subsequent judgments still apply to the TPIM and 
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ETPIM schemes. Whilst the Home Office declared that TPIMs were ECHR compliant, it is 
important to note that many of the breaches caused by the counterterrorism measures that 
have been examined in this thesis, have identified that human rights issues are raised when 
the measures are enforced, as this is when the measure is operative. The cases of MB648 and 
AF649 determined that the former regime does not amount to a criminal charge; therefore the 
standard criminal protections and guarantees do not apply under Article 6(3); Article 6(1) 
however does apply. This is a basic example of the former regime being a form of 
securitization, as discussed in Chapter Three. Considering this finding, reference to DS v Her 
Majesty’s Advocate650 Lord Hope observed that "Article 6(1) [is] a fundamental right which 
[does] not admit of any balancing exercise…the public interest could never be invoked to 
deny that right to anybody in any circumstances".651 As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
domestic courts have accepted a minimisation of the rights under Article 6(1) (eg innocent 
until proven guilty, fair trial and full disclosure of the case against the suspect) in terrorism 
cases. But in the AF case minimum standards (of disclosure) were found to apply. Given the 
interpretations in MB and AF, coupled with the fact that TPIMs have replaced control orders, 
this interpretation will remain.  
 
The TPIMs and ETPIMs continue to give rise to the same concerns as the former regime 
under the Article 6, meaning that the issues discussed in Chapter Three apply. These include: 
the use of special advocates, the on-going attitude that the suspect is guilty until proved 
innocent, closed material hearings, lack of full disclosure of evidence and a limited judicial 
involvement within the process. This latter concern arises under the TPIMA 2011 and makes 
this measure of countering terrorism a politically based matter rather than a fully legal-based 
one, as will be discussed in due course; Zedner (2014) reiterates in this context the old adage 
that "it is better for ten guilty men to go free than for one innocent man to face conviction". 
This point has been made by many including Dworkin (2002),652 Waldron (2010)653 and 
Zedner (2014) who believe that "[i]f they are innocent, the injustice of convicting and 
                                                          
648 SSHD v MB and AF (fn 54). 
649 AF v SSHD (fn 20). 
650 DS v Her Majesty’s Advocate (fn 278). 
651 Ibid. 
652 Ronald Dworkin 'The threat to patriotism' 2002 The New York Review of Books (31st January) 49(3): 1-15 
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archieves/2003/nov/06/terror-the-attack-on-civil-liberties/> accessed 22nd 
June 2012. 
653 Jeremy Waldron 'Torture, Terror and Trade-Off’s: Philosophy for the White House' (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
247 
 
punishing them is at least as great as the injustice in convicting some other innocent person 
for a less serious crime".654 This is a matter of due process and the protections guaranteed 
under the criminal justice system, as supported by Dworkin (2002) and Waldron (2010), is 
most pertinent when dealing with greater and more serious potential crimes which the suspect 
is impliedly accused of due to his/her alleged involvement in terrorist related activity. 
Although as mentioned in Chapter Three, Fenwick (2007; 2012b; 2013) has questioned the 
assertion that terrorist related activity is serious because involvement in it does not 
distinguish those that play a small role and those that play a greater role; in this context a 
person who transfers funds into a terrorist bank account provides a lesser threat compared to 
the suspect that intends on using such funds to carry out a terrorist attack. Judicial 
involvement becomes a vital component of ensuring powers are not abused, particularly 
when the measures such as TPIMs and ETPIMs can be considered coercive in nature. 
 
Due Process: Special advocates and judicial involvement 
The use of special advocates developed from the Chahal case655 when the ECtHR identified a 
better system in Canada for dealing with national security matters in the immigration system. 
Within this system special legal representatives with security clearance were used to 
challenge sensitive material. The UK implemented the use of ‘special advocates’ when 
implementing the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, as discussed in 
Chapter Four. It is widely known that the special advocates were adopted under the former 
control orders regime which was highly controversial (Crowther, 2010). The Joint Committee 
on Human Rights (2009-2010b) accepted that special advocates provided a safeguard to an 
"otherwise purely arbitrary decision-making"656 process. This was similarly the attitude of the 
courts in MB.657 Although there is support for the special advocate safeguard, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2009-2010b) has suggested that it should not be used as a way 
of circumventing the need for disclosure as a way of "reduc[ing] the standards of fairness 
where the common law, or statute, or human rights law, or Article 6 say that it is a minimum 
requirement that you must know the case against you".658  
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Under the TPIM scheme the use of special advocates has not been removed. Whilst the use of 
special advocates will not be considered a breach of Article 6, given that its use has been 
supported by the ECtHR in Chahal, it has been identified an adequate safeguard by domestic 
courts. What is fundamentally important is that as a safeguard it is not used to undermine or 
avert procedural fairness or human rights generally. For example, merely because a suspect 
has a special advocate it does not mean that the government should not disclose in full or in 
part the evidence against the suspect that formulates the measure imposed (AF (No3)). The 
issue of disclosure will be discussed later in this chapter. There have been long established 
concerns, certainly throughout the existence of the former regime, as to whether special 
advocates could effectively mitigate the potential unfairness caused by no or minimal 
disclosure (Ip, 2012). In other words, the problem does not relate to the professionalism or 
integrity of the special advocates themselves, but rather to the limitations they are placed 
under whilst still expected to fully and effectively represent the interests of their clients. 
 
When a suspect is represented by a special advocate in a closed hearing, the presiding judge 
must ensure that the suspect’s rights are protected at all times; this being an important aspect 
of the judicial role are considered 'specialists in the protection of liberty'.659 The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2009-2010b) reported that there needs to be a balance between 
the human rights of individuals and the safety and protection of the public and it is the role of 
the court to maintain such a balance. Under TPIMA 2011 the court’s reviewing power is 
limited under s6: the court may determine whether "the relevant decisions of the Secretary of 
State are obviously flawed".660 The court is entitled to consider the Secretary of State’s 
decision to reasonably believe that it is "necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or 
restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity"661 to impose the 
obligations in question – these being the Conditions imposed under the Act. The court may 
give directions in relation to the obligations imposed (s6(9) TPIMA 2011) and under s9(5) 
TPIMA 2011 may give directions to the Secretary of State to revoke or vary a specific 
obligation (s9(5)(c) TPIMA 2011); in this regard the judiciary play an assessment role, 
although any directions to revoke or vary do not have to be complied with by the Secretary of 
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State. Taking into consideration the legal history of the former control order regime, and the 
legislative framework under TPIMA 2011, the courts are unlikely to quash a TPIM under 
s9(5) TPIMA 2011. It is possible that if the court directed revocation or variation of a TPIM 
or obligation, which the Secretary of State disagreed with, the ETPIM powers may be 
invoked as a matter of urgency to ensure the protection of the public and national security. It 
is clear that the TPIMA 2011 provides for limited judicial involvement, as Fenwick (2012b) 
explained to the Joint Committee on the Draft ETPIM Bill: '[t]he judicial involvement is 
obviously limited and nothing close to what it would be in a criminal trial in the amount of 
evidence that has to be disclosed….The judicial involvement is fairly limited and most of the 
material involved is closed material. This is problematic…'662  
 
The TPIMA 2011 provides two levels of judicial involvement in the process of imposing a 
TPIM. Firstly, the court can consider the imposition of the TPIM on a subject, although for 
reasons expressed earlier and from the extensive discussion in Chapter Three the courts are 
unlikely to find that the decision of the Secretary of State was ‘obviously flawed’ in placing a 
suspect under a TPIM; this is similar to the former regime which Fenwick (2007; 2012b; 
2013) also remarked upon. Secondly, the court is able to consider the imposed obligations 
and assess proportionality and necessity in accordance with the TPIMA 2011 and ETPIMB 
2011. The concern remains that the courts will, to some extent, remain deferential to the 
government’s arguments and as a consequence continue to impose TPIM’s and obligations 
upon suspects whilst simultaneously applying a narrow interpretation to Article 6(1). A 
further problem within both of these levels of judicial involvement is that the court is prima 
facie limited to determining whether the Secretary of State’s decision was obviously flawed, 
requiring the court to consider the information the Secretary of State had available at the time 
of making the TPIM. It therefore follows: if the Secretary of State reviewed the available 
evidence and intelligence and came to the conclusion that a TPIM was required, it would 
need to be seen by the courts that the Secretary of States subjective opinion of the said 
information was clearly flawed. One may argue that this itself is a high standard to satisfy 
because the flaw needs to be ‘obvious’, meaning it cannot be anything less than clear; this 
undoubtedly retains the executive power of securitization. In MB case the Court of Appeal663 
explained that if the Secretary of State’s decision to impose a control order was obviously 
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flawed, then the control order could be quashed. At the appeal, the court accepted that the 
control order interfered with the human rights of MB; thus ultimately a wide interpretation 
was adopted to Article 6, enabling the court to express satisfaction in the control order being 
imposed itself. 
 
Given the concerns with human rights compliance, when the TPIMA 2011 passed through 
Parliament for scrutiny, the government provided a Memorandum explaining that the TPIM 
scheme complied with Convention rights. The Memorandum concluded that all aspects of 
TPIMs are Convention compatible due to the measures less stringent nature, higher threshold 
for enforcement and time limitation. As explained by Fenwick (2013) the journey of control 
order challenges has shown that Article 6 compliance depends upon the jurisprudence of s3 
HRA 1998. The assessment by the Secretary of State is intelligence-led; in other words the 
information which gives rise to the TPIM usually comes from the security services. Lord 
Carlile QC (2006) confirmed that much of the information "is derived from intelligence. The 
sources and content of such intelligence in most instances demand careful protection in the 
public interest, given the current situation in which there is needed a concerted and strategic 
response to terrorism".664 The patchy and fragmented nature of intelligence remains a risk 
with TPIMs as they did under the former regime (see Chapter Three). Intelligence gained and 
used by questionable methods (eg torture) should not be relied upon and would breach Article 
6. As explained in Chapter Five, this would arise because admitting torture-tainted evidence 
is "manifestly contrary…to most basic international standards of a fair trial".665  
 
The risk is that since information is not fully disclosed to the suspect, evidence originally 
obtained by torture might be relied upon to secure a TPIM or ETPIM. Similarly, the 
intelligence-based evidence which is relied upon by the Secretary of State may be 
circumstantial or considered inadmissible in normal criminal proceedings. One would argue 
that a process which allows such evidence to be used is ‘obviously flawed’, therefore making 
each TPIM and ETPIM revocable by the court. One would expect such questions to arise 
given the risks of unintelligibility which were discussed in Chapter Three and will be re-
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visited later in this Chapter. Given this risk, fair representation and disclosure becomes key 
safeguards for the suspect to rebut the allegations against them.  
 
Due process: Closed hearings and disclosure 
Closed hearings have become a main procedural part of counter-terrorism cases as seen under 
the former regime, and now under TPIMs; they are also forms used in deportation matters. 
The procedure to review TPIMs are governed and regulated under Part 76 Civil Procedure 
Rules (CPR) and in accordance with the legislative framework and the court apply judicial 
review principles to determine whether the Secretary of State’s decision was obviously 
flawed. Matters of closed hearings and disclosure are specifically dealt with under CPR rule 
76.22. The use of closed hearings in ordinary proceedings has become even more normalized 
under the Justice and Security Act (JSA) 2013 which allows ‘closed material proceedings’ 
(CMP) which similarly has procedural guidance under the Civil Procedure Rules Part 76. It is 
noteworthy that the JSA 2013 has no direct application to the procedural regulation of closed 
hearings. To ensure that Article 6 standards are reached in both TPIMs and ETPIMs 
proceedings, s3 HRA 1998 is relied upon as it was under PTA 2005 (Fenwick, 2013). The 
impact of closed hearings was explained by Dinah Rose QC at the Atkin Memorial Lecture 
(2012): 
'It is impossible for me to adequately convey the frustration and helplessness felt by a 
barrister seeking to represent a client when a closed material procedure applies. I have sought 
to do it in control order and SIAC cases on many occasions. Most of your time is spent 
outside court, waiting to be allowed back in. When you are able to cross examine, you have 
no idea whether the questions you are asking are pertinent, or unhelpful. You do not know 
whether your submissions are on point, or wholly irrelevant. Representing a client in these 
circumstances has been described as like taking blind shots in the dark at a hidden target.'666 
 
As explained in Chapter Three, the concerns from closed hearings is that the evidence or 
intelligence which gives the foundation to the Secretary of State’s decision to impose a 
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measure like a TPIM, can predominantly be based on closed material which the suspect never 
obtains access to; dependent upon the level of disclosure given, the suspects can do little 
more than make generic assertions in their defence. In Al-Rawi v The Security Service667 Lord 
Hope explained that the court is the "guardian of fundamental principles, such as the right to 
a fair trial, the right to be confronted by ones accusers and the right to know the reasons for 
the outcome"668 and confirmed that "this is not the time to weaken the law’s defences".669 
Whilst the Al-Rawi case is not a terrorism related case, it addresses the same issues and 
concerns that this thesis considers. In the case Lord Dyson and Lord Hope considered the 
importance of ‘open and natural justice’: 
"The basic rule is that (subject to certain established and limited exceptions) the court cannot 
exercise its power to regulate its own procedures in such a way as will deny parties their 
fundamental common law right to participate in the proceedings in accordance with the 
common law principles of natural justice and open justice."670 
 
This confirms that rights provided by a fair and impartial due process should apply in keeping 
with natural and open justice, which is the basis on which the criminal justice system works. 
The development of the closed hearings under the former regime and now TPIMs cannot be 
described as being in full accordance with natural or open justice; it is for this reason that 
safeguards and protections by legal representatives, such as special advocates, and 
involvement in proceedings by the judiciary, is important. Whilst the use of special advocates 
is widely considered in the courts to be a safeguard in closed hearings, there are on-going 
concerns and arguments that special advocates themselves receive a "lack of institutional 
support".671 Despite their best efforts to represent their client there are practical limitations on 
what they can and cannot do, including adducing evidence, counter government and security 
service assertions or communicate freely with their client (Justice, 2009; Kavanagh, 2010; 
Walker, 2011; Tomkins, 2011; Ip, 2012). It is important to note that on this last concern in 
Home Office v Tariq,672 a non-terrorism case which involved closed material and special 
                                                          
667 Al-Rawi v The Security Services [2011] UKSC 34. 
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid. 
670 Ibid [22] and [72] (Lord Dyson and Lord Hope). 
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advocates, Lord Mance confirmed that special advocates could converse with their clients 
after seeing the closed material with the court’s permission. Similar to the former regime, if 
permission were given in a TPIM case, the special advocate is restricted in what they can and 
cannot discuss with their client. In terrorism cases, like any other, the representative may 
need to clarify instructions in light of full disclosure. 
 
Under the former regime the main legal challenges related to this point arose in MB, A v 
United Kingdom673 and AF (No3). In the former case the majority of the House of Lords 
found that special advocates were an insufficient safeguard alone to ensure compliance with 
Article 6 ECHR; Lord Hoffmann, dissenting held that their use was a sufficient safeguard in 
closed hearings for measures such as control orders. Lord Bingham held that "the concept of 
fairness imports a core, irreducible minimum of procedural protection".674 The majority 
found that s3 HRA 1998 and Article 6 ECHR should be relied on to ‘read down’ the CPR so 
that courts should ensure that the proceedings overall were fair, which will continue to apply 
under TPIMs and ETPIMs (Walker, 2013; Fenwick, 2013). In the A v UK the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR held that the special advocate was a safeguard, although it could not be 
invariably relied upon alone and there had to be sufficient information disclosed to the 
suspect. The court held this to be a protection under Article 5(4) ECHR to ensure that the 
suspect is "provided with sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable 
him to give effective instructions to the special advocate."675 The court indicated that Article 
5(4) did not impose "a uniform, unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of the context, 
facts and circumstances".676 However, in light of the fact the "impact of lengthy – and what 
appeared at that time to be indefinite – deprivation of liberty on the applicants’ fundamental 
rights",677 Article 5(4) rights were found to import substantially the same protections as given 
under Article 6(1) in the criminal aspect. 
 
Following this decision and in light of it, the House of Lords dealt with AF (No3) in which 
the court held under Article 6 the suspect should similarly be given sufficient information  to 
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provide adequate instructions to his special advocate, which became known as the ‘AF 
Principle’ (Ip, 2012). The House of Lords spent time in the case trying to differentiate 
between A and AF (No3), in view of the government’s contention that the control order 
regime was sufficiently different and would allow a more lenient approach (see paragraph’s 
57, 82 and 111-112 per Lord Phillips, Lord Hope and Lord Brown respectively). It was 
argued that A dealt with circumstances in which deprivation of liberty were caused, whereas 
in AF (No3) the former regime was intended to restrict not deprive liberty as discussed earlier 
in this chapter and in Chapter Three. Nevertheless, it was found (reluctantly by some Law 
Lords, most notably Lord Hoffman) that since Article 6(1) applied, and applying A v UK, the 
suspect should be able to know of the ‘gist’ of the case against him. Thus AF made it clear 
that the requirement of a core irreducible minimum of disclosure would be applicable to 
"light touch control orders" (Ip, 2012). It therefore follows that this AF Principle applies to 
TPIMs as the replacement of control orders, which was confirmed by the Home Office whilst 
the TPIMB 2011 was passing through Parliament,678 and which became a concession made 
into law in Secretary of State for the Home Department v BM.679  
 
It is clear that to ensure that safeguards, including the provision of special advocates, are 
Article 6 compliant within counter-terrorism measures such as TPIMs Suspect must have 
sufficient information to challenge or defend the case against him; Lord Kerr dissenting in the 
Tariq case, stated: 
"A function of the counterbalancing measures is to ensure that the very essence of the right is 
not impaired. It is, I believe, important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by 
essence of the right. If equality of arms lies at the heart of a fair trial, the essence of the right 
must surely include the requirement that sufficient information about the case which is to be 
made against him be given to a part so that he can give meaningful instructions to answer that 
case."680 
In considering "the core irreducible minimum entitlement"681 Lord Kerr gave careful 
consideration of ways in which disclosure can be complied with to meet this requirement and 
                                                          
678 House of Lords (fn 534). 
679 SSHD v BM (fn 644) [2742] (Mr Justice Collins). 
680 Home Office v Tariq (fn 672) [118]. 
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meet the protections of Articles 5 and 6, although in his opinion there should be no 
circumstances in which disclosure should be minimised or withheld: 
"Whether a hearing should be conducted in private or in open session; whether information 
about the case against an individual should be provided by way of full disclosure or by 
redacted statements or in the form of a summary or gist; whether witnesses should be 
anonymised – all of these are variables to which recourse may be had in order to reflect the 
context in which the requirements of Article 6 must be examined."682 
Lord Kerr’s opinion on fairness also extended to the Al-Rawi case in which it was his opinion 
that "[t]he right to be informed of the case made against you is not merely a feature of the 
adversarial system of trial, it is an elementary and essential prerequisite of fairness. Without 
it, a trial between opposing parties cannot lay claim to the marque of judicial proceedings."683 
 
Since AF (No3) the ECtHR in Kennedy v United Kingdom,684 and the UK Supreme Court in 
the Tariq case, Article 6 does not give a right to minimum disclosure in all circumstances. As 
a consequence, the AF Principle is still relevant at the very least to measures such as TPIMs. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, in AT v Secretary of State for the Home Department685 it was 
alleged that AT was still a significant and influential member of the LIFG and the case 
related to the assessment of fairness under Articles 5(4) and 6 ECHR. At the appeal to the 
Court of Appeal from the ruling of Mitting J, Carnwarth LJ endorsed the application of the 
ECtHR test in A and elucidated in AF (No3) by the House of Lords. However, applying the 
principle, he came to a different conclusion. It was found that the allegation that the suspect 
remained an influential member of the LIFG was a justification for placing the suspect on a 
control order; there was no evidence within the open material to support this assertion and 
was based in the closed material. The court held there had not been adequate disclosure and 
the appeal was upheld.  
 
Nevertheless, the AF Principle has not been incorporated into the TPIMA 2011 (Ip, 2012). It 
is possible that the government may attempt to argue that given that TPIMs are less 
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restrictive and onerous than the former regime, the AF Principle will not apply (Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, 2010-2012b; Home Office ECHR Memorandum, 2011b:36-38; 
Ip, 2012). As Fenwick (2012b) explained to a Joint Committee at Parliament, Article 6 could 
be breached for a lack of disclosure,686 which the legal challenge history of the former regime 
illustrates. Further to this, there may be concern that if Ip (2012) is correct in his assessment 
of the government’s intention to remove the need for disclosure because TPIMs are to be less 
evasive and onerous, then it is highly possible that the matter will be litigated over again. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was correctly remarked by Fenwick (2012b) that the 
former regime had not been legally challenged in the Strasbourg Court; therefore it had never 
been given a "clean bill of health"687 there. It is highly possible however, that if the 
government try and rethink ways to prevent the need to disclose information, the TPIM 
scheme will end up being vetted by Strasbourg. If this happens then the government faces the 
risk of having to be told by Strasbourg to reconsider counter-terrorism measures of this kind. 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH TPIMS 
In Chapter Three it was discussed that risk assessment performs a vital role in supporting 
arguments to establish a breach of human rights; such holistic based assessments assist in 
determining whether a measure is a proportionate response to the threat. By using risk 
assessment to analyse the former regime, a detailed examination can be given to the TPIM 
and ETPIM schemes given that it is similar to the former regime. In Chapter Three, 
discussion of risk related to the impact of a control order on suspects’ families and friends, 
which was known as ‘collateral impact’ (Zedner, 2007b), and the (broadly) deferential 
conduct of the courts towards the government’s assertions under the former regime, were 
considered. These areas were examined as it was argued that they assisted in raising concerns 
that the former regime risked causing human rights breaches and harm to UK policies on 
counter-terrorism, an assessment that will be considered in more detail in Chapter Six.  
 
The main consequence of these risks, aside from the argument that human rights were being 
breached such as Article’s 5 and 6, was that terrorist organisations would use the UK counter-
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terrorism measures to support their campaigns to radicalise vulnerable individuals and entice 
them to join or support the organisation in some way. When considering the risks of such 
collateral adverse impact, it has become apparent that the courts are taking this into 
consideration as a factor when determining deprivation of liberty, although this has been 
more so towards the end of the former regime. In CA v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department688 Mitting J had taken into account the family circumstances caused by the 
control order, specifically the relocation obligation imposed upon CA and its effect on his 
marriage. In the CA case Mitting J did not find a breach of Article 5; however, he upheld the 
applicant’s appeal to remove the relocation obligation under the control order. The reason for 
this is outlined earlier in this Chapter and it takes into account the impact that part of the 
order will have upon the suspect and his connections. Since then the courts have begun to 
consider the ‘exit strategy’689 which is consideration of what happens after a TPIM has 
ended. It is achieved by allowing suspects to live as much of a normal life as they could 
under a TPIM, to aid in de-radicalisation, as confirmed in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AM.690  
 
The AM case raises a question about the Secretary of State’s judgment and decision-making 
process when considering which obligations to impose. This case demonstrates that the 
Secretary of State did not consider alternative factors before selecting which obligations to 
impose, which is a poor assessment of risk on the Secretary of State’s part. This strengthens 
the argument that, as the decision-maker, the Secretary of State should be held accountable 
by the courts for imposing a TPIM and its obligations. The case itself also demonstrates that 
the court can act independently and consider the measures imposed against the suspects, 
therefore should consider the measures themselves; although it should be recognised that the 
TPIMA 2011 seeks to limit judicial involvement just as the PTA 2005 did. Anderson QC 
would disagree, having stated that the TPIM scheme is "highly judicialised".691 There are 
some that believe that the Secretary of State is best placed to make these decisions, whether 
or not the court or academics agree (MacDonald Report, 2011: paragraph 40-41).  
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There is concern that the imposition of measures like TPIMs create significant adverse 
consequences for the physical and mental state of the suspect; the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (2009-2010a) explained that obligations such as the relocation obligation caused a link 
to the poor mental health of suspects. Despite this, Glees (2012) when giving evidence before 
a Joint Committee at Parliament stated: "I do not believe that civil liberties and liberty 
generally are undermined by effective, proportionate and accountable intelligence-led 
security policy."692 It is contended that this argument is difficult to support given that the 
impact that the obligations can have upon the suspect and their families. Furthermore, TPIMs 
are an intelligence-led measure, thus miscarriages of justice may occur. 
 
A fragmented intelligence-led process with little judicial intervention 
A lack or fragmented intelligence can impact on the way counter-terrorism measures are 
used, s44 (see Chapter Two) demonstrates that investigative policing becomes harder when 
intelligence gives a lack of direction or focus. Instead, measures can be used against a wide 
number of people for this same reason. Whilst a TPIM may only be imposed against a small 
number of people, given that only 52 people were subjected to a control order, the risks that 
follow from being placed under a TPIM are worrying in the long term. What remains 
concerning is the continued lack of judicial involvement, lack of information as to the case 
against the suspect and the impact of the measure and obligations on the suspect and their 
family. The courts are again being used as a formality; the Secretary of State’s decision-
making process is not being questioned fully by the courts when a TPIM can be imposed. The 
risk here is that the information which the Secretary of State is basing their information on to 
impose TPIM obligations is not necessarily complete and therefore mistakes can be made in 
the information itself or the way in which it has been gathered or used (eg evidence obtained 
by torture from other states). Like control orders, TPIMs and ETPIMs are both a pre-emptive 
and preventative measure, although due to its characteristics of looking at the risk or threat 
posed coupled with the uncertainty of it, the precautious nature of the evidence and 
prudentialism within the overarching aim of achieving security (Zedner, 2007b), creates a 
measure that is mainly a pre-emptive one, despite being named a ‘preventative measure’.  
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Knowing that pre-emptive measures characteristically look at a range of factors in order to 
calculate risk the subject matter [‘the suspect’] poses, which may include a form of profiling, 
this can mean that the intelligence that is relied upon may be invalid, inaccurate or unsafe. It 
becomes vital that the intelligence is accurate in order for it to be relied upon; yet the 
example of Cerie Bullivant which was discussed in Chapter Three, illustrates that weak and 
unfounded intelligence has been used to impose security measures against British citizens. 
Imposing a TPIM upon a person requires a level of risk assessment by the Secretary of State, 
but the nature of the intelligence may stray into the realms of uncertainty and as a result leads 
to entities [the Secretary of State] engaging with risk avoidance which leads to the limitation 
of freedoms of others in the name of ‘security’ (Ericson, 2005). 
 
A solution for this is disclosure of the case against the suspect and the ability to provide full 
instructions to their legal representatives. Without this, the government will have the power 
to represent their assertions and provide the court with what they view as supporting evidence 
in closed hearings, whilst the suspect will not be able to do this nor give sufficient 
instructions to address all of the points the government raises; as identified in the AF case. 
The risk that inaccurate intelligence may be used to support the government in this fashion 
should support the argument that measures such as TPIMs may give rise to breaches of 
Article 6. 
 
One worry about some of the intelligence that may be used as ‘supportive’ evidence to secure 
a TPIM is that it may have been obtained by torture. This particular issue was discussed at 
length in Chapter Four, specifically over the deportation matters and the cases concerning 
Abu Qatada. The main issue in most of the Abu Qatada cases was that the government 
needed to obtain assurances from the Jordanian government that evidence that had been 
obtained by torture would not be used in his trial upon his return. It may be speculated that 
most suspects under a control order or a TPIM will not know the source of the evidence 
against them; therefore they are most likely unable to know or confirm that the evidence 
being used has been obtained by torture outside of the UK. This was the crux of Abu 
Qatada’s cases which is part of the reason why it has taken so many years to deport him. The 
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case of Gafgen v Germany693 confirms that admission of evidence obtained by torture would 
be a ‘flagrant denial of justice’. However, the Court of Appeal in A v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department694 explained that control orders did not amount to the determination of 
a criminal charge, but that Article 6 would be activated by them in its civil form. If evidence 
obtained by torture is used to enable the Secretary of State to formulate grounds so that a 
TPIM may be imposed upon a suspect, this would backtrack on the core values of the UK 
which are to "guarantee basic human rights: life, security, the rule of law" (Bulley, 2008). 
Furthermore, it would also exacerbate the on-going issue of suspicion over the measure 
created by the former regime. 
 
As explained in Chapters Two and Three, a lack of information gives rise to suspicion 
(Aradau and van Munster, 2008) which is known as ‘consciousness-raising’ or 
‘unintelligibility’. The suspicion would not just be related to the source and contents of the 
evidence but it would also raise suspicion of the government and judiciary. Unintelligibility, 
as explained in previous Chapters, is the "the absence of information [which] becomes 
regarded as suspicious in itself”.695 Whilst it is widely understood that intelligence 
information cannot be made publically available for various reasons, including the sensitivity 
of the information, it becomes more important to ensure that human rights are protected and 
the Secretary of State is being held accountable for the decision to impose restrictive 
measures. This also goes to the heart of Salter’s (2010)696 remark about securitization: 
"We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, 
only that the existential threat has to be argued and gain enough resonance for a platform to 
be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures."697 
In other words, it comes down to scrutiny; it is important to scrutinise the decision makers 
[Secretary of State, Police and Security Service], the decisions they make [to impose a TPIM 
and the specific obligations within it] and to do so fairly. The danger as understood by Buzan 
et al (1998) and Bright (2012) is that securitization can construct a supportive argument 
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surrounding a security threat in order to control "any type of rule"698 such as human rights’ 
obligations. 
 
A solution to deal with the issue of inaccurate or fragmented intelligence being used to 
support the government in obtaining a TPIM, may be through the independence of the court 
and its ability to scrutinise the measures being imposed without restrictions. This would 
enable the judiciary to assess the evidence as it was presented to the Secretary of State and 
ensure that if a security measure should be imposed then it would be proportionate. A 
concern for government would be that the judiciary have made rulings that have impacted 
upon the government’s counterterrorism strategies, for example the Belmarsh case, which 
have resulted in government imposing new legislation which is still seen as repressive 
(Zedner, 2007b). Therefore limiting judicial involvement enables the government to continue 
with its counter-terrorism measures. Alternatively, the Secretary of State should be held fully 
accountable for the decisions made to impose a TPIM allowing the court to scrutinise the 
grounds on which a TPIM is being imposed, and assess the proportionality of each obligation 
imposed, rather than simply assessing whether the Secretary of State’s decision was flawed.  
 
Whilst the Secretary of State does not have to explain the basis being relied upon to secure a 
TPIM initially, the ‘lite’ touch nature of the measure with relaxed restrictions on the use of 
telecommunication allows some potential for terrorist networks to be exposed or identifiable, 
although this is purely academic speculation. The only way this may be understood to work is 
whether prosecutions follow the imposition of TPIMs. The main risk awaiting the 
government at the end of the maximum two-year period for a TPIM, as explained by Fenwick 
(2012b) is that the suspect may "just sit on that TPIMs and not engage in any terrorism-
related activity, which is not very surprising, but still remain radicalised. …at the end of that 
time, the question would be: what could happen?"699 The suspect may re-engage with 
terrorist activity and commit an act of terrorism, or due to the negative impact of the measure 
and its obligations, find it impossible to re-integrate with their community. This means that 
securing a conviction following the imposition of a TPIM is important.  
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Securing prosecution 
The implementation of TPIMs gives rise to rigorous review and assessment by the ‘Terrorism 
Review Group’ (henceforth 'TRG')700 to increase the possibility of prosecuting terrorist 
suspects who are under the scheme, as per s10(5) TPIMA 2011. Middleton (2011b) describes 
a sense of cynicism towards this 'strengthened duty' to keep the possibility of prosecution 
under review in these terms: "we did this under the old system, but we really mean it [this 
time]".701  
 
It is important to note that the statute does not specifically confirm how regularly the TRG 
must review the active TPIMs, save to say that it is to be "kept under review throughout the 
period the TPIM is in force".702 In the quarter between 1st March 2013 and 31st May 2013 the 
Home Office (2012c) confirmed that the TRG did "not meet during this reporting period",703 
so what is meant by regular? The former regime was found to "undoubtedly" result in some 
terrorists and their activities going unpunished, which Lord MacDonald described as "a 
serious and continuing failure of public policy".704 The House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution (2010-2012) found that the TPIMs is a "degree closer to the criminal justice 
system",705 identifying s10(5) TPIMA 2011 as an example. Identifying and monitoring 
terrorist networks by detecting the ‘in-degree and out-degree centrality’ as well as 
‘betweenness’ of networks, is important in the evidence and intelligence gathering process 
aimed at securing a conviction. It is explained by Striegher (2013) that "the life-blood of 
intelligence is information".706  
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It is noteworthy that the intelligence gained from analysing terrorist networks cannot be used 
on a solo basis as the information obtained can be problematic, as Krebs (2002b),707 Fellman 
and Wright (2004)708 affirm with reference to the work of Sparrow (1991).709 There are three 
identified problems with analysing a network, which one would suggest is similar in terms of 
analysing terrorist networks: 
1. Incompleteness – the inevitability of missing information, connections and links that 
the investigators will not uncover; 
2. Fuzzy boundaries – the difficulty in deciding who to include and who not to include. 
It is important to recall that pre-emptive action requires assessment and identification 
of the 'suspicious from the ‘normal’, the ‘risky’ from the ‘at risk’' (Edkins and Pin-
Fat, 2004; Amoore and de Goede, 2008); 
3. Dynamic – these networks are not static and are constantly changing and adapting. To 
counter the problem of looking for the existence or absence of a link between 
individuals, Sparrow suggests looking at the strength of a tie between individuals at 
the time and the task at hand; this being another process of pre-emptive assessment 
and identification. 
These problems are exacerbated due to the current rise in ‘lone wolf’, semi-impromptu 
attacks, such as the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013 or the Boston Marathon bombing. The 
difficulty that arises from the former regime and TPIMs is the fact that the suspect has 
knowledge that they are being monitored. By knowing that they are subject to such measures 
they are more likely to alter or curtail their behaviour whilst subject to the measure; this 
would explain why prosecutions have not been successfully brought against those under the 
former regime; neither the Security Service or the Crown Prosecution Service could find any 
evidence capable of securing convictions, as explained by David Anderson QC to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2012-2013b): 
"…I would say is that the picture looks pretty much the same. People are looking. They are 
not finding very much. I find that completely unsurprising because, if you tell people that 
they will be free of all constraint within two years, then most people, if they are rational, will 
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keep their heads down even if they might otherwise have been inclined to indulge in 
terrorism-related activity."710 
 
A network does not just span the internet and telecommunications, but is relevant to the 
physical network and connections. Whilst the TPIMA 2011 retains the right to restrict a 
person’s ability to associate with other people, such restrictions again may impact upon the 
‘terrorist network’. The problem here is two-fold: firstly, an obligation restricting a person 
from associating with others can indirectly impact upon the evidence and intelligence 
gathering process; secondly, such an obligation can negatively, and indirectly, impact upon 
the family of the suspect.  
 
The impact on others and social isolation of the suspect under a TPIM 
Given that TPIMs are deemed to be control orders in all but name (Middleton, 2011b), it is 
expected that just like the former regime TPIMs will have a negative impact upon the suspect 
and their family. In Chapter Three reference was made to Cerie Bullivant (a former 
controlee) who explained the isolation he suffered under the former regime. The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2005-2006b) explained that the negative impact upon the 
family of the suspect, under the former regime, created shame, trauma and uncertainty 
because the "family is now subject equally to the restrictions"711 imposed against the suspect. 
As a consequence "[t]he families believe themselves…to be stigmatised and isolated from 
society, to be no longer able to enjoy privacy or security within their homes without fearing 
at every moment entry by the police or disruption from telephone calls especially throughout 
the night, and an atmosphere of fear and apprehension that is constant'.712  
 
Given that the Secretary of State can impose obligations that result in the police making 
unannounced searches of the property, a family member of the suspect may be stigmatised by 
the TPIM being imposed. Having to inform the police and Security Services of any friends 
coming to the property, so that the suspect does not breach any imposed restriction to 
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associate with others; will result in the suspects family continuing to suffer as they did under 
the former regime. Fathering (2012) explained to a Joint Committee in Parliament that the 
TPIM "remains a punishment without the person who is being subject to the measure, and 
inevitably their family members who are also suffering because of the measures that are 
imposed, never knowing the details of the case against them." 713 
 
The Cerie Bullivant example and the remarks made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
clearly identify the negative impact that others suffer as a consequence of the obligations 
imposed upon the suspect. The CF case714 demonstrates that the Secretary of State has not 
risk-assessed the threat posed by CF and then determined whether the obligations imposed 
are proportionate. As a university student, the Secretary of State’s imposed obligation to 
restrict CF associating with people, meant that he was unable to associate with people 
academically or socially as one would expect in the normal life of a student. This was in 
conflict with the principle of imposing restrictions but allowing the suspect to lead a 
relatively normal life, as discussed in the AM case.715 Collectively this demonstrates that the 
risk stems from use of disproportionality onerous obligations by the Secretary of State. 
Therefore it is important that when deciding to impose a TPIM the Secretary of State should 
consider the longer term risks, such as the impact on the health of the suspect and their family 
and the possibility of radicalising the suspect (if they are not already radicalised). 
 
Radicalisation 
The impact of measures such as TPIMs, and the continuous development and implementation 
of executive counter-terrorism powers which provide conflicts with human rights, 
particularly Articles 5 and 6, coupled with the risks caused by such measures, is a continuous 
"short circuiting of due process by the need to ‘defeat’ terrorism (Livingstone, 2013). As 
Fenwick (2012b) explained, the TPIMs and ETPIMs "could be part of a narrative of 
radicalisation".716 The greatest risk that may be caused as a result of powers, such as TPIMs, 
                                                          
713 Farthing (fn 523). 
714 CF v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 843 (Admin). 
715 SSHD v AM (fn 604). 
716 Fenwick (fn 517). 
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is radicalisation of suspects. One may suggest that there are two classifications of 
radicalisation: 
(1) Those that are already radicalised before the TPIM is imposed against them; and 
(2) Those that are radicalised after the TPIM is imposed. 
If the former classification applies, then the consideration for the TRG is the exit strategy to 
de-radicalise the suspect if they are unable to prosecute. However, it is known that there is 
not enough evidence that de-radicalisation occurred under the former regime; therefore it is 
likely there will not be such evidence from reliance on TPIMs. If the latter classification 
applies the concern is that the counter-terrorism measure that is intended to pre-empt and 
prevent terrorism, as well as provide national security, actually creates terrorists. When 
considering the statement of CA’s wife when giving evidence: 
"Any shuffling outside our front door, any slight movement filled me with dread, the heart 
sinking feeling experienced during three previous early morning raids. This is something our 
first-born struggles with. If he hears a police car, if he sees men in suits and officers in the 
house he begins to get upset and frightened that they will ‘take daddy away’"717 
 
Thus the child who might otherwise be unlikely to be radicalised has to live with this sort of 
fear. The impact of TPIMs on children was an area of discussion by the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (2012-2013b), particularly by Baroness Berridge, when receiving evidence 
from David Anderson QC on the 13th March 2013; unfortunately this particular risk was one 
that David Anderson QC did not assess for his report. CA’s wife explained the impact that 
obligations imposed upon her husband under counter-terrorism measures had on her eldest 
child: "[the] hopelessness, anguish and extreme anxiety manifests itself in constant 
arguments, loneliness and in the case of our eldest child who had just turned four, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder".718 In Chapter Two there was discussion about the importance of 
perception of the police and of emanations of the state. There is a possibility that being 
indirectly subjected to the obligations under a TPIM imposed upon a parent will create 
resentment and a negative perception in children towards the police, Security Services, 
government and society etc.  In other words, these powers may potentially create terrorists of 
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the future. If this is so one may argue that the measures become disproportionate and 
ineffective.  
 
The ultimate concern is that if the risks identified in this chapter and in Chapter Three apply 
to executive counter-terrorism powers such as TPIMs, the alarming consequence is that UK 
laws and policies to counter-terrorism might actually aid in creating disillusioned 
communities and might promote opportunities for terrorism to expand. The impact of powers 
such as control orders and TPIMs mean that they may lead to individuals being, or feeling as 
though they are being, deprived of an identity and rejected as a part of humanity (McGhee, 
2008). The behaviour by government to protect ‘our’ interests creates an indifference that 
affects others which becomes acceptable. As Dworkin (2002) and McGhee (2008) explain, 
placing the security of the majority over and above the rights of others, means that we 
jeopardise a fundamental moral principle: the ‘principle of shared humanity’. 
 
By undermining the humanity of suspects under schemes like TPIMs individuals are 
excluded by no longer being recognised as human, which in turn results in the removal of 
human dignity (Balibar, 2004; McGhee, 2008). This ‘dehumanization’ is seen via the 
removal of or restrictions imposed upon suspects’ human rights, most notably under Articles 
5 and 6 ECHR. Agamben (1998) advises people to be cautious of the ‘metamorphoses’ of this 
due to the ‘hidden matrix of the politics’. In other words, there is a political game involved 
which everyone should be wary of, which is exemplified by the introduction of the Closed 
Material Proceedings ('CMP') in civil cases relating to TPIMs and potentially ETPIMs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The enactment of the TPIMA 2011 was an opportunity for government to start afresh and 
implement an executive counter-terrorism measure which would take into account the array 
of legal challenges and criticisms held against the former regime. Some of the identified 
differences between the former regime and the TPIMs include: the relaxation on the use of 
telecommunications; use of relocation obligations being available only under the proposed 
ETPIMs; the introduction of the time limits; and the change to the standard of proof which it 
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is believed will make little difference (Middleton, 2011b). Anderson QC (2014) explained 
that there have been 10 suspects subject to TPIMs, 9 of which were originally on a control 
order. Ultimately, Andrerson QC (2014) believed there was a need for TPIMs and accepted 
they had disrupted terrorism; although there had been no criminal convictions on the back of 
TPIMs for terrorism. Furthermore, despite no new TPIM notices being introduced for over 18 
months, Anderson does not alter the opinion that the scheme is an effective counter-terrorism 
measure.  
 
It would appear that the TPIM scheme is intent on reinforcing the importance of intelligence 
and evidence gathering and by keeping the matter under review on attempting to secure a 
conviction. This is despite the same stance being legislated for under the former regime 
which produced no convictions. Middleton supports many of the changes that have been 
brought about under TPIMs, yet finds that the time limits do not represent a 'real effort' of 
change; furthermore, he considers that the time limit, together with the relaxation of 
telecommunications restrictions and removal of the relocation obligation, were all workable 
under the former regime (ie it could merely have been amended). From this it is argued that 
the reason for introducing the TPIMs is one of political advantage - by applying the TPIM 
standards and practices under the former regime there would not have been a "politically 
spectacular" change compared to repeal of the controversial legislation and introduction of an 
entirely new system. This is indicative of a rebranding strategy, in other words, it is 
politically motivated, as McSherry et al (2009), de Londras (2011) and Zedner (2014) argue. 
 
Suggesting that the balancing of national security and human rights in terrorism situations is 
politically based supports the remark made by Lord Bingham in the Belmarsh case719 which 
has been referred to in this thesis. This can refer centrally to a matter of accountability; there 
are some who consider that there should be both political and judicial scrutiny of the facts of 
each case and the Secretary of State’s decisions to impose a security measure upon suspects, 
such as TPIMs (de Londras, 2011). On a political level this may be achieved through debate 
in Parliament and evidence being given before Parliamentary Committees (eg the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights). On a judicial level scrutiny may be achieved through the use 
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of "expert tribunals" such as the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Othman v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department).720 The risk of placing reliance on these levels 
of scrutiny relates to deferential attitudes: open discussion of intelligence in Parliament is 
unlikely to be supported for the same reasons as having closed material hearings. This would 
mean any Parliamentary debate or discussion would result in acceptance of any assessment 
made by the Secretary of State because the intelligence which gives foundation to their 
decision could not be made public. On a judicial level, the judiciary in domestic courts, 
including SIAC, has seen support given to the decision and assessment of the Secretary of 
State, unless the power to scrutinise the Secretary of State is not limited by government 
through legislation. In either situation the suspect is still not guaranteed any of the protections 
given to those under the criminal justice system and whilst the TPIM scheme is considered a 
"degree closer to the criminal justice system",721 it still remains separate and running parallel 
to the criminal justice system. 
 
As a consequence of remaining separate from the criminal justice system there are issues of 
human rights being breached, particularly Articles 5 and 6. Whilst on a domestic level the 
courts have not found such breaches, in the sense of condemning the schemes wholesale (and 
issuing s4 HRA 1998 declaration), despite the fact that measures such as TPIMs and the 
former regime are coercive measures; as seen under the s44 TA 2000 powers. Coercive 
elements to counter-terrorism measures can contribute to causing a deprivation of liberty. The 
discussions of risk assessment continue to show that by assessing the measures holistically, it 
is possible to determine whether the measure is effective and ultimately a breach of human 
rights. 
 
This Chapter has established that the TPIM scheme raises the same human rights issues and 
risks as the former regime. It is also important to recognise that TPIMs and control orders are 
predominately pre-emptive measures rather than preventative ones. The s44 measure (as 
discussed in Chapter Two) was aimed at disrupting, deterring and preventing terrorist 
activity, whilst TPIMs are aimed at controlling and curtailing the behaviour of suspects 
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before the threat they pose emerges or until such time the government can do something with 
them, for example deport or prosecute them.  
 
The main similarity between TPIMs and s44 is that neither measure requires that the power 
can only be invoked at a time of necessity or when there is a threat of imminent danger. Just 
as the former regime did, TPIMs give rise to concerns as to the long-term impact of such 
powers. It is confirmed that as a power of securitization, it can de-humanise people through 
the measures imposed, which in the long term through resentment and fear may result in 
radicalisation. There remains concern that those under a TPIM or their families would be 
open or vulnerable to radicalisation; as Fenwick (2012b) remarked "it could be part of a 
narrative of radicalisation".722 In turn these radicalised individuals fit into one of the three-tier 
model groupings as identified by the JTAC, as discussed by Irons (2008). The AM case 
discusses the identification of an exit strategy. Prime facie this seems to present a potential 
way of reducing the risk radicalisation may create, although case law has demonstrated that 
the Secretary of State fails to adopt this approach when considering which obligations to 
impose, for example the CF case. Also there is the need for the suspect to lead as ‘normal a 
life’ as possible when a TPIM is imposed against them; as discussed case law demonstrates 
the Secretary of State’s failure to take this into consideration before imposing a TPIM. This 
failure was also seen under the former regime as demonstrated in AR v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department723 where AR was refused permission to attend AS level Chemistry and 
Biology classes due to "national security concerns relating to access to material and 
opportunities to develop understanding and knowledge in areas that could be used for 
terrorist-related activity",724 despite AR’s ambition to go to university and medical school. 
Furthermore, inputting an exit strategy under a TPIM is not a statutory requirement under the 
TPIMA 2011, underlining its status as a political discretionary power. 
 
There are two main areas of contention in the spheres of human rights and risk assessment. 
Firstly, there are issues surrounding disclosure and the suspect’s right to know the case 
against him and his accusers, as per Article 6. On a domestic level the courts have ruled that 
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measures of this kind are not criminal proceedings; but nevertheless the guarantees under 
Article 6(1) apply. Secondly, there has been wide discussion on deprivation of liberty. In 
legal challenges towards the end of the former regime’s life the courts opened up to the risk 
assessment of other factors including the impact on family; however, this assessment was not 
to find the Secretary of State’s decision flawed, but rather emphasised the importance of 
being proportionate. The TPIMA 2011 does not expressly take into account the rulings of 
various legal challenges, most notably A and Others and AF(No3). As a result, one would 
agree with Fenwick (2012a; 2012b; 2013) that the matters of deprivation of liberty and 
disclosure may be re-litigated and until the matter is litigated in the ECtHR and possibly 
given a clean bill of human rights health, it will always be prone to legal challenges. 
 
It has been widely welcomed that the TPIMs is closer to the criminal justice system than the 
former regime. In Chapter Three there was discussion about reforming bail to use the system 
to control and manage terrorist suspects. Given that TPIMs demonstrate that it is not just 
about the power itself, but the implementation of that power which can make it controversial, 
this indicates that even a reform of bail could cause controversy. The positive aspect of 
reforming bail is that the suspect would automatically be within the criminal justice system. 
Unlike the former regime, TPIMs aims at prosecuting and convicting suspects where 
possible. The main issue as identified in this chapter relates to detection of the network of 
suspects. Unlike the former regime the blood supply of terrorist networks is not cut off; 
however, under the new TPIM scheme the suspect is still aware that they are being monitored 
as under the former regime. The risk is that the suspect would then alter their behaviour and 
wait for two years before continuing to engage in terrorist activity. Farthing (2012) explained 
that the most effective way of gathering evidence is to not let the suspect know they are being 
monitored. 
 
By monitoring a suspect and not informing them of this, a suspect will act naturally and may 
unknowingly disclose their in-degree and out-degree centrality terrorist network. This would 
ensure that the Security Services and Crown Prosecution Service, or the TRG as a whole, do 
not miss out on obtaining evidence that can be used at trial sooner rather than wait two years 
or more (if ever). It would also mean that human rights breaches would be less of an issue 
other than igniting an Article 8 ECHR discussion. Ultimately this would support the aim of 
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trying to secure convictions and would in turn support the Criminal Justice and Human 
Rights Model as discussed in Chapter One. As Ashworth and Zedner (2010) explained, the 
prioritisation of prosecution "ensures that terrorist suspects are dealt with under the 
protections of the criminal justice system".725 This is because by using the criminal justice 
system one can reassert the fundamental rights of individuals including "the presumption of 
innocence, due process protections, the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and 
the right to a fair trial" which would replace targeted and discriminatory counter-terrorism 
practices or criminal justice promises (Waldron, 2010; Zedner, 2014). Measures such as 
TPIMs or ETPIMs may be used at times of emergency, for example when there is an 
imminent threat of a terrorist attack. Ultimately this would mean that the Security Services 
would need to be more vigilant and assess the risk posed by suspects more closely. 
 
Given that there may be an alternative way of obtaining evidence and ultimately convicting 
suspects, one would argue that measures such as TPIMs are disproportionate. This is 
supported by the assessment given by David Anderson QC when giving evidence to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2012-2013b) he was asked by Baroness Lister of Burtersett: 
"…in view of your findings that TPIMs are not effective as investigation measures, is it not a 
complete misnomer to describe them as such as opposed to pure prevention measures?" 
David Anderson QC responded: "You could argue that they could not do both, and if they are 
effective at preventing then it is hardly surprising they are not very effective when it comes to 
investigation, because there is nothing to investigate. That is effectively how I see it."726 It 
may be arguable that ETPIMs are not disproportionate to the threat they are aimed at because 
they are an emergency measure which would be used at specific times, despite the fact that, 
as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the specific time has not been expressly stated within the 
TPIMA 2011 or ETPIMB 2013. This follows the same argument under the s44 powers as 
discussed in Chapter Two, with regard to when an emergency power should be enforced. It 
therefore remains for Chapter Six to consider whether pre-emptive and preventative measures 
of countering terrorism are proportionate and effective. Given the matters discussed in this 
Chapter and preceding Chapters there are issues of great concern, specifically: the ability to 
scrutinise the decisions reached by the state and its emanations; the accountability of 
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decision-makers, such as the Secretary of State; the politics involved in counter-terrorism 
measures; the lack of transparency; and the long-term effect of these powers on individuals 
and the risk they cause to national security. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ASSESSMENT OF UK PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE 
COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES, THE CONFLICT WITH 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
"Civil liberties are a vital part of our country, and of our world. But the most basic liberty of 
all is the right of the ordinary citizen to go about their business free from fear or terror."727 
- Tony Blair MP, former British Prime Minister 
 
INTRODUCTION 
UK counter-terrorism law and policy post-9/11 has developed through controversy, legal 
challenges, Parliamentary action and has been influenced by wide debate both by academics 
and parliamentarians, as discussed throughout this thesis. Terrorism post-9/11 has been 
viewed by some as the 'harbinger of a new era of ‘super-terrorism’ and has resulted in the 
need for ‘exceptional measures’ in response to this new era of terrorism (Goold and Lazarus, 
2007; Lazarus et al, 2013). The threat of terrorism post-9/11 has given the UK a recognised 
dilemma: what do you do with a terrorist suspect that you cannot indefinitely detain without 
trial, deport or prosecute due to the need to protect intelligence sources or information-
gathering methods (Donohue, 2008)? This dilemma has been exacerbated by the protection of 
human rights, in practice and in belief. The post-9/11 era has seen a considerable change in 
attitude by states, not just the UK, to the protection and safeguarding of national interests 
from terrorism. 
 
The UK government placed emphasis on its changed strategy in relation to counter-terrorism, 
as seen by CONTEST: ‘Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare’, which has been reviewed since 
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the 2010 general election and was reaffirmed under that review, reasserting the current UK 
Strategy, published in June 2011.728 The last decade has seen a plethora of innovative 
policing, intelligence and immigration control techniques as a way of dealing with the threat 
of terrorism (Lazarus et al, 2013).  
 
Each chapter of this thesis provides a detailed assessment of such techniques and measures 
introduced by the UK government to address the aforementioned dilemma. Similarly, they 
acknowledge that the current realm of counterterrorism provokes controversy on a human 
rights level. This thesis has sought also to discuss the relevance and importance of risk and 
the calculation of risk in respect of those measures employed by the UK, to counter-terrorism. 
Controversy has arisen around the impact that counter-terrorism measures have had upon 
liberty in the absence of a trial, conviction or criminal wrongdoing; instead, such measures 
reflect a move towards a law and policy-making based upon risk and uncertainty instead of 
guilt (Zedner, 2009; de Londras, 2011).729 One can recognise that there is an executive 
argument that there needs to be protection of national security and public safety, which is 
expressed in government publications (see CONTEST); this thesis has throughout sought to 
consider the elements of risk created or alleviated by enforcing or implementing counter-
terrorism measures, which relate to the concerns with human rights, as identified in each 
chapter. As de Londras (2011) explains, there is a balancing approach which identifies a co-
existence between rights and security which in turn creates limits to 'individual rights and 
[gives rise to] security-motivated' state activity (2011: 596). In this chapter the extensive 
discussion of each measure is collectively brought together to answer the fundamental 
questions identified within the introduction of this thesis.  
 
Ultimately, this chapter intends to explain and create an understanding that greater safeguards 
are required when utilising pre-emptive and preventative measures such as those 
implemented by the UK. In doing so, this chapter will look at the counter-terrorism measures 
discussed in Chapters Two to Five and at their interlinking pre-emptive and preventative 
characteristics which were discussed in detail in Chapter One. This chapter will then consider 
the link human rights have had with the discussed measures, before then examining the wider 
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risks caused by those measures. Before identifying whether pre-emptive and preventative 
counterterrorism measures, such as those adopted by the UK post-9/11, are:  
(i) proportionate,  
(ii) effective; and  
(iii) whether they support the UK strategy to counter terrorism.   
Finally this chapter, bringing together the discussions of the preceding chapters, will 
conclude that these measures are ineffective, disproportionate and do not support the UK 
strategy in countering terrorism. 
 
UK PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
This thesis has considered various types of counter-terrorism measure adopted by the UK 
which operate and behave either pre-emptively, preventatively or via some feature or nature, 
as a combination of the two. Zedner (2007b; 2009) argues that preventative measures have 
arisen to avert the risk in the growth of terrorist-related activity; this became recognised as a 
'new paradigm in prevention' (Cole, 2006; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). Consequently, it 
has been recognised that an 'aggressive preventative agenda' had been adopted by the UK, 
which Janus (2004) described as ‘radical prevention’. It will be discussed later in this chapter 
that through this approach a 'new paradigm of control and coercion' has been adopted and 
established itself (Lazarus et al, 2013). As discussed throughout this thesis, pre-emptive and 
preventative actions or decisions are widely based on intelligence; Isaacson and O’Connell 
(2002) and Cutter, Richardson and Wilbanks (2003) believe that intelligence can be "highly 
fragmentary, lacking in well-defined links, and fraught with deception".730 This creates a 
number of risks, including room for doubt about the basis for such actions, given that 
intelligence may be circumstantial rather than definitive. Pre-emptive and preventative 
applications work similarly to the ‘precautionary principle’ under which it would be 
unacceptable to wait until the level of the threat or harm is fully realised, as previously 
discussed. Later in this chapter it will be discussed that this causes a moral dilemma for the 
UK and brings into question whether the adopted measures are proportionate to the threat.  
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Ultimately, when a threat or event is uncertain or it is unknown when it will be realised - 
‘dispositif of precautionary risk’ - it creates visions of a disastrous future (Aradau and van 
Munster, 2008. In other words, it creates the ‘worst case scenario’ approach, which for the 
government can be used to support the need to act before it is too late despite there being a 
lack of strong evidence or intelligence in place. One risk arising from this situation is that 
government can create a constant argument of a ‘state emergency’, which was seen under the 
rolling-programme of s44 stop and search (see Chapter Two). This precautionary behaviour 
may also be based upon inaccurate assessments of the probability or likelihood that a threat 
will come to light, which may stem from previous events and instances rather than 
necessarily from strong evidence, including intelligence that may have been obtained by 
means of torture from other states. It therefore follows that any action or decision taken that 
may or will impact upon an individual’s life should be done under tighter controls and 
safeguards; this thesis argues that this can only be achieved through criminal justice 
safeguards and protections. The time in which the state acts should be dependent upon the 
threat posed by the suspect and pre-emptive and preventative action should be taken when the 
threats posed are imminent and likely to materialise, rather than at an earlier time when the 
threat is being assumed. This argument will go to the heart of determining whether state pre-
emptive or preventative action is proportionate to the threat. The determination and concept 
of whether a ‘state of emergency’ exists and its role in answering the three main fundamental 
points identified will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Each of the measures examined within this thesis show that they are not required to be used 
at any specific time, for example at times when there is an imminent threat of a terrorist 
attack; this has been identified as one of the concerns under ETPIMs because the ETPIMB 
2011 provides no clarification as to when ETPIMs may be activated. Assessing when to 
enforce any particular measure should impose clear accountability throughout a process; this 
was one of the main criticisms of the s44 measure which lacked accountability from the 
Secretary of State to the frontline police officer, as explained in Chapter Two. The safeguard 
of accountability will be discussed further in this chapter. In each legislative framework 
which each measure is based upon, there is a failure to provide any specific test to determine 
when a state of emergency would be deemed to exist, and instead allows this to come from 
the subjective assessment of the Secretary of State. Each of the considered measures are early 
interventionist measures, but are recognised as emergency or executive powers, used to tackle 
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terrorism through control and management of the threat. Initially the UK government was 
enforcing and enacting counter terrorism measures which eroded or breached human rights in 
the early stages of fighting terrorism post-9/11. In the later post 9/11 period the UK has 
introduced counter terrorism measures which have made greater attempts to be human rights 
compliant, as seen by the two forms of control orders, TPIMs and ETPIMs and use of 
assurances to deport foreign terrorist suspects. 
 
PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
The counter-terrorism debate has predominately been centralised around the issues of human 
rights with them being extensively discussed, debated and criticised by human rights 
campaign groups such as Liberty. It is also important to recognise that s44 stop and search, 
and the other counterterrorism measures examined in this thesis (Chapters Three to Five) 
have developed following the Belmarsh case: control orders were introduced as a direct result 
of the judgment, which consequently developed into the current TPIM and ETPIM schemes. 
Further this judgment impacted upon the development of Deportation with Assurances 
('DWA') after declaring that the Part 4 measure breached Articles 14 and 5 ECHR. Each of 
the measures considered within this thesis have been primarily based around Articles 5 and 6, 
although some measures may affect other human rights (eg DWA relates more to Article 3). 
The counter terrorism measures post-9/11 have increasingly mimicked the coercive effects of 
the criminal law; despite this they have not had to face the same restrictions and protections 
afforded to suspects in the criminal justice system (Lazarus et al, 2013); this has resulted in 
the development of a counter terrorism justice system and counter terrorism justice model 
(Walker, 2013).  
 
S44 stop and search is an adaptation of ordinary stop and search police powers, whilst control 
orders/TPIMs and ETPIMs are adaptations of ASBOs and SOPOs and other pre-emptive and 
preventative orders seen in the criminal justice system; DWA on the other hand is an 
adaption of the immigration system. These hybrid measures are generally speaking enforced 
when the Secretary of State believes that a suspect has been or is involved in terrorist-related 
activity (Lazarus et al, 2013) which requires control or management. Fenwick (2010) and 
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Walker (2013) have argued that counterterrorism measures post-9/11 have read down the 
ECHR and some of the basic fundamental rights, including rights of a fair hearing and rights 
to a private/family life (Articles 6 and 8 respectively). It has been seen that an arguable 
breach of the qualified rights, such as Article 8, may tip the balance and be of relevance to a 
breach of other Convention rights such as Article 5 (eg AP case); it may also allow the courts 
to rule on Article 8 grounds rather than on Article 5 ones, as exemplified by CA v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department731 and Gillian and Quinton v United Kingdom.732  
 
Each of the UK counter-terrorism measures discussed in each chapter of this thesis have 
questioned compliance with variety of Convention rights, primarily Article 5 and 6. The 
introduction of a counter terrorism justice system therefore creates concerns about 
Convention-compliance. If this system becomes normalized, procedural restrictions initially 
used in the counter terrorism justice system are likely to overspill into other ordinary justice 
systems, namely criminal justice and civil justice (Fenwick, 2013). This overspill has been 
seen through the passing of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and will be likely to be seen in 
a revised immigration system with upcoming immigration reforms.733 Some of the more 
concerning issues of human rights relate to a person’s freedom and liberty as protected by 
Article 5, as well as their procedural rights as protected by Article 6. In relation to these 
protections there has been a recalibration towards a merely basic/minimal protection via 
interpretation (Fenwick, 2010). Deprivation of liberty has been re-examined by the domestic 
courts to distinguish between deprivation and restriction; procedural protections under Article 
6 have been read down, and an implied limitation on the automatic right of being innocent 
until proven guilty has arisen (Article 6(2)). Further to this fair and open/transparent justice 
has been minimised as witnessed in issues of disclosure and in respect of the judiciary having 
limited involvement, which offers little protection to human rights because the Secretary of 
State and decisions made are less likely to be held accountable. 
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Deprivation of liberty caused by UK counter-terrorism measures 
The principles of Guzzardi have assisted in determining what constitutes deprivation of 
liberty, which has been discussed within Chapters Two and Five. The Gillan and Quinton 
case is an example of this as it related to the use of s44 stop and search emergency powers of 
which the House of Lords found that the measures did not deprive a person of liberty under 
Article 5(1). Although the ECtHR did find the s44 measure to be coercive, it did not 
ultimately rule on whether a deprivation of liberty had been caused by the measure. The 
decision that the measure was coercive facilitated the court’s conclusion that its use had 
breached Article 8 because this right covers aspects of physical and psychological integrity 
and it was found that a suspect would suffer embarrassment or humiliation as a result of use 
of the measure. This behaviour of reaching a finding under Article 8 as opposed to Article 5 
is illustrative of a reading down of rights, arguably a regular occurrence in judicial 
interpretation in relation to each measure assessed in this thesis. 
 
Detention prevents individuals from engaging in any normal activity; the impact is such that 
it can prevent a person from travelling, using modern technology, or participating in family or 
religious activities. Detention of this kind can impact upon a person’s sociological, 
economical and psychological status; this thesis has also demonstrated that such negative 
impacts can be felt (indirectly) on others associated with a terrorist suspect, usually the 
family. Reference has been made by some academics (Berks, 2008) to the opinion of US 
judge Justice Scalia when quoting Blackstone on the value to society of the right to liberty: 
"Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: for if once it 
were left in the power of any, the highest magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he of 
his officers though proper…there would soon be an end of all other rights and 
immunities…To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without 
accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once 
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the person, 
by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less 
public, a less striking, and therefore more dangerous engine of arbitrary government…"734 
                                                          
734 Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi, as next friend of Yaser Esam Hamsi, Petitioners v Donald H. 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al (2004) Supreme Court (No. 03-6696), 28th June 2004. 
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Whilst the domestic courts have considered deprivation of liberty and assessed its duration 
and type etc, failure to take into consideration the full impact or risks of measures which such 
deprivation creates, arguably, demonstrates the extent of judicial deference towards executive 
decisions. If the impact of such measures, including the impact they have on a suspect’s 
family, was fully taken into account, it is possible that the courts would see measures that 
were viewed as ‘restrictions’ on liberty as translating into deprivations of liberty. But this is a 
matter that has not formed part of the risk assessment undertaken by policy-makers, 
independent assessors or courts, as this thesis has argued. 
 
Article 6: Procedural fairness and a down-reading 
The House of Lords described itself and the courts generally as guardians of the rule of law 
and "specialists in the protection of liberty".735 As suggested by Ewing and Tham (2008) a 
weak rule of law has 'implications for the judicial protection of human rights...leading 
inexorably to low levels of protection of human rights'.736 It is argued that Ewing and Tham’s 
assessment is pertinent in relation to a range of counter terrorism measures enforced post-
9/11. The counter terrorism measures discussed in this thesis have seen an increased use of 
arbitrary decision-making in comparison with ordinary measures in the criminal justice 
system; this is best illustrated by s44 stop and search, control orders, TPIMs and ETPIMs. It 
is argued that a heavy burden remains with the state in order to justify detention or 
restrictions on a person’s liberty (Wellman, 2013) without trial. But insofar as indefinite 
detention is concerned, as seen by the Belmarsh case, and most of the counter terrorism 
measures enforced by the UK, such as control orders/TPIMs and ETPIMs, low standards of 
proof are imposed. When coupled with the use of closed hearings and limited disclosure, the 
processes and procedures work in favour of the government and securitization. As this thesis 
has addressed, once the government has accused the suspect of terrorist-related activity and 
imposed a counter-terrorism measure on that suspect, the burden of proof in effect shifts from 
the state to the individual. This approach arises since the suspects have to prove that their 
behaviour is normal, not abnormal; that they are at risk, rather than creating risks; these are 
the characteristics of the counter-terror scheme discussed in Chapter One. This analysis can 
                                                          
735 Ewing and Tham (fn 59) 690. 
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be seen to apply in particular to measures such as s44 as discussed in Chapter Two. In 
relation to the control orders regime, as a suspect is only entitled to minimal disclosure so 
they may give reasonable instructions to their legal representatives (including special 
advocates), there is not a level playing field (equality of arms) and suspects have a difficult 
battle to prove their innocence – which is contrary to Article 6. 
 
If counter terrorism measures are adaptations from the criminal justice system or immigration 
system, one might expect standards of fair trial or hearing to be upheld. However, UK 
counter terrorism measures have failed to adhere to those standards, although some standards, 
such as minimum disclosure, have been developed through legal challenges. This thesis has 
shown that human rights, particularly Article 6, have been read down since the judiciary has 
taken a deferential approach to executive stances on security. As exemplified by Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v BM,737 the Court of Appeal interpreted Article 6; this 
enabled the court to consider whether at the time it was necessary for the measure to be 
imposed (Walker, 2013); this stance provided minimal rights rather the full ambit of the right 
a suspect would enjoy under the criminal justice system. Other examples of this come from 
the issues of disclosure and of knowledge of the full case against the suspect. Prior to the 
judgment in AF (No 3) the executive was against disclosing information to a suspect terrorist; 
this decision however has led to a re-balance of the provisions, making them fairer in Article 
6 terms. The risk is that these ‘exceptional measures’ become normalized because the rhetoric 
of ‘exceptionalism’ and the logic of pre-emption and prevention shift the accepted standards 
and practices appertaining to existing and ordinary criminal justice systems (Beck, 2002; 
2003; 2006; Ericson and Doyle, 2004; Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Lazarus et al, 2013). 
In other words, the counter terrorism justice system and counter terrorism model which these 
exceptional measures work under, have established that greater support is given to national 
security over human rights, even in attempts to re-balance this as seen in relation to TPIMs. 
 
Securitization has supported the executive’s re-configuration of safeguards and protections 
which would ordinarily be seen in the criminal justice system, in order to fit the new counter 
terrorism justice system. The discussion of human rights can only take the debate so far, 
                                                          
737 SSHD v BM (fn 644). 
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whilst consideration and assessment of risk could aid in allowing human rights-based 
arguments to obtain greater purchase. Whilst it is recognised that discussion surrounding 
counter terrorism invokes extensive debate of human rights, the tri-relationship which 
includes risk assessment, aids in the determination that specific Convention rights are 
breached as a consequence of counter terrorism measures and obligations.  
 
PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
Within the tri-relationship of counter terrorism measures, discussion of risk assessment has 
enabled the identification of risks which are caused by pre-emptive and preventative 
measures. Whilst pre-emptive and preventative measures operate slightly differently to one 
another, the use of such measures plays a pivotal role in the creation of the new counter 
terrorism justice system and counter terrorism model, given that the UK has moved from a 
reactive to a proactive approach. The creation of this new justice system and model 
demonstrates that pre-emption and prevention have become normalized since 9/11 (Fenwick, 
2013), and the aims and actions of government have become legitimised in this context 
(Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Lazarus et al, 2013: 466). These measures have been 
normalized through the government’s determination to achieve securitization, which has been 
identified throughout this thesis; invariably the impact of securitization within the UK 
counter terrorism measures has resulted in the creation of further risks such as that of 
radicalisation. This is due to the executive’s perception of a state of emergency, a lack of 
judicial involvement, a lack of accountability and transparency and the use of coercive 
measures. Ultimately each chapter identified that there are long-term consequences. These 
arise from the use of pre-emptive and preventative measures, namely they facilitate an 
increase in support for terrorist organisations and for propaganda campaigns against the UK, 
and this in turn contributes to the radicalisation of potential terrorists. Due to such potential 
risks one may question the proportionality and effectiveness of such measures. 
 
The executive’s perception of a ‘state of emergency’ 
The existence of a terrorist threat, or terrorist-related activity, is a requirement of UK counter 
terrorism measures. When examining the s44 stop and search measure it was identified that 
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an imminent threat test should have been adopted since it would have allowed for a 
determination as to whether a pre-emptive or preventative measure was being appropriately 
utilised. As a result it would have become the first assessment undertaken prior to deciding 
which measure to use. As discussed in Chapter Two, Just War theorists rely on the distinction 
of the threat to determine whether they need to act and when: ‘pre-emption [is] aimed at 
grave threats that are imminent, and prevention [is] aimed at threats that, while equally grave 
or graver, are as yet more distant.'738 Grotius believes that "[w]ar in defence of life is 
permissible only when the danger is immediate and certain, not when it is merely 
assumed."739 In the Belmarsh case,740 Lord Bingham cited the Greek case: "[t]he emergency 
must be actual or imminent, its effect must involve the whole nation, the continuance of the 
organized life of the community must be threatened, [and] the crisis of danger must be 
exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the 
maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly inadequate."741 
 
The determination of whether there is a state of emergency or supreme emergency, remains 
for the government of the day. Walzer (2000) describes these situations as ones where the 
threat is “literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful” (2000: 253). This description 
means that emergency situations must be found to exist, otherwise it would not be possible to 
justify the importance of repudiating human rights in favour of national security. Wellman 
(2013) believes that Walzer’s description could be interpreted as a hyperbolic assertion since 
it views the terrorist threat as so serious or immediate; this means that no calculation would 
be required to consider whether a balance between human rights and national security is 
necessary. In Chapter Two, this thesis has argued that it is important that a terrorist threat 
should be found to be imminent to make it necessary to act pre-emptively; this approach is 
one which Walzer (1977) would support, identifying the two main criteria to use when 
determining necessity: 
"Though its use is often ideological, the meaning of the phrase is a matter of common sense. 
It is defined by two criteria which correspond to the two levels on which the concept of 
necessity works: the first has to do with the imminence of the danger and the second with its 
                                                          
738 Gregory M.Reichberg, Hendrick Sysc and Endre Begby (eds) 'The Ethics of War' (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 403. 
739 Grotius (fn 174). 
740 A and Others v SSHD (fn 24). 
741 Ibid. 
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nature. The two criteria must be applied. Neither one by itself is sufficient as an account of 
extremity or as a defence of the extraordinary measures extremity is thought to require".742 
The first criterion confirms the need to act, which would be based on the immediacy test as 
mentioned. The second criterion takes into account the nature and degree of the threat itself; 
whilst Wellman (2013) regards this as difficult to interpret, it must be remembered that 
‘terrorist threats’ can invoke imagery of catastrophic consequences (eg bombings). The 
second criterion supports the assessment and determination of what sort of measure should be 
enforced and may inadvertently become an assessment of proportionality. If a terrorist 
suspect supports the ideologies of an organisation, has no intention of participating in violent 
extremism but is transferring funds to that organisation which the Secretary of State lists as a 
terrorist organisation, should that person be subject to counter terrorism measures such as a 
control order/TPIM? 
 
The public perception of terrorism and that of the professional/scholarly communities, or 
‘opinion-formers’ (Gomis, 2013a), is different; the Chatham House-You Gov Survey 2012743 
sampled 2,079 members of the public and 735 opinion-formers in June 2012 (pre-London 
2012 Olympics). They were asked ‘What are the greatest threats to British way of life?’ – 
50% of the general public identified international terrorism whilst 39% of opinion-formers 
took this view, as shown Diagram 4:  
                                                          
742 Michael Walzer 'Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations' (Basic Books: New 
York, 1977), 252. Also see Michael Walzer 'Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations' (Basic Books: New York, 2000). Also see Carl Wellman 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Moral 
Assessment' (SpringerBriefs in Law, 2013) 9. 
743 Chatham House 'You Gov Survey: What are the greatest threats to British way of life?' 2012 
<http://chathamhousesurvey.org/default/summary/section-2/question-3> accessed 12th May 2013. 
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Diagram 4: Chatham House (2012) 'You Gov Survey: What are the greatest threats to British way of 
life?'744 
 
Scholars, such as Gomis (2013a), consider that perceived threats of terrorism are heightened 
by an anniversary of a previous terrorist attack (eg 9/11 or 7/7), or following a recent terrorist 
attack or large public events and forums (eg 2012 London Olympics) This may explain why 
the public perception of terrorism in this survey differs significantly from that of opinion-
formers. Due to fear and public anxiety, state officials are more likely to be influenced to take 
counter-terrorism actions which are not justified by the threat level. Taking such action may 
be justified by a cost-benefit analysis, as Wellman (2013) explains; the low number of 
innocent or ‘suspect terrorists’ detained and removed from ordinary due process is viewed as 
an acceptable cost compared with the benefit of preventing death and destruction or 
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alleviating fear of attacks. However, this ‘act-utilitarian justification’ would clearly be 
unacceptable to some, including Walzer (1977): 
"The problem is that it is too easy to juggle the figures. Utilitarianism, which was supposed to 
be the most precise and hard-headed of moral arguments, turns out to be speculative and 
arbitrary. For we have to assign values where there is no agreed valuation, no recognized 
hierarchy of value, no market mechanism for determining the positive or negative worth of 
different acts and outcomes".745  
Walzer (2004) adds that "[c]ommonly, what we are calculating is our benefit (which we 
exaggerate) and their cost (which we minimize or disregard entirely)", which may be 
acceptable to the executive (Walzer, 2004; Wellman, 2013). Where a supreme emergency is 
anticipated exceptional measures which may be ordinarily considered morally unacceptable 
due to the effect such measures have on a person, their family and human rights, may be 
deemed necessary to avert the threat. In order to achieve this there needs to exist an imminent 
threat so that such measures may be considered necessary. The difficulty seen with each 
measure examined in this thesis is that judicial scrutiny and involvement is either minimised, 
lacking or approached in a deferential fashion, allowing the Secretary of State to decide when 
a state of emergency exists. This reaffirms that this is an executive-led process rather than a 
legally-led one, supporting the government’s aim of securitization. 
 
An indirect consequence of state emergency and the aim of securitization is that questions or 
doubts are raised about morality. Walzer (1977) believes that the acknowledgement of rights, 
such as human rights, forces realisation of "our deepest moral commitments" (1977: 262). 
This thesis argues in support of human rights and the importance of them when considering 
whether to restrict a person’s day-to-day life or freedom without the aid of prosecution and 
conviction; therefore it takes the stance that the moral commitment to Convention rights 
should be higher. Walzer (2004) confirms that: 
"There are no moments in human history that are not governed by moral rules; the human 
world is a world of limitation, and moral limits are never suspended – the way we might, for 
example, suspend habeas corpus in a time of civil war. But there are moments when the rules 
                                                          
745 Michael Walzer 'Arguing about War' (Yale University Press: New York, 2004), 38. Also see Wellman (fn 742) 
121. 
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can be and perhaps have to be overridden. They have to be overridden precisely because they 
have not been suspended"746 
Wellman (2013) believes that such 'absolutism of rights' is not impenetrable to moral 
argument; this may come in the format of one person, or minority of people, losing their 
freedoms or restrictions on their freedoms rather than deprivation of liberty to save the lives 
and freedoms of many. Wellman’s point has been seen in UK counter terrorism measures: 
Article 3 ECHR is a non-derogable right; yet when deporting a terrorist suspect to another 
country with poor human rights records’, the use of assurances helps to side-step the absolute 
obligation of Article 3. As a consequence of such practices the UK’s moral commitment to 
the protection of human rights is similarly side-stepped. Consequently, when the UK 
suspends its commitment to human rights in order to enforce counter-terrorism measures, its 
moral standing is brought into question. This may be salvaged at times of a state of 
emergency such as an imminent threat of a terrorist attack. However, given that each of the 
measures assessed in this thesis were or are not required to be enforced at times of a state 
emergency, the morality of the UK is still questionable. 
 
Lack of judicial involvement 
Counter-terrorism measures discussed in this thesis demonstrate that when the Secretary of 
State suspends human rights, either in whole or part, when enforcing such measures, there 
has been limited judicial scrutiny or a deferential attitude by the courts towards the measures. 
Lord Bingham in the Belmarsh case identified that matters relating to terrorism and counter-
terrorism remains an executive-based matter, a view considered by Fenwick and Phillipson 
(2011), when explaining that the assessment of intelligence and the threat posed by suspects 
is viewed largely as the prerogative of the executive. Despite this there should be judicial 
involvement to ensure a degree of protection to the human rights of individuals and to 
remove state oppression. Dershowitz (2006) remarked that there was a need for ‘preventative 
intervention’ from the judiciary, particularly when the formal use of the criminal justice 
system or protections therein are circumscribed, which may reduce the possibility of a future 
conviction. As Lord Bingham also recognised, this is a fundamental role of the judiciary who 
                                                          
746 Ibid. 
289 
 
are guardians to the rule of law and are "specialists in the protection of liberty".747 Former 
Home Secretaries, such as Charles Clarke MP, have supported a reduced judicial involvement 
in the process of enforcing counter-terrorism measures, on the basis that 'the Government’s 
and my, prime responsibility is to protect the nation’s security. In many ways, that is our 
paramount task. Decisions in this area are properly for the Executive, who are fully 
accountable to Parliament for their actions.'748 Walker (2013) would describe this as ‘political 
constitutionalism’ which purports to achieve constitutionalism, such as accountability and 
democratic representation, by political instead of legal mechanisms. Walker (2013) suggests 
that this is achieved through interaction between government and Parliament, although as will 
be argued this has been reduced through measures such as TPIMs and ETPIMs. 
 
There has been the suggestion by Zedner (2007b) that judicial interference results in further 
restrictions being imposed. As explained in Chapter Three, the Belmarsh case led to the 
implementation of control orders which illustrates this point. The control order regime and 
TPIM/ETPIM schemes demonstrate the restrictive involvement given to the judiciary in 
counter-terrorism measures in which the court needs to determine whether the decision of the 
Secretary of State was obviously flawed. Whilst some academics, such as Ewing and Tham 
(2008), would consider the lack of or reduced judicial involvement to be a result of 
legislation, and therefore an example of the ‘laws against laws’ theory; as mentioned in 
Chapter Three, the judiciary have a mandate to provide declarations of incompatibility. These 
have not been used against counter-terrorism measures since the Belmarsh case. This in itself 
raises questions of the judiciary’s morality and moral commitment to human rights. 
 
Whilst there has been reduced involvement by the judiciary, counter-terrorism measures have 
seen an increase in the use of quasi-judicial roles which are ordinarily given to the Secretary 
of State. The exception to this is s44 stop and search which gave a quasi-judicial role to 
police. This exceptional measure was understood to reduce the trust given to the police due to 
the perceptions such powers (like s44) gave: "[m]y confidence in the police is at an all-time 
                                                          
747 Ewing and Tham (fn 59). 
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low, I don’t trust them and because of the powers they now have I trust them less".749 One 
would argue that the same feeling of mistrust would be felt towards the UK government. 
Human rights organisations have condemned suggestions to create specialist courts "as an 
attempt at co-opting judges into administrative detention policy" (Zedner, 2005: 528); doing 
so would only further raise questions of the judiciary’s moral standing, judicial findings and 
independence. 
 
As explained in Chapter Three, the TPIM and ETPIM schemes there is a legislative 
reviewing process which involves the Secretary of State, security services, police and Crown 
Prosecution Service, known as TRG in accordance with s10(5) TPIMA 2011. The primary 
function of the TRG is to determine whether it is possible to prosecute a suspect, although 
one may be cynical about whether prosecutions are likely whilst a suspect is subject to a 
TPIM/ETPIM, given that no successful convictions are recorded under the former control 
order regime. One aspect of scrutiny, one may argue, comes from open debate and 
Parliamentary scrutiny. Parliamentary scrutiny itself became seen as 'a bit of fiction',750 
despite recognition that such a safeguard could identify and recognise faults in such executive 
powers (Walker, 2013). Under the TPIMA 2011 s19, quarterly reports are 'quantative in 
nature', but provide no opportunity for debate, as recognised by James Brokenshire MP.751 
Some may view the independent reports by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation as a form of independent scrutiny; however under s20 TPIMA 2011 the provision 
for reviews by the Independent Reviewer provide no time limits or deadlines for a report to 
be produced. Given that UK counter terrorism measures post-9/11 have increased the reliance 
on executive judgments and decreased the scrutiny of those judgments, one would expect the 
judiciary to ensure that there is accountability and transparency, given that such judgments 
can result in the loss of liberty and have very restrictive effects on people’s private lives. As 
Walker (2013) explains, there should be an increase in the ‘judicialisation of intelligence’ in 
                                                          
749 Human Rights Watch 'United Kingdom Without Suspicion: Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 2000' 
2010 (July), 57 <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uk0710webwcover.pdf> accessed 1st 
September 2013. Also see: Basia Spalek 'Counter-terrorism policing and section 44 profiling' in 'Ethnic Profiling: 
The Use of ‘Race’ in UK Law Enforcement' (The Runnymede Trust, February 2010). 
750 Public Bill Committee, House of Commons 'Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill' 2010-
2012a First Sitting (21st June 2011) PBC Bill 193, 23. 
751 Public Bill Committee, House of Commons 'Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill' 2010-
2012b Eighth Sitting (30th June 2011) PBC Bill 193, 251. 
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assessing the scope, standards and processes for testing intelligence, rather than simply 
accepting the conclusions of the Secretary of State. 
 
Lack of accountability and transparency 
Clearly, for the reasons set out, judicial involvement is crucial to ensure accountability and 
transparency of executive decisions and actions. Briggs (2010) believes that accountability 
mechanisms can recognise that whilst the executive has responsibility for decisions, actions 
and processes, responsibility of the decision-making processes can be shared with others. In 
this regard frontline police officers who enforce exceptional powers like s44 stop and search, 
would be accountable for their decision to stop and search individuals which would prevent 
racial-profiling; there would also be accountability shared with senior police officers and the 
Secretary of State who would be party to the process of allowing the use of such counter-
terrorism measures. This would also prevent arbitrary decision-making. For the DWA 
measure, there needs to be accountability in respect of both the contracting and receiving 
state. Given that assurances under this measure are considered to be bi-lateral agreements or 
'paper promises from torturers'752 and are unenforceable in the courts if breached, there needs 
to be accountability by the UK as a safeguard to provide a remedy for any breach. The 
difficulty with this suggestion is that it would be difficult to monitor compliance with the 
assurances, as discussed in Chapter Four. The control order regime and TPIM/ETPIM 
schemes, provide accountability of executive decisions from either judicial or Parliamentary 
scrutiny, or both. As mentioned earlier, judicial scrutiny has been limited by legislation and 
the judiciary have been deferential towards executive judgments; Parliamentary scrutiny has 
been limited. 
 
By providing a lack of accountability, a lack of transparency arises and the risk remains that 
the UK’s moral reputation is damaged. As Briggs (2010) clarifies, a strong reputation is 
based upon the perceptions of others, such as communities, and their perceptions can only be 
based on what they see or are involved with. Therefore, if the decision-making process is not 
accountable, it becomes difficult to ensure that disproportionate decisions are not made. For 
example, the CA case demonstrates that whilst the Secretary of State deemed it necessary to 
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impose a relocation obligation upon the suspect who was subject to a control order, the judge 
held that with the assistance of CA’s wife he was less likely to be involved with terrorist 
related activity. In this case, had the judge not held the Secretary of State accountable for her 
decision and considered the potential long-term effects of such measures/obligations (eg 
social isolation), then CA may have remained a terrorist threat and his family would have 
resented the UK government for the breakdown of the marriage. 
 
UK pre-emptive and preventative measures are coercive 
An aspect of accountability comes from the determination of whether there has been a 
deprivation of liberty; this may occur in various forms including coercion. It falls upon the 
judiciary to avoid deference towards executive submissions and ensure that a deprivation of 
liberty does not result, as well as protecting human rights. The obligations imposed under a 
control order/TPIM or TPIM identifies a coercive nature, similar to that seen in s44 stop and 
search, as mentioned in Chapter Five. 
 
Coercion in s44, control orders, TPIMs and ETPIMs is demonstrated through the strict 
criminal liability they impose, enforcing compliance by citizens in respect of the execution of 
these counter terrorism measures. As explained in Chapters Two and Three, suspects were 
forced to comply with s44 and the obligations under the control order regime, this was 
coercive because failure to adhere resulted in criminal action. Coercion which mimics legally 
justified punitive practices has increasingly been used by the UK government to pre-empt 
terrorism; this is considered justifiable in the name of ‘exceptionalism’ (Lazarus et al, 
2013)753 and may also form part of the state of emergency argument. Scholars such as 
Lazarus et al (2013) acknowledged that coercive measures do not constitute punishment. This 
thesis recognises that coercion on its own would not cause a breach of Convention rights; 
however, when cumulatively added to other factors, including the impact of a measure on a 
suspects’ social contacts, a breach may occur of Article 5. Thus the risks caused by the 
counter-terrorism measure are disproportionate to their value (eg since negative perceptions 
of the state arise). 
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Given that coercion causes a person to change their behaviour, by imposing a sense of ‘self-
policing’ on a suspect (Zedner, 2007a; 2007b; 2008), greater control and management over a 
suspect’s life is the output or consequence. It also assists the government in achieving 
securitization, although the long-term risk of coercion has meant the development of 
'inadvertent legitimising of [the use] of coercive measures' (Lazarus et al, 2013: 464). UK 
counter-terrorism measures post-9/11 have seen the introduction of a range of ‘exceptional’ 
coercive measures; these include s44 stop and search, control orders, TPIMs and ETPIMs.  
 
When enforcement of counter-terrorism measures are based on fragmented or unclear 
information, some of which may be gained by torture, the ability of police to undertake 
effective investigation of suspects may be effected. Whilst preventative policing, like s44, 
may deter terrorism, this thesis has shown it does not support government policy in 
prosecuting and convicting terrorists. As a result, the use of these measures can be questioned 
because they should not be used to simply snoop on the public in the hope of identifying 
terrorists. It is suggested by Gross (2003), Ackerman (2004), Ignatieff (2004) and Lazarus et 
al (2013) that measures such as those discusses in this thesis, are justified when limited to 
emergency circumstances; it therefore follows that without emergency reasons such measures 
are unjustifiable. It is important therefore, that there exists an emergency situation, which can 
only be determined if there is an imminent threat of terrorism that will be realised (as 
discussed earlier), and the measures enforced are proportionate to counter-act the threat. The 
problem established in this thesis is that these measures fail to identify emergency 
circumstances; therefore they are enforced at the Secretary of State’s discretion and can 
create a blanket-ban or rolling-programme of control, as seen in relation to s44, control orders 
and TPIMs/ETPIMs. This situation, having been created by securitization, becomes 
normalized and enables the use of a counter-terrorism justice system or counter-terrorism 
model: this thesis opposes the counter-terrorism justice system or model becoming the norm; 
rather it should be the exception. 
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Normalization of securitization and the potential long-term consequences 
Post-9/11 there has been an increased normalization of precaution, risk management and 
preventative action (Beck, 2002; 2003; 2006; Ericson and Doyle, 2004; Aradau and van 
Munster, 2007; Lazarus et al, 2013; Fenwick, 2013). As mentioned earlier, all of the counter-
terrorism measures adopted by the UK are adaptations of pre-existing criminal justice 
measures: s44 is an adaptation of ordinary stop and search police powers; control orders, 
TPIMs and ETPIMs are adaptations of other preventative orders, whilst DWA is an 
adaptation of immigration laws and the immigration system (Roach, 2011). Given that 
counter-terrorism measures can have an appearance or prima facie appearance of being part 
of the criminal justice system or ordinary immigration process, it becomes crucial that one is 
capable of distinguishing the two types of process so that counter-terrorism measures do not 
become normalized and accepted as an available everyday measure. 
 
If counter terrorism measures become normalized the UK’s moral commitments and 
reputation would be under constant adverse scrutiny; such a situation would also create a 
fundamental shift from counter-terrorism measures as exceptional to a situation in which they 
are typical. For the DWA and immigration system the distinction between the two would rest 
on 'rights of citizens as opposed to non-citizens' (Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Lazarus et al, 
2013). In 2014 the CPS had applied to hold a terrorist trial against ‘AB’ and ‘CD’ in secret, 
preventing the evidence in the case from being disclosed or reported in wide-media. 
Applications of this kind is supportive evidence of the ‘Counter-Terrorism Model’ and a new 
counter-terrorism justice system becoming normalized. A risk associated with counter-
terrorism measures becoming normalized is that future terrorist attacks may result in the 
belief that further exceptional measures will need to be enacted (Donohue, 2000: 40; Finn, 
2010). The normalization of extraordinary powers increases the risk of repression of sectors 
of the community becoming acceptable; with ever increasing repressive measures being 
called on to manage potential threats (Finn, 2010). 
 
Normalization consequently muddies the distinction between normalcy and emergency which 
in turn undermines the concepts in question and affects the debate surrounding 
proportionality, human rights and constitutional norms. A long-term risk of counter-terrorism 
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measures becoming normalized is radicalisation and stigmatization, or development of 
suspect communities, caused by those measures. Whilst control orders, TPIMs and ETPIMs 
are not enforced by racial profiling, s44 stop and search was, and this strengthened negative 
perceptions and resentment towards the police and emanations of the state. Throughout this 
thesis there has been concern that UK counter-terrorism measures may contribute towards the 
radicalisation of terrorists; this may include the children of those subjected to control 
orders/TPIMs and ETPIMs, having indirectly suffered as a consequence of those measures. 
As Briggs and Birdwell (2009) confirm, it is rarely possible to prove more than the exception, 
rather than the rule, it being 'almost impossible to say with any certainty what the causes are 
as it is so difficult to know whether a factor is instrumental, or merely present.'754 Although it 
is not possible to provide evidence showing a link between those subject to counter-terrorism 
measures, either directly or indirectly, and radicalisation, it remains a possible risk and 
working on a precautionary basis it would be inappropriate to ignore it. Briggs (2010) 
explains that whilst the executive want to gain the confidence of Muslim communities, or 
those that would most likely face being subject to counter-terrorism measures, it must retain 
'the moral high ground and show it is committed to tackling the injustices faced by 
Muslims…';755 this would include trying to cancel out possible causes or contributing factors 
which influence radicalisation; this would include racial profiling and stigmatization. 
 
It is argued by Briggs (2010) and Gomis (2013a) that there are some, such as the 
Communities and Local Government Select Committee, 756 who believe that UK preventative 
measures should tackle threats related to and inspired by Al-Qaeda, rather than encapsulating 
other forms of violent extremism which may be present in far right groups. Briggs (2010) 
explains that the West Yorkshire police conducted a number of raids and discovered far-right 
group members in possession of 80 bombs. A member of these groups, Neil Lawington, was 
arrested in 2008 on the cusp of waging a terror campaign when a large amount of chemical 
explosives were discovered with the British National Party election candidate Robert Cottage. 
Similarly, Martyn Gilleard was found to be in possession of a huge stash of nail bombs and a 
letter in which he declared: "I am so sick of hearing nationalists talk of killing Muslims, of 
                                                          
754 Rachel Briggs and Jonathan Birdwell 'Radicalisation among Muslims in the UK' 2009 MICROCON Policy 
Working Paper 7 (May) <http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/PWP7_RB_JB.pdf> accessed 7th July 2013. 
755 Rachel Briggs 'Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom' 2010 
International Affairs 86(4): 971-981, 973. 
756 Ibid. 
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blowing up mosques, of fighting back, only to see these acts of resistance fail to appear. The 
time has come to stop the talk and start to act".757 Rather than treat these incidents separately, 
one would argue that terrorism should be equally attributed to those violent extremists that 
fall within the meaning of s1 TA 2000, rather than deal with one type of terrorist threat 
differently to another. The stigma may otherwise be attached to one type of terrorism over 
another; indeed Briggs (2010) raises concerns of stigma being attached to ‘suspect 
communities’ such as Muslim groups. Silvestri (2010) and Briggs and Birdwell (2009) 
believe that Islam is not inherently violent but despite this, links are created between those 
that believe in Islam with those that practice violent extremism. 
 
A stigma is believed to have been attached to the Muslim community. A survey conducted by 
FAIR (2004), cited by Bunglawala et al (2004), showed that since 9/11, 80% of those 
Muslims that responded to the survey had been subjected to Islamophobia; 68% felt that they 
had been perceived and treated differently; 32% reported being subjected to discrimination at 
UK airports (Briggs and Birdwell, 2009). Some suggest that young Muslim men suffer 
disproportionately and have emerged as the new ‘folk devils’ of popular and media 
imagination (Alexander, 2000; Bunglawala et al, 2004). Briggs and Birdwell (2009) 
described how Muslim men have been conceptualised as ‘dangerous individuals’ with a 
capacity for violence and/or terrorism, but they are also seen as ‘culturally dangerous’, 
suggesting that they are threatening ‘the British way of life’ (Bunglawala et al, 2004; Briggs 
and Birdwell, 2009). Despite this there are no specific links between race, religion or 
nationality etc which can be used to detect terrorists, as explained in Chapter One.  
 
The assessment of human rights and the input risk assessment can have in assessing counter-
terrorism measures, provides a holistic review of whether a specific measure or obligation is 
proportionate or disproportionate and effective or ineffective. This tri-relationship not only 
takes into consideration Convention rights and whether they are breached, it identifies the 
possible short-term and long-term implications of such measures, including negative 
perceptions of the police and state, lack of accountability, radicalisation and risks of 
securitization. 
                                                          
757 Ibid. 
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TRI-RELATIONSHIP: COUNTER-TERRORISM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RISK 
It is important that counter terrorism measures do not breach the rule of law, as this is 
considered to be the very goal which terrorists aim to attack, creating 'the destabilisation of 
society through the spreading of fear and alarm'.758 It is vital that the rule of law does not 
become collateral damage caused by the measures invoked to remove or reduce the terrorist 
threat (Dickson, 2005). Walker (2013) recognises that when terrorist suspects are dealt with 
outside the criminal justice system and criminal law, there is a cost to the fundamental rights 
of the suspect. The era of securitization post-9/11 which has developed, has caused a fusion 
of ‘criminal justice and national security’ strategies (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). This 
thesis concurs with this view, taking into consideration the CONTEST strategy and 
counterterrorism measures such as s44 and control orders/TPIMs and ETPIMs. The tri-
relationship model which this thesis has identified as a way of assessing UK pre-emptive and 
preventative measures has been used to address the main questions which this thesis has 
ventured to examine; (i) Are counter-terrorism measures proportionate to the threat; (ii) Are 
they an effective way of countering terrorism; and (iii) do they support the UK Strategy 
2011? 
 
Are the measures proportionate? 
Throughout this thesis it has been shown that some counter terrorism measures have been 
found to cause a breach of human rights, or create risks which stretch beyond that which the 
measure intended. Since the Belmarsh case those measures have increasingly been enforced 
or adapted to be proportionate and avoid breaching Convention rights. The assessment of 
proportionality is of fundamental importance when using measures such as DWA and TPIMs 
or ETPIMs. In terms of DWA, the importance of assessing whether the assurances provided 
are proportionate to the ‘real risk’ that the suspect will be tortured upon their return to the 
receiving state is recognised. Similarly, do imposed obligations proportionately restrict the 
threat from being realised? The determination as to proportionality can be ascertained by 
various calculations and formats; in this thesis the assessment considers human rights and 
whether any exceptions are available, followed by taking into consideration any risks which 
                                                          
758 Brice Dickson 'Law versus terrorism: can law win?' 2005 European Human Rights Law Review 1: 11-28. 
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have been discussed throughout this thesis (eg social isolation, indirect negative impact upon 
the suspect’s family etc). Some measures, such as control orders, have been considered 
justifiable because they 'constitute a less burdensome form of preventative detention' when 
compared to Part 4 ACTSA before it was struck down by the House of Lords (Lazarus et al, 
2013); although in comparison, TPIMs and ETPIMs are believed to proportionately impact 
upon an individual’s freedom (Walker, 2013). This can be seen in the CF case759 when the 
obligations imposed were varied slightly so that CF (a student) could live a normal student 
life. Ultimately, the TPIM scheme is considered by Walker (2013) as a more 'proportionate 
response to terrorism risk than the models of control orders that formerly operated'.760 
 
Alternatively, proportionality can be determined by quantum and cost effectiveness. 
Professor Mueller at the Chatham House 2013 seminar on ‘Counterterrorism: The Right 
Response?’761 suggested that the first question to consider in assessing counterterrorism 
mechanisms is ‘how safe are we?’. In answering this question, Mueller explained that the UK 
citizen (including citizens in Northern Ireland) has a 1 in a million per year chance of being 
killed as a consequence of terrorism. With these low chances, Mueller questioned whether the 
minimal chance of terrorism should be enough to justify the counter-terror measures in place. 
On a political basis this would be unlikely to be a positive or acceptable policy. It is also 
important to note that as the UK has adopted a pro-active approach, rather than a reactive 
approach, in its CONTEST strategy, minimal action is unlikely to be favoured politically. For 
risk thinkers the assessment being proposed by Mueller may be acceptable when compared to 
other day-to-day issues, for example road traffic accidents, cancer or murder; if the chance of 
being affected by one of these is greater, then increased resources should be reduced from 
tackling terrorism and increased to deal with that other issue. This concept was discussed 
extensively by Amoore and de Geode (2008). 
 
                                                          
759 CF v SSHD (fn 714). 
760 Walker (fn 256). 
761 Chatham House, 'Counterterrorism: The Right Response?' (6th September 2013), Professor John Mueller, 
Woody Hayes Chair of National Security, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State 
University and Professor Sir David Omand GCB, Visiting Professor at King’s College London; Security and 
Intelligence Coordinator, Cabinet Office UK (2002-2005) 
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/193133> live stream viewed on 6th September 2013. 
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When considering the matter of proportionality on a human rights basis, as mentioned in 
Chapter Five, Articles 8 – 11 ECHR provide grounds on which the state may rely on one of 
the exceptions to the Convention right in question, so long as the proportionality principle is 
adhered to. Determining whether the response to the threat posed by the suspect terrorist is 
proportionate to that threat depends upon the ECHR Article which may be invoked, meaning 
that a blanket proportionality test cannot be applied. The down-grading recalibration of 
Convention rights or of interpretations of proportionality has been seen in each of the 
chapters discussed in this thesis. Article 3 is an absolute right, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
despite this the UK government attempted to try and do so and create a ‘Suresh exception’ or 
similar test (see Chapter Four). Whilst Article 3 is a non-derogable right, DWA represents a 
counter terrorism practice that has been developed and identified as an acceptable way to 
alleviate executive responsibility for upholding the right. This has not softened the human 
rights concerns when one considers the risk assessment arm of the tri-relationship, the need 
for securitization and restrictions imposed under counter terrorism measures in favour of 
executive-led control. 
 
The thesis has examined the risks of counter-terrorism measures and the identified issue of 
morality: should morality or does it form part of the process to determine whether a measure 
is proportionate? Wellman (2013) argues that morality is indeed a fundamental part of such 
processes. As identified earlier, the question of morality is raised when human rights are 
overridden. Wellman explains that a response by the state can be justified not when balancing 
national security with moral rights or human rights, but in the assessment of each measure 
and its response to the prevention of harm and the protection of rights which are then 
weighed against the moral limits. As discussed earlier in this chapter, justification to act 
immorally may depend upon the imminence of the threat which has been described as a 
‘supreme emergency’. Walzer (2004) and Wellman understand that this creates imagery of 
the disaster, which then devalues morality and  facilitates an opportunity to take necessary 
action "so long as what we do doesn’t produce even worse disaster" (Walzer, 2004: 40; 
Wellman, 2013: 122); this would be viewed as proportionate. As Wellman (2013) best 
describes it: 
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'[the] principle of proportionality is presupposed when a moral obligation is overridden by a 
conflicting moral obligation; the latter must be relatively strong and the former relatively 
weak given the circumstances.'762 
This assessment by Wellman takes into account the necessity or imminence of the threat to 
determine whether any action is proportionate. Wellman is right in identifying this as an 
appropriate safeguard, although it then falls upon appropriate scrutiny to determine whether a 
threat requires a necessary response and this is not easily achieved. One would argue that just 
because the law allows for the derogation of human rights or for human rights to be 
overridden, the moral duty or obligation to respect basic fundamental human rights should 
not be suspended. Given that actions such as these are viewed as being the terrorist’s true 
target, the state should not be so easily swayed. Instead, when dealing with matters of 
terrorism one would argue that the need to respect and protect human rights and therefore the 
moral obligations that follow is increased. 
 
For counterterrorism measures such as control orders, TPIMs and ETPIMs, the assessment of 
proportionality has been determined by the legislative framework (eg PTA 2005 and TPIMA 
2011). The Secretary of State has the power to determine whether an imposed obligation is 
necessary and proportionate to alleviate the risk posed by the suspect. It becomes unlikely 
that the courts would rule against the Secretary of State’s decisions, particularly more so with 
TPIMs which are less restrictive than the former control order regime. This, one would 
suggest, operates in a similar way with assurances under DWA. S44 required European 
intervention before it was held to create a breach of human rights (Article 8) and given the 
risk of arbitrary decision-making by the police and possible racial profiling, this measure was 
viewed as disproportionate. If one excluded the discussions of risk of the other measures then 
one may conclude that DWA, control orders/TPIMs and ETPIMs are proportionate, given 
that there is a process of proportionate consideration involved, as discussed earlier. Although 
when adding in the identified risks, one may conclude that these measures are 
disproportionate, conversely Wellman (2013) determined these measures may still be deemed 
proportionate, if used at a time when the suspect posed an imminent threat to national 
security. If these measures are not used at such times, then they are disproportionate because 
the threat is not at such a stage as to require intervention or state oppression. This 
                                                          
762 Wellman (fn 742) 124. 
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demonstrates that the courts need to proactively be a part of the process in determining 
whether a threat is imminent and that the response is justified. 
 
Are the measures effective? 
This thesis does not consider that the assessment of proportionality is simple or 
straightforward. When determining whether a counter terrorism measure is proportionate to 
the threat it is meant to meet, the assessment of effectiveness will be relevant: if the measure 
is ineffective then it is most likely to be disproportionate; if it is effective, it is possible that it 
is proportionate. As Lum et al (2006) and van Um and Pisoiu (2011) confirm, due to the 
proliferation of counter terrorism measures post-9/11 there has been an increase in output 
"[y]et, we currently know almost nothing about the effectiveness of any of these programs" 
(Lum et al, 2006: 510; van Um Pisoiu, 2011: 2). Some may argue that counterterrorism 
measures can be justified if they increase the security and safety of the state and its citizens, 
although this thesis believes that the counterterrorism measures used by the UK excessively 
curtail the liberty and human rights of citizens, which results in the risks this thesis has 
identified throughout. Ultimately, it is the violation or diminution of human rights which can 
limit the support for and legitimisation of counter terrorism measures (Wellman, 2013).  
 
The assessment of effectiveness is widely accepted as difficult to achieve with counter 
terrorism measures (Edwards and Gomis, 2011). Similar to the assessment of proportionality, 
a stumbling block for determining effectiveness is the secrecy of systems involved in 
enforcing counterterrorism measures (Walker, 2013). Young (2001) developed a simple 
process of calculating counterterrorism effectiveness, this was reused and applied by van Um 
and Pisoiu (2011). It is a three stage process: (i) output; (ii) outcome; and (iii) impact. The 
output effectiveness refers to the measure, regulation, policy or legislation which is being 
implemented; the outcome effectiveness considers the direct and measureable effect which 
the measure is intended to have in real-terms. In other words, this looks at the aims of the 
measure itself. The impact effectiveness considers the consequences of the measure itself. 
This sort of process may be used to determine proportionality. It has been applied to each 
measure this thesis has examined and is illustrated in Diagrams 4 – 7 (below). 
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Diagram 4: S44 stop and search 
 
Diagram 5: Control orders 
Output Effectiveness 
•S44 TA 2000, 
emergency stop and 
search; 
•Enforced by police 
officers. 
 
Outcome Effectiveness 
•To proactively deter 
terrorist activity. 
Impact Effectiveness 
•Coercive measure, 
deemed a breach of 
Article 5 ECHR; 
•Used to 'balance the 
books'; 
•Lacked 
accountability; 
•Lacked remedy if 
abused; 
•Quasi-judicial role 
given to police; 
•Everyone is a 
suspect; and 
•No evidence that the 
power was an 
effective measure to 
counter terrorist-
related activity. 
Output Effectiveness 
•Control Orders under 
PTA 2005 
Outcome Effectiveness 
•To control and manage 
terrorist suspects who 
cannot be detained, 
deported or prosecuted 
and the threat they 
pose. 
Impact Effectiveness 
•Restrictive on liberty; 
•Directly impacts upon 
the suspects family; 
•Creates social isolation 
and segragation; 
•May create resentment 
towards the UK; 
•Intelligence and 
evidence gathering  is 
stifled; 
•There is less chance of 
subsequently 
prosecuting for 
terrorirsm related 
offences; 
•The suspect has to self-
regulate their 
behaviour so they do 
not breach the 
obligations; 
•The UK courts are 
deferential towards 
government opinion; 
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Diagram 6: Deportation with Assurances ('DWA') 
 
Diagram 7: TPIMs and ETPIMs 
Output Effectiveness 
• Deportation with Assurances 
Outcome Effectiveness 
• Enable the government to 
deport foreign terrorist 
suspects who cannot be 
detained or prosecuted; 
• When deporting such 
suspects to countries with 
poor human rights records, 
assurances act as mutual 
agreements giving 
protections from human 
rights breaches. 
Impact Effectiveness 
• Risk of torture and 
mistreatment contrary to 
Article 3 ECHR; 
• The receiving state is known 
to have a poor history with 
human rights compliance ; 
• The assurances are not 
legally binding and provide 
no remedy for breaching; 
• Deportation of a suspect 
removes the control and 
management power of the 
state and may prevent 
intelligence/evidence 
gathering; 
• The measure is widely 
criticised by NGO's; 
• Unknowingly to the 
deportee, evidence 
obtained by torture may be 
used as grounds to 
deporting; 
• Assurances are speculative 
assessment; 
• Assurances can impact upon 
multicultrualism and 
cultural relativism. 
Output Effectiveness 
•TPIM under the 
TPIMA 2011; and 
•ETPIM under the 
ETPIMB 2011. 
Outcome Effectiveness 
•To control and 
manage terrorist 
suspects who cannot 
be detained, 
deported or 
prosecuted and the 
threat they pose; 
•It is also forms part 
of the governments 
evidence and 
intellgience 
gathering and 
investigative process 
with a  intention to  
prosecute. 
Impact Effectiveness 
•TPIMS 
•  Reasonable belief as standard of proof; 
•Relaxed use of telecommunications; 
•Removal of relocation; 
•Obligations need to be proportionate; 
•Time limit for which a TPIM is imposed. 
 
•ETPIMS 
• 'Emergency' measure; 
•Retention of relocation obligations and an 
inexhaustive list of obligations, similar to 
control orders; 
•Time limit for which a ETPIM is imposed. 
 
•Both TPIMS and ETPIMS can: 
•  Allow a terrorist suspect to  alter their 
behaviour, making it an ineffective measure 
to gather intelligence/evidence and 
investigate; 
•Through the use of obligations they are 
both coercive; and 
•Both may continue to cause the feeling of 
social isolation and radicalisation. 
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These illustrative processes of effectiveness for each counter terrorism measure shown in 
Diagrams 4 – 7 (above), provide a clear mapping process which identifies not just the aim of 
each measure, but the actual impact of those measures. Scholars and academics have 
considered effectiveness of measures by considering their intended and un-intended side-
effects (Tudge, 2004; Ganor, 2005; Keohane, 2005; Lum et al, 2006; Stohl, 2006, Spencer, 
2006; van Dongen, 2009; van Um and Pisoiu, 2011).763 UK preventative measures, such as 
control orders and TPIMs/ETPIMs, have developed since the repeal of the Part IV measure. 
The control order regime provided the executive with exceptional powers to control and 
manage a person’s day-to-day life in the absence of a criminal conviction, which the 
domestic courts have deemed a restriction as opposed to a deprivation of liberty. However, an 
alternative view may result once the risks are evaluated. TPIMs and ETPIMs developed from 
the former control order regime and perform a similar role: ETPIMs are almost an exact 
replica of the former control order regime, whilst TPIMs are intended to improve on 
investigative and evidence-gathering process to assist in securing criminal convictions, which 
the MacDonald Report (2011) recommended should happen. Anderson QC has 
acknowledged that TPIMs and ETPIMs cannot achieve both aims; this is supported by the 
discussion of detecting terrorist networks in Chapter Five. A suspect who knows that they are 
being monitored is less likely behave openly or continue to engage with terrorist-related 
activity more freely (Fenwick, 2012b; 2013), meaning the government and security services 
are less likely to be able to identify the ‘known unknowns’ as described by former US 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld (2002) and Briggs and Birdwell (2009). Measures 
such as TPIMs and ETPIMs work as a similar deterrent to the s44 measure – they deter the 
suspect from engaging in terrorist-related activity and prevent investigative and evidence-
gathering processes. 
 
S44 was enforced as preventative policing to deter terrorists from engaging in their terrorist-
related activity by providing broad stop and search emergency powers; although did little to 
support the police in investigating and gathering intelligence to prosecute and convict 
terrorists. Government Ministers participated in ethnic profiling for s44, despite this measure 
                                                          
763 Eric van Um and Daniella Pisoiu 'Effective counterterrorism: What have we learned so far?' 2011 
(September) Economics of Security Working Paper 55 EUSECON <http://www.economics-of-security.eu> 
accessed on 23rd September 2015.  
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being used against those that did not fit the stereotypical profile of a terrorist; therefore 
became open to abuse and arbitrary decision making. The measure itself provided no 
remedial approach when police acted or behaved disproportionately and in light of the fact 
that the measure created further negative perceptions of the police and distrust of them, 
concerns are raised as to whether such a measure could be effective. This failure to provide 
remedial measures and checks led to human rights breaches or caused risks to come to 
fruition, and is a serious flaw within the safeguarding of the counter-terrorism measures 
considered within this thesis. For example, this is a missing safeguard in the DWA process – 
a suspect deported who is later mistreated by the receiving state means that the agreed 
assurances are breached, as discussed in Chapter Four. Similarly, both DWA and s44 fail to 
support the government and security services in their detection of terrorist networks (see 
Chapter Five) and identification of the ‘known unknowns’.  
 
Unlike s44 or the preventive measures of control orders and TPIMs/ETPIMs, DWA redresses 
the dilemma identified by the Belmarsh case: what does the government do with foreign 
terrorist suspects? The use of assurances have been identified as an acceptable practice, 
which side-steps the responsibilities of Article 3 ECHR.  As well as the risks in the use of 
assurances, as discussed in Chapter Four, DWA raises risks to the UK’s moral reputation for 
protecting human rights. Whilst some of the suspects themselves may be deeply disliked and 
dangerous suspects, such as Abu Qatada, the UK still knowingly deports a person to a state 
where historical practices show torture is readily used or accepted; similarly standards and 
protections under Article 6 are questioned. This thesis does not question the use of 
deportation as a measure to counter terrorism; however if the UK seeks to control and 
manage a threat whilst simultaneously protecting its reputation and beliefs, then the need for 
assurances cannot be considered an effective counter-terrorism measure. 
 
From the assessment of each counter-terrorism measure and the risks that arise, dependent 
upon the intended outcome of a measure, pre-emptive and preventative measures are seen as 
being generally ineffective. Measures such as those examined in this thesis, cannot play the 
dual role of controlling a suspect and supporting evidence/intelligence gathering processes. 
Measures are enforced when it is not possible to convict a suspect for a terrorist-related 
activity, they are early interventionist measures, empowering an executive-led process which 
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has become the norm within the counter-terrorism justice system and counter terrorism 
model. Given that the suspects, who are subjected to the pre-emptive and preventative 
measure are not convicted of any terrorist-related activity, it becomes even more important 
that such models are restricted and the criminal justice system model and human rights 
approach are engaged with. 
  
Do the measures support the UK Strategy? 
The assessment from each chapter of each measure has identified concerns that exist in pre-
emptive and preventative counterterrorist measures, and it is argued that they contradict the 
UK Strategy 2011. The 2011 strategy, or CONTEST, has re-evaluated the UK government’s 
perception on how to deal with terrorism. The strategy clearly adopts the importance of 
improving the UK’s ability to prosecute and deport terrorists and increase capabilities to 
'detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats'.764 The risk of each measure examined in this 
thesis demonstrates that pre-emptive and preventative action can stifle these two important 
aims of the strategy. Firstly, the former s44 measure identifies that having a 'police 
presence…terrorists are unlikely to carry out acts of terrorism' (Home Office, 2009-2010; 
2010-2011). This works on the basis of letting the terrorist know that there is a presence and 
therefore deterring them from carrying out acts of terrorism or being involved in terrorist-
related activity. Compare this with the control order regime and TPIMs or ETPIMs – terrorist 
suspects will know they are being monitored – knowing they are under observations, such 
preventative measures may possibly deter the suspect from being involved in or engaging 
with terrorism whilst they are subject to such measures. As explained within Chapter Five 
and this chapter, making the terrorist suspect aware that they are being monitored creates a 
greater risk because it limits the government and security services’ ability to obtain any 
intelligence which identifies other suspects or terrorist plans as well as impedes their ability 
to collect evidence to secure convictions. This is evident from the fact that during the lifetime 
of the control order regime (2005 – 2011) no controlee was successfully convicted. This is 
further supported by the Report of Anderson (2014) given that for 18 months no new TPIM 
notice was issued and the scheme itself may have had a disruptive effect to terrorist activity. 
Whilst disruption is a part of the CONTEST Strategy, it is a short term effect where as 
evidence-gathering to secure a conviction is a long-term effect and part of the 2011 Security 
                                                          
764 HM Government (fn 14). 
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Strategy. Identifying that terrorist activity has been disrupted, does not meet the long-term 
aim of the Security Strategy meaning the aim of the strategy is not supported. 
 
Secondly, when looking at DWA the removal of terrorist suspects from the UK reduces the 
UK’s opportunity to again monitor the suspect, their behaviour and their actions and control 
or manage the threat they pose. As explained in Chapter Four, deportation of suspects 
removes the UK’s ability to manage and control this threat; this is similar to the first point 
raised above and is applicable to the other counterterrorist measures examined in this thesis.  
 
Inevitably the 2011 Strategy cannot meet its aims to 'Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare'. 
Despite this, Gomis (2013a) explained that the opinion of the Director General of MI5, 
Jonathan Evan is misplaced when he stated that "[t]he fact that there have been no successful 
al Qaeda related terrorist attacks in Britain since 2005 is the result of a great deal of hard and 
creative work by the security, intelligence and Police services".765 The security services are 
known to have identified 2,000 terrorists; yet, few have been subjected to any form of counter 
terrorism measure or prosecution. These concerns must also be considered alongside the risks 
discussed in each chapter, as well as the effectiveness assessments discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Alternatively, the UK strategy should focus more on arms-length measures which 
support the investigation and intelligence/evidence gathering processes so that the same may 
be strengthened. Within any counter-terrorism measure adopted by the UK, they should take 
the advice given by the International Commission of Jurists (2009) and 'ensure that respect 
for human rights and the rule of law is integrated into every aspect of counter-terrorism 
work'.766 UK counter-terrorism measures should not cause long-term risks such as social 
isolation; otherwise there is a possibility that suspects or their families may be open to 
radicalisation and without a strong deradicalisation and rehabilitation programme, such 
counter-terrorism measures will continue to face the same risks, which show the measures to 
be disproportionate and ineffective. 
 
                                                          
765 Anderson QC (fn 47). 
766 International Commission of Jurists (fn 65). 
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Whilst post-9/11 pre-emptive and preventative counter-terrorism measures may be concluded 
as being disproportionate, ineffective and unsupportive of UK Strategy 2011 aims, this has 
only been possible through the extensive assessment of the tri-relationship. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the holistic approach of assessing counter-terrorism measures, their impact 
on human rights and the interaction of risk, is the only way that the courts can determine 
whether a measure is Convention compliant and whether the measures work. One may 
suggest that the long discussion of national security versus human rights has been the wrong 
approach; risk assessment is a balanced factor which examines both sides of the debate. For 
these reasons one would argue that the tri-relationship identified in this thesis should be 
adopted when assessing counter-terrorism measures. 
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